Future ScientistsEditorial BoardEditors-in-Chief Professor Shoujun Cui School of Global Governance, Renmin University of China, ChinaDeputy Editors in Chief Associate Professor Shugui Gao Brain Research Centre and the DjavadAssociate Professor Ling Gao Lingnan College, Sun Yat-sen University, ChinaEditors Associate Professor Yu Liu Business School, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, United States of AmericaAssistant Professor Zheng Xu Department of Economics, Party School of C.P.C. Jiangsu Committee, Nanjing, ChinaAssistant Professor Yuping Jiao School of Politics and International Studies, Central China Normal University, ChinaAssociate Professor Hoo Tiang Boon School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, SingaporeJournal of International Economy and Global Governance (JIEGG) aims to provide a platform for rigorous academic research and discourse on issues pertaining to the international economy and global governance speciafically for undergraduate, master and PhD students that meet international academic standards. Our goal is to foster a dynamic exchange of ideas among academics, policymakers, and practitioners. We aspire to publish cutting-edge research that not only contributes to theoretical insights but also offers practical implications for addressing pressing global challenges, such as sustainable development. Through our commitment to excellence and intellectual integrity, we seek to establish the journal as a trusted source of knowledge and a catalyst for informed policy decisions and meaningful interventions in the international arena.Disclaimer: The Publisher Macao Scientific Publishers and Editors cannot be held responsible for any errors in or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this journal. The views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Publisher or Editors, neither does the publication of advertisements constitute any endorsement by the Publisher, Editors, or Authors of the products advertised. For submission instructions, subscription, and all the latest information, visit:https://www.mospbs.com/journal/jiegg.htmlMacao Scientific Publishers（MOSP）https://www.mospbs.com

Disclaimer: The Publisher Macao Scientific Publishers and Editors cannot be held responsible for any errors in or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this journal. The views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Publisher or Editors, neither does the publication of advertisements constitute any endorsement by the Publisher, Editors, or Authors of the products advertised. Editorial Board MembersJournal Manager Jian YeAssociate Editorial Director Yiding Wang School of Foreign Languages, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, ChinaLidan Yao School of Interpreting and Translation Studies, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, ChinaAssistant of Editorial Director Ziyue Yang International School of Economics and Management, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, ChinaAssistant of Editorial Director Xiaorong Cui Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University, Tianjin, ChinaMacao Scientific Publishers（MOSP）https://www.mospbs.com

MenuReviewIssue InformationArticleResearch on the Atlas Network and Argentina’s Economic Policy: The Logic Behind Milei Government’s Reform BillChengchen Li, Yimin ZhuGendered Vulnerabilities and Capacities in Disaster Response and Recovery: A Case Study of the 2015 Nepal EarthquakeRuiqi ChenSubnational Science and Technology Diplomacy: Navigating Geopolitical Challenges Through the Lens of California-China Climate CooperationYucan JinResearch on the Integration of the Singapore Mediation Convention with China's Commercial Mediation SystemKaiheng Hu, Qifan JiangFrom Origins to Future: The Evolution and Prospects of Artificial Intelligence in the Reasoning EraBingyi Yang, Jiang Qu(3)(21)Page(37)(64)(83)Volume 2·Issue 2Macao Scientific Publishers（MOSP）https://www.mospbs.com(96)

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. Macao Scientifi Publishers（MOSP） https://www.mospbs.com/journal/jiegg 4·Article· Research on the Atlas Network and Argentina’s Economic Policy: The Logic Behind Milei Government’s Reform Bill Chengchen Li1, Yimin Zhu2,* 1 Institute of International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, China 2 School of International Studies, Peking University, Beijing, China * Corresponding Authors: Yimin Zhu. Email: cgxxzym51@163.com Received: 8 December 2024 Accepted: 25 February 2025 Published: 25 March 2025 Abstract: This study investigates the pivotal role of the Atlas Network, a global free-market advocacy organization, in shaping Argentina’s economic reforms under President Javier Milei. While existing scholarship has focused on the structural and social impacts of Milei’s “Law of Bases and Starting Points for the Freedom of Argentinians,” this research offers a novel contribution by uncovering the transnational ideological mechanisms through which external actors influence domestic policymaking. By integrating Austrian School economic principles with the Atlas Network’s financial and political strategies, this study reveals how the Atlas network embedded its neoliberal agenda into Argentina’s reform bill via local think tanks, policy lobbying, and direct political alignment with Milei. Theoretically, this study enriches the discourse on transnational advocacy networks (TANs) by demonstrating how non-state actors exploit ideological and financial leverage to reshape national economic sovereignty. Practically, the risks of overreliance on external capital-driven reforms become particularly pronounced when such policy frameworks are operationalized within developing economies characterized by structural inequalities. The findings underscore the tension between global neoliberal agendas and localized socioeconomic needs, offering critical insights for policymakers navigating similar challenges in an era of increasing economic globalization. Keywords: Atlas Network; Reform Bill; Argentina; Milei; Austrian School 1. Introduction In recent years, Argentina has faced severe economic challenges including high inflation, national debt pressure, and a sluggish investment climate which compelled the new government to implement urgent reforms. On November 19, 2023, following the conclusion of the second round of voting, Javier Milei, a congressman and candidate from the far-right electoral alliance “La Libertad Avanza” (Liberty Advances), was officially elected as Argentina’s new president. As a “non-traditional politician,” Milei has been controversial for his radical libertarian economic proposals, including abolishing the central

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 bank, full dollarization of the economy, downsizing government departments, cutting social welfare benefits, as well as his decision to withdraw from Argentina’s planned entry into the BRICS. These positions have caused significant international political reverberations. In June 2024, the Milei government’s comprehensive “Law of Bases and Starting Points for the Freedom of Argentinians” (Ley Bases, hereinafter referred to as the reform bill) passed the Senate by a one-vote margin, marking his administration’s first legislative victory since taking office. The bill aims to drive Argentina’s economic reform through a top-down approach, attempting to revitalize the economy through new methods. Understanding the logic behind this reform bill helps reveal its potential driving forces and possible 5future implications. Existing research primarily focuses on the profound impact of the Milei government’s economic reform bill on Argentina’s economic structure and its complex social repercussions. From a supportive perspective, scholars argue that the reform takes timely and necessary measures to address the core issues of inflation and fiscal deficit. Particularly, monetary stabilization policies and labor market flexibility could provide robust safeguards for economic recovery. Research also suggests that these reforms could attract more international investment and restore market confidence. These bold economic reforms, focusing on fiscal reform and monetary stability, are viewed as key pillars in resolving Argentina’s economic predicament. However, critics argue that these reform plans overemphasize neoliberal economic thinking while ignoring the risk of exacerbating social inequality. Some scholars worry that austerity measures and privatization might lead to a decline in public service quality, severely impacting the lives of middle and low-income groups. Furthermore, some studies point out that the lack of comprehensive consultation with various stakeholders during the reform implementation process could trigger further social unrest, posing potential threats to long-term economic development. While existing research primarily focuses on the impact of the Milei government’s reform bill on Argentina’s economic structure and public response, there has been insufficient examination of the reform’s underlying motivations and basic logic. Since this reform bill originates from the national development blueprint proposed during Milei’s campaign, this paper attempts to uncover clues about reform motivations from his campaign background. Notably, Milei received financial support and policy recommendations from the Atlas Network during his campaign. The close collaboration between Altas Network and Milei has continued after Milei took office. The Atlas Network continues to influence the direction of the Milei government’s reforms through policy advocacy, think tank recommendations, and public opinion guidance, thereby shaping Argentina’s future economic development path to some extent. Based on this, the following research questions are proposed: How does the Atlas Network promote and influence the Milei government’s reform bill through economic and political means? And how will this shape the future direction of Argentina’s economy? The author employs literature analysis and case study methods to explore the influence mechanisms of the Atlas Network in the Milei government’s reforms. The author first introduces the

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 background of the Atlas Network and its policy influence; then analyzes the proposal and specific content of the Milei government’s reform bill. Subsequently, we discussed the interest connections among the government, the network, and think tanks. Finally, the political resistance to Milei’s reforms 6and their future implications are summarized. 2. Operating Logic of the Atlas Network Since the 1980s, the U.S.-based Atlas Network has consistently influenced international political thought across multiple dimensions, including ideology and action. Through money politics, mass media, and public advocacy, it has created a roadmap of “money-thought-advocacy”. By continuously winning what Colleen Dyble calls the “war of ideas,” the network has expanded its organizational influence in the cognitive domain. Today, both academic and policy circles are paying increased attention to this “mysterious” organization and the international social dynamics it represents. Therefore, it is essential to conduct a systematic review of this organization and analyze its evolutionary process, core concepts, key areas, and impacts to understand contemporary neoliberal international movements and political trends. 2.1 Historical Development and Core Concepts of the Atlas Network The Atlas Network was established in 1981 in Virginia by British entrepreneur Anthony Fisher, initially known as the Atlas Economic Research Foundation and the Atlas Foundation. Currently, it is a U.S. 501(c) (3) organization. In practice, however, it functions simultaneously as a think tank, foundation, and civil society advocacy organization, earning it the title “think tank of think tanks.” According to the “2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report”, the Atlas Network ranked 54th among “Top Think Tanks in the United States,” demonstrating its significant position in the intellectual sphere. The Atlas Network has maintained close ties with neoliberal thought throughout its history. The network evolved from the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), established by Fisher in 1955. The institute maintained close connections with prominent neoliberal scholar Hayek and had numerous personnel exchanges and relational ties with the neoliberal elite group “Mont Pelerin Society (MPS)”. Under this ideological influence, Fisher participated in establishing various think tanks, including the Manhattan Institute and National Center for Policy Analysis in the United States, the Fraser Institute in Canada, and the Centre for Independent Studies in Australia. During the economic crisis of the early 1980s, capitalizing on the international momentum of “Reaganomics,” he launched lobbying activities for British elections. Through integrating campaign platforms and shaping economic policies, he helped Margaret Thatcher rise to power. Economist Milton Friedman publicly stated, “Fisher deserves significant credit for the policy transformation implemented by Margaret Thatcher in Britain.” Subsequently, using this model, Fisher registered and established the Atlas Research Foundation in the United States, calling to “spread free market think tanks worldwide.” Around 2005, the network focused on expanding partnerships in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. It launched initiatives such as the “Atlas Freedom Corps (IFC)” as “a free market alternative to the Peace Corps,” announced the

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 “Teach Freedom Initiative (TFI),” and established the “Freedom Champions Summit.” In 2011, it officially renamed itself as a “network,” becoming an “ideas-advocacy network” in the think tank sphere. According to its publicly released 2023 annual report, its operational scope has expanded to 103 countries, encompassing nearly 589 partner institutions, including think tanks, advocacy organizations, and universities. A significant portion of right-wing think tanks are partner members of the Atlas Network, such as the Cato Institute, Heartland Institute, Heritage Foundation, and American Legislative 7Exchange Council. In terms of organizational mission and principles, the Atlas Network’s vision is “to create a world of freedom, prosperity, and peace where the principles of individual liberty, property rights, limited government, and free markets are secured by the rule of law.” The current president is Matt Warner, who served as the Penn Kemble Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy during 2019-2020. Under his leadership, the Atlas Network has focused its international operations on alleviating poverty, protecting human rights, fostering a free society, ensuring government accountability, and growing small business. It has systematically formalized its operational procedures and developed a comprehensive system to “cultivate those who align with its expectations.” 2.2 Financial Support and Policy Advocacy of the Atlas Network Based on publicly available information, the Atlas Network’s funding comes from two main sources: conservative foundations and interest groups, and certain multinational corporations. Through combined donations from both sources, the Atlas Network’s funding increased from $150,000 in the 1980s to approximately $10 million in 2010. Under the leadership of current CEO Brad Lips, their financial income has continued to rise significantly in recent years, reaching $28 million by 2023. In the first place, support from conservative billionaires like the Koch brothers, the John Templeton Foundation, the U.S. State Department, and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) not only provided economic assistance but also lent political legitimacy to their activities. In the second place, the network received long-term funding from traditional oil, petrochemical, mining, and high-pollution multinational corporations including Shell Oil Company, Pfizer, Procter & Gamble, Shell, ExxonMobil, and British American Tobacco. The corporate funding lead the Atlas Network’s inherent anti-climate narrative tendency. In terms of organizational strategy and specific advocacy areas, the Atlas Network has developed clear action plans and advocacy guidelines. Their organizational strategy is primarily summarized as the “3Cs”: “Coach, Compete, and Celebrate.” Specifically speaking, the “Coach” pillar helps partners and allies develop ideas and actions aligned with Atlas Network’s principles while “adapting to local conditions” and increasing their organizational impact. The “Compete” pillar rewards innovative, influential, and locally designed projects through competitive grant processes, creating “Best Practices” for influence dissemination. The “Celebrate” pillar serves as an essential part of reputation shaping and network construction, strengthening identity through annual forums and dinner events. In practice, under the guidance of the “3Cs,” the Atlas Network leverages its position as the network’s “Gatekeeper.”

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 It provides funding, operational guidance, and performance monitoring feedback to think tanks as norm entrepreneurs, producing pro-Hayek and Austrian economics public knowledge, and cultivating cognitive communities with shared consciousness. Additionally, it focuses on nurturing universities and advocacy NGOs with local foundations. It primarily achieves its political objectives by employing methods such as infiltration, defamation, and social movement mobilization to challenge political opponents, while p8romoting its own “Contentious Repertoire” while shaping public opinion. In terms of specific advocacy areas, the Atlas Network’s main political operations focus on two domains: “anti-climate action” and “anti-government action.” First is anti-climate action. One strategy is denying climate change facts and actively engaging in struggles against civil society groups advocating for climate politics. Green Peace once exposed the Atlas Network’s sponsorship of activities aimed at promoting “climate change is not a crisis.” It has supported organizations like the John Locke Foundation in attacking election officials’ efforts to work with climate strategy centers and has “demonized environmental protesters as ‘extremists’ and ‘terrorists.’” The second strategy involves deeply aligning with oil, chemical, and other interest groups to delay and postpone climate change goals. For example, undermining support for UNFCCC, promoting technological optimism about negative carbon technologies, and advocating the notion that fossil fuels are essential for humanity and climate action. Second is anti-government action. This includes collaborating with petrochemical groups to manipulate elections, mobilizing right-wing libertarian movements, leading de-governmentalization and anti-socialist international movements, and advocating for complete privatization of public affairs. For instance, in May 2017, the Atlas Network’s Latin American Liberty Forum was held in Buenos Aires. Argentine President Mauricio Macri attended the forum, discussing how to defeat socialism at various levels, from university campuses to mobilizing nationwide acceptance of constitutional overthrow. It can be concluded that the Atlas Network continues to align with “Like-minded partners,” actively seeking policy planning rights in real-world politics. 3. Theoretical Foundation and Main Content of the Reform Bill Argentina’s economy has been trapped in persistent instability in recent years. From 2018 to 2020, Argentina’s GDP per capita continuously declined. Particularly in 2020, COVID-19 led to a severe economic recession, with GDP falling by 10.5%. The “economic recovery” in 2021 primarily relied on pandemic control and widespread vaccine availability. Although economic conditions improved over the following two years, Argentina’s inflation problem worsened, reaching 138.3% in 2023. Therefore, the public urgently needed a president with an economics background to alleviate the country’s long-standing pressures. As the newly elected president, Milei bears the heavy responsibility of stabilizing Argentina’s political and economic situation. The Milei government is attempting to attract foreign investment and promote economic recovery through a series of investment incentives and policy adjustments.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 93.1 The Austrian School and Economic Foundation of the Reform Bill As an economist of the Austrian School, Milei’s reform bill has a distinct theoretical background. Before discussing the economic background of the reform bill, it is necessary to analyze the Austrian School. The school is a branch of economics that focuses on studying why economic cycles of prosperity and depression occur. In the 19th century, building on economist Knut Wicksell’s concepts of “natural rate of interest” and “loan rate,” Ludwig von Mises, the founder of the Austrian School, examined the comparison between the loan rates issued by national banks and the natural rate. He argued that “the longer the period by which the loan rate falls below the natural rate, and the greater the extent to which indirect production processes inconsistent with the loan market situation are adopted, the more severe the crisis and its impact on market prosperity trends.” In other words, “the cause of capitalist market economic crisis lies in the banks’ expansion of credit intermediation.” As a key figure in the Austrian School, Friedrich August von Hayek proposed his “Hayekian Triangle” theory based on the theories put forward by these two earlier economists. The more roundabout the production, which means the more intermediate product stages needed to produce final consumer goods, the more capital input is required, and thus a greater total money supply is needed. For government, creating a “market economy free from artificial disturbances in bank money and circulation media” and allowing people’s preferences to spontaneously influence the “natural rate” represents the ideal state of the national economy. When central banks directly intervene in controlling loan rates, it makes the entire society’s production process more roundabout. This leads to artificial “economic prosperity” that will inevitably end in depression. Notably, as an economic theory that focuses on “human beings” as its main subject, the Austrian School does not use any mathematical models as theoretical references. This is because the basic characteristics analyzed in Austrian School theory, such as subjective perception of time and entrepreneurial creativity, cannot be measured by simple numbers. Similarly, most arguments proposed by the Austrian School are derived through logical reasoning. Many Austrian School scholars believe that this theory lacks practical operability. For example, Hayek mentioned that “successful politicians need not have original ideas but rather be able to express the ideas of the majority. This implies a conflict between genuine social research and political activity.” Milei, the preeminent figure of the Austrian School theories, has broken the barrier between Austrian School theory and practice. From Milei’s campaign, it is evident that many of his governing ideas as a politician, such as changing government structure, reducing public spending, and cutting individual taxes, are theoretically grounded in Austrian School principles. Milei’s election victory demonstrates that some of his ideas have successfully resonated with the public. The Argentine people have shown unprecedented patience and optimism toward Milei, creating an important administrative foundation for promoting his reform bill rooted in Austrian School thinking. The ultimate goal of Milei’s reform bill is to facilitate Argentina’s smooth and healthy economic revival in the future, emphasizing industries “self-determined” by the Argentine people to move toward prosperity. Therefore,

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 the true objective of Milei’s reform bill is Argentina’s future, that is, creating conditions for rapid 10economic growth through current reforms. 3.2 Main Content of the Reform Bill In July 2024, the Argentine government officially released the reform bill passed by the Senate. Before detailing the bill, the document declared a “public emergency in administrative, economic, financial, and energy sectors” for a duration of one year. The economic foundation of the reform bill is to create a free market without government intervention, thereby implementing a relatively thorough “shock therapy” in Argentina. However, unlike Russia’s behavior after the end of the Cold War, Milei maintains binding political and legal commitments, respecting Argentina’s private property rights. Therefore, for the Milei government, maintaining state power during the “shock therapy” period is particularly important. In exchange for its extensive powers, the Milei government offered oversight rights to the National Congress, to some extent ensuring the legitimacy of Argentine democracy. In specific terms, the reform bill passed by the Senate involves four aspects: national department reform, departmental privatization, administrative procedure simplification, and promotion of public employment. The two aspects that best reflect Austrian School economic thinking are individual tax reductions and government department streamlining. Firstly, the reform bill adjusts the previously established personal income tax limits for single and married individuals with children and reduces personal property tax to between 0.5% and 1.5%. For small-scale taxpayers, the Argentine Federal Tax Administration adjusts taxpayer categories every six months according to the Consumer Price Index and encourages small-scale taxpayers to engage in real estate rental work and join the tax registration system through a series of benefits. Secondly, the first article of the reform bill mentions government department adjustments. Except for 35 departments explicitly specified as non-dissolvable in the bill, other government departments can be merged through reorganization, modification, or transformation of their legal structure. It should be noted that these 35 departments involve nationally important strategic areas such as science and technology, healthcare, finance, and culture. The bill particularly emphasizes continued funding for institutions related to science, technology, and innovation within the framework of the 2030 National Science and Technology Innovation Plan. Meanwhile, the reform bill also sets a series of requirements for civil servants, such as simplifying administrative procedures, implementing the “administrative silence” principle, prohibiting partisan activities during work hours, and reorganizing civil servant functions. These two aspects aim to reduce government intervention and resource misallocation in economic activities, promote free market mechanism operation, and reduce intermediate product stages for consumer goods. Through tax rate reductions and tax registration incentives, the bill intends to lower tax costs for businesses and individuals, stimulating economic vitality. Meanwhile, policies related to small-scale taxpayers guide more economic entities toward legalization, thereby expanding market participation and capital allocation efficiency. The streamlining and functional adjustment of government departments reflects the Austrian School’s advocacy for reducing government size and

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 administrative barriers, to release resources into production and innovation sectors. This series of measures attempts to promote the formation of spontaneous market order by reducing additional costs in market transactions and optimizing supply and demand 11chains. 4. The Interests Network Among Milei, Atlas Network, and Argentine Think Tanks The previous two chapters examined the Atlas Network and Milei’s reform bill separately. How are these two elements interconnected? The Atlas Network’s long-term operations in Argentina are directly linked to Milei’s radical neoliberal policies. So when The Guardian asked “what connects Rishi Sunak, Javier Milei, and Donald Trump,” the answer was “the Atlas Network.” For Argentina, there exists a vast network of interests among Milei, the Atlas Network, and Argentine libertarian think tanks. The Atlas Network connects Milei with Argentine libertarian think tanks, ultimately attempting to exert its influence in many key economic sectors of Argentina. 4.1 The Atlas Network and Milei: An Important Foundation for Economic Intervention Milei’s election victory represents a signature event in the Atlas Network’s economic influence. Overall, the Atlas Network has influenced Argentina’s libertarian political thought and laissez-faire economic policies emphasizing markets over government through direct and indirect pathways. Firstly, through direct pathways, the Atlas Network has repeatedly used its communication channels to promote the personal charisma of Milei and other Argentine libertarian scholars and politicians. It aims to create “key individuals” for election campaigns and public policy influence through both legal-rational and charismatic personalities. For example, Axel Kaiser, Executive Director of Fundación para el Progreso in Chile, wrote on the Atlas Network’s blog that Milei “accurately predicted Argentina’s economic disaster” and established “a cultural and political movement that became the third way” in Buenos Aires. Furthermore, as early as 2018, the Atlas Network awarded Milei with a liberty award, strongly praising his economic thinking. Additionally, the Atlas Network has used its participation platforms to promote the political policies of Milei’s advisers and provide political defense for them. The Atlas Network’s member institution “Libertad y Progreso” prominently featured Alberto Benegas Lynch, a former Argentine congressman and advisor after Milei took office. This aimed to provide academic justification and political legitimacy for Milei’s plans to restore dollarization in Argentina and reform the Argentine Central Bank. The second is indirect pathways. Due to its nature of “non-profit organization”, the Atlas Network needs to minimize its involvement in political advocacy to reduce the possibility of being “assaulted” by target countries. Therefore, it has established “deep” ties to influence Argentina’s economic policies, where libertarian politicians expand their sphere of activities through the Atlas Network, while the Atlas Network helps determine action paths for libertarian politicians through funding and ideological support. The first aspect involves Milei’s participation in Atlas Network events, using them as hubs for spreading his ideas and as safe platforms for advancing his agenda debates. Milei serves on the advisory board of the Atlas member Fundación Libre, an Argentine far-right think tank that has been dedicated to opposing

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 the so-called “hegemonic progressive ideology and political correctness empire” for over thirty years. Former Argentine President Mauricio Macri, who also supports libertarian economic policies, attended their 30th anniversary celebration in 2018. Additionally, Milei frequently appears as a guest at conferences and debates hosted by Atlas Network member institutions in Argentina and other Latin American countries, such as Fundación Libertad y Desarrollo and Federalismo y Libertad, to promote his economic ideas. The second aspect shows how the Atlas Network helps Milei fulfill a “self-fulfilling prophecy” by continuously strengthening ties with libertarian interest groups. For instance, the “Libertad y Progreso” received funding from the Atlas Network in January 2024 after Milei took office to promote neoliberal reform agenda projects with the traditional Cato Institute. His “shock therapy” reform program has been reported to coincide with Atlas Network’s positions across multiple domains. Furthermore, Milei’s political actions have helped the Atlas Network expand its influence in other Latin American countries. Metaphorically speaking, the surge in climate denialism debates in Latin America in 2024 is closely related to Milei’s election and the Atlas Network’s 12advocacy. Whether direct or indirect, the Atlas Network requires certain “key nodes” to implement economic ideas in practice. Argentina’s high taxation in recent years has become a major target of criticism for both Milei and the Atlas Network. According to World Bank, before Milei’s reforms, Argentina had the world’s second-highest tax burden and a 221% inflation rate. In response, the Atlas Network supported the establishment of the Asociación Argentina de Contribuyentes (AAC) in 2020. Its purpose is to achieve overall tax reduction and establish tax systems based on administrative divisions. This initiative essentially encourages extreme regional economic competition leading to unbalanced development. The Atlas Network has provided multiple training activities and financial support for this organization. With its help, before Milei took office, AAC worked with a multi-party coalition to eliminate monthly taxes on credit card statements. Milei publicly expressed support for AAC’s investigation of the Argentine government to examine how the federal government distributes its collected taxes among provinces. After Milei’s election victory, AAC gained greater political legitimacy and domestic status, even being viewed by the Argentine Congress as a “center of excellence” for public policy formulation, enabling it to aggressively advance its lobbying strategy for tax reduction measures. In summer 2024, the Atlas Network released a report analyzing the economic conditions under Milei’s government in Argentina. The report specifically mentioned the crucial roles of AAC and Fundación Libertad y Progreso in formulating the reform bill. The Atlas Network also awarded AAC the “Latin American Liberty Award” for 2024, providing further funding and prestige to support its expansion into Peru, Brazil, and so on. It can be concluded that through “sweeping” reforms of the tax system, the Atlas Network has connected “thought and advocacy,” achieving influence over Argentina’s economic policies. 4.2 The Atlas Network and Argentine Think Tanks: Key Channels for Economic Intervention Since its establishment, Latin America has been a key focus region for the Atlas Network. Between 2020-2023, Latin America consistently ranked first in regional funding expenditure. Historically, Fisher

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 used his interpersonal relations of Mont Pelerin Society to penetrate Latin America, with his neoliberal activities in the region dating back to the 1980s. At that time, Atlas was already collaborating with various agricultural groups in Brazil to oppose environmental policies established by the Brazilian Workers’ Party, and in 1984 funded the establishment of the Center for the Dissemination of Economic Information in Venezuela. The social movements sparked by this center laid the foundation for the subsequent overthrow of Hugo Chávez. In 2018, the Atlas Network established its Center for Latin America, led by Dr. Roberto Salinas León, dedicated to promoting peace, justice, and development for all people in the region during turbulent changes. It utilizes a partner network of more than 80 independent civil society organizations in Latin American countries to implement “local solutions” for 13poverty and other public policy challenges. Currently, the Atlas Network has 121 partners in Latin America. According to DeSmog’s analysis of U.S. tax filings, Atlas donated approximately $12 million to think tanks in the region between 2010 and 2021, primarily for “economic education”. Their key initiatives include: 1. Training and empowering new leaders: Dedicated to developing the next generation of leaders to drive change across the region. By providing these groups with necessary skills and knowledge, they help ensure that principles of liberty continue to thrive in Latin America. 2. Supporting organizations that promote freedom: Providing crucial support to organizations at the forefront of the struggle for liberty in their respective countries. These organizations play vital roles in promoting freedom and combating authoritarian tendencies that threaten open societies and liberal democratic values. 3.Streamlining the bureaucratic state: Working to reduce inefficiencies in state bureaucracies that hinder business operations. By advocating for more flexible and responsive government, they aim to create an environment where individuals and businesses can operate efficiently and contribute to sustained and inclusive growth. 4. Collaborating on public policy proposals: Working with various organizations to develop and advocate for innovative public policy proposals that align with the Atlas Network’s core principles. This collaboration ensures their initiatives are influential and have broad-based support. In sum, the Atlas Network has made substantial efforts in advancing the free market agenda in Latin America, particularly becoming a “diffusor and connector” organization in the anti-high taxation agenda. The Atlas Network’s strategic partnership approach has taken clear shape in Argentina. Given Milei’s limited political experience, his proposed reform bill could face unprecedented resistance. In this context, the Atlas Network recognized the need to extend its influence throughout the Argentine government to ensure smooth implementation of the reform bill. In Argentina, twelve think tanks have forged close partnerships with the Atlas Network. These think tanks strengthen their policy advocacy by engaging government officials and influential economic policy advisors. Beyond Milei himself, key figures including Argentine Vice President Victoria Villarruel, former Foreign Minister Diana Mondino, Eduardo Filgueira Lima (who advocates for healthcare system privatization), and Emilio Ocampo (the economic advisor responsible for promoting Argentina’s dollarization policy) are either important members of these think tanks or receive funding from the Atlas Network. This strategic model has

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 indeed played a crucial role. During the Senate vote, supporters and opponents were virtually deadlocked. It was Senate President Villarruel’s affirmative vote that secured the passage of the reform bill. Through integrating academic resources and policy influence, these think tanks have played a vital role in advancing Argentina’s economic liberalization reforms, further demonstrating the Atlas 14Network’s policy intervention capabilities in Argentina. 5. Political Challenges in Advancing the Milei Government’s Reform Bill Overall, the Milei government’s reform bill narrowly passed the Senate review and gained formal legislative approval. However, legislative passage is merely the beginning of reform. The more challenging task lies in implementing these policies through a top-down approach. In this process, the Milei government must not only navigate complex power balances and party dynamics within Congress but also face multiple obstacles from public opinion, interest groups, and local political forces. These challenges may not only weaken the reform’s implementation but could also trigger new political conflicts in key areas, thereby placing higher demands on the Milei government’s governance capabilities and policy coherence. The Atlas Network has attempted to support Freedom Advances party members in securing key cabinet positions. However, Milei’s status as a political outsider means all his proposed bills face challenges. Statistics show that Freedom Advances holds only 7 seats in the Senate, less than 30% of the 37 senators. This means the party must engage in close negotiations with other parties to initiate sessions in either the Senate or House of Representatives and secure enough votes to pass any legislation. More importantly, although Argentina established a federal republican system in 1853, nepotism remains widespread in the country’s politics. A small political elite has maintained explicit monopolies over national and state powers for decades. For example, former President Mauricio Macri recommended his cousin for the position of Buenos Aires mayor during his term. In some states, there have been cases where governors were succeeded by their spouses. This characteristic of family politics means that almost every congressman in Argentina’s parliament represents their family’s political interests in their respective states. Against this backdrop, the negotiation and reconciliation among different political forces within Argentina’s Congress add more uncertainty to Milei’s reform agenda. Even when certain bills pass at the congressional level, their implementation in various states may be hindered by local political interests, making comprehensive implementation difficult. This disconnect between legislation and execution further highlights the structural challenges facing the Milei government in advancing policy reforms. In addition, although the Atlas Network played a crucial role in supporting Milei’s presidential campaign and providing theoretical blueprints for his reform bill, it lacks forward-looking assessment of Argentina’s actual domestic economic development trends. The Atlas Network prides itself on being able to “reach lower and middle classes that other far-right groups find difficult to reach.” However, when these classes elect candidates, they believe represent their interests to the political stage, the Network does not take practical responsibility for these groups’ future wellbeing. In other words, the

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 Network focuses more on promoting ideological dissemination and policy design while showing relative inadequacy in addressing voters’ long-term interests and structural socioeconomic issues. Since Milei took office, he has shown considerable effectiveness in controlling inflation and has performed well in fulfilling campaign promises. However, Argentina’s lower and middle classes have not increased their wealth. In the first half of 2024, Argentina’s poverty rate reached 52.9%, an increase of eleven percentage points since the second half of 2023 and Milei’s inauguration in December. While Argentine citizens may be able to endure the economic pain brought by Milei’s administration in the short term, as the reform bill is gradually implemented, social pressure on the Milei government will inevitably intensify if people’s living standards fail to improve significantly or continue to stagnate. Meanwhile, dissatisfaction surrounding the reform bill may further ferment and culminate in protests and demonstrations 15in public spaces. In response to these challenges, the Milei government introduced the Large Investment Promotion Regime (RIGI) in the reform bill to attract foreign investment to Argentina. The bill covers sectors including agribusiness, infrastructure, forestry, mining, natural gas and oil, energy, and technology. To enhance the system’s effectiveness, the Milei government has also adjusted its foreign policy, shifting from a completely pro-Western stance to engaging with China and discussing Argentina’s infrastructure matters. After Trump, who also has Atlas Network connections, became the next U.S. president, Milei immediately traveled to the United States to congratulate Trump in person and used this opportunity to align existing economic cooperation between the U.S. and Argentina. While this system attempts to help Argentina gain much-needed investment support, it faces significant obstacles. The first major concern is that the benefits provided by this system are substantial and extend for too long (30 years), potentially causing Argentina to lose policy mobility in the future and further deplete its rich natural resources. The second significant issue involves the bill’s use of the word “invite” regarding the implementation of incentive systems in various states, indicating that the ultimate usage rights and interpretation rights stem from state governments. These state officials and their nepotistic local enterprises have their own interest preferences, suggesting that the system’s implementation might be significantly compromised and fail to achieve its expected effect. 6. Conclusion The Atlas Network, leveraging its extensive academic and policy networks, has actively promoted free market economic ideas and influenced the policy direction of the Milei government. By collaborating with policymakers and academia, the Atlas Network has provided Milei with a theoretical and practical roadmap, thereby shaping Argentina's economic policy framework. The network’s deep involvement in Argentine economic policy has elevated it from a mere policy advocate organization to a key multistakeholder in shaping the country’s economic policymaking process. Through close cooperation with the Milei government, the Atlas Network has embedded its economic interests into national policies, influencing the direction of national economic structural adjustment. This profound

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 penetration of external forces into domestic policymaking highlights the growing complexity of 16interactions between global capital and local governments. Although the reform bill has brought economic vitality to Argentina, the Milei government still faces enormous challenges. In the short term, the inflow of foreign capital may provide some support for Argentina's economy, but long-term effects remain uncertain. The Atlas Network’s deep influence on Argentine economic policy marginalized the country’s social and economic sustainability needs. This not only exacerbated social inequality but may also limit the government’s policy independence when facing global economic fluctuations. For China, the evolving dynamics in Argentina offer a dual framework of strategic opportunities and instructive lessons. First, China should deepen pragmatic cooperation with Argentina by aligning infrastructure and technology investments with Argentina’s reform priorities, such as energy, mining, and agribusiness, while ensuring mutual benefits and safeguarding against overreliance on external capital. Second, China could leverage multilateral platforms like the Belt& Road Initiative (BRI) to foster sustainable development partnerships, emphasizing green energy and poverty alleviation projects to counterbalance the social disparities exacerbated by neoliberal reforms. Third, strengthening policy dialogues between Chinese and Argentine think tanks would promote a better understanding of Argentina’s reform challenges and enable China to offer tailored solutions that respect local socioeconomic contexts. Finally, as Argentina navigates its dependence on Western-aligned networks like the Atlas Network, China should advocate for a multipolar global economic order that prioritizes equitable development, thereby providing Argentina with alternative pathways to balance external influences. How the Milei government balances external capital control with domestic economic autonomy will directly impact Argentina's foreign policy choices. For China, Milei’s sudden shift in attitude is not driven by ideological conviction but rather represents a pragmatic response to Argentina’s economic realities. Although China-Argentina relations may improve in the short term due to economic interests, the underlying reason for this transformation remains rooted in Argentina’s domestic economic inertia and deep dependence on external capital. The turbulence of Argentina’s economic underscored that the competition among multiple forces within Latin American countries will continue to influence the region’s long-term stability. Acknowledgement None. Funding Statement This research is a research outcome of the 2023 China Foreign Affairs University Graduate Research Innovation Project (Type B) “Research on Factors Affecting Latin American Sub-regional Security Cooperation Mechanisms from Non-traditional Security Perspective”.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 17Author Contributions Chengchen Li: Writing & editing, Conceptualization, Methodology, Supervision, Funding acquisition. Yimin Zhu: Conceptualization, Writing–review, Methodology, Supervision. Availability of Data and Materials None. Conflicts of Interest The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest to report regarding the present study. References [1]. Zhang Xinyu. (2023). Uncertainties Under Argentina’s Trump-like President Milei. World Affairs, No. 24, 49-51. [2]. Rutger Brattström. (2024, October 24). Javier Milei's Economic Reforms Are Already Paying Off in Argentina. Reason. https://reason.com/2024/10/24/javier-mileis-economic-reforms-are-already-paying-off-in-argentina/. [3]. News Wires. (2024, June 28). Argentina's parliament approves President Milei's austerity-heavy reform package. France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20240628-argentina-s-parliament-approves-president-milei-s-austerity-heavy-reform-package. [4]. Agence France Presse. (2024, July 8). Milei's Economic Reforms Take Effect In Argentina. Barrons. https://www.barrons.com/news/milei-s-economic-reforms-take-effect-in-argentina-436e92dc. [5]. Veronica Smink. (2024, June 13). 4 grandes cambios que contempla la Ley Bases, la primera legislación que Milei logró aprobar en el Congreso de Argentina (y el regreso del impuesto a las ganancias). BBC News Mundo. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/clmmv7m4pvko. [6]. Mar Centenera. (2024, June 13). Los puntos clave de la Ley Bases: superpoderes para Milei, desguace del Estado, flexibilización laboral y beneficios para grandes empresas. El País, https://elpais.com/argentina/2024-06-13/los-puntos-clave-de-la-ley-bases-superpoderes-para-milei-desguace-del-estado-flexibilizacion-laboral-y-beneficios-para-grandes-empresas.html. [7]. Frank Holmes. (2024, May 10). Argentina President Milei’s Bold Economic Reforms Should Be A Model To The Rest Of The World. US Funds. https://www.usfunds.com/resource/argentina-president-mileis-bold-economic-reforms-should-be-a-model-to-the-rest-of-the-world/. [8]. Veronica Smink. (2023, December 27). En qué consiste la polémica ‘ley ómnibus’ de Milei que se vota en el Congreso de Argentina y que ha desatado violentas protestas. BBC News Mundo, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c51zlz63lp3o. [9]. Ruth Green. (2024, July 30). Milei’s radical reforms risk rolling back labour rights and rule of law in Argentina. International Bar Association. https://www.ibanet.org/mileis-radical-reforms-risk-rolling-back-labour-rights-and-rule-of-law-in-argentina.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 [10]. 18Jaroslav Lukiv & George Wright. (2024, June 13). Buenos Aires rocked by clashes over Milei reforms. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c255zdlde92o. [11]. Brad Lips. (2023, December 7). Javier Milei’s rise in Argentina carries a valuable lesson for Americans. Atlas Network. https://www.atlasnetwork.org/articles/javier-mileis-rise-in-argentina. [12]. Colleen Dyble. (2008). Ed. Taming Leviathan: Waging the War of Ideas around the World, London: Institute of Economic Affairs. [13]. Srdjan Vucetic. (2024). Atlas asunder? Neo-liberal think tanks and the radical right. International Affairs, Vol.100, No.5, 2173–2193. [14]. James G. McGann. (2020). Global Go to Think Tank Index Report. TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports. https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2020-Global-Go-To-Think-Tank-Index-Report-Bruegel.pdf. [15]. Atlas Network. (2023, October 14). Increasing Intellectual Capacity & Depth in Asia to Enable More Adoption of Policy Reforms that Work. Atlas Network. https://www.atlasnetwork.org/articles/increasing-intellectual-capacity-depth-in-asia. [16]. MacLean, N. (2017). Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America, New York: Penguin. [17]. Julia Smith, Sheryl Thompson and Kelley Lee. (2017). The atlas network: a “strategic ally” of the tobacco industry. The International Journal of Health Planning and Management, Vol. 32, 433-448. [18]. Clifford Bob. (2005). The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 18-22. [19]. Clifford Bob. (2011). Introduction: Fighting for New Rights. in The International Struggle for New Human Rights, Clifford Bob edited, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 6-10. [20]. R. Charli Carpenter. (2011). Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the Paradox of Weapons Norms, International Organization, Vol. 65, No. 1, 69-102. [21]. Peter M. Haas. (1992). Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1-35. [22]. Karin Fischer. (2018, July 9). The Atlas Network: Littering the World with Free-Market Think Tanks. Global Dialogue. https://globaldialogue.isa-sociology.org/articles/the-atlas-network-littering-the-world-with-free-market-think-tanks. [23]. Charles Tilly. (2004). Social Movements, 1768-2004, London: Paradigm Publishers, 3-9. [24]. Greenpeace. (2017). Atlas Network Koch Industries Climate Denial Front Group. https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/fighting-climate-chaos/climate-deniers/front-groups/atlas-economic-research-foundation/. [25]. Amy Westervelt and Geoff Dembicki. (2023, September 12). Meet the Shadowy Global Network of Right-Wing Think Tanks. The New Republic. https://newrepublic.com/article/175488/atlas-shadowy-global-network-right-wing-think-tanks.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 [26]. Walker, J. (2023). Silencing the Voice: The Fossil-19fuelled Atlas Network’s Campaign against Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australia, Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 15, Issue 2, 105-125. [27]. Aram Aharonian and Álvaro Verzi Rangel. (2018, August 29). Atlas Network, the right-wing libertarians. People dispatch. https://peoplesdispatch.org/2018/08/29/atlas-network-the-right-wing-libertarians/. [28]. CEPAL. (2021). Balance Preliminar de las Economías de América Latina y el Caribe 2020. https://www.cepal.org/es/publicaciones/46501-balance-preliminar-economias-america-latina-caribe-2020. [29]. CEPAL. (2023). Balance Preliminar de las Economías de América Latina y el Caribe 2023. https://www.cepal.org/es/publicaciones/68747-balance-preliminar-economias-america-latina-caribe-2023. [30]. Ludwig von Mises. (2013). The Theory of Money and Credit, New York: Skyhorse Publishing. [31]. Wei Sen. (2021). Austrian Theory of Money and Business Cycles. Journal of History of Economic Thought. No. 1, 97-123. [32]. Friedrich August Hayek. (2008). Prices and Production and Other Works On Money, the Business Cycle, and the Gold Standard, Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute. [33]. Li Lili. (2021, July). Money and Business Cycle: Hyman Minsky and the Austrian School. Academic Monthly. 67-77. [34]. Friedrich August Hayek. (1999). On Being an Economist. in the What Do Economists Contribute?, edited by Daniel B. Klein, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 133-149. [35]. Michael N. Peterson. (2024, November 7). Javier Milei’s “shock therapy” is working. The Daily Economy. https://thedailyeconomy.org/article/javier-mileis-shock-therapy-is-working/. [36]. Boletín Oficial de Argentina. (2024, July 8). Ley 27742: la Ley Bases y Puntos de Partida para la Libertad de los Argentinos. https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar/detalleAviso/primera/310189/20240708. [37]. ARCA Novedades. (2024, July 24). Monotributo: El Poder Ejecutivo Nacional estableció adecuaciones a través del Decreto 661/2024. https://servicioscf.afip.gob.ar/publico/sitio/contenido/novedad/ver.aspx?id=4088. [38]. George Monbiot. (2024, January 6). What links Rishi Sunak, Javier Milei and Donald Trump? The shadowy network behind their policies. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/jan/06/rishi-sunak-javier-milei-donald-trump-atlas-network. [39]. Axel Kaiser. (2021, September 18). El fenómeno Milei. Fundación para el Progreso. https://fppchile.org/el-fenomeno-milei/. [40]. Araldi, L. (2022, August 18). Argentina’s right wing think tanks and the building of a new version of Bolsonaro. Think-tank Network Research Blog. http://thinktanknetworkresea

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 rch.net/blog_ttni_en/argentinas-right-wing-think-tanks-and-the-building-of-a-new-version-of-bolsonaro/. [41]. 20Atlas Network. (2018, May 15). Fundación Libertad Commemorates 30 years in defense of democracy in Argentina. https://www.atlasnetwork.org/articles/fundacion-libertad-commemorates-30-years-in-defense-of-democracy-in-argentina. [42]. Multinational Observatory. (2024, May 30). The Koch-funded Atlas Network is also targeting Europe. https://multinationales.org/en/investigations/the-atlas-network-france-and-the-eu/. [43]. Atlas Network. (2024). Amidst Turmoil In Argentina, Tax Reformers Spearhead Change. https://www.atlasnetwork.org/stories/amidst-turmoil-in-argentina. [44]. Atlas Network. (2024). Freedom’s Champion: Will Argentina Achieve a Freer Future? [45]. Atlas Network. (2024, March 22). Asociación Argentina de Contribuyentes wins Atlas Network’s 2024 Latin America Liberty Award. https://www.atlasnetwork.org/articles/aac-wins-2024. [46]. Atlas Network. (2023, December 31). Annual Impact Report 2023. https://admin.atlasnetwork.org/assets/documents/financials/AtNet-2023AnnualReport_Online.pdf. [47]. Atlas Network. (2022, December 31). Annual Impact Report 2022. https://admin.atlasnetwork.org/assets/documents/financials/AtNet-2022AnnualReport.pdf. [48]. Atlas Network. (2021, December 31). Annual Impact Report 2021. https://admin.atlasnetwork.org/assets/documents/financials/AtNet-2021AnnualReport_Digital_sprd.pdf. [49]. Atlas Network. (2020, December 31). Annual Impact Report 2020. https://admin.atlasnetwork.org/assets/documents/financials/AR_2020_Spreads_2021-08-19-155008_byqa.pdf. [50]. Lucas Araldi. (2023, August 22). The Atlas Network and the Building of Argentina’s Donald Trump. Desmog. https://www.desmog.com/2023/08/22/javier-milei-argentina-atlas-network/. [51]. Marie Laure Djelic and Reza Mousavi. (2020). How the Neoliberal Think Tank Went Global: The Atlas Network, 1981 to the Present. in Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, eds., by Plehwe Dieter, Slobodian Quinn, Mirowski Philip, London and New York: Verso, 257-282. [52]. Juan López Páez. (2023, April 27). La cabeza de hidra del neoliberalismo: Atlas Network y la red de think tanks en Latinoamérica y España. El Común. https://elcomun.es/2023/04/27/la-cabeza-de-hidra-del-neoliberalismo-atlas-network-y-la-red-de-think-tanks-en-latinoamerica-y-espana/. [53]. El Cronista. (2024, June 3). Mondino y Petri, en el think-tank de habla hispana más prestigioso de política exterior. https://www.cronista.com/economia-politica/mondino-y-petri-en-la-cena-del-cari-el-think-tank-de-habla-hispana-mas-prestigioso-de-politica-exterior/. [54]. Ivy Cángaro. (2023, October 29). Quiénes están detrás de la fundación que más influye sobre las principales usinas de la derecha argentina. Data Clave. https://www.dataclave.com.ar/poder/quienes-estan-detras-de-la-fundacion-que-mas-influye-sobre-las-principales-usinas-de-la-derecha-argentina_a653dba21947a68be06836555. [55]. Gustavo Ybarra. (2024, June 13). En una votación electrizante, Victoria Villarruel debió desempatar y el oficialismo logró aprobar la Ley Bases. La Nación. https://www.lanacion.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 4-21 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250449 com.ar/politica/ley-bases-en-una-votacion-electrizante-debio-desempatar-villarruel-y-el-oficialismo-logro-aprobar-en-nid12062024/. [56]. 21Déborah de Urieta. (2023, November 19). El desafío de Milei en el Congreso: cuántos diputados y senadores tendrán los libertarios. El Cronista. https://www.cronista.com/economia-politica/nuevo-gobierno-el-desafio-de-milei-en-el-congreso-cuantos-diputados-y-senadores-tendran-los-libertarios/. [57]. Infobae. (2014, May 9). El nepotismo, una plaga sin freno en la política argentina. https://www.infobae.com/2014/05/09/1563127-el-nepotismo-una-plaga-freno-la-politica-argentina/. [58]. Claudia Peiró. (2023, June 3). Dinastías en la política argentina: cuando la voluntad de perdurar deriva en formas de nepotismo. Infobae. https://www.infobae.com/politica/2023/06/04/dinastias-en-la-politica-argentina-cuando-la-voluntad-de-perdurar-deriva-en-formas-de-nepotismo/. [59]. Aram Aharonian. (2024, May 30). El terraplanismo, la Red Atlas y Javier Milei. Rebelión. https://rebelion.org/el-terraplanismo-la-red-atlas-y-javier-milei/. [60]. BBC Mundo. (2024, September 27). La pobreza en Argentina alcanza el 52,9% en el primer semestre de 2024, un aumento de 11 puntos desde que asumió Javier Milei. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cvglwrg1rnpo. Copyright: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MOSP and/or the editor(s). MOSP and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. Macao Scientifi Publishers（MOSP） https://www.mospbs.com/journal/jiegg 22·Article· Gendered Vulnerabilities and Capacities in Disaster Response and Recovery: A Case Study of the 2015 Nepal Earthquake Ruiqi Chen1,* 1 Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia * Corresponding Authors: Ruiqi Chen. Email: 1366534204@qq.com Received: 14 December 2024 Accepted: 25 February 2025 Published: 25 March 2025 Abstract: Nothing except for disasters can be nearer to death, nothing except for disasters can reveal the vulnerabilities and capacities of people. In the 2015 Nepal earthquake, disaster acted as a mirror by reflecting how gender dynamics shaped women's experiences during the earthquake, and how gendered aftermath operations restructured Nepalese society. Based on case studies, this paper aims to propose a gendered perspective in disaster risk management, by clarifying women's sufferings and effectiveness in immediate disaster response and the longer-term recovery process. Situated at the encounter of socio-cultural norms, economic inequalities, and natural disasters effects, this article finds that, women emerged as key drivers in disaster response and recovery to foster resilience, instead of purely suffering and waiting for rescue as portrayed in previous disaster narratives. Women actively engaged in rescue operations, provided care and support to affected communities, and took leadership roles in rebuilding efforts. Their participation not only contributed to the swift recovery of their communities but also catalyzed a shift in traditional gender roles, challenging long-standing patriarchal norms. However, this article also finds that, without systematic institutional support, women's achievements will be marginalized in the long time. The findings suggest that a gender-sensitive approach to disaster management can enhance the effectiveness of recovery efforts, ensuring that women's roles as leaders and agents of change are fully acknowledged and supported in future disaster scenarios. Keywords: Gendered Vulnerabilities; Nepal Earthquake; Disaster Response; Women's Resilience 1. Introduction 1.1 The 2015 Nepal Earthquake and Its Impact On April 25, 2015, Nepal was struck by a catastrophic earthquake with a magnitude of 7.8 Mz. The epicenter was located 77 km northwest from the capital city, Kathmandu, Nepal's most densely populated area. The earthquake was caused by the collision of Indian and Eurasian plates (USGS, 2015).

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 The immediate aftermath saw the destruction of thousands of homes, historical monuments, and infrastructure, including the loss of approximately 9,000 lives and left nearly 22,000 injured (Aon Benfield, 2015). In this least developed Southeast Asian country with a population of around 28 million in, 8 million people were directly affected. Experts estimate direct damages and losses at approximately $7 billion (Ovesen & Heiselberg, 2016). Tremors were felt across the region, including in neighboring countrie23s such as Bangladesh, China, and India. The earthquake and subsequent aftershocks, such as the one on May 12, caused widespread devastation to residential buildings, with over 800,000 buildings and monuments suffered destruction or damage, reflecting the vulnerability of the local architecture to seismic forces. Examples like masonry structures are the most effected (Aon Benfield, 2015). Moreover, rapidly urbanized cities like Kathmandu lacked adequate urban planning and regulation at that time, which led to unplanned urban sprawl that accentuated inequality in access to basic living resources (UN-Habitat, 2024). This was also a central contributing factor for the extensive damage during the earthquake (Thapa, 2107). Aside from related small-scale disasters caused extensive damage, the earthquake also set off a series of landslides, including an avalanche on Mount Everest claimed more than 19 people, and another huge avalanche in the Langtang Valley which caused roughly 350 fatalities, complicating an already serious situation (Thapa, 2108). The local communities responded to the earthquake first, followed by the global response. The United Nations (UN) allocated $15 million in emergency funds for disaster response, while neighboring countries like China and India deployed aid and rescue teams to assist (UN News, 2015; Anderson & Ayres, 2015). However, distribution of aid and execution of rescue operations were severely hindered by the rugged terrain, complex topography and the remoteness of affected villages. 1.2 Gender Norms and Roles in Nepal Pre-Earthquake Traditionally, Nepalese society has been patriarchal, with distinct roles for men and women. Men typically dominate public and political spheres, while women had restricted access to resources and decision-making processes, with their roles predominantly confined to household chores and agricultural work. Gender-based discrimination was prevalent in Nepal, among the 188 countries, the 2015 Gender Inequality Index (GII) of Nepal was placed at 115th (with value 0.495) (UNDP, 2015). Women faced challenges in areas like education, employment, and health. Scholars like Maharjan pointed out that Nepal ranks second highest on the world index for son preference in 2013 (Maharjan, 2013). These deep-rooted cultural biases then impact girls' education. A UNICEF's Nepal Country Study in 2016 revealed that girls have far less possibility than boys to receive education (UNICEF, 2016). This educational gap has further and extensive repercussions, speeding the continued marginalization of women in the workforce. Based on a 2017–2018 survey carried out by Government of Nepal, only 22.9 percent of women were employed at working age, compared to 48.3 percent of men (Government of Nepal, 2020). Furthermore, shame and fear to be widow pervasively exist in Nepalese society because widow is more easily to be targeted. Research and accompanying statistics not only

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 showcase the prevalent gender inequalities in Nepalese society but also highlight the systemic barriers that women face. The combination of these variables accelerates women's socioeconomic disadvantage and exposes them to the effects of numerous disasters24. 1.3 Why Need a Gender Perspective in Disaster Response Historically, disaster studies have often overlooked the gender perspective, as more scholarly work with gender elements come out, scholars namely Enarson identified this phenomenon as 'calculated blindness', he clarified that it's due to generalizations of individuals behaviors (Enarson, 2012). Enarson and Alvina Erman et al. (2021) further highlighted the significance of adding gender issues into disaster response and planning to address these overlooked disparities (Alvina Ermanet al., 2021). When disasters happen, people often get injured or influenced physically or mentally. Traditionally, those people are treated as a homogeneous group of victims, making it challenging to tell apart the levels of need and urgency in disaster risk management. Then, researchers including Fordham clarify that, referring to the nature of disasters as well as sociocultural context, some people are more affected and vulnerable than others, with inequality being common in disasters (Fordham, 1999). According to scholars like Samir Dasgupta et al. (2010), disasters consequences are different for men and women, with women experiencing even more impacts (Dasgupta et al., 2010). Men and women often have different vulnerabilities during and after disasters due to societal roles, responsibilities, and expectations, which means women might be more vulnerable due to responsibilities like caregiving, or cultural norms that restrict their mobility. Furthermore, disaster studies have shown that women mortality rates in disasters are higher compared to males in states where women have lower socioeconomic status (Oxfam, 2005; The World Bank, 2021). Those women often experience greater poverty, have fewer educational opportunities, and get marginalized from political, community and household decision-making processes relating to their lives (WEDO, 2007). Disaster impacts often mirror and enlarge existing gender inequalities because disasters are associated with gender dynamics within societies and further complicate pre-existing problems (Erman et al., 2021). These gendered differences highlight an urgency in integrating a gender perspective into disaster response. Incorporating this new approach can improve the response process by prioritizing the requirements of the most vulnerable groups, minding the gap in disaster responses that female groups' needs are always overlooked, and fostering the development of women's skills and capacities (Byrne & Baden, 1995). Introducing a gender perspective into the disaster response also highlights how gender can be either mitigated or aggravated by factors such as class, ethnicity, and disability. In all, this paper aims to analyze the intersection between gender and disaster, stating that gender is a valuable source of both vulnerability and resilience in 2015 Nepal earthquake disaster context, by influencing access to resources, decision-making processes, and exposure to risks. It hopes to provide useful suggestions for gender-sensitive disaster response and crisis management strategies.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 252. The Intersection of Gender and Disaster 2.1 Examine Gendered Vulnerabilities in Disasters The definitions of disasters have evolved from mainly focusing on natural phenomena that cause disasters, to consequences in human society that arise from disasters. Then comes a combination of the two sides, notable scholars namely Terry Cannon and Ben Wisner (1994) conceptualize disasters as a compound of natural hazards and human actions (Cannon, 1994; Perry, 2018). Contemporary disaster studies recognize that disasters are caused by an intricate combination of both natural hazards and sociopolitical and economic processes in human society. Vulnerability is proposed as an approach to study disaster since it refers to a range of physical, social, economic, and environmental elements within a society that determine how much a hazard affects an individual or a community (Blaikie et al., 2014). Applying a vulnerability approach can help figure out how much risks different groups of people might take in disasters, and the inequalities they might face when seeking for resources, capabilities, and opportunities (Neumayer & Plümper, 2007). An individual's gender significantly shapes their role and experiences during a disaster. Evidence shows that women are at greater risk than men in disasters, as pre-existed inequalities and risks systematically place women in a disadvantaged position, increasing their vulnerability (Ciampiet al., 2011; Mian & Namasivayam, 2017; United Nations, 2011). This phenomenon was coined as a “gendered disaster vulnerability” by Enarson and Morrow in 1998; and since the 1990s, the gendered aspects of disasters received growing attention from academic (Enarson & Morrow, 1998; Fordham, 2013). Gendered vulnerabilities cause women undertaking a disproportionate burden of the costs of disasters, manifesting in various ways when a disaster happens: from survival, death, trauma to recovery, which appeals for recognition of gender-specific disaster response (Mehta, 2007; Enarson & Chakrabarti, 2009). From the physical perspective, disasters have a profound impact on women's health, leading to increased mortality and morbidity due to factors such as physical trauma, malnutrition, infectious diseases, abortion, psychological stress, exhaustion, and gender-based violence (Arrow, 2017; UNDP, 2013; CARE International, 2021; UNDP, 2020). For example, women were disproportionately infected during the COVID-19 pandemic, because they shoulder responsibilities of both taking care of the families and doing healthcare jobs on the frontlines (Fatouros & Capetola, 2021). Also, women-specific health services, including contraception and abortion, tend to be deprioritized in disaster scenarios (Carballo et al., 2005; Campbell, 2005; Laplante et al., 2008). Scholarly work consistently shows that women suffer from higher rates of post-disaster psychological distress than men (Norris et al., 2002), with pregnant and postpartum women being especially at risk for mental health issues (Vesga-Lopez et al., 2008). From the social and culture perspective, gender-based discrimination, gender norms and roles place women as weak, poorer, and less educated. They are portrayed as in need of rescue in disasters. In contrast, men are viewed as strong and capable who require least assistance (Cannon, 2002). Such

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 stereotypes cost opportunities and resources distribution for women, resulting that fewer women are offered or encouraged to take part in training for disaster preparedness and response. In this way, women not only have less trainings, and their wills and power are also neglected in decision making and risk management when faced with disasters. Examples show that in the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, the survival rate for men was significantly higher than for women, with mortality rate for women was 14 times higher than men (Arrow, 2011; UNDP, 2011). These disproportionate sufferings were mostly due to the gendered stereotypes, roles, expectations and behaviors of female citizens (Oxfam International, 2005). In Sri Lanka, gender norms discouraged women from acquiring skills like swimming or tree climbing, which were traditionally considered male activities. This consequently increased women's vulnerability during the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami (Oxfam International, 2005). Additionally, women frequently act as the primary caregivers, which confines them to household responsibilities. These duties restrict their mobility as they are tasked with ensuring 26the safety of infants and elderly family members. In all, gendered vulnerability in disasters is not due to a single reason such as physical difference or poverty suffered. Rather, it is an intersection of physical, historical and cultural patterns of gender relations, resulting in inequality. Then, the situation is further complicated by hazardous conditions, which disproportionately endanger women in disasters. 2.2 Analyze Gendered Capacities and Resilience in Disasters The concept of resilience in disaster risk reduction (DRR) has gained growing attention in scholarly work, emphasizing communities' capacity to anticipate, prepare, react, and restore post-disasters. However, resilience must consider the subtle roles of gender in disaster contexts since women's experiences and capacities play an important role in communities' resilience, often shaping and influencing disaster preparedness and response in profound ways (Ashraf & Azad, 2015). Gendered resilience in disasters depends on structural factors, individual social relations, and 'capitals' including human and social capital that women can mobilize in the aftermath (Putnam, 2000). Women's local knowledge and social networks are invaluable assets in disaster preparedness and response despite a lack of formal recognition (ILO, 2002). This is evident in the aftermath of various disasters: many men were killed or disabled, leaving the whole society in shortage of labor force. In these situations, women stepped forward to take over the duties, rescue actions, and provided healthcare. Their involvement in multiple roles during post-earthquake settings not only facilitated immediate recovery but also brought up opportunities to challenge and change gender norms. For example, in the 2004 tsunami, Sri Lankan women seized the occasion to establish their own businesses, thereby breaking traditional gender roles and norms (Perera-Mubarak, 2013). Furthermore, in Sri Lanka, women also got involved in disaster planning process to develop more inclusive disaster management strategies following the tsunami. According to former discussions, education is also important in gendered disaster preparedness. Higher levels of education among women are associated with greater benefits for communities (Ermanet

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 al., 2013). In the earthquake preparedness on Thailand's Andaman Coast, scholars namely Muttarak and Pothisiri (2013) found out that higher individual education levels of women correlate with better preparedness (Muttarak & Pothisiri, 2013). This aligns with existing literature on disaster governance, which highlights the necessity to speed the inclusive stakeholder involvement and the empowerment of 27marginalized groups, including women, in building community resilience (Djalante et al., 2011). 2.3 Examples can Illustrate Gender Dynamics in Disasters Although women are viewed as vulnerable, initial scholarly work clearly demonstrates that gender influences not only can be found in disaster risk management, capacities, decision-making processes, but also in disasters lifecycle (Enarson, 2018). Examples show that after the 2015 Nepal earthquake, many men were killed or became disabled, then women who survived took over their roles in society. Those women were active in rescuing trapped people, sourcing basic living necessities, and providing healthcare to children and the elderly. Back then, migration for foreign employment had become a major source of income for many Nepali households, most of the men either leaved Nepal after the earthquake or they were not at present (Shakya et al., 2022). As a result, women received training and had increased opportunities to find employment. In Nepal's efforts to recover from the 2015 earthquake, there was a shortage of trained builders to reconstruct to the more than half a million destroyed houses. To deal with this lack, the Swiss development agency Helvetas, financed by the UK's Department for International Development (DfID), trained 6,500 masons, a third of whom were women (Pattisson, 2018). This aid programme not only helped Nepal reconstruction but also unburdened women from potential poverty. During that period, women took on multiple roles in assisting post-earthquake settings, underlining how such post-disaster settings also foster opportunities for women (Hallegatte & Henriet, 2009). While Nepalese women have made great achievements in disaster recovery, there're still prevailing gender-blind practice in other disasters contexts continuing to cause avoidable loss (Saito, 2012). In the cyclone Freddy in Malawi, health sector's service delivery broke down due to the outbreak of cholera, which further complicated an already failing system. Notwithstanding the fact that both men and women were seriouly harmed in disasters, pregnant women still experienced more onerous issues due to their distinctive situations. Moreover, gender-based violence towards women and girls, namely rape and sexual abuse, happened in the camps caused potential spread of HIV/Aids, unwanted pregnancies, and trauma (Kondowe, 2023). Examples demonstrate the urgency of gender-specific interventions in post-disaster recovery. Customized approaches that take into account the unique needs of women and girls not only mitigate disaster's immediate effects, but also boost the community's long-term resilience and well-being.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 283. Gendered Vulnerabilities in 2015 Nepal Earthquake 3.1 Women's Experiences and Challenges The 2015 Nepal earthquake had a disproportionate impact on women, as the pre-existing socio-cultural norms and economic disparities intersected with the earthquake, exacerbating their vulnerabilities (K.C. & Hilhorst, 2022). In Nepal, women constitute a slight majority of the population at 51%, despite the country's historically strong preference for sons (National Planning Commission, 2015). Among the districts most influenced by the earthquake, approximately 327,000 households were led by women, which accounted for 26.5% of the total households in these areas. Additionally, there were around 40,000 women and girls living with disabilities and over 163,000 elderly women above the age of 65 (UN Women, 2016). Notably, the mortality rate for women was higher than that of men, largely due to Nepalese societal gender norms that constrained women to indoor tasks, as well as the fact that the significant number of men had migrated abroad for employment. Many women faced challenges like gender-based violence, limited access to emergency relief services, and exclusion from decision-making processes related to relief and recovery efforts, especially those who were pregnant, elderly, indigenous or had disabilities (Bajracharya et al., 2022). Their limited mobility and lack of access to information made them more susceptible to risks both during and after the earthquake. The United Nations reported that only 11% of the 82 displacement camps had designated safe/social spaces for women, and 73% of displacement camps lacked gender-sensitive or separate toilets and washing facilities (UN Women, 2019). 3.2 Socio-Economic Factors Influencing Vulnerabilities Economic disparities and food security. Many women in Nepal were already living in poverty prior to the earthquake, which compounded their difficulties in recovery and rebuilding. Given that the limit resources and job opportunities for women, 73% of Nepalese women are employed in agriculture. Agricultural sector was a main resource of Nepalese economy. According to what United Nations reported, the earthquake caused serious repercussions to agriculture, leading to loss of livelihoods because the it's a combination of bad timing, an unfavorable monsoon season, and 15% damage of irrigation systems. These factors led to a shortened or cutoff planting periods. The repercussions were particularly serious to those women in disadvantaged financial conditions, with women's agricultural losses estimated at around 15 billion Nepalese Rupees, compared to men's losses were around 10 billion (National Planning Commission, 2015). Women not only lost their financial resource but also faced growing concerns over food security and malnutrition. The earthquake also had a destructive impact on Nepal's tourism industry, with extensive damage to hospitality infrastructures leading to a drastic 90% drop in tourist arrivals. While men bore the brunt of the industry's collapse, losing 14.3 billion Nepalese Rupees, women still suffered a loss of around 3.6 billion Nepalese Rupees (UN Women, 2019). Lack of human safety. Survival from the actual natural hazard doesn't mean real survival for women. Apart from killing disaster risks, women's well-being was further threatened by human-made

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 risk of violence and abuse. Especially in regard to the destruction of homes and shelters left many women exposed to the elements and potential violence (Tearne et al., 2021). Reports show that there were increased incidents of gender-based violence, including sexual assault, exploitation and trafficking in aftermath of an earthquake (UN Women, 2015). Girls were particularly at risk of early forced marriages and trafficking, and so did widows in receiving unwanted sexual harassment and violence. Due to Nepal's patriarchal property ownership norms, many women did not have rights to their homes 29or land, complicating their ability to claim assistance or rebuild. Limited access to resources. In Nepal, women's involvement in decision-making and governance has historically been underrepresented, with only 16.8% of positions in public service. As a result, the unique needs of these groups were then often neglected in the planning for reconstruction due to insufficient understanding and data. Let alone women had limited access to financial resources, education, and healthcare, which further enlarged their vulnerabilities during the disaster (UN Women, 2019). One of the most vivid examples of this situation in the patriarchal Nepalese society, is that property ownership is predominantly in the hands of men, leaving many women, especially those who are single, without legal claim to their homes or land (Chandran, 2016). This lack of property rights became a significant hurdle in aftermath of this disaster, as women struggled to obtain assistance or engage in rebuilding efforts. According to a survey by Oxfam, a high proportion of the damaged or destroyed homes belonged to female-headed households and these women encountered considerable obstacles in navigating the relief processes due to missing personal documentation and little engagement (Oxfam, 2016). More focused support systems that address the particular vulnerabilities of widows and single women in catastrophe situations are still required, notwithstanding Nepal's significant accomplishments in changing policies to protect women's land rights and gender equality. 4. Gendered Capacities and Resilience in 2015 Nepal Earthquake 4.1 Women Served as Active Agents in Disaster Response In the aftermath of 2015 earthquake, Nepalese women emerged not only as victims but also as active agents of change and resilience. Walking in the ruins, they transcended traditional gendered roles: rebuilding communities, organizing resources actively, and always working in the frontlines. Women's groups, especially in Kathmandu's Chandragiri Municipality, launched non-structural mitigation efforts, largely contributing to disaster risk reduction. Their efforts ranged from clearing ruins to participating in the rebuilding of communities, which were mainly undertaken by men in the past. This shift in roles was not just a response to the crisis management but also a step towards future, challenging long-lasting gender norms in Nepalese society, and demonstrating the potential for long-term transformation in gender dynamics. At the same time, Nepal's only women's fund, Tewa, partnered with women's group Nagarik Aawaz to support earthquake relief and rehabilitation. These organizations inquired women directly to understand their needs and those of their communities, providing temporary shelter, toiletries, and other

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 goods (Global Fund for Women, 2016). Similar women's groups like Women's Awareness Center Nepal (WACN), Loom Nepal and so on, also effectively addressed the unique requirements of women, from providing sanitary napkins, maternal and newborn healthcare, medicine, to dignity kits containing soap, mosquito nets, gowns, undergarments, and nutritious food (Global Fund for Women, 2016). Moreover, women's groups made progress in raise awareness about the risks of sexual violence and trafficking targeted at women and girls, which usually occur after the earthquake, distributing suggestions and 30resources teaching women to protect themselves. Scholars namely Luna K.C. and Dorothea Hilhorst (2022) have analyzed Nepalese women's actions during the earthquake evacuation period. By examining the stories of Nepalese women including Sunita Mali, Uma Thapa, and Sanu Mali, K.C. and Hilhorst found out that Nepalese women who were perceived as weak and dependent on men for rescue, turned out to play an important role in saving their family members and demonstrated remarkable bravery and composure in the face of disaster (K.C. & Hilhorst, 2022). 4.2 Shifts in Gender Roles and Norms Post-Earthquake Following the earthquake, Nepalese society has been witnessing an enduring transformation of its traditional gender roles and norms. Previously, women hardly worked in construction field, let alone receiving training as masons, or learning evacuation techniques. As more and more women assumed leadership and decision-making positions during recovery process, stereotypes, gender-discriminations, conservative norms were seriously undermined. This shift not only provided women with employment opportunities but also challenged the deep-rooted patriarchal norms by positioning women in roles typically dominated by men. Organizations, especially grassroots ones, expressively devoted to speed the transformation, ensuring that women's contributions were recognized and given a voice in the recovery process. Empowering women through these measures has had a profound impact, cultivating a culture of resilience and equality. In many ways, the resilience demonstrated by Nepalese women after the earthquake signifies the expansion of their capacity during times of crisis. The efforts of women have changed the social and economic structure of this patriarchal country. 4.3 Analysis of Disaster Response and Recovery The 2015 Nepal earthquake, intersected with socio-economic factors, revealed the vulnerabilities of different groups, particularly women. While it also displayed the resilience and capacity of women as they overcame the challenges of disaster response and recovery. Local women impressed the Nepalese society a lot by their remarkably devotion and bravery in disaster response: from evacuating family members to provide mental support to the communities. Local women helped clear the ruins and rebuild the destroyed houses. Also, they handled jobs like searching, organizing and distributing living essential resources. All of these contributions, proved women's talent and potential in disaster response and recovery.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 In the immediate aftermath, women-led groups mobilized rapidly to provide assistance, even much more rapidly than international organizations such as the UN, showcasing a thorough understanding of the needs within local communities. These groups were active in aiding like offering basic living resources, with a specific focus on the unique needs of women and children. Women-led groups also played a key role in challenging traditional gender norms by encouraging women to learn new skills, participate in the workforce, and take on leadership roles that were traditionally male-dominated. They facilitated economic empowerment through vocational training and entrepreneurship, which was crucial for women who had lost their homes and income means. This empowerment went beyond economic 31impact: it's also social, as women began to assert more control over their lives and communities. The gender-sensitive approach adopted by these organizations was fundamental in ensuring that the disaster response and recovery efforts were inclusive and effective. However, gaps in the response still existed. It’s necessary to reflect on whether these gender-sensitive efforts could remain sustainable in the long run. Although the initial response was rapid and efficient from both domestic and international levels, evidence shows that most of the women were gradually excluded from the labor market again. A study conducted by the Housing Recovery and Reconstruction Platform, which included all entities in earthquake reconstruction, found that only half of the trained Nepalese women as masons were still working in the trade three years after the earthquake (Pattisson, 2018). Recovery strategies that fail to safeguard, restore, and promote economic engagement of disadvantaged groups are weak. To bridge this gap, it is essential to develop strategies that not only provide initial training and employment opportunities, but also ensure the persistence of these opportunities. 5. Conclusion and Recommendations 5.1 Legal Support to Address Gender Inequality Initially, the earthquake worsened already present gender inequalities in Nepal, where socio-cultural standards, economic inequalities, and restricted access to resources significantly contributed to increasing women's vulnerabilities. Women in Nepal, especially in rural settings, faced disadvantages because of patriarchal systems that limited their access to land, resources, and power in decision-making. The absence of property rights worsened their chances of obtaining assistance and participating in recovery initiatives, highlighting the overlap of economic and gender-related vulnerabilities. To address these challenges, policy interventions should prioritize strengthening women's legal rights and property ownership, ensuring legal recognition of their land rights to enable effective participation in relief and reconstruction efforts, thereby fostering long-term stability. Legal reforms empowering women have been witnessed as Constitution of Nepal (2015), National Civil Code (2017), and National Land Policy (2019). However, the practical implementation in rural areas remains slow due to both social norms and unawareness of national policy. Land titling programs and activism campaigns achieved much less than expected, since women's independent land ownership is still uncommon in practice compared to joint land ownership (Tiwari, 2024). As a result, fostering confidence and communication skills in women

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 can enhance their leadership capabilities and empower them to advocate effectively, particularly when engaging with local government authorities like land administration and agricultural welfare offices (Karki and Listyarini, 2023). Nepalese women have not only lost their rights to land ownership for a long time, but their rights to housing ownership and personal safety have also been on the verge of collapse during the earthquake. The devastation of residences and infrastructure rendered numerous women susceptible to gender-based violence, such as trafficking, early marriages, and sexual exploitation. Those risks necessitate policies that ensure women's safety, including the establishment of women-friendly spaces, immediate support services for survivors, and community-based initiatives to 32raise awareness and provide legal protection. 5.2 Empowerment Strategies to Maintain Recovery Efforts In spite of difficulties, the earthquake also highlighted the considerable strength and autonomy of Nepalese women. They assumed proactive roles in disaster response and recovery, breaking gender norms, and demonstrating leadership in reconstruction efforts. Measures namely expanding vocational training programs for women in disaster-affected areas, had largely raised women’s competitiveness in non-traditional sectors, such as construction and infrastructure rebuilding. Measures not only aided in the swift recovery but also signified a significant change in gender roles, confronting longstanding patriarchal standards. Women's participation in disaster management showcased their ability to guide and redefine their positions in society. Further policy and practical measures should focus on maintaining the gender empowerment achievements already made and exploring ways to empower Nepalese women in more areas. Women’s voices must be formalized in long-term decision-making, ensuring their active involvement in designing and implementing recovery strategies, making the process more inclusive and responsive to their needs, and fostering a resilient, equitable society. Relevant examples show that Nepalese women can go beyond, they also have great potential in politics, diplomacy, and art regarding disaster topics (Embassy of Nepal, 2024). As a result, Nepalese women's contributions to disaster response must be officially recognized and valued within national and international disaster management policies. Their shared experiences will serve as a valuable asset for emotional connection in future disaster aids, allowing Nepalese women to contribute a unique gender perspective into the construction of global south disaster response strategies. 5.3 Economic Inclusion for Gender Sustainability Although the initial reaction to the catastrophe highlighted the possibility for gender-based change, the lasting effects on women's empowerment and participation in recovery activities are still unclear. While women were originally part of training programs and disaster response efforts, research indicates that many of these women faced exclusion from the job market afterward, especially in the construction industry, with merely half of the women trained as masons continuing in the field years post-earthquake. This indicates a necessity for more sustainable approaches that guarantee women's continued involvement in rebuilding and economic efforts after the crisis period, including long-term mentorship

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 programs, official job placement services, reduce the tax rates, and career networking events, to help women persist in traditionally male-33dominated fields with professional growth. The earthquake's effect on agriculture caused profound economic damage, particularly for women farmers. Women experienced significantly greater losses than men, worsening their already unstable financial conditions. National economic recovery plans must incorporate gender-sensitive approaches. Examples observed worldwide demonstrate that giving women farmers targeted and useful financial support, such as low-interest loans, grants for seeds and irrigation equipment, and reducing market access, can have a significant positive impact. Besides, voluntary projects aiming to empower women in agriculture should develop more practical initiatives, including developing professional harvesting skills, learning product management, and enhancing digital marketing technical. Furthermore, local government bodies should be responsible for exerting practice like transforming women farmers into entrepreneurs and producers, which can boost the industrialization of agriculture. In an era when both natural and man-made disasters happen more frequently, the necessity for developing gender-sensitive, and sustainable recovery strategies is marked. The 2015 Nepal earthquake serves as a key example: while gendered disaster response can challenge and transform gender roles, without systemic changes that promote women's agency in governance, economics, and decision-making, these improvements risk slipping backwards. The observations from Nepal stress the requirement to include global south gender perspective into disaster management frameworks as a core rule of resilience. Women's leadership is not an exception but a crucial part of sustainable recovery, reinforcing that resilience should be understood not only as survival but also as empowerment and inclusion throughout all phases of disaster response and recovery. Acknowledgement None. Funding Statement None. Author Contributions The author confirms sole responsibility for the following: study conception and design, data collection, analysis and interpretation of results, and manuscript preparation. Availability of Data and Materials None. Conflicts of Interest The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest to report regarding the present study. References

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 [1]. 34Anderson, A., & Ayres, A. (2015). Disaster relief: China and India come together. Council on Foreign Relations. [2]. Ashraf, M. A., & Azad, M. A. K. (2015). Gender issues in disaster: Understanding the relationships of vulnerability, preparedness, and capacity. Environment and Ecology Research, 3(5), 136–142. https://doi.org/10.13189/eer.2015.030501 [3]. Asian-Pacific Resource & Research Centre for Women (ARROW). (2017). Women’s health and climate change. [4]. Bajracharya, A., Shrestha, K. K., Zwi, A. B., & Baldry, E. (2022). Reframing gendered disaster: Lessons from Nepal’s indigenous women. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 83, 103422. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2022.103422 [5]. Aon Benfield. (2015). Nepal earthquake event recap report. [6]. Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., Davis, I., & Wisner, B. (2014). At risk: Natural hazards, people’s vulnerability, and disasters (2nd ed.). Routledge. [7]. Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. (2020). Gender and disasters. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). [8]. Byrne, B., & Baden, S. (1995). Gender, emergencies and humanitarian assistance (No. 33). Institute of Development Studies. [9]. Campbell, M. M. (2005). Tsunami and the silent tide: the invisible challenge of women's health. J Fam Plann Reprod Health Care, 31(2), 95-97. [10]. Cannon, T. (1994). Vulnerability analysis and the explanation of 'natural' disasters. Disasters, Development and Environment, 1, 13–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.1994.tb00485.x [11]. Cannon, T. (2002). Gender and climate hazards in Bangladesh. Gender & Development, 10(2), 45–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/13552070215894 [12]. Carballo, M., Hernandez, M., Schneider, K., & Welle, E. (2005). Impact of the tsunami on reproductive health. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 98, 400–403. [13]. CARE International. (2021). The 10 most under-reported humanitarian crises of 2020. [14]. Chandran, R. (2016, August 10). Nepal quake impact on single women underlines need for equal land rights: Activist. Reuters. [15]. Ciampi, M. C., Gell, F., Lasap, L., & Turvill, E. (2011). Gender and disaster risk reduction: A training pack. Oxfam GB. [16]. Dasgupta, S., Şiriner, İ., & De, P. S. (Eds.). (2010). Women’s encounter with disaster. Ismail Siriner. [17]. Dhungel, R., & Ojha, R. N. (2012). Women’s empowerment for disaster risk reduction and emergency response in Nepal. Gender & Development, 20(2), 309–321. [18]. Djalante, R., Holley, C., & Thomalla, F. (2011). Adaptive governance and managing resilience to natural hazards. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 2, 1–14.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 [19]. 35Embassy of Nepal. (2024). Empowering Nepalese women in politics and diplomacy; Interaction program at Nepal House. [20]. Enarson, E., Fothergill, A., & Peek, L. (2018). Gender and disaster: Foundations and new directions for research and practice. In H. Rodríguez, W. Donner, & J. E. Trainor (Eds.), Handbook of disaster research (pp. 205–223). Springer. [21]. Enarson, E., & Morrow, B. H. (1998). Why gender? Why women? An introduction to women and disaster. In E. Enarson & B. H. Morrow (Eds.), The gendered terrain of disaster: Through women’s eyes (pp. 1–8). Praeger. [22]. Enarson, E., & Chakrabarti, P. G. D. (Eds.). (2009). Women, gender and disaster: Global issues and initiatives. SAGE Publications India. [23]. Enarson, E. P. (2012). Women confronting natural disaster: From vulnerability to resilience. Lynne Rienner Publishers. [24]. Erman, A., De Vries Robbe, S. A., Thies, S. F., Kabir, K., & Maruo, M. (2021). Gender dimensions of disaster risk and resilience: Existing evidence. World Bank. [25]. Fatouros, S., & Capetola, T. (2021). Examining gendered expectations on women’s vulnerability to natural hazards in low to middle income countries: A critical literature review. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 64, 102495. [26]. Fordham, M. (2013). Gendering vulnerability analysis: Towards a more nuanced approach. In Mapping vulnerability (pp. 174–182). Routledge. [27]. Fordham, M. (1999). The intersection of gender and social class in disaster: Balancing resilience and vulnerability. International Journal of Mass Emergencies & Disasters, 17(1), 15–36. [28]. Saito, F. (2012). Women and the 2011 East Japan disaster. Gender & Development, 20(2), 265–279. [29]. Global Fund for Women. (2016). One year later: Women rebuilding Nepal. [30]. Government of Nepal. (2020). Nepal human development report. Nepal Planning Commission. [31]. Government of Nepal, National Planning Commission. (2015). Nepal Earthquake 2015 post disaster needs assessment (p. 56). Kathmandu. [32]. Hallegatte, S., & Henriet, F. (2009). Assessing the consequences of natural disasters on production networks: A disaggregated approach. [33]. International Labour Organization (ILO). (2002). Crisis, women and other gender concerns: Selected issues papers. Recovery and Reconstruction Department, ILO. [34]. Karki, K., & Listyarini, A. (2023). Women’s right to land is the foundation for a better tomorrow. Equal Times. [35]. K.C., L., & Hilhorst, D. (2022). Gendered experience of disaster: Women’s account of evacuation, relief, and recovery in Nepal. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 72, 102840. [36]. Kondowe, U. (2023). Gender-blind disaster preparedness and response: The case of Cyclone Freddy in Malawi. For Equality Africa.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 [37]. 36Laplante, D. P., Brunet, A., Schmitz, N., Ciampi, A., & King, S. (2008). Project Ice Storm: Prenatal maternal stress affects cognitive and linguistic functioning in 5½-year-old children. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 47(9), 1063-1072. [38]. Maharjan, K. (2013). Simulating policy alternatives for dropouts and girls' scholarship program in community primary schools: The case of Nepal. Unpublished manuscript. [39]. Mehta, M. (2007). Gender matters: Lessons for disaster risk reduction in South Asia. The International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD). [40]. Mian, L. H., & Namasivayam, M. (2017). Sex, rights, and gender in the age of climate change. Asian-Pacific Resource & Research Centre for Women (ARROW), 58. [41]. Ministry of Education, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), & United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (2016). Global Initiative on Out of School Children – Nepal Country Study. [42]. Muttarak, R., & Pothisiri, W. (2013). The role of education on disaster preparedness: Case study of the 2012 Indian Ocean earthquakes on Thailand’s Andaman Coast. Ecology and Society, 18(4). [43]. Neumayer, E., & Plümper, T. (2007). The gendered nature of natural disasters: The impact of catastrophic events on the gender gap in life expectancy, 1981–2002. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 97(3), 551–556. [44]. Norris, F. H., Friedman, M. J., Watson, P. J., Byrne, C. M., Diaz, E., & Kaniasty, K. (2002). 60,000 disaster victims speak: Part I. An empirical review of the empirical literature, 1981—2001. Psychiatry, 65(3), 207-239. [45]. Ovesen, P., & Heiselberg, S. (2016). The humanitarian response to the 2015 Nepal earthquake. Humanitarian Action: A Shared Responsibility, 53(1). [46]. Oxfam. (2016). I am alone: Single women and the Nepal earthquake. OCHA Services. [47]. Oxfam International. (2005). The tsunami’s impact on women. [48]. Pattisson, P. (2018). Nepal’s female masons dig deep to lay foundations for change and renewal. The Guardian. [49]. Perera-Mubarak, K. N. (2013). Positive responses, uneven experiences: Intersections of gender, ethnicity, and location in post-tsunami Sri Lanka. Gender, Place & Culture, 20(5), 664–685. [50]. Perry, R. W. (2018). Defining disaster: An evolving concept. In H. Rodríguez, W. Donner, & J. E. Trainor (Eds.), Handbook of disaster research (pp. 3–22). Springer. [51]. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital. In Culture and politics: A reader (pp. 223–234). Routledge. (Original work published in Journal of Democracy, 6(1), 1995) [52]. Saito, F. (2012). Women and the 2011 East Japan disaster. Gender & Development, 20(2), 265–279. [53]. Shakya, S., Basnet, S., & Paudel, J. (2022). Natural disasters and labor migration: Evidence from Nepal’s earthquake. World Development, 151, 105748.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 22-37 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250450 [54]. 37Tearne, J. E., Guragain, B., Ghimire, L., Leaning, J., & Newnham, E. A. (2021). The health and security of women and girls following disaster: A qualitative investigation in post-earthquake Nepal. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 66, 102622. [55]. Thapa, P. B. (2018). Analysis of landslides triggered by the 2015 Gorkha earthquake, Nepal. In Living under the threat of earthquakes: Short and long-term management of earthquake risks and damage prevention in Nepal (pp. 45–63). Springer International Publishing. [56]. Thapa, R. B. (2017). Kathmandu metropolitan area. In Urban development in Asia and Africa: Geospatial analysis of metropolises (pp. 217–237). Springer Singapore. [57]. The World Bank. (2021). Gender dynamics of disaster risk and resilience. [58]. Tiwari, M. (2024). Land ownership and nutrition in Nepal. Review of Development Economics. [59]. UN-Habitat. (n.d.). Nepal. https://unhabitat.org/nepal [60]. United Nations Development Programme. (2013). Gender and disaster risk reduction. Retrieved May 2, 2020, from https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/environment-and-climate/gender-and-disaster-risk-reduction.html [61]. United Nations. (2011). Fact sheet: Women, gender equality and climate change. The UN Internal Gateway on Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women. [62]. United Nations Human Development Reports (UNDP). (n.d.). Gender inequality index (GII). [63]. UN News. (2015). UN allocates $15 million in emergency funds for Nepal earthquake response. [64]. UN Women. (2016). Nepal: A year after the earthquakes. [65]. UN Women. (2015). Reaching out to survivors of violence in post-earthquake Nepal. [66]. UN Women. (2019). The aftermath of an earthquake in Nepal. [67]. U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). (n.d.). M 7.8 - 67 km NNE of Bharatpur, Nepal. USGS Earthquake Hazards Program. [68]. Vesga-Lopez, O., Blanco, C., Keyes, K., Olfson, M., Grant, B. F., & Hasin, D. S. (2008). Psychiatric disorders in pregnant and postpartum women in the United States. Archives of general psychiatry, 65(7), 805-815. [69]. Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO). (2007). Changing the climate: Why women’s perspectives matter (Fact Sheet). Copyright: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MOSP and/or the editor(s). MOSP and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. Macao Scientifi Publishers（MOSP） https://www.mospbs.com/journal/jiegg 38·Article· Subnational Science and Technology Diplomacy: Navigating Geopolitical Challenges Through the Lens of California-China Climate Cooperation Yucan Jin1,* 1 American Studies Center, School of English and International Studies, Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing, China * Corresponding Authors: Yucan Jin. Email: yucan_jin@bfsu.edu.cn Received: 5 January 2025 Accepted: 25 February 2025 Published: 25 March 2025 Abstract: Amid escalating geopolitical tensions, traditional state-centric science and technology (S&T) diplomacy faces significant limitations, while the urgency of the climate crisis necessitates innovative frameworks for collaboration. This article examines the critical role of subnational actors in advancing climate diplomacy, using the case of California-China climate cooperation as an illustrative example. Through an in-depth analysis of the mechanisms and dynamics of collaboration among California’s subnational entities, Chinese governmental bodies, private sectors, and academia, the study uncovers the rationale and strategies underpinning these cooperative efforts. The findings reveal that the California-China partnership exemplifies a hybrid governance model that integrates top-down initiatives with bottom-up engagement, guided by the interplay of ideas, interests, and institutionalization (I-I-I). This model is sustained by shared climate priorities, pragmatic economic incentives, and multi-level institutional networks, enabling resilience despite federal constraints and geopolitical uncertainties. By framing California-China climate cooperation as a microcosm of broader U.S.- China relations, this study highlights the transformative potential of subnational actors to navigate geopolitical fragmentation and foster global climate solutions. It contributes to the theoretical understanding of subnational S&T diplomacy by demonstrating how decentralized governance and cross-sector collaboration can transcend competition and advance shared objectives. Ultimately, this research provides a novel lens for reimagining S&T diplomacy in an era of geopolitical complexities and climate urgency intertwined, offering actionable insights for policymakers and scholars alike. Keywords: Science and Technology Diplomacy; Subnational Cooperation; California- China Climate Cooperation; Geopolitical Challenges

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 1. I39ntroduction Subnational climate cooperation between the US and China offers a crucial and concrete avenue for science and technology diplomacy amid rising geopolitical tensions. While national-level engagement remains strained, a network of subnational actors—including U.S. state governments, Chinese central, provincial and municipal bodies, private sectors, and academic communities—continues to demonstrate the capacity and willingness to forge partnerships and advance climate policies and actions. Theoretically, this challenges the traditional state-centric model of international relations by emphasizing the importance of multi-level landscape of climate cooperation. Subnational actors are uniquely positioned to complement national governments, circumvent obstacles at the federal level, and fill leadership voids when necessary. Their jurisdiction over key climate-relevant sectors such as energy, transportation, and land use enables them to implement innovative policies and pilot projects tailored to regional and local needs. These efforts are often supported by industries and academia, which play a critical role in technological solutions and fostering collaboration. Under the overarching framework of the U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement (STA) established in 1979, California has emerged as the most pronounced front-runner among U.S. states in accelerating the development and deployment of climate solutions at the subnational level. California’s climate diplomacy efforts with its Chinese counterparts have navigated geopolitical complexities by maintaining dialogue, fostering mutual understanding, and achieving tangible progress on climate change. Despite the fact that the newly signed protocol to amend and renew the STA for another 5 years is still under review, the potential for such cooperation remains evident, as demonstrated by historical successes and ongoing programs in both government and private sectors. By bridging local actions and global climate goals, subnational agency not only advances climate outcomes but also serves as a stabilizing force in international relations. This article seeks to uncover the rationale behind such subnational partnerships in facilitating climate diplomacy under the broader framework of U.S.-China STA. Using California-China climate cooperation as a case study, this article identifies the mechanisms, challenges and opportunities facing diverse subnational actors on both sides. It aims to shed light on the relatively understudied role of subnational agency in science and technology diplomacy, particularly in current context of intensifying geopolitical challenges. To thoroughly explore the evolving landscape of California's climate policies and actions in navigating geopolitical complexities and strengthening cooperation with China, this article begins by historically contextualizing California-China early-stage engagement from 1979 to the 2000s. This foundational period laid the groundwork for subsequent collaborative expansion and diversification. A brief review of the existing theoretical lenses through which subnational climate cooperation is typically discussed will follow and put forward an analytical framework. The article then delves into representative cross-sector collaborations, including government-led initiatives, private sector

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 engagement, and academic exchanges. A deeper examination of the structural forces at play, guided by the interplay of ideas, interests, and institutionalization (I-I-I), will uncover the incentives, disincentives and opportunities that have been shaping California-China cooperation. The article concludes by asserting that California-China collaboration is resilient and has the potential to take precedence over 40competition amid geopolitical uncertainties. 2. Historical and Theoretical Foundations 2.1 Historical Context: The Formative Period of California-China Climate Cooperation (1979-2000s) The evolution of California-China climate cooperation began in the late 20th century, transitioning from a predominantly California-led initiative to a more reciprocal, two-way collaboration. This gradual transformation underscores the intricate interplay between geopolitical challenges and strategic considerations that have uniquely influenced the trajectory of U.S.-China science and technology ties. Both national and subnational levels of climate collaboration have grown increasingly significant, reflecting the urgent need for solutions to the escalating global climate crisis as both parties strive for green transitions. The U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement (STA), signed in 1979, marked the beginning of bilateral ties in science and technology diplomacy. This agreement was a key component of U.S. strategy to engage China and counterbalance Soviet influence during the Cold War. As the first major agreement between the two governments, it served as part of US’ broader efforts to integrate China into the global system and influence its development. The STA established a foundation for further subnational climate engagement in the decades that followed though, particularly led by California due to its early environmental leadership. California’s leadership in environmental policy began in earnest with the passage of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) in 1970, signed into law by then-Governor Ronald Reagan shortly after the federal National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). CEQA positioned California as a trailblazer in environmental protection, inspiring fifteen other states to model their environmental statues after it. During the 1980s and early 1990s, California emerged as a national leader in environmental policy through stringent air quality regulations and early adoption of renewable energy initiatives. Influenced by laws such as the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), high natural gas prices, and the advancement of new energy technologies, this era cemented California’s progressive environmental stance. This period coincided with rising global awareness of climate change, fostering early-stage dialogue and cooperation between U.S. and Chinese scientists. A notable example emerged in 1988 when the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab in California established the China Energy Program. This initiative aimed to collaboratively investigate solutions to energy, environmental and climate challenges, laying the groundwork for future partnerships.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 At the national level, the U.S.-China Environment and Development Forum was established in 1997 during Vice President Al Gore’s visit to Beijing. This development aligned with the Clinton administration’s broader national security strategy of “engagement and enlargement” toward China. Shortly after, a joint statement was signed between then President Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin, expanding the scope of the STA to include cooperative initiatives in climate change, energy and clean technology trade. These efforts demonstrated the early linkages between national science and 41technology diplomacy and local climate goals. Building on national momentum, California initiated subnational-level moves at the turn of the century. For instance, after the establishment of the U.S.-China Energy Policy Dialogue in 2004, then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s 2005 trip to China underscored the state’s focus on sharing advancements in environmental technology and exploring cooperative opportunities in clean energy and sustainable practices. Domestically, California continued to set itself apart with the enactment of the Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32) in 2006. This landmark legislation created a cap-and-trade system and ambitious greenhouse gas reduction targets, reinforcing California’s position as a leader in climate governance. Notably, 2006 also marked a turning point in California-China relationship as China surpassed the U.S. as the world’s largest annual greenhouse gas emitter. This development signaled a critical shift in their bilateral dynamic, evolving from a California-led cooperation model to a more two-way collaboration driven by both parties’ recognition of climate changes. California’s advanced legislative framework, innovative clean energy policies and proactive climate leadership created opportunities for international partnerships, particularly with China, whose rapid industrial growth imposed significant environmental pressures. China’s growing need for green transition strategies propelled its engagement with California into new dimensions. While the formative period of California-China interactions did not focus exclusively on climate change, these early exchanges shaped the cooperative trajectory that defines their present-day climate relations. A pivotal example is the 2009 California-Jiangsu agreement, China’s first subnational partnership for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Within the STA’s framework for scientific exchange, California's assertive climate actions—combined with China's increasing commitment to sustainable development—foreshadowed the robust partnerships that emerged in subsequent years. 2.2 Theoretical Foundation of Subnational Climate Cooperation Within Recent Realities The burgeoning body of literature on subnational climate cooperation highlights its growing importance, with California consistently serving as a focal point for academic inquiry. Among the most prominent analytical frameworks are paradiplomacy, multi-level governance (MLG) theory, and polycentric governance, each of which offers valuable insights into the mechanisms of subnational climate diplomacy. Hocking (1993) conceptualizes paradiplomacy to describe how subnational actors independently engage in international relations, forming networks that support climate goals. In this context, Selin and

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 VanDeveer (2009) examine the direct engagement of U.S. subnational entities with international counterparts, such as California’s partnership with Chinese provinces on emissions trading and clean technology transfers. These collaborations operate within complex legal and policy frameworks, enabling subnational actors to leverage their economic influence and policy innovations to advance climate action. This decentralized approach contributes to a polycentric governance landscape, which, according to Pahl-Wostl (2009), fosters innovative solutions and complements national efforts. Building on this, Kellner, Petrovics and Huitema (2024) have made inspiring strides to enhance the analytical power of polycentric governance by emphasizing the role of the state, diffusion of local actions, and other pertinent factors. Their work provides further evidence that decentralized governance frameworks 42can be adapted to address complexities across various stakeholder levels. Expanding on this, Setzer (2015) emphasizes the adaptive nature of decentralized governance, suggesting that distributed policy-making enables subnational actors to develop responsive environmental strategies. Bulkeley (2013) provides further insight through the lens of multi-level governance theory, which asserts that authority is distributed across interconnected levels. Bulkeley notes the capacity of subnational actors, like cities and states, to implement impactful policies that advance global climate agendas—often when national governments hesitate or stall. This aligns with Hocking’s argument that subnational entities engage in “paradiplomacy” to form partnerships and independent agreements that proactively drive climate goals (1993). However, these frameworks often lack the specificity to accurately analyze California-China climate cooperation, particularly in current global contexts characterized by an increasing mix of turbulence and transformation. Climate cooperation has not only been politicized but also securitized at the national level, complicating the engagement. Recent dynamics of great power competition, according to Meckling and Van de Graaf (2020), have bostered power-based explanations of global cooperation, complementing interest-driven analyses in global environmental politics. Scholars such as Bäckstrand et al. (2017) proposes a “hybrid multilateralism” framework, which balances macro- and micro-level perspectives to analyze climate diplomacy. Yet, the distinct contrast between U.S. federal actions, U.S. subnational innovation, and China’s proactive approach underscores the need for an innovative analytical framework. This article argues that existing paradigms lack granularity, to some extent, to explain the complexity of California-China climate cooperation in today’s geopolitical climate. The cooperation model emerging from California-China relations exemplifies a hybrid governance model that integrates top-down initiatives with bottom-up engagement, guided by the interplay of ideas, interests, and institutionalization (I-I-I). This study examines how subnational actors from diverse stakeholders in California and China navigate geopolitical constraints and sustain climate cooperation under the broader framework of science and technology diplomacy. By doing so, the article seeks to enrich theoretical understanding and offer actionable insights into the mechanisms motivating subnational climate diplomacy in today’s era.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 3. A Case Study of California-43China Climate Cooperation This section explores the multifaceted nature of subnational climate cooperation between California and China, focusing on the synergetic effect of government-led initiatives, private sector engagement, and academic exchanges. Through examining representative examples including Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), flagship private sector localized manufacturing and operations represented by BYD and Tesla, and academic institutions, such as the California-China Climate Institute, this case study highlights that it is the cross-sector cooperative mechanisms that sustain such subnational cooperation amid geopolitical challenges. 3.1 Top-Down Initiatives by Subnational Entities California’s subnational leadership in climate policy has been instrumental in advancing U.S.-China cooperation. Over the past 15 years, the state has demonstrated a polycentric approach (Ostrom, 2010) to climate governance, forging partnerships that complement and, at times, bypass federal-level actions. This resilience has allowed California to maintain its climate diplomacy, even amidst shifting national policies. One of the most significant tools for California-China collaboration has been Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). The 2013 MOU between California and China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) set the stage for enduring cooperation on emissions trading, clean energy, and air quality. Since then, California has signed more than 20 MOUs with Chinese national, provincial, and municipal entities, addressing areas such as zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) and industrial decarbonization. Spanning the leadership of Governors Schwarzenegger, Brown, and Newsom, these efforts highlight California’s enduring bipartisan and multi-administrative commitments to achieving mutual benefits. The gradual formalization and institutionalization of this cooperation mechanism has strengthened California's leadership within its subnational jurisdiction, creating a virtuous cycle of engagement and innovation. Key events, such as the 2017 Subnational Clean Energy Ministerial in Beijing, further solidified California’s leadership. Hosted by then-Governor Jerry Brown, the event provided a platform for subnational actors to reaffirm their commitment to the Paris Agreement and expand the Under2 Coalition, a global network of subnational governments committed to reducing emissions. More recently, Governor Newsom’s 2023 visit to China reinforced California’s role as a climate leader by focusing on emerging areas like offshore wind and climate adaptation. California’s leadership trickles down to private sectors and academic communities facilitated through MOUs. These agreements have been instrumental in forging collaborative pathways on issues such as California’s Scoping Plan and China’s Five-Year Planning Process, industrial decarbonization with Guangdong, clean energy deployment with Jiangsu, climate mitigation strategy-making with Beijing, and the LA-Shanghai green shipping corridor. By providing clear frameworks for engagement, these agreements enable concrete climate actions and inform broader national discussions, helping to integrate subnational progress into global climate governance.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 These initiatives underscore the importance of institutional frameworks like the California Air Resources Board (CARB), which has exchanged expertise with Chinese counterparts on emissions trading and air quality. For example, CARB’s collaboration with Beijing contributed to the development of China’s air pollution control strategies. Such partnerships highlight the enduring value of California’s top-44down climate governance in advancing global cooperation. The state government of California demonstrates competence in alternating between bypassing federal gridlock and leveraging positive federal momentum, which underscores the pivotal role and adaptability of subnational governance in advancing climate diplomacy. Through government-led initiatives, California has laid the groundwork for effective climate collaboration by establishing and enhancing institutional frameworks, fostering high-level policy dialogues, and facilitating staff-level exchanges and training programs. These efforts not only provide the structural and political foundation necessary for long-term cooperation but also highlight the autonomy of subnational actors to act meaningfully, even in the face of fluctuating national-level political conditions. This adaptability ensures continuity and resilience in climate partnerships while sending clear signals to a broad range of stakeholders—governments, businesses, and academia alike—on the priorities and opportunities for engagement. 3.2 Bottom-Up Proactiveness by Private Sector While top-down initiatives and policies provide the framework, bottom-up proactive engagement led by private sector has been crucial in translating ambitious goals into tangible outcomes. Companies like BYD and Tesla exemplify how businesses can drive innovation, foster international partnerships, and align with subnational climate priorities, particularly when state, provincial, or municipal objectives surpass those set at the national level. In many cases, the private sector pioneers the way in subnational cooperation, often acting ahead of government entities by responding to clear policy signals and taking advantage of institutional frameworks that offer predictability and viable returns on investment. This dynamic underscores how private sector, especially leading enterprises can foster innovation and build momentum for climate goals by leveraging opportunities provided by subnational governance. 3.2.1 BYD Fitting into California’s Zero-Emission Transition BYD, a global leader in electric vehicle (EV) technology based in Shenzhen, China, has not only revolutionized transportation solutions in its home market but also established a significant presence in California as a key player in the state’s ambitious transition to clean energy and zero-emission public transportation. BYD’s entry into California in 2013, with its North American headquarters located in Downtown Los Angeles, represents a landmark case of proactive engagement by private- sector actors facilitated by subnational entities. This collaboration exemplifies the role of bottom-up governance in fostering international partnerships that align market expansion with local sustainable energy objectives. A pivotal moment in BYD’s California journey came with the establishment of its electric bus manufacturing facility in Lancaster, California, in 2013. This facility—the largest of its kind in North

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 America—underscored BYD’s commitment to localizing production, creating unionized green-sector jobs, and enhancing the economic vitality of the region. By introducing cutting-edge technologies and operating local manufacturing facilities for electric buses and large-scale batteries, BYD has invested significantly in California’s green economy. In March 2021, BYD celebrated the delivery of its 400th American battery-electric bus from the Lancaster plant, marking a major milestone in its contribution to California’s zero-emission transportation goals. The company was also awarded a $12.1 million contract with Long Beach Transit Authority to produce 10 zero-emissions all-electric buses in April of 45the same year. The subnational partnership between BYD and Lancaster was built on over a decade of trust-building efforts and mutual engagement. This relationship originated in 2009, when Los Angeles County Supervisor Michael D. Antonovich and Bill Allen, President of the Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation (LAEDC), initiated mutual visits to explore opportunities for collaboration. LAEDC, a nonprofit organization focused on equitable economic growth in the Los Angeles region, played a key role in facilitating BYD’s entry into the California market. Later, Lancaster Mayor R. Rex Parris and other city representatives participated in a trade mission to China to attract firms to the city. During this mission, they visited BYD’s headquarters in Shenzhen, further strengthening the relationship. These efforts culminated in innovative projects such as the “Home of the Future,” a partnership between BYD and American home-building giant KB Home, which integrated BYD’s solar panels, LED lighting, and energy storage technologies to promote affordable green energy solutions during the 2010s. Beyond its contributions to California’s transit electrification goals, BYD has been instrumental in advancing the state’s broader green economy. As the first pure electric vehicle manufacturer in the U.S. to have an all-union workforce and a pioneering Community Benefits Agreement, BYD has worked to ensure that its operations benefit local communities. In partnership with SMART Local 105 and Antelope Valley College, BYD launched the Industrial Manufacturing Technician Apprenticeship Program in 2019. This program enhances production efficiency and product quality while boosting the local economy by providing stable green jobs for residents, including women, veterans, and second-chance employees. BYD’s electric buses have become a cornerstone of California’s electrified public transportation system. For example, its collaboration with the Antelope Valley Transit Authority (AVTA) has enabled AVTA to become the first transit agency in North America to operate a 100% electric bus fleet, years ahead of California’s statewide mandate for zero-emission buses by 2040. BYD has also been actively involved in transitioning Los Angeles International Airport’s (LAX) shuttle bus fleets to electric buses, a project aligned with Mayor Eric Garcetti’s “Sustainable City pLAn”, known as L.A.’s Green New Deal. BYD’s pilot programs with LAX and the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) have laid the groundwork for the state’s mandate for zero-emission airport shuttle fleets by 2035. As a result, in 2020, BYD became a major part of the largest order of electric buses in American history with the Los

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 Angeles Department of Transportation (LADOT). This proactive engagement has furthered BYD’s contribution toward making LADOT’s bus fleet entirely emissions-free in time for the opening ceremonies of the 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games, showcasing the company’s alignment with California’s long-46term sustainability ambitions. BYD’s success in California highlights the power of subnational partnerships in driving international climate action. The company’s responsiveness to California’s policy landscape— bolstered by frameworks such as zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) mandates and incentives— has allowed it to align its business development with the state’s ambitious climate goals. In return, California has benefited from BYD’s innovation in green technology, job creation, and economic revitalization. This case not only demonstrates the critical role of private sector actors in advancing subnational climate diplomacy but also serves as a model for how international cooperation can accelerate the transition to a low-carbon future. 3.2.2 Tesla Advancing Sustainability in China Tesla, a global leader in electric vehicle (EV) innovation based in California, exemplifies how subnational science and technology diplomacy can manifest through private sector engagement. Tesla’s entry into China, the world’s largest EV market, marks a critical milestone in the internationalization of clean technologies and underscores the reciprocal benefits of U.S.-China collaboration in advancing global sustainability goals. By leveraging China’s policy incentives and localizing production through its Shanghai Gigafactory, Tesla has aligned its growth with China’s industrial and environmental policy frameworks, creating a dynamic model of transnational cooperation in the EV sector. Tesla’s China operations began in earnest in 2019, with the completion of the Shanghai Gigafactory, the company’s first fully foreign-owned manufacturing plant in the country. Located in the Lingang Free Trade Zone, the facility enables Tesla to produce its Model 3 and Model Y vehicles at scale while bypassing tariffs that previously constrained its competitiveness in the Chinese market. This localized manufacturing capacity significantly reduced costs, allowing Tesla to price its vehicles more competitively and expand its customer base in China. As of July 2023, the Gigafactory has the capacity to build over 750,000 vehicles per year and is the primary production site for Tesla vehicles exported to regions without a Gigafactory (“Q2 2023 Update,” 2023), contributing to Tesla’s leading position in the global EV market. China’s supportive policy environment has been instrumental in Tesla’s success. Government initiatives, including subsidies for EV buyers, investments in EV charging infrastructure, and clear targets for reducing internal combustion engine vehicle production, have strengthened Tesla’s market prospects. The Chinese central government’s promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI) facilitated Tesla’s ability to build its factory and operate without a joint venture partner, a significant departure from previous policies governing foreign automakers in China. Additionally, Tesla has partnered with local suppliers for key EV components, such as batteries from Chinese companies like CATL and

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 lithium sourced from domestic producers, which has further deepened its integration within the Chinese 47market. Tesla’s presence in China also underscores its role as a global innovation leader. The company has invested heavily in research and development (R&D) to expand the capabilities of its vehicles and adapt them to Chinese consumers’ preferences. For instance, Tesla implemented a “made-in-China” strategy, producing affordable localized versions of its vehicles while ensuring the same quality and innovations associated with its U.S. manufacturing. Tesla’s research team in Shanghai has been involved in refining its autonomous driving software and battery technologies, contributing to advancements in sustainable mobility in the world’s fastest-growing EV market. Tesla’s symbiotic relationship with China has facilitated mutual benefits. For Tesla, access to the Chinese market has propelled the company’s growth and global leading position in EV production and sales. Meanwhile, China has benefited from Tesla’s ability to accelerate the adoption of high-quality EVs, strengthen domestic supply chains, and drive innovation within its rapidly growing clean technology sector. However, Tesla’s operations in China have not been without challenges. Geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China, the increasing scrutiny of data security issues, and rising competition from local EV manufacturers such as BYD, NIO, and XPeng all pose risks for Tesla’s long-term position in the market. Despite these challenges, Tesla’s experience in China demonstrates the critical role private actors play in advancing subnational and international science and technology cooperation. By fostering innovation, transferring expertise, and aligning its operations with local policy priorities, Tesla represents a two-way avenue for collaboration, where global climate goals intersect with national and subnational economic and environmental strategies. As China pushes toward its target of peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060, Tesla’s continued contributions to electrification efforts will be essential in driving global EV adoption and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 3.2.3 Comparative Analysis: BYD and Tesla in Subnational Climate Cooperation The cases of BYD and Tesla reflect two dimensions of subnational science and technology diplomacy: bottom-up international collaboration fostered by local entities and private sector-driven global engagement that aligns with national and global climate priorities. While both companies have successfully leveraged subnational policies to advance clean energy transitions, their distinct approaches highlight the reciprocal nature of U.S.-China cooperation in green industry. First and foremost, in terms of localized production and economic integration, both Tesla and BYD prioritize the localization of production to reduce costs, enhance competitiveness, and align themselves with regional climate policies. BYD’s establishment of a manufacturing facility in Lancaster, California, underscores its commitment to creating unionized green jobs and revitalizing the local economy. Similarly, Tesla’s Shanghai Gigafactory illustrates how foreign direct investment policies and localized manufacturing enable cost reductions and market access, fueling EV adoption at scale. However, the scale and focus of their local economic contributions diverge. BYD has emphasized its collaborations

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 with local governments and community organizations, such as its apprenticeship programs in partnership with Antelope Valley College. This highlights a more community-centered approach to workforce development and regional integration. In contrast, Tesla’s China operations focus heavily on scaling production and integrating with local supply chains, such as battery partnerships with Chinese manufacturers like CATL. While Tesla has also created significant employment opportunities in China, the company’s focus has been more on meeting rapidly growing market demand rather than fostering 48broader community engagement. Second, policy alignment and subnational support by local entities have played pivotal roles in the success of both companies. For BYD, partnerships with Los Angeles County and the City of Lancaster exemplify California’s role as a climate leader, aligning local economic interests with zero-emission policies. Projects such as “Home of the Future” and AVTA’s 100% electric bus fleet highlight how regional initiatives drive innovation and operational success in the green transportation sector. On the other hand, Tesla’s expansion into China benefited from the central government’s relaxation of regulations on foreign automotive manufacturers and its robust EV subsidies. Tesla has capitalized on China’s ambitious national clean energy policies while building relationships with subnational governments in key industrial hubs such as Shanghai. The Shanghai Gigafactory’s location in the Lingang Free Trade Zone demonstrates Tesla’s ability to navigate and leverage China’s evolving FDI framework, setting a new benchmark for foreign automakers in the Chinese market. Third, technology innovation and knowledge exchange come into play in differentiated ways. Both Tesla and BYD are leaders in EV technology innovation, yet their strategies diverge in terms of fostering cross-border knowledge exchange. BYD’s deployment of EV technology in California reflects how Chinese companies can transfer expertise to align with subnational climate mandates. This bottom-up approach underscores the proactive role of American municipalities in attracting international partners to deliver localized, sustainable energy solutions. Tesla’s operations in China, on the other hand, illustrate the reverse dynamic: an American company offering global leadership in automotive technology while adapting to local market needs. Tesla’s investments in R&D within China, from fine-tuning autonomous driving software to improving battery recycling capabilities, have contributed to advancements in Chinese EV innovation and consumer adoption. In this way, Tesla serves as an example of two-way technology transfer, where foreign expertise is merged with domestic industry capabilities. Tesla, however, faces challenges partly due to its asymmetrical reliance on China’s manufacturing capacity given the “reshoring” strategy deeply embedded in U.S. bipartisan consensus in the last decade or so, leaving it rather sensitive to U.S.-China political dynamics. Also, Tesla must balance its position as a foreign company in an increasingly competitive market dominated by local players. Despite these challenges, the two case studies underscore opportunities and potentialto advance bilateral cooperation at the intersection of science, technology, and climate action. The reciprocal nature of BYD’s and

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 Tesla’s efforts demonstrates that both countries’ industries can contribute to global solutions, provided 49that subnational partnerships remain resilient and continue fostering mutual trust. 3.3 Bridging the Divide: Academic Engagement in California-China Collaboration While the private sector has demonstrated a dynamic ability to drive subnational climate engagement through innovation and strategic partnerships, academic institutions and research organizations have also played an indispensable role in fueling long-term climate collaboration across California and China. By facilitating joint research initiatives, knowledge exchange, and policy dialogues, academia has acted as a neutral and enduring bridge between the two regions, helping to sustain collaboration even during periods of geopolitical strain. These contributions are particularly significant in building the institutional trust and scientific capacity that underpin long-term engagement on climate issues. One prominent example is the California-China Climate Institute (CCCI), a prominent think tank founded by former California Governor Jerry Brown in partnership with the University of California, Berkeley and key Chinese institutions. The Institute promotes bilateral cooperation through research partnerships, high-level policy dialogues, and joint academic programs focused on developing clean energy solutions and actionable climate policy. For instance, it has hosted forums centering on opportunities for enhanced near-term U.S.-China climate action through subnational climate leadership, such as “Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Development”, “Inside China’s National Adaptation Strategy 2035”, and “An Inside Look at China and California’s Carbon Markets” , providing a platform for policymakers and researchers to exchange insights and strategies. These conversations not only strengthen institutional ties but also ensure that California-China climate cooperation is informed by the latest scientific findings and best practices. Similarly, academic exchanges between Stanford University and Tsinghua University have further demonstrated the value of collaborative research in advancing climate solutions. Through joint projects on clean energy technology, such as solar power innovations and battery storage systems, these partnerships have yielded breakthroughs that benefit both regions. In addition, Stanford and Tsinghua have co-organized workshops on sustainable urban development, fostering dialogue on how megacities like Beijing and Los Angeles can reduce carbon emissions through smarter planning and technology deployment. These academic collaborations are supported by an ecosystem of think tanks and research bodies on both sides. For example, the Energy Research Institute of the National Development and Reform Commission (China) and California-based organizations such as the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory have demonstrated the power of bilateral knowledge-sharing. Joint research programs between the University of California system and renowned Chinese universities have facilitated collaborative studies on topics such as clean energy technologies, emissions reduction strategies, and climate modeling. Their joint efforts to model energy efficiency policies have provided actionable frameworks for reducing emissions, with implications for other regions worldwide. Such collaborations

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 highlight academia’s unique ability to transcend political divides—focusing instead on scientific innovation, mutual capacity-50building, and the shared urgency of climate action. 4. Rationale behind California- China Climate Cooperation Mechanism As illustrated in the preceding case studies, California-China climate cooperation thrives on a dynamic interplay of cross-sector collaboration, where subnational entities, private industry, and academia work in tandem to advance shared goals. However, understanding the resilience of this partnership requires a deeper examination of the structural forces at play, the interplay of ideas, interests, and institutionalization (I-I-I) in particular. This section delves into the rationale behind California-China cooperation by exploring the incentives that drive engagement, the disincentives that pose barriers, and the opportunities that emerge from their alignment. By linking these dimensions to practical examples, the analysis highlights how mutual priorities and constant trust-building have sustained subnational collaboration in spite of federal constraints. 4.1 Incentives for Engagement The California-China climate cooperation mechanism has been primarily driven by a convergence of incentives that align the mutual interests of both parties. These incentives spanning economic, technological, environmental, and political dimensions, reinforce the resilience of their collaboration. For both California and China, these incentives act as critical drivers, enabling sustained partnerships challenged by national-level uncertainties. 4.1.1 California’s Perspective: A Quest for Economic Growth and Climate Leadership California’s leadership role in global climate diplomacy stems from its dual ambition to foster economic growth and position itself as a leader in climate action. Strategically, engaging with China— one of the largest markets for green technology— offers California an unparalleled opportunity to export innovative solutions, such as electric vehicles (EVs) and renewable energy technologies. Chinese companies, such as BYD, have created green jobs in California, from establishing facilities in Lancaster to reducing emissions through EV production. In 2022 alone, BYD’s expansion in California created over 1,000 manufacturing jobs, demonstrating how international collaboration directly supports local economic development. These partnerships highlight how economic incentives, including business investment and job creation, naturally intersect with state-level policies on decarbonization and sustainable development. In addition, California seeks to showcase its climate leadership globally by pioneering policy frameworks and encouraging international collaboration. Collaborating with China, a key player in the global climate arena, reinforces California’s image as a committed and effective advocate for sustainability. Agreements such as the Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) on zero-carbon technologies signed during Jerry Brown's administration illustrate this marriage of economic ambition

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 with environmental goals. For California, these initiatives reflect a subnational persistence to advance U.S.-51China climate diplomacy even when relations falter at the national level. 4.1.2 China’s Perspective: Access to Markets and Innovation For China, engaging with California offers access to valuable technical expertise, clean technology innovation, and strategic partnerships with one of the largest clean energy markets worldwide. California’s advanced policies— such as its ambitious Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) mandates— align closely with China’s own clean energy transformation goals, making collaborations mutually beneficial. Companies like Tesla act as role models for sustainable mobility and have contributed to boosting domestic industry capacity in China, with Tesla’s Shanghai Gigafactory serving as a case study in integrating international expertise with national priorities. Moreover, California-China cooperation at the subnational level provides China with an opportunity to bypass policy hurdles imposed by federal tensions in U.S.-China relations. While official relations remain strained, China uses partnerships with California’s municipalities, industries, and academic entities to sustain knowledge transfer and strengthen its position as a global leader in clean energy innovation. This engagement not only improves China’s access to cutting-edge research but also builds cooperative networks vital for achieving its dual-carbon goals (carbon peak by 2030 and neutrality by 2060). 4.1.3 Shared Incentives: The Economic and Environmental Nexus Both California and China ultimately share a pressing incentive to address the worsening effects of climate change while simultaneously pursuing economic opportunities through clean energy innovation. By working together in areas such as EV development, renewable energy deployment, and emissions reductions, both sides benefit from advancing their domestic energy transitions while contributing to global progress on climate action. The California-China Clean Tech Partnership, which fosters collaboration in areas like battery storage and grid modernization, exemplifies how both sides leverage their strengths to accelerate clean energy innovation. Additionally, the collaboration has opened pathways for public-private partnerships, fostering creativity and scaling up technological adoption in ways that unilateral action might not achieve. 4.2 Disincentives and Barriers Barriers to California-China climate cooperation mainly come from within the U.S. Federal government’s impediment, partisan thoughts on climate action and trade protectionism at the national level complicate subnational efforts. These challenges underscore the difficulty of sustaining subnational engagements amid volatile U.S.-China relations. 4.2.1 Geopolitical Tensions as Overarching Barriers It is unrealistic to isolate California-China climate cooperation completely from intensifying geopolitical tensions. The ongoing global polarization creates a pervasive framing challenge, where

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 every partnership or project is viewed through the lens of “strategic competition” by Washington. Political polarization, coupled with escalating military tensions in the Indo-Pacific, raises questions about the long-term sustainability of California’s col52laborative efforts, even at the subnational level. Plus, California’s framing of climate action as an crisis-motivated emergency contrasts with China’s emphasis more on green economic development, leading to slight divergence. Though those differences are not insurmountable, they prolong timelines to further institutionalize subnational cooperation. Without actionable frameworks that transcend short-term political agendas by federal government, California-China partnerships risk stagnating, leaving critical climate goals unmet amid escalating geopolitical uncertainties. 4.2.2 Federalism and Jurisdictional Overlaps in the U.S. One of the most pressing barriers arises from the overlapping jurisdictions between the federal government, states, and local governments in the United States. While California has positioned itself as a global climate leader, under U.S. constitutional law, its ability to conduct international diplomacy is constrained by federal oversight. Subnational actors like California lack the legal authority to negotiate treaties, which means its partnerships with its Chinese counterparts at various levels rely primarily on non-binding agreements such as Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). These agreements, while both symbolically and substantially important, often fall short of guaranteeing enforceable commitments, leading to legal uncertainties for joint projects. To complicate matters further, the inconsistency of U.S. federal climate policy remains one of the most significant obstacles to long-term California-China climate cooperation. Policy swings between administrations— ranging from Obama’s ambitious emissions reduction goals under the Clean Power Plan, Trump’s first-term withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, and Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), to the latest Trump’s signing his first-day executive order directing the U.S. a second withdrawal from the Paris Agreement— have created uncertainty for US-China climate engagement. The inconsistency in U.S. federal climate policy complicate subnational efforts by creating a disjointed national climate strategy that hampers California’s ability to maintain consistent collaboration with China. California’s MOUs with its Chinese counterparts usually face constraint by the federal government’s authority over international treaties. Congressional gridlock and partisan divides further weaken the credibility of long-term climate commitments, deterring Chinese partners from fully embracing subnational initiatives. The result is a growing perception of institutional instability in the U.S., which complicates deeper institutionalization under the California-China cooperative framework. This jurisdictional overlap and discontinuity discourage private-sector and academic stakeholders from committing to long-term projects. Not only do they fear regulatory instability, but federal scrutiny of subnational efforts further complicates California-China relations. These constraints expose the structural limits of subnational diplomacy, underscoring the need for more cohesive federal-state coordination on international climate action.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 534.2.3 Chilling Effects on Scientific and Academic Collaboration One of the most detrimental barriers has been the federal government’s “China Initiative,” which has created a chilling effect on academic and scientific exchanges between U.S. and Chinese institutions. Established to address concerns about the alleged intellectual property theft and cyber security threats, the program inadvertently disrupted legitimate collaboration by stoking mistrust. Chinese researchers in the U.S., including those collaborating with California’s world-renowned academic institutions like Stanford and UC Berkeley, faced heightened scrutiny and fears of racial profiling. Meanwhile, U.S. researchers grew hesitant to engage with Chinese counterparts, fearing accusations of espionage or potential violations of compliance regulations. This chilling effect is particularly harmful to California-China cooperation because trust between academic and research institutions is essential for advancing technological innovation in areas critical to climate solutions, such as clean energy technologies and urban sustainability frameworks. Without safeguards to ensure academic freedom and distinguish legitimate risks from xenophobia, the “China Initiative” has significantly disrupted cross-border knowledge exchange. Efforts to reopen academic trust-building remain fragile in the face of lingering and pervading skepticism especially in Trump’s second term. Restoring these channels of collaboration is vital to aligning policies, practices, and technologies that California and Chinese provinces could jointly use to respond to the escalating climate crisis. 4.2.4 Economic Protectionism and Regulatory Barriers Economic tension between the United States and China introduces significant complexity to subnational cooperative efforts. On paper, both California and China share the goal of advancing green technology, but divergent interests between California subnational entities and the U.S. federal government create friction. For example, China’s dominance in solar panel production makes its supply chain indispensable to California’s renewable energy goals. Yet U.S. federal scrutiny over alleged labor practices under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) has led to sanctions and trade restrictions on Chinese solar imports, delaying California-based renewable energy projects and raising ethical dilemmas for state-level policymakers. Moreover, protectionist measures such as tariffs on Chinese imports introduced during Trump’s first presidency, a rather large part of it continued during Biden administration accompanied with even tougher export controls and sanctions, disrupt supply chains essential to California’s clean energy transition. Besides, the Biden administration’s industrial policies, while focused on domestic green investment through the IRA, send mixed signals internationally by emphasizing subsidy-driven competition rather than true collaboration. While the $369 billion subsidy allocations strengthen the state’s clean energy leadership, it has prompted a global “subsidy race to the bottom”, creating new barriers to collaboration. Recognizing the financial incentives offered by the IRA, France and Germany, for instance have advocated for aggressive EU-wide green subsidies to stay competitive in the global

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 clean energy market. As a result, these economic approaches fail to deliver the synergistic effects 54originally intended by bilateral collaborations, heightening the risks of fragmented global supply chains. 4.2.5 Trust Deficits and Institutional Barriers Beyond tangible hurdles like jurisdictional constraints and trade barriers, deeper challenges stem from a lack of trust between the U. S. and China. While California has successfully fostered goodwill through cooperative initiatives with Chinese provinces, broader distrust persists at the national level. Political narratives amplify these suspicions. In the U.S., cooperation with China is often stigmatized as giving an adversary undue leverage, which fuels skepticism toward the institutionalization of trust in climate partnerships. Anti-China rhetorics, coupled with repeated alleged accusations of intellectual property theft and espionage, has stifled collaborative research opportunities in areas pivotal to addressing global climate challenges. Trust-building is further hindered by the politicization and securitization of climate actions amid these tensions, which limits the ability of California and Chinese stakeholders to separate environmental issues from contentious political debates. Additionally, this skepticism is compounded by institutional inefficiencies. Differentiated decision-making processes between the U.S. and China, together with differences in how decisions are executed, create misalignment. In other words, collaborative projects can face potential delays, bureaucratic hurdles, or unclear expectations, even when there is mutual enthusiasm. These inefficiencies make it difficult to institutionalize partnerships in ways that transcend one-off initiatives or temporary goodwill. 4.3 Resilience and Opportunities Despite all the disincentives outlined above, resilience and adaptability have been hallmarks of the California-China climate cooperation mechanism. This subnational partnership endures due to its focus on practical benefits, mutual priorities, and institutional flexibility. This section examines the factors that sustain the collaboration, as well as opportunities emerging accordingly when California and China align their shared climate goals within the context of economic, technological, and institutional resilience. 4.3.1 Resilience in the Face of Geopolitical Tensions California-China climate cooperation has demonstrated remarkable resilience in navigating the challenges of a highly polarized global political environment. This subnational partnership thrives in part because it operates parallel to, and often independently of, federal-level tensions between the U.S. and China. By emphasizing mutual interests pragmatically— such as advancing clean energy technologies and addressing climate change— California and Chinese provinces effectively insulate their collaboration from the broader rhetoric of the so-called “strategic competition”.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 Moreover, the flexible nature of these gradually being institutionalized engagement, which largely relies on non-binding MOUs, ensures that they remain less vulnerable to abrupt policy changes or diplomatic conflicts. Unlike federal diplomacy, which can be hindered by partisan gridlock and international rivalry, subnational collaborations are rooted in direct problem-solving and local benefits, allowing for more sustainable and pragmatic exchanges. For example, even during periods of heightened U.S.-China tensions, California’s partnerships with Shenzhen on zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) policies and with BYD on green transportation projects have persisted uninterrupted, showcasing 55the adaptability of this model. 4.3.2 The Role of Key Individuals in Driving Cooperation Behind every major breakthrough in California-China climate cooperation are key individuals whose leadership and personal diplomacy have bridged divides. At the subnational level, California governors have played a pivotal role in sustaining and advancing partnerships with Chinese regions. For instance, former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (2003–2011) pioneered state-level climate action by actively engaging with Chinese officials and regional leaders to promote the exchange of ideas and best practices on sustainability. Schwarzenegger’s efforts laid the foundation for California’s climate diplomacy, integrating international cooperation into the state’s broader climate strategy. Building on this legacy, Governor Schwarzenegger’s successors, Governor Brown and current Governor Newsom have both continued to champion California-China partnerships, securing advancement of climate action through collaboration. These personal connections underscore the importance of leadership in maintaining momentum for climate partnerships, even during periods of strained federal relations. At the federal level, U.S.-China climate cooperation has also been shaped by key figures like John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua, whose long-standing relationship has helped sustain dialogue during challenging geopolitical times. Their ability to maintain communication and broker agreements, such as the Sunnylands Statement and key language in the Paris Agreement, demonstrates how personal diplomacy can sometimes transcend political divides to deliver tangible progress on climate goals. 4.3.3 Opportunities for Economic and Technological Synergies Despite economic protectionism and regulatory barriers, California-China collaboration remains a critical driver of innovation in the green economy. By pooling resources and expertise, both sides can capitalize on opportunities for joint technological breakthroughs and scale-up production of clean energy solutions. For instance, China’s dominance in the manufacturing of solar panels and batteries complements California’s expertise in policy innovation and market transformation, creating a fertile ground for cooperation in renewable energy deployment and grid modernization. Public-private partnerships are equally pivotal in this context, as they serve as a bridge between academic research, industry innovation, and climate policy. Initiatives like the California-China Clean Tech Partnership exemplify how collaboration can overcome bureaucratic inefficiencies to accelerate

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 adoption of advanced technologies. Additionally, California’s ambitious renewable energy targets, coupled with China’s industrial capacity, present opportunities to jointly explore emerging fields such as hydrogen energy, carbon capture and storage (CCS), and next-generation battery technologies. These synergies not only strengthen local economies but also contribute meaningfully to global 56decarbonization efforts. 4.3.4 Advancing Institutional Resilience and Trust-Building Institutional trust-building is a cornerstone of California-China cooperation. This task is particularly challenging given the backdrop of widening geopolitical distrust, but subnational actors have proven adept at maintaining relationships based on shared interests and mutual accountability. For example, long-standing collaborations between California’s universities and Chinese research institutions, such as Tsinghua University, have continued to yield shared climate solutions and technological advancements, demonstrating the value of sustained knowledge exchange. Furthermore, California’s decentralized governance model offers a unique advantage in fostering institutional partnerships, as individual municipalities, academic institutions, and private-sector stakeholders are empowered to contribute to cross-border cooperation. For instance, the University of California system has partnered with Chinese academic institutions to exchange research on urban sustainability and renewable energy technologies, which directly informs localized climate policies. Subnational initiatives also provide a buffer against federal-level uncertainty, ensuring long-term resilience even as geopolitical dynamics shift. 4.3.5 Leveraging Global Consensus for Subnational Cooperation Amid rising geopolitical tensions, California-China cooperation highlights the critical role that subnational actors can play in advancing global climate goals. The persistence of this partnership demonstrates that climate action can serve as a bridge, even in otherwise adversarial relationships. Leveraging global frameworks—such as the Paris Agreement—California and Chinese provinces align their local strategies with international objectives, ensuring that subnational actions contribute to broader global progress. Moreover, California’s leadership in platforms like the Under2 Coalition and China’s active participation in multilateral environmental agreements provide opportunities to set global standards while fostering bilateral learning. These forums amplify the impact of subnational collaborations by creating a space for dialogue where local actors can share best practices and scale successful solutions worldwide. 4.3.6 Seizing Untapped Opportunities in New Frontiers Looking ahead, California and China have significant opportunities to deepen their collaboration in emerging areas of climate innovation. Joint research initiatives can focus on clean hydrogen technology, leveraging California’s early investments in hydrogen refueling infrastructure and China’s

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 expertise in industrial hydrogen production. Similarly, climate adaptation strategies—such as combating wildfires, advancing urban resilience, and improving water management— present areas 57where localized knowledge can be shared and scaled internationally. Additionally, as both parties work toward their respective climate goals— California’s target of achieving carbon neutrality by 2045 and China’s dual-carbon goals— there is a shared urgency to explore mechanisms for scaling up finance for green infrastructure. Collaborations in climate finance, such as joint investments in green bonds or sustainable development projects, could unlock much-needed resources to accelerate the global energy transition. One of the most recent example is that CITIC Group (China International Trust and Investment Corporation) expressed its willingness to explore further cooperation with Tesla in new energy development and comprehensive financial services during its Chairman Qihua Xi’s meeting with Tesla’s Vice President Mike Snyder on February 14th, 2025 in Beijing. 5. Conclusion The California-China subnational climate partnership serves as a compelling case study in the evolving landscape of S&T diplomacy, particularly in the context of intensifying geopolitical challenges. This collaboration underscores the critical role of subnational actors in advancing global climate objectives, offering theoretical insights into decentralized governance and actionable lessons for fostering cross-sector cooperation. From a theoretical perspective, the California-China partnership challenges traditional state-centric models of international relations by emphasizing the effectiveness of multi-level and polycentric governance. Subnational actors, such as California, demonstrate the capacity to complement national governments, bypass federal-level constraints, and address global challenges like climate change. This partnership exemplifies how decentralized governance fosters innovative solutions, particularly when national-level relations are strained. The application of frameworks such as multi-level governance (Bulkeley, 2013) and polycentric governance (Ostrom, 2010) highlights the adaptability and resilience of subnational actors in navigating complex geopolitical landscapes. Moreover, the California-China collaboration enriches the discourse on hybrid governance models, integrating top-down initiatives with bottom-up engagement, guided by the interplay of ideas, interests, and institutionalization (I-I-I). The subnational cooperation’s reliance on MOUs, public-private partnerships, and academic exchanges illustrates how non-binding agreements and informal networks can sustain collaboration even in the absence of formal treaties. This hybrid approach aligns with emerging theories of “hybrid multilateralism” (Bäckstrand et al., 2017), which emphasize the interplay between macro- and micro-level actors in addressing transnational issues. By framing California-China cooperation as a microcosm of broader U.S.-China relations, this study contributes to the theoretical understanding of how subnational actors can navigate geopolitical fragmentation to advance shared objectives.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 Practically speaking, the California-China partnership highlights the potential of subnational diplomacy to drive tangible progress in climate action. California’s leadership in climate governance, supported by its advanced policy frameworks and institutional networks, has enabled sustained collaboration with Chinese provinces despite broader geopolitical tensions. Initiatives such as the California-China Clean Tech Partnership and the establishment of the California-China Climate Institute demonstrate the effectiveness of cross-sector collaboration in advancing clean energy 58technologies, emissions reductions, and sustainable development. On the other hand, the involvement of private sector actors, such as BYD and Tesla, further underscores the importance of bottom-up proactive innovation in achieving climate goals. BYD’s localized production in California and Tesla’s integration into China’s EV market illustrate how businesses can align with subnational climate priorities to foster economic growth and technological advancement. These case studies highlight the reciprocal nature of U.S.-China cooperation in the green economy, where shared incentives— such as market access, job creation, and technological innovation— drive mutual benefits. Furthermore, academic institutions further foster long-term collaboration via joint research and dialogue. The partnership faces federal constraints, trade barriers, and the politicization of climate action, which create trust deficits and complicate deeper institutionalization. However, its resilience and adaptability offer actionable insights in prioritizing clean energy, leveraging global frameworks like the Paris Agreement, and seizing opportunities in hydrogen energy, carbon capture, and climate finance. These emerging areas provide new platforms for innovation and scalable global solutions. Theoretical insights from this case study contribute to the understanding of decentralized governance and hybrid cooperation models, while its practical achievements showcase the critical role of subnational actors in driving innovation and resilience. The California-China subnational climate partnership exemplifies the transformative potential of S&T diplomacy in addressing global challenges. By bridging local actions with global objectives, this partnership not only advances climate outcomes but also serves as a stabilizing force in international relations. As the world grapples with the escalating climate crisis, the California-China partnership provides a blueprint for how subnational diplomacy can transcend geopolitical tensions to deliver meaningful progress. Strengthening institutional trust, fostering cross-sectoral collaboration, and exploring untapped opportunities in emerging climate solutions will be essential for sustaining this partnership and achieving shared decarbonization goals. Ultimately, the California-China collaboration underscores the enduring relevance of S&T diplomacy as a tool for navigating global uncertainties and advancing a sustainable future. By focusing on shared priorities and fostering mutual trust, this partnership demonstrates that even amid geopolitical complexities, climate action can serve as a unifying force for global progress.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 59Acknowledgement The author would like to extend sincere gratitude to the moderators and commentators of Panel 10: U.S.-China Relations: Non-Traditional Issues at the 20th Annual Conference of the American Studies Network held in Beijing from October 25 to 27, 2024, the theme of which is “Connecting People, Culture and Ideas: Re-examining Sino-American Exchange.” The author appreciate their insightful feedback and constructive suggestions, which greatly enriched this paper. Special thanks are also due to the organizers of the conference, U.S.-China Education Trust, and the co-sponsor, Beijing Foreign Studies University for providing this invaluable platform for scholarly exchange. Funding Statement This research was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Project Approval No. 2024JX081). Author Contributions The author Yucan Jin confirms sole responsibility for the following: study conception and design, data collection, analysis and interpretation of results, and manuscript preparation. Availability of Data and Materials The data used in this study are derived from publicly available literature, news reports and web pages, which have been listed in the references. Conflicts of Interest The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest to report regarding the present study. References [1]. Congressional Research Servive. (2024, May 16). U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12510 [2]. Gray, N. (2021, March 12). How Californians Are Weaponizing Environmental Law and How to Fix It. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/03/signature-environmental-law-hurts-housing/618264/ [3]. Lieberthal, K., & Sandalow, D. (2009, January). Overcoming Obstacles to U.S.-China Cooperation on Climate Change. Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/01_climate_change_lieberthal_sandalow.pdf [4]. Hobbs, A. (2012, September 21). Renewable Energy in California: What Has Policy Brought Us? Climate Policy Initiative. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/renewable-energy-in-california-what-has-policy-brought-us/ [5]. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. (n.d.) International Energy Analysis: China Energy Program. Retrieved October 8, 2024, from https://international.lbl.gov/china-energy-program

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 [6]. 60The White House Office of the Vice President. (1997, October 29). Vice President Announces United States and China Advance Energy and Environment Cooperation. U.S. Department of State Archive. https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eap/971029_gore_china.html [7]. Asia Society Policy Institute. (n.d.) U.S.-China Climate Cooperation Timeline. Last Updated October 17, 2024, from https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/us-china-climate-cooperation-timeline [8]. Schwarzenegger, A., Adams, L. S., Nichols, M. D., & Goldstene, J. N. (2008, December). Climate Change Scoping Plan: A Framework for Change. California Air Resources Board for the State of California. https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/classic/cc/scopingplan/document/adopted_scoping_plan.pdf [9]. Finamore, B. (2009, October 3). California and Jiangsu Province Sign Agreement for Cooperation on Climate Policies - Part I. Natural Resources Defense Council. https://www.nrdc.org/bio/barbara-finamore/california-and-jiangsu-province-sign-agreement-cooperation-climate-policies [10]. Hocking, B. (1993). Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy (1st ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. [11]. Selin, H., & VanDeveer, S. D. (Ed.) (2009, September 1). Changing Climates in North American Politics: Institutions, Policymaking, and Multilevel Governance. MIT Press. [12]. Pahl-Wostl, C. (2009). A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Adaptive Capacity and Multi-level Learning Processes in Resource Governance Regimes. Global Environmental Change, 19(3), 354-365. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.06.001 [13]. Setzer, J. (2015, October). Testing the Boundaries of Subnational Diplomacy: The International Climate Action of Local and Regional Governments. Transnational Environmental Law, 4(2), 319-337. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102515000126 [14]. Bulkeley, H. (2013). Cities and Climate Change (1st ed.). Routledge. [15]. Rabe, B. G.(Ed.) (2010, August 16). Greenhouse Governance: Addressing Climate Change in America. Brookings Institution Press. [16]. Kellner, E., Petrovics, D., & Huitema, D. (2024). Polycentric Climate Governance: The State, Local Action, Democratic Preferences, and Power—Emerging Insights and a Research Agenda. Global Environmental Politics, 24(3), 24-47. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00753 [17]. Meckling, J., & Van de Graaf, T. (2020). "Chapter 22: To engage, or not to engage? U.S. foreign policy on climate and clean energy". In Handbook of U.S. Environmental Policy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Retrieved Dec 5, 2024, from https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788972840.00031 [18]. Bäckstrand, K., Kuyper, J. W., Linnér, B. O., & Lövbrand, E. (2017). Non-State Actors in Global Climate Governance: from Copenhagen to Paris and Beyond. Environmental Politics, 26(4), 561–579. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1327485

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 [19]. 61Ostrom, E. (2010). Polycentric Systems for Coping With Collective Action and Global Environmental Change. Global Environmental Change, 20(4), 550-557. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.07.004 [20]. Leffel, B. (2018, March). Subnational Diplomacy, Climate Governance & Californian Global Leadership. University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy. https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u39301/Subnational%20Diplomacy,%20Climate%20Governance%20&%20Californian%20Global%20Leadership%20-%20Benjamin%20Leffel_0.pdf [21]. US Energy Foundation. (2013, September 25). China, California Sign Climate MOU. https://www.ef.org/2013/09/25/china-california-sign-climate-mou/ [22]. California Energy Commission. (n.d.) Cliamate Change Partnerships. Retrieved December 8, 2024, from https://www.energy.ca.gov/about/international-cooperation/climate-change-partnerships [23]. The Climate Group. (n.d.) The Under2 Coalition. Retrieved October 8, 2024, from https://www.theclimategroup.org/under2-coalition [24]. Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr..(2017, June 6). Photo Release: China Day 3: Governor Brown Meets with President Xi of the People’s Republic of China, Signs Agreement with National Government to Boost Green Technology. https://archive.gov.ca.gov/archive/gov39/2017/06/06/news19832/index.html [25]. Yuanling, L. (2024, May 13). Opinion: Strengthen Subnational Links to Promote China–US Climate Cooperation. Dialogue Earth. https://dialogue.earth/en/climate/opinion-strengthen-local-links-to-promote-china-us-climate-cooperation/ [26]. Office of the Governor of California. (2023, October 28). CA-Jiangsu-MOU-2023. https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/CA-Jiangsu-MOU-2023.pdf [27]. Governor Gavin Newsom. (n.d.) What Governor Newsom’s Trip to China Accomplished. https://www.gov.ca.gov/2023/10/30/what-governor-newsoms-trip-to-china-accomplished/ [28]. BYD Motors. (n.d.) Bus American Workforce. Retrieved December 13, 2024, from https://en.byd.com/bus/about/#bus-about-3 [29]. BYD. (2021). BYD Produces 400th Bus at Lancaster, Calif. Manufacturing Plant. Retrieved December 13, 2024, from https://en.byd.com/news/byd-produces-400th-bus-in-lancaster/ [30]. Business Wire. (2013, May 1). BYD and the City of Lancaster Announce Two Manufacturing Facilities in Lancaster, California. Retrieved December 13, 2024, from https://en.byd.com/news/byd-and-the-city-of-lancaster-announce-lancaster-energy-module-and-electric-bus-manufacturing-facilities/ [31]. International Airport Review. (n.d.). Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) Goes Greener with Electric Buses. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from https://www.internationalairportreview.com/news/68598/los-angeles-international-unveils-fleet-of-electric-buses/

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 [32]. California-China Climate Institute. (2023, July 14). Opportunities for Enhanced Near-62Term U.S.-China Climate Action: Subnational Climate Leadership [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/hetF9wS0quo?si=G76D5npTYrNnGC7b [33]. California Environmental Protection Agency. “Press Release: California Leaders Visit China to Strengthen Climate Partnerships, Advance Global Climate Action.” Retrieved October 9, 2024, from https://calepa.ca.gov/2024/04/02/press-release-california-leaders-visit-china-to-strengthen-climate-partnerships-advance-global-climate-action/ [34]. BYD. (2019, November). BYD Highlights Industrial Manufacturing Technician Apprenticeship Program During National Apprenticeship Week. Retrieved December 16, 2024, from https://en.byd.com/news/byd-proud-to-support-apprenticeship-program/ [35]. Avta. (2022, March 16). AVTA Becomes First All-Electric Zero-Emission Transit Agency. https://www.avta.com/avta-becomes-first-all-electric-zero-emission-transit-agency [36]. Tesla's Gigafactory Shanghai and EV production: Tesla. (2022). Tesla vehicle production & deliveries. Retrieved from https://www.tesla.com/ir [37]. Global EV market and cost reduction through China-based production: Mou, N. (2023, January 3). Tesla Gigafactory Shanghai 2022 deliveries exceed 700,000 vehicles. CNEVPost. Retrieved from https://cnevpost.com/2023/01/03/tesla-gigafactory-shanghai-2022-deliveries-exceed-700000-vehicles/ [38]. Partnerships with CATL (lithium battery supplier) and impact on EV cost efficiency: Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited. (2021). Annual report. Retrieved from https://www.catl.com/en/investor/announcement/ [39]. Connection between Tesla's EVs and California’s zero-emission vehicle mandate: California Air Resources Board. (2022). Zero-emission vehicle program. Retrieved from https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/zero-emission-vehicle-program [40]. Tesla’s workforce and green-skills initiatives at Gigafactory Shanghai: Choudhury, S. (2020, October 22). Tesla’s Shanghai factory ramps up hiring, hints at wider EV market push in China. CNBC. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com [41]. California’s “just transition” goals and emphasis on workforce sustainability: California Workforce Development Board. (2021). Putting California on the high road: A jobs and climate action plan for 2030. Retrieved from https://cwdb.ca.gov [42]. California EV adoption target and Tesla’s contribution: California Energy Commission. (2021). 2021 IEPR update volume III: Decarbonizing transportation. Retrieved from https://www.energy.ca.gov [43]. California-China climate cooperation and subnational agreements: Office of the Governor of California. (2021). California-China climate partnership. Retrieved from https://www.gov.ca.gov/climate/

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 [44]. “U.S.-China Cities and States Strengthen Ties to Advance Climate Action.” California-63China Climate Institute, May 29, 2024, https://ccci.berkeley.edu/news/2024/05/us-china-cities-and-states-strengthen-ties-advance-climate-action [45]. [Q2 2023 Update]. (2023). In Q2 2023 Update (p. 1) [Report]. https://digitalassets.tesla.com/tesla-contents/image/upload/IR/TSLA-Q2-2023-Update.pdf [46]. California-China Climate Institute. (2023, June 9). [WEBINAR] Opportunities for Enhanced Near-Term U.S.-China Climate Action: Zero Emissions Vehicles [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BesZPizL040 [47]. California-China Climate Institute. (2022, October 17). Inside China’s National Adaptation Strategy 2035 [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AIwvjo5PfK4 [48]. California-China Climate Institute. (2022a, May 17). An Inside Look at China and California’s Carbon Markets [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZvH6WdQb1XQ [49]. 2022 International Green Energy Summit and 14th US-China Green Energy Summit Were Successfully Held-Department of Electrical Engineering Tsinghua University. (n.d.). https://www.eea.tsinghua.edu.cn/en/info/1038/2781.htm [50]. [Research] landing page. (n.d.). California-China Climate Institute. https://ccci.berkeley.edu/research [51]. Institute for China-America Studies. (2024, February 21). Renewing the US-China Science and Technology Agreement. Can S&T Cooperation Coexist with Decoupling? [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIXNMHtlDQo [52]. Wang, B. (2024b, October 24). Four Lessons from 30 Years of US-China Climate Cooperation. Dialogue Earth. https://dialogue.earth/en/climate/four-lessons-from-30-years-of-us-china-climate-cooperation/?mc_cid=9147354ecf&mc_eid=751460e836 [53]. Ching, N. (2024, December 13). US, China Sign 5-year Amended Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-china-sign-5-year-amended-agreement-on-science-and-technology-cooperation-/7900132.html [54]. Yu, Liang. “Feature: Chinese Electric Automaker BYD Drives Job Growth in S. California.” XinHuaNet, May 7, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/07/c_137159957_7.htm [55]. California Governor’s Office of Business and Economic Development. “International Support China.” Accessed Oct. 8, 2024. https://business.ca.gov/advantages/international-trade-and-investment/international-collaboration/international-support/ [56]. Dai, Fan. “California-China Subnational Climate Cooperation Including the Example of GHG Cap-and-Trade Program, and the GHG Benchmarking in the Cement Industry” PhD diss., State University of New York, 2015. file:///Users/JinYucan/Downloads/Fan%20Dai%20diss%200119.pdf [57]. Center for Strategic & International Studies The Trade Guy Podcast. “A New Tariff Man in Town.” May 21, 2024, https://youtu.be/5q3sCm8d0wk?si=zeVA2EyepldaDhYS.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 38-64 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250451 Copyright: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MOSP and/or the editor(s). MOSP and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or 64products referred to in the content.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. Macao Scientifi Publishers（MOSP） https://www.mospbs.com/journal/jiegg 65·Article· Research on the Integration of the Singapore Mediation Convention with China's Commercial Mediation System Kaiheng Hu1, Qifan Jiang2,* 1 School of International Law, East China University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai, China; Pritzker School of Law, Northwestern University, Chicago, USA. 2 School of International Law, East China University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai, China; Law School, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands. * Corresponding Authors: Qifan Jiang. Email: jqflance2001@outlook.com Received: 5 January 2025 Accepted: 25 February 2025 Published: 25 March 2025 Abstract: The Singapore Mediation Convention is another milestone document in the development of international commercial dispute resolution mechanisms, providing a unified framework for the enforcement of cross-border settlement agreements. However, the convention's rules differ significantly from China's existing commercial mediation system in terms of the legal nature of settlement agreements and enforcement mechanisms. These differences may lead to challenges in judicial review and an increased risk of fraudulent mediation. This article proposes a transition from a "dual-track system" to a "unified system" as a progressive approach to aligning the convention with China's commercial mediation framework. Drawing on international experience and China's legal practice, the article examines key issues such as the legal effect of mediation agreements, reforms in enforcement procedures, and remedies for third parties. Specific recommendations include improving mediator guidelines, optimizing review mechanisms, and establishing a phased enforcement system. The study aims to provide a feasible plan for China's timely ratification and effective implementation of the convention, thereby promoting the development of international commercial mediation and enhancing the global competitiveness of China's commercial mediation system. Keywords: Singapore Mediation Convention; Enforcement of Settlement Agreements; International Commercial Mediation; China's Commercial Mediation System 1. Introduction Since World War II, the acceleration of globalization and the increasing frequency of transnational commercial interactions have led to a growing preference among commercial entities worldwide for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, particularly arbitration, due to its efficiency, confidentiality, and convenience. In international commercial practice, arbitration is often favored over

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 litigation in resolving disputes. However, as commercial arbitration has become more standardized and specialized, arbitration costs have surged, and procedures have become increasingly complex. Consequently, mediation, another form of ADR, has garnered widespread international attention. Nevertheless, since the enforceability of commercial settlement agreements is often equivalent to that of ordinary contracts, parties frequently harbor doubts regarding the effectiveness of mediation and the enforceability of settlement agreements. These concerns are even more pronounced in international 66commercial transactions, posing a significant barrier to the use of mediation for dispute resolution. In contrast, arbitration does not face this issue due to the existence of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter referred to as the New York Convention). The New York Convention, which has been ratified by over 160 countries, grants international enforceability to arbitral awards, facilitating their cross-border recognition and execution in most major jurisdictions. It is fair to say that the New York Convention has played a pivotal role in making arbitration more attractive than litigation and in establishing arbitration as the preferred method for resolving international commercial disputes. Inspired by the success of the New York Convention in the field of arbitration, the international community widely recognized the need for a similar international instrument for commercial mediation. This led to the drafting of the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (hereinafter referred to as the Singapore Convention on Mediation or the Convention) under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The Convention was opened for signature in Singapore on August 7, 2019, and has since been signed by 58 countries. As the "spiritual successor" of the New York Convention in the field of commercial mediation, the Convention carries high expectations from the international community. However, significant debates remain among scholars and practitioners worldwide regarding whether and when to ratify the Convention. Only 15 have officially ratified it. China, along with the majority of signatory states, has yet to ratify the Convention. The primary reason for this hesitation is that the Convention mandates the enforcement of all settlement agreements meeting its requirements without allowing reciprocal reservations. Furthermore, it grants such settlement agreements full enforceability and, to a certain extent, res judicata effect, which conflicts with the mediation regimes of many countries. Additionally, the Convention requires signatory states to adjust their domestic legal frameworks to ensure the enforceability of settlement agreements, which poses significant challenges for many countries, including China, in terms of aligning their domestic laws with the Convention within a short timeframe. Nonetheless, as a signatory to the Convention, China has an obligation to ratify it. Moreover, enhancing and refining the mediation system aligns with China's legal culture, which traditionally emphasizes the resolution of disputes outside the courtroom (Wusong). It also supports China's broader economic policy objectives of improving the business environment and its legal strategy of prioritizing non-litigation dispute resolution mechanisms. Ratifying the Convention would not only stimulate the

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 development of China's mediation system but also play a crucial role in safeguarding China's extensive 67overseas economic interests. Accordingly, this paper examines the alignment between the Singapore Convention and China's commercial mediation system based on a comparative analysis of the Convention's provisions, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation (hereinafter referred to as the Model Law), and China's domestic mediation framework. Through this analysis, the paper aims to provide recommendations for improving China's mediation system to facilitate the smooth ratification and implementation of the Convention. 2. Challenges of Ratifying the Singapore Convention on Mediation for China 2.1 Terminological Discrepancies Between the Convention's "Settlement Agreement" and Chinese Legal Practice The final authoritative Chinese text of the Singapore Convention on Mediation adopts the term "settlement agreement" to refer to an enforceable agreement resulting from mediation. However, in China's legal framework, a settlement agreement primarily refers to an agreement independently reached by parties of equal standing to resolve a dispute, involving the disposition of substantive rights and obligations. According to Article 1 of the Convention, a settlement agreement refers specifically to a written agreement resulting from mediation, in which parties seek to resolve a commercial dispute. Mediation, in turn, is defined as a process in which a neutral third party assists disputing parties in amicably settling their dispute. This definition effectively excludes settlement agreements reached independently by parties without third-party assistance from the scope of the Convention. In contrast, in Chinese legal terminology, agreements resulting from mediation are generally referred to as "mediation agreements" or "mediation decisions" rather than "settlement agreements." For instance, the Civil Procedure Law refers to such agreements as "mediation decisions," while the People's Mediation Law uses the term "mediation agreement." Recognizing this potential issue, UNCITRAL took deliberate steps to harmonize the use of the terms "settlement" and "mediation" during the revision of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation to avoid inconsistencies within the text. However, if China ratifies the Convention, the inconsistency between the terminology in the Convention and China's domestic legal documents may cause confusion among enforcement agencies and parties involved in mediation, thereby affecting the practical application of the Convention in China. 2.2 Impact on Judicial Review and Protection 2.2.1 Direct Enforcement of Settlement Agreements Weakens Judicial Review The most significant legislative purpose of the Singapore Convention on Mediation is to establish a unified legal framework for the enforcement of settlement agreements, enhancing their cross-border applicability and thereby increasing the attractiveness of mediation for commercial entities. To achieve

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 this, Article 3 of the Convention explicitly provides that settlement agreements under its scope shall have direct enforceability in contracting states. The first paragraph of Article 3 stipulates that contracting states must enforce settlement agreements directly through their domestic procedures, without requiring a prior judgment or ruling. In other words, the Convention requires and expects enforcement authorities in contracting states to treat settlement agreements as legally binding and directly enforceable documents, rather than merely as contracts enforceable under the general 68framework of contract law. Admittedly, from the perspective of international commercial dispute resolution, this provision is relatively reasonable. While a settlement agreement is, in essence, a civil contract, it is based on the voluntary waiver of original contractual rights by both parties. Moreover, parties often make significant compromises and concessions and invest considerable time and effort in the mediation process. Therefore, settlement agreements should indeed receive greater privileges in enforcement compared to ordinary contracts. However, most jurisdictions, including China, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom, currently treat settlement agreements either as ordinary civil contracts or as legal documents that require transformation before they become enforceable. Only a few countries, such as Russia and Spain, recognize settlement agreements as directly enforceable legal documents. As early as the drafting stage of the Convention, some state representatives explicitly opposed the direct recognition of settlement agreements' legal effect, leading to the Convention's current approach of merely enumerating the binding effect of settlement agreements while avoiding a direct definition of their legal nature. Even so, the Convention still grants settlement agreements the effect of precluding parties from initiating new dispute resolution proceedings and requires contracting states to recognize and enforce such agreements. This effectively treats settlement agreements as directly enforceable legal documents with a certain degree of res judicata, which fundamentally differs from China's current legal practice and commercial mediation system. Moreover, the Convention does not impose any qualifications or procedural requirements on mediators. The only relevant provision is Article 2, which allows a competent authority to refuse enforcement if a mediator has violated applicable professional standards or has lost impartiality and independence. Thus, the Convention permits individuals and various entities to act as mediators, recognizes their facilitated settlement agreements, and grants all international settlement agreements within its scope equal enforceability. In contrast, China's legal framework currently allows only specific types of mediated settlement agreements to be transformed into enforceable legal documents, while others remain mere civil contracts with no special enforceability. Generally, mediation in China is categorized into three types based on enforceability: litigation (or arbitration) mediation, institutional mediation, and non-institutional mediation. Litigation (or arbitration) mediation refers to mediation conducted within court or arbitration proceedings under judicial or arbitral supervision. Settlement agreements resulting from

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 this process typically hold the same enforceability as judgments or arbitral awards. Institutional mediation refers to mediation conducted outside litigation but under the supervision of legally established mediation organizations, where the resulting settlement agreement can be judicially confirmed under China's Civil Procedure Law, making it enforceable through compulsory execution. Non-institutional mediation, on the other hand, takes place outside both litigation and institutional frameworks. Settlement agreements reached through this type of mediation generally lack special enforceability and are treated only as ordinary civil contracts, requiring a court ruling to gain enforceability. In other words, China's current mediation system does not recognize non-institutional mediation as a formal mediation process, and such agreements are not granted enforceability distinct 69from ordinary contracts. The Convention, however, treats all settlement agreements resulting from mediation conducted outside litigation (or arbitration) as directly enforceable legal documents, granting them the same enforceability as mediation decisions issued through formal institutional mediation. This fundamental difference in legal treatment creates significant challenges for China if it ratifies the Convention. China's existing legal framework lacks clear regulations on the qualifications and ethical standards of mediators, particularly for non-institutional mediation. In practice, the quality and impartiality of mediation conducted by informal mediation organizations are often questionable. At the same time, commercial parties frequently opt for non-institutional mediation due to its flexibility, efficiency, and confidentiality. Because the Convention does not impose any restrictions on mediator qualifications, its ratification may allow non-institutional mediations to achieve the same enforceability as institutional or even litigation-mediated settlements, thereby necessitating stricter judicial scrutiny of non-institutional mediation agreements. This results in a fundamental conflict: on the one hand, China currently allows only litigation-based and institutional mediation agreements to be enforced or transformed into enforceable legal documents. However, the Convention mandates direct enforceability for all settlement agreements under its scope, bypassing judicial review procedures under China's current system. Within the Convention's framework, Chinese courts would only be able to conduct a formal review of whether a settlement agreement resulted from mediation, rather than a substantive review of its contents. This significantly reduces the ability of Chinese courts to exercise discretion in reviewing international settlement agreements. On the other hand, the Convention explicitly provides that if a mediator has seriously violated applicable standards, a party may request the competent authority to refuse enforcement. However, the Convention itself does not define the qualifications or ethical standards for mediators, leaving these issues to be determined by each contracting state. This places an additional regulatory burden on China. Given that China's commercial mediation system is still in its early stages of development, various mediation service providers currently follow different sets of rules regarding mediator qualifications and ethical standards. While these rules share similarities, they lack uniformity and authoritative

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 recognition. Without a well-established and unified framework for mediation standards and judicial review mechanisms, Chinese courts would struggle to assess the validity and enforceability of 70international settlement agreements under the Convention. Table 1: Mediation Agreements Under the Current Legal System and the Singapore Convention Procedure Procedure Legal Nature Mediation Entity Mediation Agreements under China's Current Legal System Litigation (Arbitration) Mediation Legally enforceable document Courts, Arbitration Commissions Institutional Mediation Document enforceable after transformation Mediation institutions established by law Non-Institutional Mediation General contract Various entities Mediation Agreements under the Singapore Convention Non-Litigation (Arbitration) Mediation Legally enforceable document Various entities 2.2.2 Impact on Judicial Authorities' Ability to Protect China's Commercial Interests The Convention requires that settlement agreements within its scope must be international in nature and must result from a mediation process. According to Article 1 of the Convention, the criterion for determining internationality is the place of business of the parties. This provision effectively eliminates the "nationality" of settlement agreements. As a result, parties seeking mediation can conclude their settlement agreement anywhere under the guidance of any mediator, and the resulting settlement agreement will be enforceable in any contracting state. On one hand, this provision relieves enforcement authorities from the responsibility of examining the governing law of settlement agreements, thereby simplifying the cross-border enforcement process. This aligns with the growing trend of "delocalization" in international commercial dispute resolution, reflecting the flexible nature of mediation and the fact that commercial mediation often involves multiple jurisdictions, making it difficult to determine a fixed place of conclusion. However, on the other hand, this provision also means that the Convention does not allow for reciprocal reservations, meaning that all contracting states must enforce any settlement agreement under the Convention, regardless of the governing law, the mediation institution, or the location where the mediation took place. Consequently, ratifying the Convention may provide non-contracting states with a "free-riding" opportunity, thereby weakening the ability of Chinese courts to protect domestic commercial entities and potentially harming China's commercial interests. The "free-riding" issue arises because without reciprocal reservations, an international settlement agreement may be enforceable in one contracting state where a party's assets are located, while

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 remaining unenforceable in another state that is not a party to the Convention where the counterparty's assets are located. For example, before China ratifies the Convention, an international settlement agreement could be enforced in China through one of the following two pathways: (1) The mediation is conducted by a Chinese mediation institution, and the settlement agreement is confirmed by a Chinese court, obtaining a judicial ruling as the basis for enforcement. (2) The parties initiate litigation in a Chinese court, which renders a judgment that serves as the basis for enforcement. Under either pathway, the settlement agreement either goes through mediation under a Chinese institution or is subject to a substantive review by Chinese courts, ensuring a higher level of protection for Chinese commercial entities. However, if China ratifies the Convention, international settlement agreements would automatically be enforceable in China, and Chinese courts would only be able to conduct a formal review within the enforcement process. Under the Convention's framework, this review would be limited to procedural aspects rather than a substantive examination. This inevitably reduces the ability 71of Chinese judicial authorities to protect Chinese commercial interests. Conversely, if the counterparty's main assets are located in a non-contracting state, and that state does not grant direct enforceability to international settlement agreements, then its courts will have greater discretion and flexibility to review the agreement, thereby better protecting the counterparty's rights. Even if the agreement is ultimately enforced in that state, the costs and efforts incurred by Chinese commercial entities would be significantly higher. That said, China's ratification of the Convention could also enhance its business environment, potentially making foreign commercial entities more willing to engage with Chinese businesses. This could indirectly increase the competitiveness of Chinese commercial entities. However, ensuring the protection of domestic commercial entities should remain a primary concern for China's enforcement authorities after ratifying the Convention. The issue of fraudulent mediation also warrants serious attention. Fraudulent mediation refers to the abuse of the mediation process by parties who collude to fabricate legal relationships or legal facts, thereby harming third-party rights, disrupting judicial fairness, and interfering with litigation procedures. and establish relaxed review procedures to facilitate the enforcement of settlement agreements. This pursuit of efficiency could easily result in third-party rights being compromised. Additionally, since settlement agreements under the Convention are inherently international, multiple foreign elements such as the place of business of the parties and the location of mediation make it inherently difficult for courts to ascertain the facts of the case and the applicable law. The complexity of legal determinations is further exacerbated in cases of fraudulent mediation, where the parties involved deliberately conceal the true nature of the dispute. Under the guiding principle of "acting swiftly," courts may face significant obstacles in effectively reviewing such agreements. Moreover, due to the confidential nature of mediation, third parties have no means of knowing that the mediation has taken place, let alone the specific terms of the settlement agreement. Given the international nature of settlement agreements, a third party's habitual residence and the location of

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 relevant assets are often in different jurisdictions, leading to situations where settlement agreements are 72fully enforced before third parties even realize that their rights have been harmed. Under the Convention framework, third parties also face significant obstacles in seeking legal remedies. First, both Chinese law and the Convention lack protective mechanisms for third-party relief. Under China's legal framework, third-party remedies in enforcement proceedings primarily take the form of third-party objections to enforcement and third-party revocation lawsuits. However, as of now, neither of these mechanisms can be invoked by third parties against settlement agreements. The Convention, for its part, only provides relief procedures for parties to the settlement agreement, with no provisions whatsoever addressing the rights of third parties. Additionally, under the Convention framework, the party seeking enforcement may not have assets in the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought. If a third party wishes to pursue recovery enforcement against the applicant's assets, the process could involve cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments. Given that court judgments carry significantly greater public authority than settlement agreements, the recognition and enforcement of judgments are far more challenging than those of settlement agreements. This process often requires judicial cooperation from foreign courts and involves a complex network of bilateral and multilateral treaties, reciprocal enforcement reservations, and procedural hurdles, making it extremely difficult for third parties to seek effective remedies. 2.2.3 Exacerbate the Fraudulent Litigation The so-called fraudulent mediation refers to a situation in civil litigation where parties abuse the mediation process by colluding, fabricating civil legal relationships or legal facts, and thereby harming the legitimate rights and interests of third parties outside the case, undermining judicial fairness, and interfering with litigation procedures. As previously discussed, once China ratifies the Convention, the ability and effectiveness of its competent authorities to review settlement agreements will be significantly affected, which in turn may increase the likelihood of fraudulent mediation and exacerbate its negative consequences. Specifically, from an analysis of the legislative intent behind the Convention, it is evident that the Convention expects competent authorities in contracting states to act swiftly and establish relaxed review procedures to facilitate the enforcement of settlement agreements. This emphasis on efficiency can easily result in the rights and interests of third parties being compromised. Furthermore, since settlement agreements under the Convention are inherently international, they often involve foreign elements such as the place of business of the parties or the location of mediation, making it inherently difficult for courts to ascertain the facts of the case and determine the governing law. This difficulty is exacerbated in cases of fraudulent mediation, where the parties involved deliberately conceal the true nature of the dispute. Under the guiding principle of "acting swiftly", courts would face substantial challenges in effectively reviewing such settlement agreements. Additionally, due to the confidential nature of mediation, third parties whose rights have been infringed have no means of knowing that the mediation has taken place, let alone the specific terms of

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 the settlement agreement. Given the international nature of settlement agreements, a third party's habitual residence and the location of relevant assets are often in different jurisdictions, and in many real-world cases, settlement agreements are fully enforced before the third party even realizes their 73rights have been harmed. Moreover, under the Convention, third parties face significant obstacles in seeking legal remedies. First, both Chinese law and the Convention lack protective mechanisms for third-party relief. Under China's legal framework, third-party remedies in enforcement proceedings primarily take the form of third-party objections to enforcement and third-party revocation lawsuits. However, as of now, neither of these mechanisms can be invoked by third parties against settlement agreements. The Convention, for its part, only provides relief procedures for parties to the settlement agreement, with no provisions whatsoever addressing the rights of third parties. Additionally, under the Convention framework, the party seeking enforcement may not have assets in the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought. If a third party wishes to pursue recovery enforcement against the applicant's assets, the process could involve cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments. Given that court judgments carry significantly greater public authority than settlement agreements, the recognition and enforcement of judgments are far more challenging than those of settlement agreements. This process often requires judicial cooperation from foreign courts and involves a complex network of bilateral and multilateral treaties, reciprocal enforcement reservations, and procedural hurdles, making it extremely difficult for third parties to seek effective remedies. 2.3 The Enforcement Mechanism is Incompatible with China's Existing System The differences between the Convention and China's mediation system extend beyond just the definition of settlement agreements, which determines the scope of application. A more fundamental divergence lies in the enforcement mechanism, which governs how settlement agreements are executed. In China, both the People's Mediation Law and the Civil Procedure Law explicitly stipulate that courts can only initiate the confirmation procedure to review settlement agreements if both parties jointly apply for it. In contrast, the Convention does not explicitly state whether initiating the enforcement procedure requires the joint application of both parties. However, Article 5 of the Convention provides that one party may request the competent authority to refuse enforcement under certain conditions. This suggests that the Convention allows enforcement procedures to be initiated upon the request of a single party; otherwise, if one party's objection could prevent the initiation of enforcement, the provision allowing a party to request refusal of enforcement would be meaningless. This difference largely stems from the fact that the Convention and China's system place the review of settlement agreements in different procedural stages. The Convention integrates the review of settlement agreements into the enforcement process. Since enforcement procedures are inherently triggered only when one party fails to perform, requiring both parties to jointly apply for enforcement would be neither feasible nor necessary.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 In contrast, China places the review of settlement agreements within judicial proceedings or a separate confirmation procedure, depending on whether the mediation was conducted by an institution or another entity. Under China's system, this review process functions as an optional "supplementary procedure" available to mediation participants. A settlement agreement that has not undergone such a review cannot be directly enforced. When parties enter into a settlement agreement, they are generally aware that mediation agreements do not carry enforceability by default, and this understanding of the non-binding nature of such agreements is one of the reasons why parties are willing to resolve disputes 74through mediation in the first place. For this reason, China's courts emphasize the voluntary nature of the confirmation process and place significant importance on protecting the autonomy of the parties involved in mediation. Under China's existing legal framework, a settlement agreement can only be enforced after undergoing a confirmation procedure in which both parties participate. If China decides to ratify the Convention, this would mean that settlement agreements in China would no longer require a confirmation or judicial review process as a safeguard, allowing one party to directly apply for enforcement. If the other party is unaware of this procedural change, their rights and interests could be jeopardized. 2.4 The Ratification of the Convention May Increase the Burden on China's Judiciary Approving the Convention could lead to a shift of related cases to China, causing a surge in enforcement cases and placing additional pressure on China's enforcement agencies. Due to institutional and systemic challenges, "difficulties in enforcement" have long been a persistent issue in China, re-emerging despite continuous efforts to address them. At the same time, with the acceleration of globalization, China has actively participated in international trade and investment, attracting foreign capital, and as a result, a large number of "international assets" exist within its jurisdiction. These assets could potentially become targets for enforcement under international settlement agreements arising from commercial transactions. Since contracting states to the Convention are obligated to enforce all settlement agreements under its scope, regardless of the nationality of the parties, China's ratification would mean that numerous settlement agreements not governed by Chinese law and not concluded in China could still be submitted for enforcement in Chinese courts simply because the enforcement target is located in China. This would require Chinese courts to invest significant time and effort in determining the facts of these cases and the applicable law. Furthermore, because the Convention grants settlement agreements direct enforceability and integrates their review into the enforcement process, many agreements that should have been reviewed abroad may instead be submitted for review in China, further intensifying the burden on Chinese enforcement agencies. Additionally, since the enforcement of settlement agreements under the Convention does not require any connection between the agreement itself and the enforcing state, Chinese courts may encounter a large number of settlement agreements whose validity must be assessed under foreign laws. This presents significant challenges in terms of ascertaining and applying foreign law. If China attempts

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 to ease the judicial burden by reducing the scope or depth of review, this would inevitably weaken the judiciary's ability to scrutinize settlement agreements, ultimately diminishing the level of protection provided to Chinese commercial entities. Therefore, after ratifying the Convention, China must develop 75effective measures to address this contradiction. 3. Reform Directions for China's Commercial Mediation System 3.1 Defining the Semantic and Legal Nature of Settlement Agreements and Clarifying Grounds for Invalidity First, there is a terminological discrepancy between the Convention and China's existing legal framework regarding the terminology for enforceable agreements under the Convention, which may lead to semantic confusion. As previously mentioned, the official Chinese text of the Convention adopts the term "settlement agreement". However, in Chinese commercial practice, a settlement agreement typically refers to an agreement reached independently by both parties without the involvement of a third-party mediator. By contrast, under the legislative intent of the Convention, an enforceable agreement resulting from mediation is commonly referred to in China as a "mediation decision" or "mediation agreement". To avoid ambiguities in interpretation, China must resolve this terminological inconsistency upon ratification of the Convention to prevent confusion among enforcement authorities and parties involved, which could hinder the practical application of the Convention. Clearly, it would not be feasible for China to revise all domestic legal documents to replace their terminology with "settlement agreement", as this would create greater uncertainty and confusion. Therefore, China should adopt a two-pronged approach: First, upon ratifying the Convention, China should issue relevant judicial interpretations to standardize the terminology used in the Convention and explain the distinction between the term "settlement agreement" in the Convention and its equivalent terms in China's legal framework. This will ensure that China's judiciary can implement the Convention without misinterpretation. Second, China should conduct awareness campaigns regarding the Convention or consider a "party consent" reservation to ensure that commercial entities seeking mediation are not misled by the semantic inconsistency. Additionally, the Convention grants settlement agreements direct enforceability, treating them as directly enforceable legal instruments, whereas China currently treats them as either transformable into enforceable documents or merely as contracts. Therefore, after ratifying the Convention, China must define the legal status of settlement agreements within its enforcement framework to align domestic law with the Convention. Given that settlement agreements under the Convention are inherently international, they can be categorized into "foreign-related settlement agreements" and "other settlement agreements" for discussion. To ensure alignment with the Convention, China must at least allow foreign-related settlement agreements to be directly enforced. This would require amending the enforcement provisions of the

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 Civil Procedure Law to explicitly recognize the enforceability of foreign-related settlement agreements as legally binding documents within China's enforcement framework. However, for other settlement agreements that do not meet the Convention's criteria for internationality, it would not be advisable to drastically alter China's existing legal structure—at least not immediately upon ratification—to avoid 76disruption caused by sudden systemic changes. Moreover, under the Convention, grounds for revocation do not constitute valid reasons for refusal of enforcement by the enforcing authority. Given the non-national nature of settlement agreements under the Convention, Chinese courts would not have jurisdiction to revoke an international settlement agreement under China's Contract Law. However, as enforcement authorities, Chinese courts must assess the contractual validity of settlement agreements to determine whether they qualify for enforcement. Therefore, China must establish a clear legal framework specifying whether a revocable settlement agreement under Chinese Contract Law constitutes a defective agreement under the Convention. It would be reasonable for China to explicitly classify revocable agreements as falling within the Convention's category of agreements with defects in validity, meaning that Chinese courts should refuse enforcement in such cases, regardless of whether the parties formally seek revocation. Under Chinese law, contracts may be revoked under five circumstances: material misunderstanding, significant unfairness, fraud, coercion, or exploitation of a party in distress. Since mediation involves an independent third-party mediator, the likelihood of these situations arising in a settlement agreement is relatively low. However, if any of these conditions are met, it would indicate that the mediation process was ineffective or had minimal influence on the agreement's outcome. Accordingly, settlement agreements formed under such defective conditions should not enjoy greater legal status than ordinary contracts and should therefore be deemed unenforceable. 3.2 Improving the Legal Framework for Mediation and Enhancing the Quality of Mediation Services As previously discussed, the Convention grants enforceability to settlement agreements resulting from "non-institutional mediation." This means that once China ratifies the Convention, it must at least recognize the validity of foreign-related non-institutional mediation. Moreover, the Convention provides that a party may request the competent authority to refuse enforcement of a settlement agreement if the mediator has seriously violated applicable professional standards. This necessitates that contracting states maintain a well-developed domestic mediation system. At present, China has made significant progress in developing its mediation-related legal framework, particularly in the litigation mediation and people's mediation systems, which have begun to take shape. However, China still lacks clear and comprehensive regulations regarding mediation standards, mediator qualifications, and other fundamental aspects of mediation governance. If China seeks to align its mediation system with the Convention, it must further refine its mediation-related legal framework and enhance the overall quality of mediation services.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 First, China should establish a professional training and certification system for mediators. This could be modeled after the qualification requirements for lawyers and notaries, requiring mediators to hold legal practice certifications, possess relevant professional knowledge, and accumulate a certain number of years of work experience. This would ensure a higher level of professionalism among 77mediators. Second, China should develop a unified nationwide "Mediator Code of Conduct" to serve as a standard reference for Chinese courts. Based on Article 5 of the Convention and the general principles of mediation, this code should include at a minimum: the principle of independence, the principle of impartiality, the mediator's duty of disclosure, and the principle of confidentiality. Third, to better integrate with the Convention, China should, after establishing a sound mediation system, grant direct enforceability to all settlement agreements resulting from mediations conducted by qualified mediators within China. This is not only a necessary step for aligning with the Convention but also reflects the global trend of enhancing commercial dispute resolution mechanisms. 3.3 Establishing a Relief Mechanism for the Enforcement of Foreign-Related Mediation Through Public Notice and Objection Procedures As previously discussed, ratifying the Singapore Convention on Mediation will significantly weaken the judiciary's ability to review and protect parties' interests, potentially exacerbating the risks of fraudulent mediation, increasing the difficulty of judicial review, and making it harder for third parties to seek relief. Therefore, before ratifying the Convention, China must implement institutional safeguards to mitigate these challenges. The following measures could help address these issues. First, while maintaining the "expeditious enforcement" principle, China should strengthen the review of international settlement agreements to the greatest extent possible. Ideally, this could be achieved by incorporating a rigorous review mechanism into the enforcement process to prevent the enforcement of settlement agreements from harming parties or third parties. Second, China could introduce a public notice requirement before enforcing settlement agreements. This would involve publicizing the enforcement details for a reasonable period, thereby allowing third parties to become aware of enforcement actions and seek relief if necessary. Third, China should amend the Civil Procedure Law or introduce separate legislation to establish procedural remedies for third parties affected by the enforcement of settlement agreements. This could include third-party objections to enforcement and third-party revocation lawsuits, ensuring that once a third party becomes aware that their legitimate rights have been harmed, they have a formal legal pathway to seek relief. Fourth, China could require applicants for enforcement to provide sufficient guarantees within China, ensuring that there are adequate assets available for enforcement in case of disputes. If an applicant fails to provide such a guarantee, the public notice period could be extended accordingly to address challenges related to recovery enforcement.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 3.4 Gradually Establishing an Enforcement Mechanism for Foreign Settlement 78Agreements The Convention is a non-self-executing treaty, meaning that each contracting state must implement it through its domestic procedural rules and in accordance with the conditions set out in the Convention. The Convention does not provide an enforcement procedure, so each contracting state must incorporate its provisions into its legal framework before it can be effectively applied. As previously discussed, there are significant inconsistencies between the Convention and China's existing system, as well as unique challenges stemming from China's legal and institutional framework. To fully implement the Convention and allow it to function effectively, China's current system will require substantial adjustments. Against this backdrop, there are two possible approaches for reforming China's foreign-related mediation system at the macro-level: the "dual-track" model and the "unified" model.The dual-track model would establish a special enforcement mechanism for international commercial settlement agreements, separate from the general enforcement procedure for domestic settlement agreements. This approach would allow the two enforcement systems to operate in parallel, thereby minimizing the impact of the Convention on China's existing system. By contrast, the unified model would integrate the enforcement of both international and domestic commercial settlement agreements into a single procedural framework, ensuring that both types of agreements are reviewed and enforced through the same process. Since the dual-track model mirrors China's approach to the New York Convention, an analysis of why China adopted the dual-track model for international arbitration awards and how the New York Convention has been applied in China may help predict the outcomes and potential impacts of adopting either approach for the Singapore Convention on Mediation. The primary reason China ultimately chose the dual-track model for the New York Convention was a fundamental conflict between China's position on ad hoc arbitration and the Convention's requirements. The New York Convention does not allow reservations regarding the recognition of ad hoc arbitration, meaning that ratifying the Convention required China to recognize the validity of arbitration awards issued by non-permanent arbitration institutions. Given that fully recognizing ad hoc arbitration would have significantly disrupted China's existing legal framework, and a comprehensive acceptance of ad hoc arbitration was not feasible at the time, China adopted a dual-track approach. Under this system, international arbitration awards were enforced in accordance with the New York Convention, while domestic arbitration awards continued to follow China's original enforcement rules. A similar conflict exists between the Singapore Convention on Mediation and China's mediation system regarding the recognition of non-institutional mediation. This raises the question of whether China should adopt the same dual-track approach for the Singapore Convention. It must be acknowledged that immediately adopting a unified model would pose significant challenges. Due to the mismatch between the Convention and China's existing mediation system, ratifying the Convention

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 could lead to an increase in fraudulent mediation cases and an overwhelming number of enforcement applications ("enforcement explosion"). Given that China's mediator standards are not yet well-established, and the development of mediation institutions and mediation centers remains relatively weak, it would be unrealistic to undertake a major overhaul of China's mediation system to align with the Convention at this stage. Furthermore, China's existing mediation framework differs significantly from the standards outlined in the Convention, and adopting a dual-track model would be a practical way to alleviate judicial burdens, mitigate fraudulent mediation risks, and simplify the implementation of the Convention. Many early adopters of the Convention, including Singapore, have also implemented dual-79track legislative models. However, the dual-track model is inherently a transitional or compromise measure and should not be considered a permanent solution. On the one hand, this "temporary solution" does not resolve the fundamental conflict between the Convention and China's legal system. While it minimizes disruptions to China's existing framework and reduces the negative impact of the Convention, it also creates a disconnect between China's foreign-related and domestic mediation systems. In practice, this grants foreign arbitral awards or foreign-related settlement agreements preferential treatment over domestic ones, which could encourage parties to artificially create foreign-related elements to bypass procedural requirements. This undermines the authority of China's legal system. On the other hand, the need for China to rely on a dual-track system is gradually diminishing. In 2017, the Supreme People's Court issued the Opinion on the Pilot Program for Lawyer-Led Mediation (司发通〔2017〕105 号), which authorized lawyers to act as mediators in pilot regions. This suggests that as China's commercial mediation system continues to develop and international trade expands, China is gradually moving toward recognizing non-institutional mediation. Adopting a unified model would help prevent procedural evasion, enhance the attractiveness of mediation as a dispute resolution mechanism, and facilitate the international circulation of settlement agreements, which aligns with the Convention's objectives and legislative intent. Furthermore, establishing a comprehensive mediator code of conduct is an essential step in the development of China's mediation system. Ratifying the Convention could serve as a catalyst for improving China's mediation standards, and given China's ongoing economic and legal reforms, these challenges are not insurmountable. In summary, immediately adopting a unified legislative approach is impractical at this stage, while relying indefinitely on a dual-track system is also not a sustainable solution. The dual-track approach is a temporary measure, primarily suited for countries with underdeveloped mediation frameworks or lower levels of internationalization in mediation practices. Therefore, China should initially adopt the dual-track model after ratifying the Convention while simultaneously strengthening its mediation system, improving mediation legislation, and enhancing the development of mediation institutions. At an appropriate time, China should transition to a unified legislative model to fully integrate its mediation system with the Convention's framework.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 4. 80Conclusion The Singapore Convention on Mediation provides a framework for the cross-border enforcement of international settlement agreements, significantly enhancing the efficiency and accessibility of international commercial mediation. It represents a major milestone in international commercial dispute resolution, following in the footsteps of the New York Convention. The Convention is of great significance in promoting the development of international commercial mediation, increasing the cross-border circulation of settlement agreements, and facilitating the resolution of international commercial disputes. Ratifying the Singapore Convention on Mediation holds substantial importance for China. First, the Convention aligns with China's legal philosophy, which emphasizes mediation and negotiated dispute resolution. Ratification would compel China to improve its legal framework, enhance its participation in the global supply of mediation services, and promote the development of China's commercial mediation system. Second, ratifying the Convention would help optimize China's business environment, enhance the global reputation of Chinese commercial entities, and further stimulate foreign trade. Third, many signatories of the Convention are also key partners in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Ratification would strengthen China's trade and economic cooperation with these countries, advancing the BRI's long-term strategic goals. China should continue improving its commercial mediation system, strengthening mediation legislation, and establishing high-level international mediation centers. Proper institutional integration would allow China to fully leverage the Convention's benefits, contributing to the advancement of global mediation systems and showcasing China's leadership in dispute resolution. Currently, the dominant influence in international commercial mediation remains in the hands of developed countries, with institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the U.S.-based Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS) playing a leading role in shaping global mediation standards. To fully harness the Convention's potential and enhance China's influence in international commercial mediation, China must not limit itself to passively adapting to existing international rules. Instead, it should actively engage in shaping global discourse in commercial mediation, advocating for China's mediation models and standards on the international stage. The Convention should not be seen merely as a tool for adapting to international mediation rules, but rather as an opportunity for China to establish its leadership in global mediation governance. China should take proactive steps to shape international mediation norms, promote the establishment of China-led mediation centers and standards, and increase its influence in the global commercial dispute resolution system. Finally, as only a limited number of countries have ratified the Convention so far, there remains a lack of extensive legislative and judicial practice in its application worldwide. This limits the scope of comparative legal and empirical research in this paper. As a result, this study draws from China's experience with the New York Convention to explore a development path suited to China's national

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 conditions. As international commercial mediation continues to evolve and more countries ratify the Convention, legal and judicial practice will gradually expand, providing richer materials for future 81research. The road ahead is long, but progress is on the horizon. Acknowledgement None. Funding Statement None. Author Contributions Kaiheng Hu: Writing, Original draft, Conceptualization, Methodology. Qifan Jiang: Conceptualization, Writing–review & editing. Availability of Data and Materials The data on the Singapore Convention used in this paper are all sourced from the official website of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law and are available through the following link. https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/mediation/conventions/international_settlement_agreements/status Conflicts of Interest The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest to report regarding the present study. References [1]. Bhardwaj, P. (2022). Critical appraisal of the Singapore Convention on mediation. Jus Corpus Law Journal, 3(2), 967-975. [2]. Cai, W. (2022). Diversity of mediation and its impact on the Singapore Mediation Convention. Hong Kong Law Journal, 52(1), 235-256. [3]. Chen, Meng. (2023). Commercial mediation in mainland china: pitfalls & opportunities. Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, 23(2), 167-201. [4]. China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission. (2010). The New York Convention and judicial practice of international commercial arbitration [Conference proceedings]. Beijing: Law Press. [5]. Dong, C. (2020). Regulating "evasion": The technical choices, institutional evolution, and improvement strategies of China's civil and commercial law. Northern Legal Science, 14(3), 14-25.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 [6]. 82Duric, Duro, Jovanovic, Vladimir, & Skoric, Sanja. (2024). Mediation settlement agreement under the singapore convention as cross-border restructuring instrument. LAW Theory and Practice, 41(3), 1-16. [7]. Dong, L. (2018). Practical report on the Chinese translation of "Achieving Reasonableness: An Empirical Assessment of International Commercial Mediation" [Master's thesis, Shandong University of Science and Technology]. [8]. Hioureas, C. G. (2019). The Singapore Convention on International Settlement Agreements resulting from mediation: A new way forward? Ecology Law Quarterly, 46(1), 61-70. [9]. Jiang, H. (2022). Reflection and innovation of the recognition and enforcement mechanism of China-ASEAN commercial arbitration under the RCEP background. Political and Legal Forum, 2022(6), 97-109. [10]. Li, C., & Chen, L. (2014). Prevention and regulation of malicious mediation—Based on the analysis of its causes. Theory and Reform, 2014(1), 158-161. [11]. Lian, J. (2022). The construction of China's enforcement mechanism for international commercial settlement agreements under the Singapore Mediation Convention. Yangtze Forum, 2022(3), 69-78. [12]. Malacka, M. (2022). The Singapore Mediation Convention and international business mediation. International and Comparative Law Review, 22(2), 179-196. [13]. Malacka, M. (2022). The relations between the Singapore Mediation Convention and the European Mediation Directive. European Studies, 9(2). [14]. Saumya, Ayushi. (2020). Singapore Convention on Mediation: Historic Evolution of the Mediation Landscape. International Journal of Law Management & Humanities, 3, 938-947. [15]. Shah, C., & D'cunha, A. A. (2020). Singapore Mediation Convention: Transforming the future of alternative dispute resolution. Jurisprudence, 1(1). [16]. Sheng, Z. (2023). The Singapore Convention on Mediation and China's commercial mediation: Toward a full-fledged regime. China Legal Science, 11(1), 82-109. [17]. Sun, N. (2021). The ratification and implementation of the Singapore Mediation Convention in China. Legal Studies, 43(2), 156-173. [18]. Tan, D. (2023). The Singapore Convention on Mediation to reinforce the status of international mediated settlement agreement: Breakthrough or redundancy? Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 40(4), 467-482. [19]. Tan, Yumeng. (2022). An Analysis of Mediators' Misconducts Relating to Articles 5(1)(E) and 5(1)(F) of the Singapore Convention on Mediation. Bristol Law Review, 2022, 115-142. [20]. Wang, F. (2022). A decade of China's commercial mediation: Keeping up with the times, striving forward, and exploring innovation. China Foreign Trade, 2022(10), 26-29.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 65-83 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250452 [21]. Wen, X. (2019). The Singapore Convention and China's commercial mediation—83A comparison with the New York Convention and the Hague Choice of Court Convention. China Law Review, 2019(1), 198-208. [22]. Xiong, H. (2022). The Singapore Mediation Convention and China's commercial mediation legislation from a contextualist perspective: Centering on mediation models. The Jurist, 2022(6), 17-30, 191. [23]. Yan, H., & Chen, Q. (2022). Defining and addressing fraudulent mediation under the Singapore Mediation Convention: Challenges and China's response. Journal of Shanghai University of Political Science and Law (Rule of Law Forum), 37(3), 93-105. [24]. Yu, J., & Wu, Z. (2014). International Economic Law. Beijing: Peking University Press. [25]. Zhang, L. (2020). Judicial issues and legislative improvements regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in China. Shandong Social Sciences, 2020(8), 135-139. [26]. Sheng, Zhang. (2023). The singapore convention on mediation and china's commercial mediation: toward full-fledged regime. China Legal Science, 11(1), 82-109. [27]. Zhang, X. (2022). An empirical study on the application of the due process clause of the New York Convention by mainland Chinese courts. Commercial Arbitration and Mediation, 2022(4), 53-63. [28]. Zhao, Y. (2020). The Singapore Mediation Convention: The future development of international commercial mediation under the new "New York Convention". Local Legislation Research, 5(3), 76-86. [29]. Zuo, W. (2022). An empirical study on China's response to "difficulty in enforcement"—Based on regional experiences. Peking University Law Journal, 34(6), 1445-1463. Copyright: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Disclaimer/Publisher's Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MOSP and/or the editor(s). MOSP and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. Macao Scientifi Publishers（MOSP） https://www.mospbs.com/journal/jiegg 84·Article· From Origins to Future: The Evolution and Prospects of Artificial Intelligence in the Reasoning Era Bingyi Yang1,*, Jiang Qu2 1 China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, Beijing, China 2 China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, Beijing, China * Corresponding Authors: Bingyi Yang. Email: yangbingyi@caict.ac.cn Received: 9 January 2025 Accepted: 25 February 2025 Published: 25 March 2025 Abstract: With the release of the OpenAI o1 model, artificial intelligence (AI) technology has ushered in a new era of Reasoning. This article reviews the development history of AI technology, from the early days of symbolic reasoning and logic programming, to the data-driven era of machine learning, and to the current era of deep learning and large models. Driven by the AI technology, the close connection and impact between economic support and policies have been analyzed, as well as the cyclical fluctuations in the development of AI industry. All sectors of industry, academia and research play different roles in the development of AI, and in the context of industrial profit-seeking and national security issues, the international governance variables of AI will further increase. In this context, this paper analyzes the dilemmas and risks of international cooperation in artificial intelligence, as well as the challenges facing the development of industrial ecosystem, and looks forward to the future development and international governance direction of AI. Keywords: Artificial Intelligence; Era of Reasoning; Global Governance; International Cooperation 1. Introduction The history of artificial intelligence is an epic tale of ups and downs in the unrelenting pursuit for human intelligence. From mechanical beings in ancient myths to the conception of modern electronic brains, mankind's longing for creating intelligent entities has remained unchanged. Since the mid-20th century, with the birth of digital electronic computers, AI has seen its modern starting point. In 1956, the Dartmouth Conference has first introduced the concept of "artificial intelligence," marking the official establishment of this emerging field. In the following decades, AI has experienced a roller coaster ride from optimistic predictions during its golden age to two AI valleys of severe challenges, reflecting not only the twists and turns of technological progress but also the profound impact of economic and governance.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 84-96 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250453 In the early explorations of AI, scientists tried to simulate the human mind through symbolic reasoning and logical programming. However, problems are gradually emerging with the deepening research of AI, such as computational complexity, the difficulty of commonsense reasoning, and the lack of understanding of the nature of intelligence. AI hit its first low point in the 1970s, when declining government funding and disappointing public expectations hit AI research hard (Galanos, 2023). In the 1980s, with the rise of expert systems (Kastner & Hong, 1984), which can simulate the decision-making process of human experts in specific fields, AI once again enjoyed a boom. However, when users' expectations for AI systems increased and the economic bubble burst into its second trough, the limitations of expert systems promptly became apparent. These cyclical fluctuations reveal the close 85link between AI development and economic support and policy guidance. During the early period of AI development, AI was significantly influenced by financial support and policy environment. Thus, the history of AI development is a history of the interaction between technological evolution and social adaptation (Boyd & Holton, 2018). Every technological breakthrough is accompanied by a boom in economic investment and policy adjustments, and it also reflects the lag and insufficiency of governance mechanisms in coping with technological change. With the rise of the Internet and the arrival of big data era, it not only provides new development opportunities for AI, but also poses new challenges to the economic system and social governance (Helbing, 2019). 2. From Machine Learning to the Large Model Era 2.1 The Emergence of Machine Learning: Rationality in Broad Applications In the 1990s, the rise of the Internet and the advent of the big data era injected new vitality into the development of AI. The internet has not only accelerated the speed of information dissemination but also fostered interdisciplinary collaboration, enabling AI technologies to be more widely applied across various domains such as business, healthcare, education and other fields (Stuart & Peter, 2010). Those kind of technological transformation has not only addressed many limitations of expert systems but also provided fertile ground for new technologies and methodologies to emerge. The widespread adoption of the internet and the exponential growth of data have propelled machine learning algorithms into the mainstream. Their powerful pattern recognition and predictive capabilities have offered new approaches and tools for addressing complex problems. Compared to the previous era of machine learning, the market's expectations for AI have undergone a shift from optimism to pessimism, and ultimately to a more rational outlook. Throughout the pre-machine learning era, the limitations of AI technologies were gradually revealed, which resulted in a halt in research advancements and a decrease in investment and government enthusiasm，which bring AI development into the winter period. However, breakthroughs in machine learning reignited market expectations, albeit in a more objective and rational manner. People began to focus more critically on the sustainability of the technology and its societal value (Müller & Guido, 2016). During this period, researchers began to explore how computers could automatically learn patterns from data to improve

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 84-96 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250453 their performance and behavior. The core of machine learning lies in feature engineering, which involves extracting useful features from data to train models. Key research achievements during this stage include algorithms such as decision trees, support vector machines (SVM), and random forests. For instance, SVM and decision tree algorithms have demonstrated outstanding performance in classification and regression tasks, enabling researchers to achieve data-driven decision-making in fields such as healthca86re and finance (Bishop, 2006). With the rapid iteration and in-depth research of technology, machine learning has started to move towards deep learning as a result of the exponential growth in data volume and the notable improvement in processing power. Traditional machine learning techniques depend on comparatively simple model architectures and manually created feature extraction, both of which are becoming less and less effective. By using multi-layer neural networks that imitate the structure of the human brain, deep learning, on the other hand, can automatically learn complex features in data and map raw input to output prediction in an end-to-end manner. This allows for deeper recognition and prediction capabilities and significantly streamlines the feature engineering process. This opens up a new wave of technological innovation and makes it achievable to train and use deeper network architectures. 2.2 Deep Learning Poses Challenges for Data Governance In the era of deep learning, the scale and complexity of models have made a qualitative leap. Early artificial neural networks typically contained only a few layers of nodes, while modern deep learning architectures may have dozens or even hundreds of hidden layers. This "depth" enables the network to capture more subtle data patterns, thereby achieving more accurate task solving capabilities. For example, deep learning has brought about convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and recurrent neural networks (RNNs), which have achieved breakthroughs in tasks such as image recognition and speech recognition (LeCun et al, 2015). CNNs effectively processes image data through local connections and weight sharing, significantly improving the accuracy and efficiency of image recognition (Krizhevsky et al, 2012). RNN and long short-term memory network (LSTM) have promoted the development of speech recognition and language generation technology by capturing contextual relationships in time series (Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997). The rapid development of deep learning has not only promoted the widespread application of AI in various fields, but also laid a solid foundation for the subsequent era of large models. At the same time, with the widespread application of AI and the surge in data volume, the importance of governance has gradually been recognized. Especially in data governance, effective data governance strategies can not only promote the rational use of data, but also ensure the security and compliance of data, becoming an important part of AI governance (Zwitter, 2014).

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 84-96 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250453 873. Enter to the Era of the Large Models 3.1 Shift From Data Governance to AI Technology Governance in the Era of Large Models Since the Google team introduced the Transformer architecture in 2017, the field of natural language processing (NLP) has undergone a revolutionary change. The Transformer architecture achieves efficient processing of long sequence data through the self-attention mechanism, which not only optimizes the sequence processing efficiency, but also gives birth to a series of pre-trained models such as BERT and GPT, opening the door to the era of large models (Vaswani et al, 2017). The outstanding capabilities of these large models in natural language understanding and generation mark a major leap forward in AI capabilities, while simultaneously raising market expectations and awareness of AI to previously unheard-of levels. Large models exhibit an emergent intelligence phenomenon that is not yet fully understood. These models, without explicit programming, are capable of self-learning and demonstrating behaviors that surpass expectations. This phenomenon has sparked widespread academic debate and drawn significant attention from the public and investors (Brown et al, 2020). The emergent intelligence and the black-box nature of large models are closely intertwined, rendering the decision-making processes of these models highly opaque (Bommasani et al, 2021). This has brought critical issues of AI governance to the forefront, marking a shift from the focus on data governance in the machine learning era to a growing emphasis on governance of the AI technologies themselves (Vallor, 2022). As the scale of these models continues to expand, their internal complexity and lack of transparency increasingly raise demands for higher standards of data privacy and algorithmic fairness, driving unprecedented attention from governments and societies worldwide toward AI governance (Shin et al., 2023). 3.2 The Bottlenecks of Scaling Laws Urgently Require the Exploration of New Paradigms The concept of scaling laws proposed by OpenAI attempts to theoretically explain the emergent intelligence and indicates the development direction of large models—namely, achieving significant performance improvements by increasing the number of model parameters and the volume of training data (Kaplan et al, 2020). This theory has sparked intense global competition among technology companies, which have poured substantial investments into a "arms race" for computing power, model parameters, and data. For instance, the outbreak of China's "AI war of hundred models" in 2023 saw numerous companies and research institutions racing to release their own large model products, aiming to secure a foothold in this technological revolution (Ye, 2023). Notably, unlike the earlier machine learning paradigm led by research institutions, the massive demand for computational power in the age of large models has positioned tech companies as the driving force behind AI development. This shift not only reflects the profound impact of technological advances on markets and supply chains, but also intensifies global competition in AI. Those who master advanced AI technologies will have a significant advantage in future technological and market dynamics.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 84-96 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250453 However, as the parameter scale of large models continues to expand, the bottlenecks they face are becoming increasingly prominent, which has also led to the discussion of whether the scaling laws theory is invalid becoming a hot topic in the AI industry. The current surge in computing power demand, data challenges, and the increase in training and reasoning costs caused by the growth of model parameters have become important obstacles to further expanding the scale of models. For example, the Meta team pointed out in the paper on LLaMA3 that even in the top data centers, maintaining the stability of ultra-large-scale GPU clusters is a major problem, and frequent failures caused by hardware loss have seriously restricted the further expansion of the model (Smith, 2023). In addition, "Large Language Monkeys: Scaling Inference Compute" emphasizes that expanding inference computations simply by increasing the number of generated samples does not fundamentally solve the essential problem of models, which is that they are still "typing" tools based on statistical probability, lacking true creative and logical reasoning capabilities (Hestness et al, 2023). Therefore, AI research may need to seek more essential innovation in algorithms and architectures, and need to seek a new paradigm that enables AI to have inspiration, creativity and logical reasoning ability to break through the current bottlenecks, rather than merely relying on the accumulation of computational power and model 88parameters. 4. Entering the Reasoning Era However, the exploration of new paradigms has high risks, because various factors such as initial costs, learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations will lead to increasing returns, and investors are unable to see the future benefits, so many enterprises are discouraged. This also leads to the phenomenon that the development of technology and industry often enters the path dependence. In the large model technology or method based on the Transformer architecture is widely adopted, even if there is a better alternative, it is difficult to change its dominant position. Therefore, the industry rushed to follow OpenAI's operation mode, and developed a large number of application products based on large language models, which intensified the situation of homogeneous product competition. The emergence of OpenAI o1 becomes an important attempt to break out of the original technical framework and explore the path of reasoning technology. 4.1 New Paradigms for Reasoning Models The release of OpenAI o1 reasoning model marks the advent of a new era in AI development characterized by advanced reasoning capabilities. OpenAI o1 model represents a new model paradigm and working principle, from the language as the core to the chain of thought (CoT), which enables the model to carry out more in-depth and orderly thinking process (OpenAI, 2024). By using this technique, the model can develop methods to address problems gradually instead of making decisions based on itself instantaneous probabilistic forecast like earlier models did. Which indicates that the o1 model can approach complex problems in a more nuanced and methodical manner, resulting in behavioural patterns that are more akin to those of human intellectual ability.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 84-96 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250453 A notable distinction between the o1 model and earlier large language models, such as GPT-4, lies in their learning and inference mechanisms. Traditional large language models excel at generating text based on statistical probabilities but often lack true logical reasoning and innovation capabilities. In contrast, the o1 model learns to "think slowly" through reinforcement learning, engaging in extended reasoning processes. This innovation not only enhanced the model's performance on a specific tasks but also signifies a significant advancement in AI, transitioning from basic pattern recognition to advanced 89intelligent reasoning. The emergence of the o1 model signifies the onset of the "reasoning era" in AI. This era is marked by the development of models that can perform complex reasoning tasks with greater accuracy and efficiency. This development has not only advanced AI capabilities but also spurred innovation across the industry. In response to this paradigm shift, other AI companies have developed models that offer competitive performance at more accessible costs. Notably, the DeepSeek series has emerged as a significant player under the reasoning era. DeepSeek's R1 model, for instance, has demonstrated performance comparable to leading models like OpenAI's o1, but at a fraction of the cost. The models of different enterprises together confirm that AI has entered the era of reasoning, making people exposed to more accessible and efficient AI solutions, which will further expand AI applications in various fields. However, the advent of these advanced AI models also presents new challenges. The complexity and opacity of models like o1 and DeepSeek raise concerns about their interpretability and control. The intricate decision-making processes inherent in these models make it difficult to fully understand their reasoning, leading to potential risks in their deployment across sensitive areas. In this case, if solely tech company holds the core technology, it may raise concerns about the risk of intelligence, especially when the model is widely applied in many social spheres. Moreover, the rapid advancement of AI technologies will intensified global competition, with nations and corporations striving to lead in AI development. This competition has implications for economic and technological landscapes, potentially exacerbating disparities in AI capabilities and access. 4.2 New Path for Large Model Scaling Law: Inference Scaling Law With the release of o1, OpenAI also proposed a new scaling law for inference, which states that the performance of the model continues to improve with the increase of reinforcement learning time and inference time (OpenAI, 2024). Different from the traditional scaling law of computing power, model parameters, and data, the new inference scaling law emphasizes the positive impact of investment in training time and inference time on model performance. The emergence of this new paradigm opens a new path for the development of large models. In contrast, the discussion on the failure of scaling law for traditional large models has entered a heated stage, mainly due to the bottleneck of computing power and data. However, the new inference scaling law provides new possibilities for the development of large models. Although the current scaling law of large models has shown a slowing trend, it is still possible to achieve further performance improvement by optimizing inference time and training time. Speaking at the TED AI conference in

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 84-96 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250453 San Francisco, Noam Brown, a researcher working on o1 at OpenAI, said that " It turned out that having a bot think for just 20 seconds in a hand of poker got the same boosting performance as scaling up the model by 100,000x and training it for 100,000 time90s longer." In addition to the development of inference scaling law itself, whether there is a mutual promoting relationship between inference scaling law and traditional scaling law of computing power, model parameters and data is a problem worthy of in-depth discussion. At the moment, these two scaling laws seem to be relatively independent, but o1 model scaling nowadays has two dimensions: training time and testing (inference) time. Perhaps predictably, future studies may reveal the mechanisms by which they interact. If we can find the synergy between these two scale laws, it will provide a broader space for the development of artificial intelligence. This dual-drive model is not only expected to solve the current technical bottleneck, but may also open up a whole new era of intelligence. 5. New Pathways and Challenges of Overcoming Data Bottlenecks With the development of AI technology entering the era of large models, data has become an important resistance to its further development, and this has become a general consensus in the academic community. Although there is a large amount of data on the Internet, statistics show that the data can be effectively used in common crawl only accounts for 6%-9% of the data on the whole network. In addition, a large amount of unstructured data within enterprises cannot be used, resulting in extremely limited data available for training (Pablo et al, 2022). Therefore, how to break through the data bottleneck has become the key to achieve breakthroughs in large model research and development and technological improvement. With the release of reasoning era, it provides a new solution to solve the problem of data shortage to some extent. First, through the synthetic data can improve the available data limitations, including the use of human intervention to improve the data quality, to increase the amount of data available for training. Second, synthesize data through models, that is, use large models to accelerate the generation of synthetic data. Reasoning model through chain thinking, can make the model reflect on its way of thinking, thus generating new data. However, compared with manual qualified data, its quality is relatively low, and it still needs to be improved through technological progress. Admittedly，the advent of the era of reasoning can not directly solve the technical card points in the development of AI, and it will also bring new problems. Due to the relatively serious data homogeneity, the training effect is not good, and the spread of false information in the process of AI training may not only lead to misleading and confusing information, but also lead to ethical and legal problems. Furthermore, the widespread application of generated data could exacerbate social inequality since it makes it easier for individuals and tech giants with advanced AI technology to create and use high-quality data, while underfunded groups may be excluded. These factors are the direct cause of the intelligence gap between countries and regions and will continue exist.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 84-96 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250453 6. Potential Risks and governance Dilemmas of International Governance in the Era of 91AI The rapid development of AI has brought not only technological innovation, but also challenges to global supply chains, international markets, geopolitical situations and even the traditional international order (Anwer & Hosen, 2024). The widening of the digital divide caused by technology is reflected in different levels of the international community. Strengthening national strategic scientific and technology authority has become an unavoidable decision to deal with worldwide competitiveness, due to the macrotrend of growing global scientific and technological competition. The trend and role of tech companies to achieve technological frontier breakthroughs and join the technological competition have become more prominent under these pressures and trends in order to meet the strategic needs of intensified international competition. 6.1 The Imbalance in Resource Allocation Has Widen the AI Gap Driven by business logic, AI concentrates an extensive amount of capital, computing power, data, and other resources in the giant technology companies. This can also influence how governments and businesses make decisions, which may lead to an imbalance in the distribution of innovation resources. With more abundant capital and technical resources, leading AI technology enterprises have rapidly occupied a dominant position in the industry and market in terms of technology research and development, data set resources, and algorithm application. Furthermore, the state may be unduly swayed towards applied research and development with short-term commercial value when deciding on technology development strategies and allocating resources, neglecting basic research and other crucial areas related to long-term development, when commercial investment and market reverse become decisive factors affecting industrial policy related to AI. For the countries of the global South, computing infrastructure is still an important obstacle to whether the country can truly access AI, so this will also lead to the global intelligence gap will be further widened (Garcia, 2024). 6.2 Regulatory Dilemma Review the history, each technological revolution will promote the long-term growth of human society and economy, and the current AI is also widely regarded by the international community as an emerging revolutionary technology. In the early stage of technology development, although it is easier to control it, it is not easy to formulate effective control measures due to the lack of full understanding of its potential social harm. Conversely, when the negative social effects of technology become apparent, control often becomes costly and slow. Therefore, while pursuing the innovative potential of AI development, countries need to recognize the importance of effective regulation of the technology (Collingridge, 1982). In the field of AI, the lack of effective regulation may lead to the proliferation of standards and norms, exacerbate the instability, unreliability and security of the technology, and hinder the further development and application of the technology. Some scholars also call on AI enterprises to introduce

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 84-96 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250453 internal audit mechanisms, so that technology developers and enterprise management decision-makers are aware of the existence of risks at different levels, and integrate management norms into the research and development process to ensure the healthy development of AI. Expand to the international level, the trend of the industrial side to seek profits from capital and the rise of national sovereign AI (Mügge, 2024) construction have become an important dilemma that hinders the alignment of AI international governance. Therefore, some scholars also put forward the point of view of agile governance, which needs to pay attention to industrial development and supervision at the same time, and try to keep the same pace (2018). However, to grasp the parallel scale and rhythm of regulation and AI development has become an important issue to ensure the sound and sustainable development of AI, and it is also an 92issue that the international community needs to solve jointly through close dialogue and exchanges. 6.3 Difficulties and Risks in International Cooperation on AI In the context of increasingly fierce global competition in technology, geopolitical factors have become an unavoidable consideration for tech enterprises, and when domestic protectionist sentiment spreads, it will further hinder normal international scientific exchanges and cooperation. This will undoubtedly increase tension and confrontation in international relations, increase market and technological barriers, make it more difficult for countries to reach consensus on AI standards, ethical norms and regulatory policies, and weaken the foundation for international cooperation in addressing common challenges. At present, countries around the world have reached some basic consensus in the field of AI to promote the "AI for Good" and the development of responsible AI, but it is difficult to reach a specific and effective regulatory framework in the field of governance (ITU, 2017). An open and inclusive international cooperation mechanism has always been a key factor in promoting technological innovation and application transformation, and technological development is the result of open source contribution to international cooperation, “small yard high fence” (Cavangh, 2023), decoupling industry chain breaking are not conducive to the overall development and progress of the industry. Technology blockade is not conducive to the development and progress of technology, but will increase the cost of enterprise research and development, in contrast to encourage open source can promote technological innovation and knowledge sharing, in order to further integrate the industrial wisdom to promote a deeper integration of the industrial chain and common development at higher level. Recently, the international community generally recognizes the international governance of AI under the United Nations framework, and the promotion of AI capacity building in developing countries through strengthening international cooperation is expected to become a new international consensus (United Nations, 2024), may leading to the next stage of AI international governance. 6.4 Industrial Ecological Development Dilemma From the perspective of long-term development of technology, the sustainable and healthy development of AI needs to rely on a benign ecosystem, and this ecosystem is usually composed of a number of interrelated and interdependent subjects such as technology research and development

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 84-96 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250453 institutions, technology enterprises, regulators, investors and users. In international technology competition, countries with a healthy ecosystem can attract domestic and foreign investment and innovators, foster local technology companies, and help the country play a greater role in global science and technology innovation and standards setting. At present, with the monopoly advantages of capital, technology and talents, some tech enterprises control the upstream and downstream of the industrial chain through mergers and acquisitions, patent authorization and other ways. If coupled with government related strategic competitive pressure and protectionist policies, the monopoly position of technology giants will be further strengthened, and the action space and voice of other actors in the industrial ecosystem will be further squeezed. The lack of a benign interactive industrial ecology may lead to the lack of impetus for technological innovation and the weakening of industry resilience will continue to worsen, which will further affect the country's overall innovation capacity and international 93competitiveness. 7. Conclusion At present, we are still constantly exploring the route of AI development, and we are constantly bumping into data bottleneck on the road of exploration, such as the problem of data wall, scaling law failure and so on. A large number of researchers are still exploring different AI architectural paths, there still have long way to go to reach the AGI ultimate goal. But as countries focus on governance, there still need a balance through the path between the research innovation and regulation. It is worth mentioning that, responsive governance from policy makers to ensure that its positive impact is maximized. At the same time reduce the potential risk and negative impact. The path of AI development requires the joint efforts of policy makers, technology developers and all sectors of society to build a flexible, inclusive and forward-looking governance system under the framework of a broader international multilateral platform to continuously evolve, assess and adapt to the new challenges posed by AI. Acknowledgement None. Funding Statement None. Author Contributions Bingyi Yang: Writing, Conceptualization, Policy research. Jiang Qu: Writing, Original draft, Technical trend analysis. All authors reviewed the results and approved the final version of the manuscript. Availability of Data and Materials None.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 84-96 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250453 94Conflicts of Interest The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest to report regarding the present study. References [1]. Galanos, V. (2023). Expectations and expertise in artificial intelligence: specialist views and historical perspectives on conceptualisation, promise, and funding. [2]. Kastner, J. K., & Hong, S. J. (1984). A review of expert systems. European journal of operational research, 18(3), 285-292. [3]. Boyd, R., & Holton, R. J. (2018). Technology, innovation, employment and power: Does robotics and artificial intelligence really mean social transformation?. Journal of Sociology, 54(3), 331-345. [4]. Helbing, D. (2019). Societal, economic, ethical and legal challenges of the digital revolution: from big data to deep learning, artificial intelligence, and manipulative technologies (pp. 47-72). Springer International Publishing. [5]. Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig. 2010. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (3 ed.). Prentice Hall. [6]. Müller, A. C., & Guido, S. (2016). Introduction to machine learning with Python: a guide for data scientists. O'Reilly Media. [7]. Bishop, C. M. (2006). Pattern recognition and machine learning (Information Science and Statistics series). Springer. [8]. LeCun, Y., Bengio, Y., & Hinton, G. (2015). Deep learning. Nature, 521(7553), 436-444. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature14539 [9]. Krizhevsky, A., Sutskever, I., & Hinton, G. E. (2012). ImageNet classification with deep convolutional neural networks. In Advances in neural information processing systems (Vol. 25, pp. 1097-1105). [10]. Hochreiter, S., & Schmidhuber, J. (1997). Long short-term memory. Neural Computation, 9(8), 1735-1780. https://doi.org/10.1162/neco.1997.9.8.1735 [11]. Zwitter, A. (2014). Big data ethics. Big Data & Society, 1(2), 1-6. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951714559253 [12]. Vaswani, A., Shazeer, N., Parmar, N., Uszkoreit, J., Jones, L., Gomez, A. N., Kaiser, Ł., & Polosukhin, I. (2017). Attention is all you need. In Advances in neural information processing systems (Vol. 30). [13]. Brown, T. B., Mann, B., Ryder, N., Subbiah, M., Kaplan, J., Dhariwal, P., ... & Amodei, D. (2020). Language Models are Few-Shot Learners. NeurIPS 2020, 33, 1877-1901. https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14165

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 84-96 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250453 [14]. 95Bommasani, R., Hudson, D. A., Adolphs, R., Schuessler, H. F., & Weld, D. S. (2021). On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models. Communications of the ACM, 64(12), 62-71. https://doi.org/10.1145/3460218 [15]. Vallor, S. (2022). Technology and the Virtues: A Philosophical Guide to a Future Worth Wanting. Oxford University Press. [16]. Shin, D., Lee, H., & Lee, S. (2023). The Governance of Artificial Intelligence: Perspectives, Challenges, and Solutions. AI & Society, 38(4), 845-859. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-023-01598-2 [17]. Ye, J. (2023). China’s AI “War of a hundred models” heads for a shakeout. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/technology/chinas-ai-war-hundred-models-heads-shakeout-2023-09-21/ [18]. Kaplan, J., Henighan, T., Chess, B., Child, R., Gray, S., Brown, T. B., Ko, A., Dennison, D., & Amodei, D. (2020). Scaling laws for neural language models. arXiv preprint. https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.08361 [19]. Smith，J. (2023). The Llama 3 Herd of Models. arXiv, 2407.21783. [20]. Hestness, J., et al. (2023). Large Language Monkeys: Scaling Inference Compute. arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.12148. [21]. OpenAI. (2024). Learning to reason with LLMs. OpenAI Blog. https://openai.com/blog/learning-to-reason-with-llms [22]. Villalobos, P., Ho, A., Sevilla, J., Besiroglu, T., Heim, L., & Hobbhahn, M. (2024, June 4). Will we run out of data? limits of LLM scaling based on human-generated data. arXiv.org. https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.04325 [23]. Anwer, S., Hosen, M. S., Khan, D. S., Oluwabusayo, E., Folorunso, M. M. H. M., & Khan, H. (2024). Revolutionizing the global market: An inclusion of AI the game changer in international dynamics. Migration Letters, 21(13), 54-73. [24]. Garcia, E. V. (2024). The technological leap of AI and the Global South: deepening asymmetries and the future of international security. In Research Handbook on Warfare and Artificial Intelligence (pp. 370-387). Edward Elgar Publishing. [25]. Mügge, D. (2024). Eu AI sovereignty: for whom, to what end, and to whose benefit?. Journal of European Public Policy, 1-26. [26]. Collingridge, D. (1982). The social control of technology. [27]. Wallach, W., & Marchant, G. E. (2018). An agile ethical/legal model for the international and national governance of AI and robotics. Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. [28]. International Telecommunication Union. (2017). AI for Good. https://aiforgood.itu.int/about-us/#:~:text=AI%20for%20Good%20was%20established,industry%2C%20civil%20society%20and%20UN.

J. Int. Eco. Glo. Gov. 2025, 2(2), 84-96 https://doi.org/10.12414/jiegg.250453 [29]. 96Cavanagh, C. (2023). U.S. economic restrictions on China: Small yard, high fence?. Georgetown Security Studies Review. https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2023/12/26/u-s-economic-restrictions-on-china-small-yard-high-fence/ [30]. United Nations. (2024). Enhancing international cooperation on capacity-building of artificial intelligence : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4054005?ln=en&v=pdf Copyright: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MOSP and/or the editor(s). MOSP and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.