I2009. 4歷史Comparing the Incomparable: Some Thoughts on the 17th Century Macauand Fort Zeelandia ........................................................................................................ Roderich PTAK 1共處分治中的主導治理──論明政府對澳門的治理措施 ......................................................何志輝 12乾隆九年定例研究 .....................................................................................................................王巨新 21鴉片戰爭前巴黎外方傳教會駐廣州和澳門賬房之探析 ..........................................................韋 羽 27政治與法律有關澳門諮詢制度化的若干思考 .............................................................................................謝四德 35論澳門一般合同條款制度 .........................................................................................................陳卓琦 41澳門物權之佔有制度 ..................................................................................................................楊 洋 54論重推四厘利息補貼制度 .........................................................................................................陳君傑 59經濟Dependent Development? Macau’s Gaming Industry: Its Problems and Prospects ....................HAO Zhidong 64Basic Principles of Gaming Regulation: Lessons for Macau .................................................SIU Lam Carlos 78澳門博彩產業集群競爭力初探 .................................................................................阮建中、李勝會 83澳門賭場酒店空間佈局研究 ......................................................................................陳雪瓊、林家輝 90CEPA協議框架下對知識產權地域性突破的探討 ....................................................................易在成 96金融海嘯衝擊下的澳門特區人力資源問題與對策 ..................................................................柳智毅 102澳門建築產業市場競爭現狀探討 .............................................................................................麥瑞權 108澳門公定會計發展歷程初探 ......................................................................................................尚慧然 112社會與文化“在地養老”對澳門的啟示 .......................................................................................區耀榮、陳建新 116從“家庭中心為本”及“成人中心主義”反思──分析澳門兒童及家庭服務 .............................................................................梁啟賢、龐麗華 123未來澳門人口年齡結構的預測 .................................................................................李金平、林子健 127中美世界自然遺產資源管理比較 .............................................................................................彭順生 132澳門與大陸學生文化差異因素分析 ......................................................................王力東、司徒英杰 142The Impact of IntergroupAttitude on Language:A Survey Study of Macau High School Students .......................................................... LEONG Sok Man 146會議紀要“‘一國兩制’下澳珠合作與發展”圓桌會議紀要 ...........................................《澳門研究》編輯部 155目錄
澳門研究II第51期HistoryComparing the Incomparable: Some Thoughts on the 17th Century Macauand Fort Zeelandia ................................................................................................................ Roderich PTAK 1The Dominant Governance in the Coexistence and Separate Governance:Some Measures for Macau by the Ming Government ............................................................... HE Zhihui 12On the Case Law of the 9 th Year of Emperor Qianlong’s Reign ................................................ WANG Juxin 21A Study on the Procuratorship of Paris Foreign Missions in Guangzhouand Macau before the Opium War .................................................................................................. WEI Yu 27Politics and LawSome Views on Macau Consultation for Institutionalization .........................................................CHE Sei Tak 35An Analysis of the General Contractual Clause System of Macau .................................... CHAN Cheok Kei 41A Study on the Possession System in the Law of Real Right in Macau .................................... YANG Yang 54A Discussion on the Re-introduction of “4% Subsidy Scheme” ............................................. CHAN Kuan Kit 59EconomicsDependent Development? Macau’s Gaming Industry:Its Problems and Prospects ....................................................................................................HAO Zhidong 64Basic Principles of Gaming Regulation: Lessons for Macau ................................................ SIU Lam Carlos 78A Pilot Study on Competitiveness of Macau Gaming Industrial Cluster ........ UN Kin Chong, LEE Shenghui 83A Research on the Layout of Hotels in Macau Casino Hotel ........................ CHEN Xueqiong, LAM Ka Fai 90A Study on Breakthrough Protected Territory of Intellectual Property in CEPA .......................... YI Zaicheng 96The Impacts of Financial Tsunami on Macau SAR Human Resourcesand Its Countermeasures ........................................................................................................ LAO Chi Ngai 102A Study on the Competitive Status of the Construction Industry in Macau ............................. MAK Soi Kun 108An Exploratory Study on the Development Process ofthe Official Account System in Macau .................................................................................SHANG Huiran 112Society and Culture“Aging in Place” and its Implication for Macau ................................................ AO Io Weng, CHAN Kin Sun 116A Critical Review on Macau Family Service: Family-centered Practiceand Combating Adultcentrism Perspectives ............................................ LEUNG Kai Yin, PONG Lai Wa 123Forecast of Population and Age Distribution in Macau ............................................................. LEI Kam Peng 127A Comparison of World Natural Heritage Resources Managementin America and China ...................................................................................................... PENG Shunsheng 132Analysis on Cultural Difference of Students betweenMacau and the Mainland ......................................................................... WANG Lidong, SI TOU Ieng Kit 142The Impact of Intergroup Attitude on Language:A Survey Study of Macau High School Students ......................................................... LEONG Sok Man 146Seminar SummarySummary of the Roundtable Discussion on “Macao-Zhuhai Cooperation and Development under the‘One Country, Two Systems’ Policy” ........................ Editorial Department of Journal of Macau Studies 155CONTENTS
1《澳門研究》第51期2009. 41. IntroductionDuring the last decades historians have developed variousmodels to categorize Asian port cities involved in both pre-colonial and colonial trade. This has led to a number ofcomparative studies focusing on the internal administration ofparticular places, on their economic functions, the structureof their societies more generally, demographic factors, culturalfeatures, and so on. One type of port is the so-called emporium,usually defined as a location freely accessible to all or mostmerchant groups, irrespective of their background, nationality,religion, etc. Typical emporia would be 15th century Melakaor medieval Quanzhou. These places were characterized notonly by the presence of sizeable foreign communities, butalso by predictable economic conditions regarding demand andsupply, a stable institutional framework, and a strong orientationtowards the sea. Of course, between these two examplescertain differences can be identified as well. For instance, Melakalargely depended on supplies brought by ship, while Quanzhou,which was much larger and much more developed, receivedmany products from the interior of China – in spite of itsrole as a port.Here we may turn to another type of coastal settlement,the so-called export-outlet. Certain locations in the PersianGulf belong to this category. They collect oil from the hinterland,the only product they offer for sale, which is then carriedby ship to various destinations. There are virtually no imports;the flow of commodities is mostly in one direction. Other typesof ports include bridgeheads, simple entrepôts, and so on.They can be defined in different ways and, of course, veryoften, one place can be associated with more than just onecategory, depending on the parameters used for analysis. Indeed,most ports could probably be classified as “hybrid” entitiesin one way or another.Some years ago, Chinese historians have enriched thistypology by introducing yet another category, the so-calledfanfang (番坊) (plus variant names). A typical fanfang wouldbe a foreign urban compound with a certain degree of juridicaland cultural autonomy. Medieval Guangzhou and Quanzhouare cases in point. The foreign quarters existing in these twoemporia, it is believed, were once dominated by Muslimmerchants, who operated their own mosques and were allowedto follow their own laws, at least under certain conditions.Furthermore, there was a community leader who representedthe foreign residents vis-à-vis the Chinese authorities. Similararrangements can once again be detected in pre-PortugueseMelaka and other Malay ports, the office of shabandar beinga typical example.The above suggests that the fanfang structure shouldperhaps be compared with common diaspora models. To somemeasure both entities represent variations of the same theme.What we do not know is, whether the earliest fanfang/diasporacompounds emerged in Southeast Asia, coastal India, or alongthe coasts of China.Be this as it may, the diaspora category has also beenbrought into connection with Macau. It was argued by somescholars that early Macau would resemble a typical fanfangComparing the Incomparable: Some Thoughts onthe 17th Century Macau and Fort ZeelandiaRoderich Ptak** Professor of Sinology, Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich
Comparing the Incomparable: Some Thoughts on the 17th Century Macau and Fort Zeelandia澳門研究2第51期of the kind one can find, for example, in medieval Guangzhou,or other locations. Elsewhere I have tried to show that sucha view depends on the criteria applied and the period examined.My conclusion was that in certain regards, yes, early Macauwould probably be similar to, while in others it would bequite different from the “classical” fanfang category.Here, I do not wish to repeat these ideas, but ratherwant to draw attention to yet another “foreign settlement” inthe Chinese world – Fort Zeelandia, the centre of Dutch activitieson Taiwan during the 17th century. Furthermore, I would liketo offer some comparisons between this place and Macau.There are three reasons for such an approach: Macau wasthe first European outpost along the China coast, F. Zeelandiashould be seen as the second major European settlement inthis area (smaller places, like Shangchuan (上川)， Pinhal/Piñal and others set aside). Macau can be investigatedin terms of various categories such as the fanfang model,as we saw. That should also apply to F. Zeelandia. Yet,the history of both places was and still is perceived verydifferently, depending on certain factors and modes of writing,as we shall see.2. The Beginnings of Portuguese Macau andDutch Fort ZeelandiaTo being with, the Portuguese settlement on the Macaupeninsula and the Dutch trading post F. Zeelandia were bornunder different circumstances. We shall look at the Portuguesecase first. Immediately prior to using Macau as a tradingbase, the Portuguese made regular stopovers on some nearbyislands such as Shangchuan. The main reason for graduallygiving up these places in favor of Macau during the 1550sprobably had to do with the more advantageous location ofthe latter, especially its closer vicinity and easier access toGuangzhou, and certainly also with the convenient possibilityof sheltering ships in the so-called Inner Harbor.Whether Macau – more precisely, the southern part ofthe Macau peninsula – was given to the Portuguese incompensation for providing military aid against pirate gangs,as was traditionally argued by Portuguese historians, whethermoney was involved in one way or the other, for examplein the form of bribes, or whether both aspects came together,is an old point of debate. Whichever way applies, Macauwas not taken by force; no war was fought between Chineseand Portuguese soldiers over this small piece of land. Onthe contrary, it was the local authorities, which gave the placeto the Portuguese, with or without Beijing’s explicit consent.While the long history of Luso-Chinese relations iscomparatively free of violent clashes – there are only threeor four minor incidents and these amount to very little – theDutch presence in Chinese waters, which only lasted for afew decades, provides a very different picture. The VOC (DutchEast India Company) undertook several blockades of Macau’sharbor in the early 17th century, which was followed by amajor attack in 1622. When this attack had ended in failure,the Dutch turned to the Penghu Islands (澎湖), from wherethey were ousted shortly thereafter by Chinese troops. Theythen moved to Taiwan, taking advantage of unclear circumstancesat the Chinese side, and set up a new base along thesouthwestern shore of that island, near a small settlement oftenreferred to as Dayuan (大員). In the course of time, thenew installation, called F. Zeelandia, became heavily fortified.But in spite of its military strength, Chinese forces led bythe Zheng regime (鄭), took F. Zeelandia in 1662, after along siege, renaming it Anping (安平), and the Dutch werecompelled to leave Taiwan once and for good. Thus, whilethe Portuguese stayed on in Macau for circa 4 1/2 centuries,the Dutch presence on Taiwan lasted for less than 40 years.Like Macau and many other ports in the East, F. Zeelandiawas used as a commercial base in trade to Japan. But whileMacau’s principle raison d’être was peaceful exchange andgiving logistic support to the Church in China and Japan,F. Zeelandia became a military stronghold, as was said, fromwhich the Dutch would try to disturb trade between Manilaand Fujian, or occasionally set out to kidnap Chinese junkssailing through the Taiwan Strait. In Dutch military strategy,Spain in particular had to be fought along a great arc stretchingfrom Japan, via Taiwan and Manila down to Sulawesi andMaluku. This also explains why the Dutch took, again byforce, the small posts operated by the Spanish along the northernshores of Taiwan. But violence was not only exerted againstChinese ships and European competitors, Dutchmen alsolaunched attacks against tribal groups inside Taiwan. If these
3《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4were not willing to cooperate with the VOC, they were“punished” and badly treated. In the early 1640s this led tosmall wars and unnecessary killings. One episode even involveda small settlement along the eastern side of Taiwan.At the commercial level, the Dutch on Taiwan cooperatedwith some local Chinese residents (but definitely not with all),who had migrated to the island before the 1620s (often againstcontemporary regulations in China). At first sight this sharplycontrasts with the fact that VOC ships would chase Chinesevessels in the open ocean, as was already mentioned, ordirect attacks against coastal sites in Fujian. This unusual situationcan be explained by temporary economic needs and, aboveall, by political dissent inside the Chinese camp, which broughtsome Chinese into opposition to the Dutch, while others heldmore “liberal” views. Moreover, cooperation did not occur atall times. And finally, the VOC was unable to efficiently controllarger areas beyond F. Zeelandia, although it moved into somenearby villages such as Sincan (新港), Saccam (赤嵌), orPoncan (北港). This suggests that many Chinese settlers andmerchants had nothing to do with the VOC because theywere outside the Dutch confines.In the early 1650s relations between the local Chineseand the Dutch deteriorated rapidly, possibly because of taxproblems. This led to heavy fighting, and left more than 4000Chinese killed. Paradoxically, some sources refer to theseevents as an “insurrection”. But the Manju court, so it seems,had a clearer perception of the situation and was now convincedthat the VOC could not be trusted, no matter how it wouldperform in the future.Here we may briefly return to earlier stages. Alreadyprior to the arrival of the Dutch, many Chinese had settledin the fertile plains of western Taiwan, as was said. Landcultivation, trade and hunting were the principal occupation ofthese settlers. This leads to an important consideration. Somehistorians believe that, in the early 17th century, Taiwan didnot yet belong to anyone, not even to China. But the island’sties with Fujian, it was suggested by others, were then muchcloser than we tend to think. Trading groups around Li Dan(李旦), Lin Feng (林風) and others had already used Dayuanin pre-Dutch days. With the growth of the Zheng regime, theseties even strengthened. A brief review of textual evidencereveals that by then, and even earlier, Taiwan, still called“Xiao Liuqiu” (小琉球) or “Dongfan” (東番) at around 1600,was not only quite well-known on the mainland, but alsohailed a growing population and therefore had already becomepart of China’s periphery. If this view is accepted, then theVOC’s activities on Penghu (which had played a special rolein Chinese geo-strategic thinking), and later, on southwesternTaiwan, must be considered as intrusions into Chinese territory.Even the Manju court, it appears, took that view. The Portuguese,as was shown, had appeared on stage in a less dramaticmanner and the authorities in Beijing usually proved quite toleranttowards Macau, even if certain officials did not like theirLusitanian guests.3. Greater Political FrameworksSome of the “general functions” of Macau and F. Zeelandiawithin the greater context of maritime East Asia were alreadyaddressed. There are many more aspects that should bementioned as well. First, both places formed part of major“colonial empires”, or structures.1 But Macau’s foundation wasnot an official act promoted by the government in Goa. Ittook several decades for the new settlement to become fullyabsorbed into the Estado da Índia and to develop the kindof administrative framework that one finds in other coastal portsthen under Portuguese control. By contrast, the foundation ofF. Zeelandia was an official project directed by the VOCwith fierce determination, much enthusiasm, and sizeable funds.In terms of internal setting, F. Zeelandia did resemble manyother strongholds put up by the VOC. However, in the early17th century, the VOC had just begun to move on stage.From that perspective, the Dutch involvement on Taiwan shouldbe counted among the early experiments of the Company.Macau was different: its birth was a slow process and camemore than 40 years after the foundation of Goa – at a stage,when the Estado da Índia had already begun to mature.There was one other very general difference betweenthe Portuguese and the Dutch. This concerns the macro-levelof their respective systems. In contrast to the Estado da Índia,the VOC in its totality operated as a single company, andnot as a state, or territorial dependency. However, it wasendowed with the powers and rights comparable to those of
Comparing the Incomparable: Some Thoughts on the 17th Century Macau and Fort Zeelandia澳門研究4第51期a sovereign entity. Thus, while F. Zeelandia was run bya “firm” with a special status, Macau formed part of an “ordinary”government structure.The latter leads to another observation. In the beginningof their overseas ventures, the Portuguese were not reallyinterested in conquering large spaces. Consequently, the earlyEstado da Índia has often been described as a system ofcoastal mini-possessions, a network of fortified locationsand /or simple feitorias, at best with a few acres of “hinterland”,and often heavily dependent on food imports. Usually, theseplaces were not accessible to everyone, only the Portugueseand their partners were allowed to enter them. Therefore mostPortuguese ports cannot really be classified as free emporia.Rather, they functioned as entrepôts in a general sense,i.e., as trading bases within a complex system of mini-posts,tied together by a net of official and less official trade routes,often called carreiras, and nearly always run by the Portuguesethemselves, be they crown representatives, private individuals,or others.Within the VOC structure one also finds a set of moreor less fixed sea routes and some variations in the degreeof control over individual locations. Fortifications were a commonsight, but not all positions were heavily fortified. More generally,as in the case of Portuguese-Asia, the Dutch system alsooperated as a network of entrepôts, and not as an ensembleof free emporia.The above suggests that Macau and F. Zeelandia shouldboth belong to the entrepôt category. However, as commercialstopovers on an important sea route – the one leading toJapan – they were more deeply integrated into their respectivemacro-systems than many other locations, for example theEuropean installations in Japan. Put differently, the degree of“colonial” influence was certainly strongest in Goa and Batavia,but negligible in cities such as Nagasaki. Macau and F. Zeelandiaranged somewhere between these two “extremes”.Withoutdoubt, theaboveremainssomewhat “impressionistic”.The same applies to the following assumption: If we see in17th Macau a location which, in terms of its internal settingand administration, partly depended on Chinese influence, andnot only on its Portuguese and mestizo ruling elite, then F.Zeelandia was probably somewhat different – in the sensethat it was always more “Dutch” than Macau was “Portuguese”.Pre-modern Macau went through several stages characterizedby a strong growth in its Chinese population; F. Zeelandia,due to its short-lived history, had few chances to experiencesimilar developments – if we disregard the fact that it hadto take Chinese refugees (like Macau). Although in both cases,the temporary (or permanent) presence of large Chinesepopulation groups did not automatically lead to qualitative changeswithin the government and other structures, there was somepressure for adjustment, and that pressure was certainly muchmore strongly felt inside Macau than in F. Zeelandia .There is a second and very general argument for speakingof different degrees in “colonial-hood”. The western sectionsof the Estado da Índia were much more characterized by“formal” rule than those positions which the Portuguese heldaround the Bay of Bengal and to the east of Melaka. Furthermore,during the middle of the 17th century, after the conquest ofthat port by the Dutch (1641), Portugal’s presence in the Malayworld was severely weakened, with Macau being virtuallycut off from India. These geo-political circumstances increasedMacau’s dependency on its Chinese hinterland.A comparable process, or division of “empire”, cannotbe observed in the case of the VOC, at least not duringthe period considered here. F. Zeelandia was never a lonelyoutpost at the rim of a greater maritime “world”, it was alwaysquite close to Batavia, and thereby of key importance to theentire Dutch system. Unlike Macau, it did not experience longcycles of economic decline, and it was never forgotten bysome distant authority. But it disappeared almost as abruptlyas it had been born – against a violent background.A further difference between F. Zeelandia and Macauconcerns their respective hinterland. This point was alreadyaddressed above, but only at random, therefore a few moreaspects must be considered. For about 300 years, Portugal’spresence in Macau was restricted to the southern half of theMacau peninsula. The northern section was only added underthe government of Ferreira do Amaral in the 19th century.Taipa and Coloane were also taken at some point, but notthe island regions to the west of the peninsula.By contrast, the Dutch on Taiwan, almost from the beginning,made efforts to expand their area of influence beyond the
5《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4confines of F. Zeelandia. Although they never really acquireda sizeable share of the island’s western half, they neverthelesswent beyond the point of being satisfied with merely a smallport town. Moreover, militarily they were capable of movingdeep inland, if this was required.It is here that the earlier concept of a network tied togetherby a set of coastal “mini-colonies” seems to become invalid.This picture works in the early Portuguese case, but it doesnot really suit the Dutch. To understand the reasons, one maybriefly look at the Spanish side. Manila harbored hopes ofacquiring larger territories in Southeast Asia. Already in thelate 16th century the first moves in that direction begin tosurface. One project was the conquest of Fujian or, alternatively,of Hainan Island. The Portuguese did not like such ideas,they were more prudent and modest and by far not asbelligerent as their Iberian “colleagues”. Japan was amongthe expansionists, Hideyoshi, it is well known, overran Koreain the 1590s. The Dutch, after having concluded the initialphase of their “colonial” adventure by setting up several keyposts and some fortresses, also proved to be of a toughnature; and like the Spanish and Japanese, they were readyto get involved in contest over major territories.It is into this dark period that the rise of F. Zeelandiahappens to fall. The acquisition of control over some landbehind that post, therefore, is not purely accidental, but seemsto be in line with contemporary politics.By contrast, after circa 1640, Macau was caught in declineand economic isolation. No one in this city would then dreamof enlarging Portugal’s “sphere of influence”. The Estado daÍndia was on retreat, and Lisbon’s general interests in Asiagradually shifted away from the Far East to the Indian scenario.3. Cultural BridgesMacau had a different type of hinterland, this was the“spiritual empire” of the Jesuits. Although weak in numbers,the missionaries exerted significant influence over certainmembers of the intellectual elite inside China. Even duringthe difficult period of transition from Ming to Qing Dynasty,Macau’s “cultural annex” continued to operate very efficiently– and did in fact grow. It may be recalled here, that theJesuits served the Nan Ming and Shunzhi courts simultaneously,and that such bright minds as Johann Adam Schall von Bellwarned the Manju government against the Dutch.The case of Taiwan was different. There were someProtestant missionaries on the island, but these persons leftvery few imprints – and nothing comparable to what the CatholicChurch was able to achieve on the mainland. The latter, itis well-known, also functioned as a cultural mediator betweenEurope and the Far East, intellectually, in certain technologicalfields, in medicine and science, arts, and other areas. Bycontrast the few missionaries active on Taiwan were mostlyinterested in turning certain local groups into loyal Protestantswho would serve their “colonial” masters.This leads to another point. In terms of classificationsystems, Macau was much more a cultural bridgehead thanF. Zeelandia. The difference in degrees becomes particularlyevident if one looks at the flow of intellectual expertise. Chinareceived as much from Europe as it gave to Europe in return,while the local non-Han population on Taiwan had little tooffer. Few intellectual debates could be led with these groups,if at all, neither on philosophical issues, nor on scientific orother questions. To this should be added that religious exchangebetween the VOC and its few Chinese partners on Taiwanwas minimal as well and again in no way comparable tothe transfer of knowledge taking place inside China or viaMacau.The above picture can be enriched in several ways.First, the Jesuits constituted an international society, almosta multicultural enterprise operating on a global level. Its primaryinterests did not lie in the maximization of material gains,but in spiritual achievements and instrumental to this end,diplomatic and cultural exchange. From the viewpoint of theChurch, Macau, as a bridgehead, served the Society. However,Macau’s residents probably took the opposite view. If themissionaries would act diplomatically and respect Chinesetraditions, they were a factor that could be instrumental instabilizing Macau’s position vis-à-vis those radical officials, whoproposed to throw out the Portuguese altogether.From this follows yet another observation. 17th centuryMacau was not only embedded in one European structure,but it did in fact form part of two “empires” simultaneously– of the Estado da Índia as a worldly structure, and of the
Comparing the Incomparable: Some Thoughts on the 17th Century Macau and Fort Zeelandia澳門研究6第51期Catholic Church with its center in Rome. The multi-nationalcharacter of the Church and the extraordinary educational levelof its members were certainly held in high esteem by someleaders inside the Ming and Manju courts, especially underthe Kangxi emperor.It may be recalled here that, numerically, the Manju eliteitself was a small group as compared to the millions of subjectsunder its guidance. Comparisons are often risky, but if wethink of the Manju empire in terms of a multi-cultural enterprise,its character was not totally different from the multi-nationalstructure of the Church. Both “organizations” had to keep adelicate balance of power inside their respective systems, andboth had to adjust themselves to the needs of different ethnicgroups and varying local traditions. Thus, along the sea board,the Manju government would often follow the earlier standardsalready installed by the Ming, while at the inner Asian frontier,it adopted a different set of policy tools, as exemplified, forinstance, by the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), which wasessentially negotiated through the Jesuits. Treaties of this kindwere not made at the maritime periphery, at least not in theseventeenth century.Put differently, to some extent both structures, the Qingruling elite and the Society of Jesus, had to remain veryflexible and even ambiguous on certain points, so as to pleaseall sides. The wonderful phrase jing tian (敬天) (associatedwith the famous tablet, which the Jesuits received from theKangxi emperor) is an excellent example for this “diplomaticambiguity”. It can be translated in many ways and may beinterpreted – at least implicitly – as a sign of mutual respect,silent understanding, and unusual harmony.On Taiwan, no comparable double structure (Church /Estado) existed, and there were no mechanisms which wouldbring the Dutch into regular intellectual exchange with a Chineseor Manju ruling elite. The delicate question of who would beinstrumental for whom, therefore, was irrelevant.In the eyes of Beijing, Taiwan constituted a peripheralregion, opposite of Fujian, and not much more than that. Interms of its functions, it was similar to certain remote regionson Hainan or in Yunnan. By comparison, Macau stood, atleast intellectually, much closer to the center of Ming power,and later, the Manju elite. The difference became evident whenthe Dutch, threatened by the Zheng regime, undertook a diplomaticinitiative in Beijing. They were turned down and achievedclose to nothing. The Portuguese, used to Chinese ways ofthinking, were less direct in formulating their concerns, demandedvery lit t le, and usually received much more. Mutualunderstanding required self-control, modesty, and a sense forharmony – elements that a profit-maximizing firm like the VOCwould rarely make use of.Here we may briefly return to the issue of China’s medievalfanfang. Usually, a typical fanfang would emerge in an alreadyexisting urban area, as was noted above. This neither appliesto the southern half of the Macau peninsula, nor to F. Zeelandia.Although the former was used by Fujianese and other sailorsin pre-Portuguese days, a major town did not exist on thispiece of land. The same is valid for the area around F.Zeelandia, which did not compare to a major Chinese centersuch as Zhangzhou or Xiamen. Therefore, in terms of environmentand setting, both places, Macau and F. Zeelandia differed froma “conventional” fanfang.Yet, they shared certain things in common as well. Afanfang, like most diaspora settlements, was nearly alwaysembedded in a major foreign network, and probably exertedsome kind of cultural influence over its immediate (Chinese)neighborhood. At the same time, those living inside the fanfang,would adopt certain Chinese ways of life. Acculturation maythus have gone in two directions. The latter certainly appliesto the situation inside Macau, and perhaps to a lesser extent,also to the Dutch on Taiwan.But conceptually we may run into difficulties here, especiallyif acculturation is conditioned on (or simply linked to) peacefulcoexistence and harmony – ideally, between groups of a similarcultural level. By and large, this can be said of Macau,which was a multi-ethnic place, where all groups would livetogether without being caught in racial clashes, but it cannotbe claimed for F. Zeelandia and the villages under its control.There was no long-lasting harmony and very little peace.The diaspora or fanfang problem can also be approachedin another way. Macau flourished at some distance from amajor metropolis, Guangzhou. As seen through Chinese eyes,F. Zeelandia emerged in a peripheral region without any importantcity in its immediate vicinity. A place such as this had fewer
7《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4opportunities to prosper intellectually, or to become involvedin a long-lasting process of mutual acculturation. Profit wasthe only thing that mattered, mutual tolerance beyond the purelymonetary level was at best a dream.These ideas can now be linked back to the issue ofgreater cultural frameworks, and thereby to the concept ofa “double empire”. Macau, as a multicultural place and miniature,characterized by internal acculturation, mirrored the globalstructure of a well-connected and – at times – equally open-minded institution, namely the Catholic Church; simultaneously,it formed part of a complex political system with its seatin Goa. Physically, Goa was far away, but Beijing – Macau’s“host” – was nearby, at least spiritually. Perhaps it was this“cultural proximity” that gave Macau a good chance of survival,especially in situations, where, normally, Goa’s help wouldhave been needed.F. Zeelandia, although much more closely connected toits “suzerain” on Java, geographically and in other respects,could not count on an independent, circumglobal enterprise thatwould promote cultural research, provide “development aid”and offer spiritual exchange. There was no strong partner withwhom to cooperate, whom to consult, or who would serveas a guide and mediator. The structure of which the Dutchpossessions on the island formed part, rested on one pillaronly – essentially a profit-maximizing firm which, at that time,expanded its operational radius by relying on guns and powder.4. Trade and the Economic DimensionHere we may continue with the more “profane” strataof the maritime world. 17th-century Macau and F. Zeelandiaboth lived on trade. This implied the need of buying cheapand selling dear, and thus also the need of nurturing foreignrelations. In later years, towards the third quarter of the 18thcentury, and again in more recent times, Macau did not onlyundertake efforts to maintain its exterior networks, it alsounderwent several structural “transformations”. The first qualitativetransformation came with the growth of what one may callthe “service sector”, when Macau began renting houses toits European competitors, who would need a few weeks ofrest after doing business in Guangzhou. This was followedby the opium and coolie cycles (during these cycles traderevived under completely different conditions), and finally bythe emergence of local production on a broader scale.F. Zeelandia did not last long enough to experience majortransformations of this kind (although, according to some, itdid experience minor “alterations”). As was said, the 17th centurywas mainly characterized by the acquisition and simple exchangeof commodities, and not much more than that. Even politicalturbulences and local wars did not matter very much in thatregard.In the case of 17th-century Macau, trade was first centeredon shipping Chinese silk to Japan and other destinations, andbringing Japanese silver (plus some Manila silver) to Guangzhou.Gold, copper, mercury, tin, lead, spices, precious woods, coral,musk and medicinal substances were involved as well, butthey were only of secondary importance. After 1640 thecomposition of Macau’s exports and imports altered and theoverall volume of trade declined dramatically. The loss of Melakato the Dutch, the closure of Japan, the temporary interruptionof the Macau-Manila route, and the tensions arising from politicalshifts and changes inside China were the principal reasonsfor this decline.F. Zeelandia did not go through such a development.The impact of exogenous factors on the internal structure ofthis “colonial” settlement proved less dramatic – with theexception, certainly, of its final stages, when the Dutch weredefeated by the Zheng regime.During its prosperous years, above all, F. Zeelandia servedas a stopover on the long route between Japan and SoutheastAsia, as has been said. While the Portuguese suffered setbacksat both ends, in Southeast Asia and Japan, the Dutch expandedtheir influence over the Malay world and were allowed tocontinue their business in Nagasaki, even after the closureof Japan. This was certainly of great advantage to the VOCin F. Zeelandia. The merchants staying in or regularly visitingthis place did not suffer the enormous pressure felt by thePortuguese, who were compelled to search for alternativemarkets.In spite of different developments at the political andeconomic frontiers – conditions for Macau worsened, whileF. Zeelandia enjoyed a somewhat better fate – both placesdid share certain functional features. These may again be
Comparing the Incomparable: Some Thoughts on the 17th Century Macau and Fort Zeelandia澳門研究8第51期described in terms of exogenous variables. There was, firstof all, the dependence on food imports, and secondly, onregularly receiving major trade commodities. Macau could notlive without Chinese silk, F. Zeelandia had to acquire deerskins for the Japanese market, to mention only two examples.Skins also came from Siam, just as silk could be obtainedthrough many international ports other than Guangzhou. In thatsense, there was strong competition at various levels – toan extent that neither Macau nor F. Zeelandia could lean backand relax.But on the other side, certain differences between Macauand F. Zeelandia can be noted as well. From a macro-perspective, the exchange of silk for silver was the key stratumof Far Eastern trade in its totality, even after 1640; skinscould only count as a minor commodity. In that sense theacquisition of Taiwanese deer skins for the Japanese marketplayed a subordinated role. A decline or complete disruptionof this trade, due to ecological or other reasons, would nothave mattered very much. In theory, if left unchallenged byits enemies, F. Zeelandia would have been able to stay on,because it was needed as a stopover on the route betweenJapan and those regions in Southeast Asia, where silk couldbe purchased. Thus, it could always count on Batavia’s support.Macau did not “run” a subordinated production zonecomparable to the skin producing areas “behind” F. Zeelandia.Nor did Portuguese demand ever lead to a radical exploitation(or even depletion) of natural resources. In other words, Macauhad nothing to give up, there was no “supplement” the lossof which might have been digested with ease; on the contrary,Macau had to keep up with its traditional commitments, byall means, and as best as it could.Most merchants in Guangzhou and Xiangshan (香山),it would appear, had a strong interest in keeping Macau afloat,as long as some profits could be derived from trade withthe Portuguese, and as long as no major conflicts would arise.Since no such conflicts had ever occurred, there was mutualconfidence – not at all times, but at least over long periods.Neither the Zheng forces nor the aboriginal tribes on Taiwancould claim the same vis-à-vis the Dutch; in fact, each sidecould do without the other (especially since the skin trade,as was said, was of a secondary nature). It may be assumed,therefore, that Macau and Xiangshan / Guangzhou were ina much closer (commercial) alliance than the VOC and itspartners could ever be.This picture can be complicated by a few additionalassumptions. Fujianese trading groups and the Guangdongmerchants in and around Guangzhou should not be lumpedtogether. The Portuguese were closer to the latter, their relationsto the Fujianese being somewhat more “special”. Theadministrative levels were also different. Macau had to dealwith the local officials in Xiangshan, with the provincialgovernment, and at times (even if rarely, because this wasin the hands of the clergy), with the court in Beijing. Intheory, if tension between different administrative levels emergedinside China, subtle diplomacy could be made use of tocounterbalance possible threats. Rhetoric was a tool whichthe Portuguese had learned to handle well, at all levels.The Dutch cooperated with some local Chinese of Fujianesedescent, but not with all merchant groups, as was mentioned;they had few chances of acquiring the kind of diplomatic routine,which Macau’s merchant class had mastered since early times.Above all, there was no need of balancing the interests ofdifferent administrative levels within one and the same regime,in order to find acceptance. The Zheng clan acted like anindependent entity, the Manju side was a different factor.Moreover, when the Zheng group clashed with the VOC, itwas like a clash between two reckless rivals, without therebeing a realistic diplomatic option, after all that occurred inthe past, to solve the conflict.5. The Mediterranean ConceptSeveral Asian seas have been brought into connectionwith the Mediterranean concept of Fernand Braudel. Althoughno two marit ime spaces can claim an identical set ofcharacteristics, it is nevertheless possible to state that boththe South and the East China Seas – the latter with its“adjunct”, the Yellow Sea – shared certain constituents withthe Mediterranean world. This concerns, for example, the factthat all these spaces were characterized by exchange anda certain degree of “built-in” homogeneity. However, in the17th century, the Northeast Asian scenario was probably moreclosed and more self-sufficient than the South China Sea,
9《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4because the main thrust of trans-Pacific traffic and most Europeaninitiatives were targeted at the ports and shores around thelatter. Both Macau and F. Zeelandia can be seen as locationswhich partook in the exchange of goods and ideas insidethis second space, and between that area and maritime NortheastAsia.When the Portuguese withdrew from Nagasaki, the Dutchwere left as the only European group in Japan – and theonly group, which had its power center outside the East ChinaSea, i.e., on Java. Regarding the Chinese who sailed toNagasaki, they mostly came from “within” the system, fromcoastal Fujian and Zhejiang, or from Taiwan. Even the Chineseoperating out of Ayuthaya, Patani and other ports around theGulf of Siam, normally maintained close connections to China’sown ports and often cannot be disassociated from their mainlandcolleagues. Therefore, after 1640, F. Zeelandia was the lastEuropean outpost to remain involved in trade between twomaritime zones with a (partially) “Mediterranean” character.Macau did not only loose its former functions in theNortheast. Due to Qing blockades and the long conflict betweenZheng-China and Beijing it was periodically cut off from theother (quasi-)“Mediterranean” as well, with the inevitable resultthat, functionally, it became even more dependent on its hinterlandthan before. This state of affairs only ended after the downfallof the Zheng regime, when trade prohibitions, under whichcoastal China – from the north down to the south – hadso badly suffered, were lifted and trade resumed.Thus, Macau went through a dramatic change – in thesense that it was reduced from a flourishing entrepôt betweentwo “Mediterranean” spaces to a simple port with limitedcommercial functions, whereas F. Zeelandia retained much ofits original character. Put differently, after 1640 Macau wasno longer a “classical” entrepôt on a major Portuguese shippingline, rather it became an occasional port-of-call, almost a terminalpoint for Portuguese vessels coming in from Southeast Asia.At best it served as a small-scale entrepôt for local trade,and trade between China and Southeast Asia. The Dutch onTaiwan, needless to add, never had to experience anythingeven close to that – with the exception of F. Zeelandia’sfinal years.Seen from the “Mediterranean” perspective, i.e., from theviewpoint of the maritime historian who is looking from thesea to the land, and not in the other direction, Macau wasone of many places located at the western fringe of the Nanhai(南海). Prior to 1640, it served as a stable pillar for tradethrough the South China Sea. After that date, and even afterthe end of the Manju ban on trade in the 1680s, Macau,now with less funds to draw on and a much reduced populationas compared to the golden years of the Japan trade cycle,became much more absorbed into the hinterland than before,both in relative and absolute terms. It thus changed into aplace which, from a purely functional perspective, was less“Mediterranean” than before. None of this applies to F. Zeelandia,which pursued a less dramatic career.6. PerceptionsIn spite of the many ups and downs experienced bythe Portuguese, Macau was never occupied by a major foreignfighting force (if we overlook the brief British incursion in theearly 19th century, which was ended through Arriaga’s diplomaticskills). Furthermore, Macau lasted much longer than the oldfanfang in medieval Guangzhou and Quanzhou, which haddisappeared in the course of dynastic wars. Flexibility, mutualdependency, and silent understanding on all sides – as ifthe Portuguese were more Confucian than their Chinese partners– accounted for Macau’s outstanding success, at least in part.Consequently, the perception of Portugal’s presence in thatcity (and of the Church inside China) also floated up anddown. In the end, however, these nuances in views hada common denominator, for, as a rule, roaring thunder wasnearly always diverted away from the modest houses, inwhich the Portuguese used to live.The presence of the Dutch on Taiwan was rememberedin Europe and Japan, but almost forgotten in China, and generallyof little concern to the Taiwanese themselves. It was onlyduring the last three or four decades that Chinese historiansin Taibei and elsewhere, three hundred years after the fallof F. Zeelandia, became more interested in this neglected topic.At the same time, Dutch historians began seriously investigatingthe enormous body of colonial documents related to F. Zeelandia’sgloomy past. This led to the emergence of new pictures –and a respectable apparatus of beautifully printed books and
Comparing the Incomparable: Some Thoughts on the 17th Century Macau and Fort Zeelandia澳門研究10第51期articles, not only designed for the academic world, but alsoto entertain a broader readership in both the Netherlands andon Taiwan.One curious facet of this apparatus pertains to its current“application”. Taiwanese intellectuals – and that even includessome local romanciers, as the author of the present articleexperienced on several occasions – often assign a very specialsignificance to the short-lived presence of the Dutch on “their”island. Not infrequently, this presence is unduly inflated, tothe extent that the period in question is labeled the “Dutchera” in Taiwanese history. By presenting the past in sucha light, the role of the Chinese immigrants is implicitlydowngraded, and the brief presence of the Spanish almostforgotten.There seem to be two important reasons for these distortions.First, for several decades Taiwanese historians were influencedby English and Dutch writers, who would of course presentthe role of the Iberian powers from their “northern” (and oftenvery Protestant) viewpoints. Secondly, by intentionally upgradingthe Dutch “heritage”, those Taiwanese, who were dreamingof political independence, began developing an extra tool, whichwould enable them to claim that Taiwan had gone througha past distinctly different from what the rest of China hadexperienced. In other words, if there would be something likea special Taiwanese identity, this identity would be partlyconditioned on a “colonial” background – which of course doesnot apply to the mainland.Probably there are few cases worldwide, where the colonialpast is perceived in similar ways, the Dutch presence insouthwestern Taiwan being one of these exceptions. Occasionally,this has even reached the point, where the image of theVOC has almost been whitewashed. Paradoxically, as wassaid, the Dutch “intermezzo” on the island was all but smoothand peaceful, in contrast to Portugal’s role in Macau. However,mainland historians dealing with Euro-Chinese relations, havenot given very much attention to these differences. So far,they were mainly interested in the history of Hong Kong,Shanghai, Macau and other major cities, while the Dutch,who killed thousands of Chinese already two centuries beforethe first Opium War, were often treated at the margin. Futureresearch on a comparative basis will be needed to revealthe many intellectual asymmetries linked to this alarmingsituation.Notes:1 Here and elsewhere, the word “colonial” appears in quotationmarks, because in my understanding “colonialism” is a termmore applicable to the French, British and other overseasempires of later periods.References:1. Andrade, T., How Taiwan became Chinese. Dutch,Spanish, and Han Colonization…(e-book).2. Andrade, T., “The Rise and Fall of Dutch Taiwan, 1624–1662: Cooperative Colonization and the Statist Modelof European Expansion,” Journal of World History, Vol.17 (2006).3. Blussé, L., “Dutch Protestant Missionaries as Protago-nists of the Territorial Expansion of the VOC onFormosa,” in Kooiman, D., van den Muizenberg, O. andvan der Veer, P. (Eds.), Conversion, Competition andConflict. Essays on the Role of Religion in Asia(Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1984), pp. 87–105.4. Blussé, L., Zhong He jiaowang shi 1601–1989 (N.p.:Lukoudian chubanshe, 1989). (Translation from Dutch)[包樂史著，莊國土、程紹剛譯：《中荷交往史 1601–1989》，阿姆斯特丹：路口店出版社， 1989 年。]5. Blussé, L. (Ed.), Around and About Formosa: Essays inHonour of Professor Ts’ao Yung-ho (Taibei: SMCPublishing Inc., 2003).6. Borao, M. J. E., Spaniards in Taiwan. Documents, 2Vols (Taibei: SMC Publishing, 2001-2002).7. Boxer, C. R., “The Siege of Fort Zeelandia and theCapture of Formosa from the Dutch, 1661–1662,”Transactions and Proceedings of the Japan Society ofLondon, Vol. 24 (1926–1927), pp. 16–47.8. Cai, Pingli, Penghu tongshi (Taibei: Zhongwen tushugufen youxian gongsi, 1959). [蔡平立：《澎湖通史》，台北：中文圖書股份有限公司， 1959 年。]9. Cao, Yonghe, Taiwan caoqi lishi yanjiu xuji (Taibei:Lianjing chuban gongsi, 2000). [曹永和：《台灣早期歷史研究》，台北：聯經出版公司， 2002 年。]10. Cariot i, P. , Zheng Chenggong (Napoli: Is ti tutoUniversitario Orientale, 1995).11. Cheng, Shaogang (Tr.), Helanren zai Fuermosha [DeVOC en Formosa 1624–1662], 2nd Edition (Taibei:Lianjing, 2005). [程紹剛註譯：《荷蘭人在福爾摩莎》，第 2 版，台北：聯經， 2005 年。]12. Flores, J. M., “China e Macau,” in Marques, A. H. deOliveira (Ed.), História dos Portugueses no ExtremoOriente, Vol. 1.2 (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 2000),pp. 151–293.13. Flores, J. M., “Macau: Os eventos políticos,” inMarques, A. H. de Oliveira (Ed.) , História dosPortugueses no Extremo Oriente, Vol. 2 (Lisbon:
11《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4Fundação Oriente, 2001), pp. 71-155.14. Höllmann, T. O., “Formosa and the Trade in Venisonand Deer Skins,” in Ptak, Roderich and Rothermund,Dietmar (Eds.), Emporia, Commodities and Entrepre-neurs in Asian Marit ime Trade , c . 1400–1750(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991), pp. 263–290.15. Jin, Guoping and Wu, Zhiliang, História(s) de Macau.Ficção e realidade (Macau: Associacao de Educacao deAdultos de Macau, 2001). [金國平、吳志良：《鏡海飄渺》，澳門：澳門成人教育學會， 2001 年。]16. Jin, Guoping and Wu, Zhiliang, Em busca de história(s)de Macau apagada(s) pelo tempo (Macau: Associacaode Educacao de Adultos de Macau, 2002). [金國平、吳志良：《東西洋望》，澳門：澳門成人教育學會，2002 年。]17. Jin, Guoping and Wu, Zhiliang, Abrindo as Portas doCerco (Macau: Associacao de Educacao de Adultos deMacau, 2004). [金國平、吳志良：《過十字門》，澳門：澳門成人教育學會， 2004 年。]18. Knapp, R. G. (Ed.), China’s Island Frontier. Studies inthe Historical Geography of Taiwan (Honolulu: HawaiiUniversity Press, 1980).19. Liao, Dake, Fujian haiwai jiaotong shi (Fuzhou: Fujianrenmin chubanshe, 2002). [廖大珂：《福建海外交通史》，福州：福建人民出版社， 2002 年。]20. Lin, Renchuan, Ming mo Qing chu siren haishangmaoyi (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe,1 9 8 7 ) . [林仁川：《明末清初私人海上貿易》，上海：華東師範大學出版社， 1987 年。]21. L inc k- Kes t in g , G . , E in Kap i t e l c h ine s i sc he rGrenzgeschichte. Han und Nicht-Han im Taiwan derQing-Zeit 1683-1895 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag,1979).22. Ollé, M., “Chinos, Holandeses y Castellanos en Taiwan(1624-1684),” Revista de Cultura ( internationaledition), Vol. 7 (2004).23. Ollé, M., La invención de China: Percepciones yestrategias filipinas respecto a China durante el sigloXVI (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2000).24. Pires, B. V., “A viagem de comércio Macau-Manila nosséculos XVI à XIX,” Boletim do Instituto Luís deCamões, Vol. 5, No. 1–2 (1971), pp. 5–100.25. Ptak, R., “Der Handel zwischen Macau und Makassar,c a . 1 6 4 0 - 1 6 6 7 , ” Z e i t s c h r i f t d e r D e u t s c h e nMorgenländischen Gesellschaft, Vol. 139, No. 1 (1989),pp. 208–226.26. Ptak, R., “Die Rolle der Chinesen, Portugiesen undHolländer im Teehandel zwischen China und Südostasien(ca. 1600-1750),” Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte(1/1994), pp. 89-106.27. Ptak, R., “Wirtschaftlicher und demographischerWandel in Macau: Stadien einer Entwicklung,” in Malek,Roman (Ed.), Macau: Herkunft ist Zukunft (SanktAugustin: China-Zentrum and Institut MonumentaSerica; Nettetal: Steyler Verlag, 2000), pp. 153-186.28. Ptak, R., “China’s Medieval fanfang – A Model forMacau under the Ming?” Anais de História de Além-Mar, Vol. 2 (2001), pp. 47–71.29. Ptak, R., “Anatomie einer Eintracht: Portugal undChina im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert,” in Kraus, Michaeland Ottomeyer, Hans (Eds.), Novos Mundos/NeueWelten: Portugal und das Zeitalter der Entdeckungen(Berlin: Deutsches Historisches Museum; Dresden:Sandstein Verlag, 2007), pp. 163–173.30. Ramos, J. de D., “Kangxi, os Jesuítas e o Aforismo JingTian,” Daxiyangguo. Revista Portuguesa de EstudosAsiáticos, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 59–86.31. Shepherd, J. R., Statecraft and Political Economy onthe Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800 (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 1993).32. Souza, G. B., The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Tradeand Society in China and the South China Sea 1630–1754 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).33. Struve, Lynn, The Southern Ming, 1644–1662 (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1984).34. Tang, Kaijian, Ming Qing shidafu yu Aomen (Macau:Macao Foundation, 1998). [湯開建：《明清士大夫與澳門》，澳門：澳門基金會， 1998 年。]35. Tang, Kaijian, Aomen kaibu chuqishi yanjiu (Beijing:Zhonghua shuju, 1999). [湯開建：《澳門開埠初期史研究》，北京：中華書局， 1999 年。]36. Thompson, L. G., “The Earliest Eyewitness Accountsof the Formosan Aborigines,” Monumenta Serica, Vol.23 (1964), pp. 163–204.37. Van Veen, E., “VOC Strategies in the Far East (1605–1640),” Bulletin to of Portuguese/Japanese Studies,Vol. 3 (2001), pp. 85–105.38. Vermeer, E. B. (Ed.), Development and Decline ofFukien Province in the 17th and 18th Centuries (Leiden:E. J. Brill, 1990).39. Wills, J. E., Pepper, Guns and Parleys: The Dutch EastIndia Company and China, 1622–1681 (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1974).40. Wills, J. E., Embassies and Illusions. Dutch andPortuguese Envoys to K’ang-hsi, 1666–1687 (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1984).41. Wu, Zhiliang, Segredos de sobrevivência. Históriapolítica de Macau (Macau: Associacao de Educacao deAdultos de Macau, 1999).42. Xu, Xiaowang (Ed.), Fujian tongshi, 5 Vols (Fuzhou:Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2006). [徐曉望編：《福建通史》，福州：福建人民出版社， 2006 年。]43. Yang, Guozhen, Min zai hai zhong. Zhuixun Fujianhaiyang fazhanshi (Nanchang: Jiangxi gaojiao chubanshe,1 9 9 8 ) . [楊國楨：《閩在海中；追尋福建海洋發展史》，南昌：江西高教出版社， 1998 年。]44. Zeng, Shaocong, Dongyang hanglu yimin: Ming Qinghaiyang yimin Taiwan yu Feilübin de bijiao yanjiu(Nanchang: Jiangxi gaojiao chubanshe, 1998). [曾少聰：《東洋航路移民：明清海洋移民台灣與菲律賓的比較研究》，南昌：江西高教出版社， 1998 年。]45. Zhang, Tingmao, Ming Qing shiqi Aomen haishangmaoyishi (Macau: Aoya zhoukan chuban youxian gongsi,2 0 0 4 ) . [張廷茂：《明清時期澳門海上貿易》，澳門：澳亞周刊出版有限公司， 2004 年。]
共處分治中的主導治理──論明政府對澳門的治理措施澳門研究20第51期5 1 同註 39 。5 2 同註 50 。5 3 Boxer, C. R., The Great Ship from Amacon (Lisbon, 1959), p. 17.5 4 同註 4 ，第 90 頁。55 湯開建：《澳門開埠初期史研究》，北京：中華書局， 1 99 9 年，第 1 97 頁。5 6 參見裴化行：《天主教十六世紀在華傳教志》，轉引自戴裔 、鍾國豪：《澳門歷史綱要》，北京：知識出版社， 1999 年，第 74 頁。5 7 同註 2 ，第 18–19 頁。5 8 [意 ]利瑪竇、金尼閣著，何高濟等譯：《利瑪竇中國劄記》，北京：中華書局， 1983 年，第 114 頁。5 9 同註 2 ，第 100–101 頁。6 0 同註 29 ，第 48 頁。6 1 參見《大明律》規定：“凡將馬牛、軍需、鐵貨、銅錢、段匹、綢絹、絲綿私出外境貨賣及下海者，杖一百”。並有條例規定：“凡夷人到岸，未曾報官盤驗，先行接買番貨及為夷人收買違禁貨物者，俱發邊衛充軍”，參見《大明律例》，卷十五，《兵律‧私出外境及違禁下海》條。6 2 Boxer, C. R., Seventeenth Century Macau in ContemporaryDocuments and Illustrations (Hong Kong: Heinemann, 1984),p. 77.6 3 同註 12 。6 4 [清]張嗣衍：《乾隆廣州府志》，卷五十三，載於《明清時期澳門問題檔案文獻匯編》（第五卷），北京：人民出版社， 1999 年，第 192 頁。6 5 [明 ]李侍問：《罷采珠池鹽鐵澳稅疏》，見（清）張嗣衍：《乾隆廣州府志》，卷五十三。6 6《廣東賦役全書‧澳門稅銀》，轉引自黃啟臣：《澳門通史》，廣州：廣東人民出版社， 1 9 9 9 年，第 8 9頁。6 7《明熹宗實錄》，天啟元年六月丙子條。
21《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4“乾隆九年定例”是指清政府關於乾隆八年夷人晏些盧扎傷民人陳輝千致死案的處理意見，它影響了其後半個多世紀澳門地區涉外刑案的司法審判。乾隆九年定例經皇帝和刑部批准“著為令”，並在澳門地區廣泛適用，是清朝前期澳門地區最重要的判例法。一、乾隆九年定例的形成清代關於涉外刑案的司法管轄，在《大清律例》中明文規定“凡化外（來降）人犯罪者，並依律擬斷”1，但這簡單的律文顯然缺乏現實操作性，難以適應錯綜複雜的社會現實。清朝前期，澳門人口不斷增長，民番衝突日漸增多，如何審理涉外刑案就成為擺在清政府面前的重要問題。清初到乾隆八年（1743），澳門地區有兩件外國人殺死中國人案件見於記載。1710年，葡萄牙戰船船長曼努埃爾‧阿爾瓦雷斯‧德‧奧利維依拉（M a n u e l A l v a r e s d eOl ive i ra）殺害了一名中國人並將屍體裝進口袋扔到海裏，但沒有注意到口袋上有他的標記，於是事情敗露。在真憑實據面前，王室大法官伽斯巴爾‧馬爾丁斯（Gaspar Mart ins）為平息事態，不得不將殺人兇手逮捕，押送到燒灰爐堡壘處死。觀看行刑的有兩位耶穌會神父、受害者的妻子、家人和王室大法官。2 1712年，又有帝汶人若奧‧蘇亞雷斯‧里斯博阿（Joao Soares Lisboa）殺害一名中國人，澳門兵頭晏多尼下令將其置於大炮台的炮口上開炮處死，並下令將其他罪行較輕的8個同夥在街上當眾鞭笞，然後押往馬尼拉賣出。3這兩起案件都未見清朝政府參與司法審判，甚至不見於中文檔案文獻記載。之所以如此，一方面是由於外國人多採取賄賂死者家屬和地方官員的辦法，使死者家屬保持沉默，也使地方官員匿不上報，另一方面是清朝地方官員尚無堅持涉外案件司法管轄權的意識，只要案件不引起社會混亂和上司關注而危及自己官職，寧願視而不見，虛假瞞報，或者索取賄賂，中飽私囊。1744年廣州將軍策楞等曾上奏指出：“惟民番交涉事件，罪在番人者，地方官每因其系屬教門，不肯交人出澳，事難題達，類皆不稟不詳，即或通報上司，亦必移易情節，改重作輕，如鬥殺作為過失，冀幸外結省事，以故曆查案卷，從無澳夷殺死民人抵償之案。”4也就是說，由於涉外案件審判執行困難，清朝地方官一般採取不稟不詳或者改重作輕的辦法，以致在澳門從未發生清朝政府審判處死外國罪犯之例。乾隆八年夷人晏些盧扎傷民人陳輝千致死案是第一起引起清朝中央政府關注的涉外命案。該案案情比較簡單：乾隆八年十月十八日，澳門商人陳輝千酒醉之後，途遇葡人晏些盧（Anselmo）發生爭執，陳輝千被晏些盧用小刀戮傷致死。死者家屬不願被收買，訴至香山縣衙。香山知縣驗傷訊供之後，立即上報暫署兩廣總督之廣州將軍策楞，並“密稟西洋夷人犯罪，向不出澳赴審，是以兇犯於訊供之後，夷目自行收管，至今抗不交出”。策楞會同廣東巡撫王安國嚴批香山知縣照例審擬招解。香山知縣迭催澳葡當局後向策楞等轉述澳葡當局之請：“番人附居澳境，凡有干犯法紀，俱在澳地處治，百乾隆九年定例研究王巨新 ** 山東省委黨校政法部講師、歷史學博士
29《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4隨即下旨，將居住在廣州的西洋傳教士盡數驅趕至澳門，嚴格禁止民眾入教，嚴防澳門的傳教士再次進入內地傳教。在嚴厲的禁教環境下，當時巴黎外方傳教會在廣州的賬房也被迫搬遷到澳門，繼續為中國內地的秘密傳教活動提供支援和服務。根據檔案資料的整理，擔任巴黎外方傳教會駐廣州賬房的有7位，駐澳門賬房的有12位，列表如下：從以上兩個表格可以看出，賬房職位保持連續表2 巴黎外方傳教會駐澳門賬房名錄14序號 姓名 任職期限 備註安東‧郭奈1 （？ –17 55） 1732–1740年Antoine Connain讓－白蒂斯特‧麥格霍特2 （1704–1752） 1740–1752年Jean-Baptiste Maigrot皮埃爾‧拉塞爾3 （1711–？） 1752–1754年Pierre-Antoine Laccére奧利維耶‧勒本4 （1710–1780） 1754–1764年Oliv ier Le Bon皮埃爾‧羅曼5 （1736–？） 1765–1771年Pierre Romain查理斯‧伯當6 （17? –1772） 1771–1772年Charles Bertin讓‧斯泰奈爾7 （1738–1814） 1772–1780年Jean Steiner讓‧德古維埃爾8 （1744–1804） 1780–1788年Jean Descourvières克洛德‧勒頓達爾9 （1753–1813） 1788–1813年Claude-François Letondal讓‧巴魯德爾10 （1779–1847） 1816–1830年Jean Baroudel皮埃爾‧勒格埃古瓦11 （1801–1866） 1830–1841年Pierre Legrégeois拿破崙‧李播12 （1805–1872） 1841–1847年Napoléon Libois出生於法國大西洋盧瓦爾省（Lo i re -A t lan t iqu e）， 172 9 年前往中國，在 173 2 年接替吉奈和福賽爾出任賬房。 1 7 3 2 年傳教士被清廷下令驅逐至澳門時，賬房也隨之搬遷到澳門。郭奈繼續擔任駐澳門賬房直到 1 7 4 0 年。170 4 年出生於朗格勒（La ngre s）， 174 0 年前往澳門，被任命為駐澳門賬房。 17 47年四川代牧區的馬青山主教（Mgr de Mar t i l ia t）離開四川途徑澳門返回歐洲時，任命麥格霍特為四川、貴州和雲南教區的助理主教，但他作為駐澳門賬房的同時對這項職務幾乎沒有履行其職責。讓－白蒂斯特‧麥格霍特於 1 7 5 2 年 1 0 月 2 0 日在澳門逝世。1 7 1 1 年生於圖盧茲。在外方傳教會修道院的時間並不長。 1 7 3 7 年 1 0 月前往暹羅，在暹羅總修院擔任教師。 1 7 4 9 年到達澳門，在白蒂斯特‧顏當（ J . B .M a ig r o t）去世後，於 1 75 2 –1 7 54 年接任賬房。後被提名四川代牧主教，拉塞爾對此婉拒，在 1 7 5 7 年回到法國後離開了巴黎外方傳教會。171 0 年 3 月 17 日生於聖馬婁（Sa in t - Ma lo）， 174 5 年 5 月 18 日前往暹羅，在暹羅總修院擔任教師直到 1 7 4 8 年。 1 7 5 4 年勒本到達澳門接任拉塞爾，履行賬房職責。 176 4 年勒本離開澳門，同年在羅馬由教宗克萊芒十三世（Clé ment XI I I）祝聖為梅特羅波利斯（Mé te l lo po l i s）主教和暹羅教區助理主教。 17 80 年 1 0 月 2 7 日逝世於果阿。173 6 年生於卡爾瓦多斯（Calvado s）， 176 4 年加入外方傳教會， 176 5 年晉鐸為神父，同年到澳門接替準備前往四川傳教的艾若擔任賬房。同時羅曼在澳門尋找和付洗被遺棄的嬰孩。 1 7 7 1 年羅曼重新回到法國，擔任外方傳教會修道院院長。1 7 7 7 年羅曼離開外方傳教會。擔任駐澳門賬房的時間很短。伯當在 17 69 年 1 2 月出發前往澳門， 17 72 年 7 月 1 3日便在澳門逝世。173 8 年生於法國摩澤爾（Mo se l l e）， 176 2 年 9 月 18 日晉鐸， 177 1 年 8 月 12 日加入巴黎外方傳教會， 177 2 年 11 月 4 日前往澳門，擔任駐澳門賬房 7 年時間。 17 78年被派往四川、貴州和雲南一帶傳教。174 4 年生於法國道布斯（Dou bs）， 176 8 年左右晉鐸， 177 6 年加入巴黎外方傳教會，隨即負責駐澳門賬房職務， 178 6 年離開澳門被派遣到暹羅傳教，後於同年返回巴黎，任巴黎外方傳教會修道院的院長，直到 1 7 8 9 年 4 月 2 1 日。 1 7 9 2 年被派駐到羅馬， 1 8 0 4 年 8 月 6 日逝世於羅馬。175 3 年生於法國拉－隆格維爾（La Long ev i l le）， 17 84 年進入巴黎外方傳教會，1 7 8 5 年 3 月 1 2 日前往澳門履行賬房職責， 1 8 0 7 年到巴黎外方傳教會在檳城（Pe na n g）的總修院任職， 1 81 3 年 1 1 月 1 7 日逝世於本地治里。177 9 年生於法國貝桑松（Bes anço n）， 181 5 年 4 月加入巴黎外方傳教會， 181 6 年5 月 2 日前往澳門接替勒頓達爾的賬房職位，在職期間持續不斷地寫過大量信件送回巴黎，匯報教會的新情況。 1 8 2 9 年他被召回巴黎，出任巴黎外方傳教會修道院院長一職。 1 8 3 7 年他離開巴黎外方傳教會，轉而加入貝桑松的聖‧查理斯修會（L a So c ié t é d e Sa in t - C ha r l es d e Be sa n ç on）， 1 84 7 年 7 月 3 日逝世於馬賽（Mar se i l le）。180 1 年 8 月 6 日生於法國卡爾瓦多斯（Calvado s）， 182 6 年加入巴黎外方傳教會，18 27 年 1 2 月 2 2 日成為神父， 1 82 8 年 2 月 2 7 日出發前往澳門， 1 83 0 年被任命為賬房。 1 84 2 年被任命為巴黎外方傳教會修道院院長， 1 8 6 6 年 4 月 1 6 日逝世於修道院。180 5 年 12 月 14 日生於法國諾姆（Om e）， 183 0 年 9 月 18 日晉鐸為神父， 183 6 年7 月 2 9 日加入巴黎外方傳教會， 1 83 7 年 2 月 2 0 日外出傳教。 1 84 2 年被任命為駐澳門賬房。 184 7 年隨 賬房駐地遷往香港。 186 6 年被召回巴黎，同年 5 月 7 日被任命為巴黎外方傳教會修道院院長，隨後又被任命為外方傳教會駐羅馬的賬房。1 8 7 2 年 4 月 6 日逝世於羅馬。
鴉片戰爭前巴黎外方傳教會駐廣州和澳門賬房之探析澳門研究30第51期性，並未因法國來華路途遙遠、行程艱難或其他原因而使賬房空缺，這是對巴黎外方傳教會在華傳教事業的有力支持。到了19世紀初期，賬房還配備有副手（sous-procureur）。如巴魯德爾在1816–1830年擔任賬房一職時，勒格埃古瓦就從1828–1830年間作為巴魯德爾的副手，協助其工作。而到了勒格埃古瓦任職賬房時，李播在1838–1841年是他的副手。二、賬房職責與傳教經費的用途（一）賬房職責巴黎外方傳教會派駐廣州和澳門的賬房的職責，主要有以下三個方面：1. 掌管和分派傳教經費在范益盛（François Pot t ier）擔任四川代牧主教時期（1767–1784），外方傳教會修道院每年提供給每位代牧主教的經費是600法郎（f ranc），傳教士則是300法郎。當時對本地神父並不提供傳教經費，但是四川傳教區除外。四川的華籍神父每人每年可獲得200到300法郎的資助。15 這些經費由賬房分派，通常由信使（courr ier）來往內地和澳門帶回，信使一般都是平信徒，往往以經商名義行走。他們不僅會帶回經費，而且也不時從賬房神父那裏領取舉行宗教儀式時所需要的器物，如葡萄酒、聖油和畫像等。法文資料記載，1758年兩位原從澳門賬房勒本神父處返回成都的信使，因為彼此鬧出分歧而在外教人面前暴露身份，被人看到裝有宗教器物的行李箱而遭人告密被捕。162. 接引新的傳教士和指派傳教目的地這是賬房的一項重要任務。當有新的傳教士前往中國傳教時，首先會到達澳門。一則因為中國內地嚴厲的禁教環境，二來新傳教士需要聽從賬房的派遣，去往合適的傳教區。比如，四川傳教區的另一位代牧主教徐德新（Gabrie l -Taurin Duf resse）1776年8 月首次到達澳門時，是由當時的賬房斯泰奈爾（Steiner）神父在半夜裏“像領一名走私商人一樣”將他帶回到住處。17又如，曾在巴黎外方傳教會的大城（Juthia）神學院學習15年的華籍神父李安德，在1726年學成回到中國內地後，被當時駐廣州的賬房郭奈神父先後派往福建和四川傳教。183. 對本地傳教區事務進行一定的指導，保持與巴黎總會的聯絡賬房的另外一個作用，是充當聯絡員的角色，甚至如吳旻女士所言，具有特派員的性質。每年本地傳教區的主教和神父們都撰寫大量書信，寄往法國的總會及其親人朋友。這些書信就成為我們今天進行研究的重要史料之一。這其中還包括寫給賬房的書信報告。畢竟歐洲路途遙遠，許多事務性的請示根本等不及總會的回覆，因此，我們在法文資料中經常能夠看到本地代牧主教與賬房的書信來往中涉及這些事情──本地修道院的籌建和修生的培養、對貞女制度的爭議、教理書籍的印發，以及教案發生時的應對措施等等。（二）傳教經費用途對於巴黎外方傳教會的資金來源，有文章對此論及，側重點在法國大革命之後。對於在法國大革命前，巴黎外方傳教會的資金主要來自五個方面：什一稅；國王和貴族的個人資助；法國教士組織的資助（Assemblé du c le rgé de France）；傳教會進行商業投資的收益；教士和信徒的捐贈。19然後這些資金再撥往遠東的各傳教區。一般來說，傳教經費主要有以下三個用途。1. 傳教士個人生活費用包括傳教士的日常生活費用、修道院和言經學校裏教師的生活費用及文具書籍開銷。根據資料顯示，外籍傳教士與本地神父之間在經費上有一定差別，通常是前者高於後者。而且由於經費不能獲得保障，時常出現經濟拮据的狀況。范益盛甫到四川，就有建議取消對本地神父的經費。事實上，在沒有傳教士到來的情況下斷掉對本地神父的經費資助，很可能會被人認為是巴黎外方傳教會已經放棄這片傳教區。對此，范益盛極力請求延期，表示讓本地神父需要時間來自給自足。20此外，還有一點值得注意的是，如果傳教士被捕入獄，在獄中的花銷也是一大筆費用，李安德日記曾記載一次他和傳教士費布仁（Urbain Lefebv re）在獄中15天僅飯錢就花掉一兩五錢。212. 教會事業的支出指教會的一些宗教活動支出、宗教用品的開支、付洗嬰兒的費用、教堂和修道院的營建及維持。仍以四川為例，范益盛主教在修建龍溪修道院時，向駐澳門賬房申請提前支付經費 2 0 0 皮埃斯特（piastre），計劃在未來5年內的傳教津貼中逐年扣除
鴉片戰爭前巴黎外方傳教會駐廣州和澳門賬房之探析澳門研究32第51期人而遭受到中國當局的迫害，要將他逮捕，起初葡萄牙人對他給予支持，但隨即感到厭煩。他在澳門處境艱難，他最好是遠離此地……”32德古維埃爾離開澳門後由勒頓達爾接替駐澳賬房的位置。但是門德薩主教在此問題上仍然糾纏，要求勒頓達爾保證今後不再派遣和幫助傳教士進入中國，不過勒頓達爾以“本教團規定阻止傳教士進行傳教活動者將被革除教籍”為由拒絕遵守。門德薩還認為駐澳賬房和法國傳教士是對華貿易的障礙。33在駐澳賬房與澳門主教的僵持中，前者獲得了法國駐澳代辦小德金（Lou is -Joseph de Guignes）34 的支持，對門德薩的譴責進行反駁。小德金認為法國傳教士是從澳門而非廣州秘密離開，如果駐澳賬房不予以庇護，一旦他們被中國官員發現，將必死無疑。他還指出“儘管中國官員知道中國人Tsai神甫35從廣州到澳門避難，葡國對華貿易並沒有受到影響”。 36儘管駐澳賬房與澳門署理主教門德薩之間有 不愉快的經歷，但是澳葡當局還是在必要且對自己有利時，對巴黎外方傳教會駐澳賬房及其傳教士予以支持。例如蘇維宏神父（Paul Souvi ron）在廣州被捕一事。蘇維宏於1796年6月9日從法國來到澳門，次年3月份在5名平信徒的陪同下離開澳門準備前往四川傳教，不幸地是，因為被人告發，9天後他在廣東省境內被捕，被搜查出有駐澳賬房勒頓達爾簽名的信件，引起廣東官員的震怒，將其關押在廣州監獄，幾次提審拷問。兩個月後蘇維宏逝世於監獄中。37在審理此案期間，廣東官員曾派遣3位行商前往澳門，要求將勒頓達爾帶回廣州審問，並將蘇維宏領回至澳門。但是勒頓達爾猶豫不決，因而發生了中國官兵企圖強行帶走勒頓達爾事件。葡文資料亦為我們提供了此事件的詳細過程：“蘇維宏（Souvi ron）神甫帶給四川傳教士的信件和文件是經勒頓達爾（Letondal）神甫簽署的；廣東總督決定不惜採取任何手段招撫這位駐澳賬房；他派遣3位行商抵達澳門要求勒頓達爾神甫前往廣州，和平解決蘇維宏神甫（當時已被關押）事件。勒頓達爾神甫認為對蘇維宏神甫的關押是毫無理由的，應將蘇維宏神甫送往東京。管理行商的海關官員要求勒頓達爾神甫前往廣州同廣東總督面談，然後將蘇維宏神甫帶回澳門。勒頓達爾神甫猶豫不決。商人們表示他可以仔細考慮，作出決定後到瑞典代辦家中找他們，他們在那裏參加晚宴。勒頓達爾神甫去了那裏。到達之後，300名中國官兵闖入瑞典代辦家中；中國人將勒頓達爾神甫拿下，企圖將其帶走。這時瑞典商貿經紀人莫維斯（Morv is）拔出手槍，威脅說誰動他的客人，他就對誰不客氣。主人帕爾瑪（Palm）出面調解，說來此參加晚宴的都是他的朋友，不應發生衝突；否則他將被迫採取武力。商人們撤退，向他們的官員報告行動失敗。”38在澳門彈丸之地，如此行動必會造成嚴重影響。得知中國官兵的這一武力行動，澳門議事會議員安東尼奧‧文森特‧羅薩（António Vicente Rosa）嚴厲譴責這些商人，並同這位海關官員要求勒頓達爾撰寫一份書面文件交給他們。中國官員對勒頓達爾的回覆極度不滿意，要求澳門議事會驅逐勒頓達爾，否則澳門將要“承受廣東總督的盛怒”。39 但是，主持議事會的澳門總督邊度（Manuel Pi to）和王室大法官費雷拉（Lázaro da Si lva Ferrei ra），反對中國人的背信棄義和武裝入侵，給予勒頓達爾保護。他們在回函結尾寫道：“查閱檔案，可以找到許多歐洲人被遣回澳門例子，但沒有一個澳門將歐洲人交由廣州當局裁決的例子。”40由此，勒頓達爾獲得澳門總督的庇護，應該有兩點原因：其一，從回函內容和語氣來看，澳葡當局試圖在對華關係上變得強硬，企圖衝破中國政府的絕對管治，因而不放過任何可利用的事件試探廣東方面的反應；其二，勒頓達爾認為，在澳門的葡人一直對駐澳賬房和法國傳教士持有敵意，設法與在澳法國人和外國商人交好，取得法國駐澳代辦小德金的幫助和保護。41 1794年時小德金正在廣州為以德勝（ Isaac T is ingh）為正使、范罷覽（A. E van BraamHockgeest）為副使的荷蘭使團擔任漢文翻譯。42 小德金很有可能插手勒頓達爾一事，向澳門總督求情予以勒頓達爾保護。事實上，影響到駐澳賬房與澳葡關係的因素，除了葡人要維護澳門的利益這一根本原因，重要的還有法國與葡萄牙國家之間的關係。18世紀末至19世紀初正是拿破崙帝國在歐洲的擴張時期，作為歐洲小國的葡萄牙亦深受其苦，至1813年還加入第六次反法同盟。43因此法國與葡萄牙之間的交惡進而影響到澳門葡萄牙人對法國人的態度和行動。1793年澳
33《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4葡擅自扣押了一艘法國船隻，鬧得香山知縣許敦元出面下諭給澳門理事官甘博亞（A n t ó n i o J o s é d eGamboa），令澳葡當局將船隻交還法國商人。許敦元認為：“爾等外夷相爭，應在爾等外夷地方，不容在我天朝邊境滋生事端，今佛啷哂國夷船來天朝生理，即應遵我天朝法度，聽其丈輸貿易。豈可因兩國構釁，在於澳門重地擅將船貨查封？”44所以，他令澳門葡人立即將人船貨物交法國商人，聽其丈輸貿易。但澳門葡人拒絕歸還船隻貨物，迫使許敦元立即來到澳門，一方面命令法國大班與船主面謁澳門總督，一方面親自來到總督處，進行面諭。最後葡人交出法國船隻，該船將所載炮械卸下後，前往廣州貿易。45在這種情況下，澳葡對勒頓達爾等駐澳賬房和法國傳教士的態度可想而知。從上述駐澳賬房與澳葡之間發生的種種來看，賬房神父需要花費很多精力與澳門葡人周旋，以此保障對內地傳教區後勤支援的安全。正是賬房向內地傳教區尤其是四川的巴黎外方傳教會的神父們提供傳教經費及其他援助，使得他們免去為衣食住行操勞奔波之苦，能夠安心於傳播福音工作。儘管由於禁教緣故，傳教經費經常不能按時送往內地傳教區，經費的拮据甚至逼迫范益盛主教提出要平信徒供養神父的辦法，不過，賬房的設立對傳教事業的發展仍然具有保證和促進作用，為遠離歐洲總會的本地傳教區提供後勤服務，給予建議，及時跟進傳教事務。然而，隨 第二次鴉片戰爭後法國獲得在華保教權，教會勢力在中國大漲，賬房也於 1847年再次從澳門搬遷至香港。此時的賬房，更加不是一個單純管理財務的職位了，他們更多地介入到政治活動中去，設法影響法國駐華使節和法國政府，為教會在中國獲取更多的政治和經濟利益。註釋：1 榮振華著，耿升譯：《在華耶穌會士列傳及書目補編》（下冊），中華書局， 1995 年，第 773–780 頁。2 戚印平：《關於耶穌會駐澳門管區代表及其商業活動的若干問題》，載於《遠東耶穌會史研究》，中華書局， 2007 年，第 348–349 頁。3 《乾隆五十年三月十五日四川總督李世傑續獲傳教士訊明解京折》，引自秦和平、申曉虎編：《四川基督教資料輯要》，巴蜀書社， 2008 年，第 20 頁。4 [ 法 ] 衛青心著，黃慶華譯：《法國對華傳教政策》（上），中國社會科學出版社， 1991 年，第 87 頁。5 吳旻：《巴黎外方傳教會創建史及其所藏中文檔案初探──〈以福安周縣官初審問供為例〉（1746）》，載於《九州學林》， 2006 年，第 192–216 頁。6 載於《世界宗教研究》，第 4 期， 2001 年，第 73–87頁。此文歸納出明清之際中國天主教會傳教經費來源主要有 4 條管道：各教會宗主國及教廷的資助；澳門各界及國內教友的支持；中國政府的賞賜與傳教士的俸祿；借貸收租，參與經貿活動。7 載於章開沅、馬敏主編：《基督教與中國文化叢刊》，第六輯，湖北教育出版社， 2 0 0 4 年，第 1 3 5 –1 4 9 頁。該文從清代四川天主教會的經費類別與來源、用途及對其認識等方面進行分析，時間上主要偏向於 1840 年以後。8 載於《史學月刊》，第 3 期， 1994 年。9 崔維孝：《明清之際西班牙方濟會在華傳教研究（1579–1732）》，中華書局， 2006 年。1 0 載於戚印平：《遠東耶穌會史研究》，中華書局，2007 年，第 348–390 頁。這是目前所見有關教會財務和經費研究最為系統詳盡的論文之一。文章首先提出對 procurador（與 procure 對應的葡語）的中文翻譯應為“管區代表”，而不是司庫或會計之類。在文中對耶穌會管區代表制度的形成與演變及其若干問題進行了論述。1 1 Les procures de la Société des Missions-Étrangère, dansAnnales de la Société des Missions-Étrangère,1932, pp. 250–252.1 2 莊吉發：《清朝政府對天主教從容教政策到禁教政策的轉變》，載於《文史論集》（四），台北：文史哲出版社， 2000 年，第 160–165 頁。1 3 根據 Gérard Moussay et Br ig i t te Appavou, Repertore desmembers de La Société des Missions - Étrangères（1659-2004）（Archives des Missions Étrangères, Paris,2004）整理，分別見於第 63 、 64 、 66 、 67 、 69 和 70 頁。1 4 根據 Gérard Moussay et Br ig i t te Appavou, Repertore desmembers de La Société des Missions - Étrangères（1659–2004）， Archives des Missions Étrangères, Paris, 2004 整理，分別見於第 70 、 72 、 73 、 74 、 80 、 81 、 84 、86 、 93 、 100 、 108 頁。1 5 Adrien Launay, “Histoire Missions de Chine: Mission du Se-Tchoan,” Paris:Téqui Vol. 1, p. 397.1 6 Adrien Launay, “Histoire Missions de Chine: Mission du Se-Tchoan,” Paris:Téqui Vol. 1, p. 347.1 7 Adrien Launay, “Histoire Missions de Chine: Mission du Se-Tchoan,” Paris:Téqui Vol. 1, p. 435.1 8 Jean-Marie SEDES, Une Grande Ame Sacerdotale: Le PrêtreChinois André Ly (1692–1775) (Paris: Declée de Brouwer etCie, 1942), p. 76.1 9 郭麗娜：《巴黎外方傳教會在四川傳教模式述評》，中山大學 2006 年博士論文，第 37 頁。2 0 “Lettre de Poitier à Lalanne, 11 Octobre 1757,” Archives desMissions Étrangères, Vol. 436, pp. 685.2 1 Armand Olichon, Aux origins du clergé chinois:Le Prêtre AndréLy, missionnaire au Setchouan (Paris:Bloud et Gay, 1933),p. 391.2 2 Adrien Launay, “Histoire Missions de Chine: Mission du Se-Tchoan,” Paris:Téqui, Vol. 1, p. 475.2 3 Adrien Launay, “Histoire Missions de Chine: Mission du Se-
鴉片戰爭前巴黎外方傳教會駐廣州和澳門賬房之探析澳門研究34第51期Tchoan,” Paris:Téqui , Vol. 2, p. 48.2 4 Adrien Launay, “Histoire Missions de Chine: Mission du Se-Tchoan,” Paris:Téqui , Vol. 2, p. 48.2 5 Adrien Launay, “Histoire Missions de Chine: Mission du Se-Tchoan,” Paris:Téqui, Vol 1, pp. 47–48.2 6 Adrien Launay, “Histoire Missions de Chine: Mission du Se-Tchoan,” Paris:Téqui, Vol 1, p. 450.2 7 Armand Olichon, Aux origins du clergé chinois:Le Prêtre AndréLy, missionnaire au Setchouan (Paris:Bloud et Gay, 1933),p. 391.2 8 湯開建、田渝：《明清之際澳門天主教的傳入與發展》，載於《暨南學報》，哲學社會科學版，第 2 期，2006 年，第 123 頁。2 9 Manuel Te ixe ira , Macau e a sua Diocese (Macau: Vo l . 3 ,1956-1961), p. 758.3 0 乾隆四十九年（1784）教案由福建興起，波及全國，四川地區亦抓獲馮若望、徐德新、戴爾朋（J o s e p hDelpon）、吳神父（Etienne Devaut）四位巴黎外方傳教會的神父，四人不久被押京問審。參見《兼署四川總督印務成都將軍保甯奏報拿獲接引西洋人入境傳教各犯訊明解京折》和《四川總督李世傑奏報續獲西洋人吧升哩 哂等訊明解京折》，載於《清中前期西洋天主教在華活動檔案史料》，中國第一歷史檔案館編，中華書局， 2003 年，第 671–674 、 709–712 頁。3 1 Manuel Teixei ra, Macau e a sua Diocese , (Macau: Vol . 3,1956–1961), p. 759.3 2 德古維埃爾訃告，來自巴黎外方傳教會亞洲網檔案室。網址， http://archivesmep.mepasie.org/annuaire/chine/notices-necrologies/1700-1799/1744-02.htm 。3 3 Manuel Teixeira, Macau e a sua Diocese , Vol. 3, p. 759.3 4 小德金為法國著名漢學家、法國科學院院士老德金（Josoph de Guignes）子之， 1759 年生。 1783 年出任法國駐廣州領事館隨員， 1789 年任法國駐廣州臨時代理領事， 1 8 0 3 年被任命為法國駐中國外交代表，未赴任。 1794 年 3 月 22 日，署澳門同知吳某下理事官諭，令小德金在澳門管理法國鄉信。參見《署澳門同知吳為轉飭德金在澳管理本國鄉信事下理事官諭》載於劉芳編、章文欽校：《清代澳門中文檔案匯編》（下冊），澳門基金會， 1999 年，第 596 頁；耿昇：《貢斯當與〈中國 18 世紀廣州對外貿易回憶錄〉》，載於《暨南史學》，第 2 輯， 2003 年。3 5 此處 Tsa i 神甫疑為乾隆四十九年（1784）福建教案中的蔡伯多祿。 1 7 8 4 年福建漳州人蔡伯多祿在接引四位方濟各會傳教士入華時被發現，從而引發了一場在全國範圍內搜捕西方傳教士及蔡伯多祿本人的大教案。乾隆皇帝屢下諭旨將蔡伯多祿抓捕歸案未果，猜測應該是逃往澳門避難，很可能還獲得澳門方面的保護，因乾隆四十九年兩廣總督舒常還奏報“委派能幹營弁改裝易服，分赴洋行、澳門及人煙稠密、荒僻山林處所”緝捕查拿，說明地方官如有疏漏將嚴懲治罪，如此仍未抓獲蔡伯多祿。因此小德金才會舉出此例對澳督加以反駁。參見《兩廣總督舒常奏為嚴拿蔡伯多祿等人犯片》，載中國第一歷史檔案館編：《清中前期西洋天主教在華活動檔案史料》，中華書局，2003 年 10 月，第 613 頁。3 6 Manuel Teixei ra, Macau e a sua Diocese , (Macau: Vol . 3,1956–1961), p. 759.3 7 蘇維宏訃告，來自巴黎外方傳教會亞洲網檔案室。網址， http://archivesmep.mepasie.org/annuaire/chine/notices-necrologies/1700-1799/1768-01.htm 。3 8 Manuel Teixei ra, Macau e a sua Diocese , (Macau: Vol . 3,1956–1961), pp. 759–760.3 9 Manuel Teixei ra, Macau e a sua Diocese , (Macau: Vol . 3,1956–1961), p. 760.4 0 Manuel Teixei ra, Macau e a sua Diocese , (Macau: Vol . 3,1956–1961), p. 762.4 1 勒頓達爾訃告，來自巴黎外方傳教會亞洲網檔案室。網址， http://archivesmep.mepasie.org/annuaire/chine/no-tices-necrologies/1700-1799/1753-01.htm 。4 2 蔡鴻生、包樂史等著：《航向珠江：荷蘭人在華南（1600–2000 年）》，廣州出版社， 2004 年，第 10 頁。4 3 陳文海：《法國史》，人民出版社， 2004 年，第 296頁。4 4《香山知縣許敦元為飭將所查封法船貨物交還事下理事官諭》，載於劉芳編，章文欽校：《清代澳門中文檔案匯編》（下冊），澳門基金會， 1 9 9 9 年，第 6 7 3頁。4 5 參見《香山知縣許敦元為飭將所查封法船貨物交還事下理事官諭》、《香山知縣許敦元為飭令將擅行搬起之法船貨物給還事下理事官諭》、《香山知縣董鳳鳴為查明給還法船槍炮火藥事下理事官諭》，載於劉芳編、章文欽校：《清代澳門中文檔案匯編》（下冊），澳門基金會， 1999 年，第 673 、 674 、 675 頁。
37《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4於諮詢方法的錯誤應用，歸咎於欠缺一套彈性的諮詢模式，導致犯了用同一方法處理不同性質的諮詢，最後沒有達到諮詢的目的。三、美、日、港諮詢制度的比較（一）美國離散型1模式諮詢對象──多元化。如“聯邦諮詢委員會法”（Federal Adv isory Commi t tee Ac t , FACA）中，特別強調不同觀點的人要能同時並列於諮詢委員會中，且預告及公開開會內容的方式，主動地讓更多的民眾有參與及表示意見的機會。諮詢方式──彈性多樣。如聯邦諮詢委員會（Federal Adv isory Commit tee , FACs）的成立是建基於行政部門運作上的需要，而不一定經由國會法，而FACA在管理考查上，力求盡量減少直接依法律而設立的經常性諮詢單位，因其可能失去依需要而調整的彈性。此外，大量應用公眾會議、公聽會，而各種現代技術媒體，如電子佈告欄（BBS），也常被應用到諮詢方式上。諮詢組織──較傾向三元體系而非純粹離散型的二元體系。三元傾向具體表現在整個體系中諮詢單元的特性及政府內部諮詢組織的成員任命、組成和運作上；而在諮詢組織與行政體系之關係上，則仍有二元傾向。就整個體系而言，美國民間智庫非常發達，其成員多為曾在政府任職的行政或研究人員，或來自學術界的專家學者，扮演美國行政體系和專業部門中介調和的角色。而在政府內部的諮詢組織則多為專業和行政人員共同組成，且諮詢委員的任命及委員會的運作，行政主管並不扮演主要角色，專業人員亦可有相當的職權。至於諮詢組織與行政體系之關係上，以 F A C A 之規定為例，明示FACs和行政主管機關各自獨立，FACs無權要求行政部門執行其決議，行政部門也不能主導和影響FACs之決議。不過，FACA在管理考查上，要求行政機關說明對FACs之建議的處理情況。諮詢功能──美國政策諮詢體系的功能表現，似較符合離散型的特質，也就是較長於公益表達及政府革新，但較短於問題分析及政策設計，爭議解決方面的功能則較不確定。（二）日本集中型2模式諮詢對象──較集中有限。日本在諮詢對象的挑選上，重視利益的託管者（Trustees），而非直接利益的代表者（Delegates）。所謂利益的託管者，主要指一些政、經、學界的菁英。所以日本具有諮詢性質的審議會雖以行政民主化為主旨，但所聘任代表各方利益的委員很明顯的集中在國會議員及高級行政主管、企業領袖及學者群體，因此有所謂“委員兼任族”的名詞產生。而所邀請具有不同觀點的人，也以在利益上互相對立的企業團體代表為主，一般反對人士（對政府立場而言）的出席保障則並不明確。諮詢方式──較固定而缺乏彈性，但已開始廣泛應用現代科技，如電腦，作為諮詢媒介。日本是重視人際關係的社會，一般諮詢的進行，可能以非正式的溝通接觸為主，但其非正式的方式也常有制度化的傾向，如黨、政、商高級人員的經常餐敘。在正式的諮詢方式上，日本是以法令明訂諮詢義務，目前多以審議會的方式進行之，而審議會的成立基本上也有法律上的明文根據，開會的程序更要求符合議會的模式，包括會議召集、人數清點、表決方式、審議方法及審查結果處理等。至於美國所習見的公眾會議、公聽會，在日本是不存在的。有關現代科技的應用，最主要是資訊系統的建立，包括決策資料庫的普遍設立及互相交流，並制定相關的法令，如資訊自由法，及使用、儲存資料的保護法，使資料能有效的流通。諮詢組織──就整個體系而言，日本民間並沒有像美國布魯金斯研究所（Brook ings Ins t i tu t ion）那樣具獨立性質的智庫，最相近及最普遍的是半官方性質的研究單位，如日本外務省支持的“日本國際事務研究所”及大藏省支持的日本電子電腦公司等，或企業界本身支持的研究部門，主要關心和企業利潤有關的問題、或協助行政官僚制定和自身利益有關的政策，如野村總合研究所。就行政體系內部而言，幕僚因有能力並有資訊，常受決策者諮詢，而成為被諮詢對象。至於具有諮詢組織性質的審議會，在設立宗旨上即為行政決策機關的附屬機構，其成員視為公務員；審議會實際性質的發展，雖因民主化的要求而具有聚集各方意見並獨立為意思決定的傾向，但因成員中行政高級官員常佔多數，而形成無形中的控制，至於其委員會的聘任和組成亦主要由行政體系主導。
論澳門一般合同條款制度澳門研究42第51期的條款。”澳門的法律亦有界定何謂一般合同條款，其概念載於規範合約的一般條款制度的第17/92/M號法律第1條第2款，這條法律是以葡語立法的，故現有的中文文本屬於翻譯版本。然而，由於翻譯未臻完善，導致一般人難以理解條文的內容；為此，本文嘗試透過一些學者的見解對一般合同條款的概念加以明確。Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro認為一般合同條款是：“As c lausu las pre fo rm u ladas com v i s ta à d is c ip l i naun i fo rme de uma s ér ie , em r egra inde t e rm i nada, decontratos de certo t ipo a celebrar pelo predisponente oupor te rcei ro.”9 另一學者 Jorge A.F. God inho 指出︰“Standard contract c lauses are that prepared in advanceby one of the par t ies, so as to be accepted without anynegot iat ion in an indetermined number of cont racts.”10簡言之，一般合同條款主要具備以下兩個特點：其一，由合同一方當事人單方面草擬及預先制定，合同的相對方對之只可以選擇接受或不接受，但對於條款的內容則不可以作任何更改。其二，一般合同條款的設計是為了適用於不確定數量的合同中，使企業與消費者之間的法律關係可以統一，從而簡化企業的支出及法律手續，得出一個合理的、統一的交易模式。（二）一般合同條款與相關概念的辨析以下將對一般合同條款與傳統合同、附合合同之間的關係進行剖析，以便能更清楚理解一般合同條款的概念。1. 一般合同條款與傳統合同合同，又稱契約，是平等的民事主體之間設立、變更或終止民事權利義務關係的協議。11合同的內容，亦即合同的條款，是由雙方或多方當事人依照程序，通過磋商達到意思表示一致而形成的。合同條款固定了雙方或多方當事人的權利義務關係，成為法律關係意義上的合同的內容。12合同本質上是當事人通過自由協商，決定其相互之間的權利及義務，並根據其意志調整他們相互間之關係，換句話說，合同的本質就在於合意。13合同條款構成合同的內容，而一般合同條款是合同條款的一種，即一般合同條款亦可以構成合同的內容。合同與一般合同條款的關係就在於合同的內容既可以由一般合同條款構成，亦可以由非一般合同條款構成。然而，傳統合同的條款與一般合同條款的不同之處在於：首先，傳統合同的條款是由雙方或多方當事人透過協商、討論的情況下達成共識而產生的，當中要約方和承諾方都是特定的，但一般合同條款是為不特定的人制定，故一般合同條款在訂立以前，只有要約方是特定的，而承諾方往往都是不特定。其次，在合同的訂立過程中，要約方和承諾方的地位可以隨時改變，但一般合同條款中，要約人和承諾人雙方地位是固定的，不可以隨便更改。再者，合同的內容原則上應由當事人共同磋商，以達成合意，但一般合同條款的相對人（即承諾人）只能對條款表示完全的同意或拒絕，不能更改、變更合同的內容，亦不參與協商的過程。142. 一般合同條款與附合合同附合合同，亦稱為框架合同或定式合同，是指由締約方（通常是一些頗具規模的企業）單方面提出一些合同條款（一般是載於印件上），而另一締約方可以決定接受或拒絕印件上的條款，但不能修改對方提出的合同制度。如保險、海運、陸運、空運、提供日常生活重要物品（煤氣、電力等等）合同，在出售某些儀器（如家用電器）及在產權出售的中介活動中亦經常採用此類合同。15亦有學者認為附合合同是指包含有一般合同條款的合同。16一般合同條款是一方預先擬定的條款，在訂立合同而向對方出示時，還只是條款製作人單方的意思表示，在合同成立時才成為合同的條款。換言之，合同成立前的一般合同條款在性質上還不是合同，而被合同所採用的一般合同條款才是附合合同或者附合合同的一部分。17附合合同是合同的一種，附合合同與一般合同條款近似，兩者都是由一方單方面制定或草擬，而另一方只可以選擇接受或拒絕有關合同或條款。然而，一般合同條款的設計是為了適用於不確定數量的合同中，其相對人是不特定的，例如是巴士公司、船公司、航空公司或保險公司等，而附合合同則不同。附合合同的相對人可以是特定，亦可以是不特定的，因為附合合同既可以用於不確定數量的合同中，亦可以只用一次。例如，某個企業主為某個特定的顧客專門制定一份合同，合同的內容是該名顧客不能更改的，他只可以選擇是否接受相關
論澳門一般合同條款制度澳門研究46第51期可以其他顯著方式如廣播、張貼公告等形式提醒相對人注意。其實，應當盡可能採用個別方式提醒相對方注意，只有在不可能採用個別提醒方式時，才採用公告方式。43 採用公告方式時，條款制定方在“合同訂立的地方以明了易見的告示形式（deut l i chs ichtbarer Aushang）指示”一般合同條款即可44。緊記的是，不論以哪一種形式指示一般合同條款，都不能因文章結構，標題或字體的編排而使處於真正受意人地位的正常受意人易於忽略該些條款，否則有關條款會被排除於合約之外。45此外，通知應於必要的提前時間內進行。必要的提前時間可以理解為在合同訂立之前或訂立過程中。46如果在訂立合同後，再把一般合同條款列入合同當中，按第17/92/M號法律第9條d）的規定，有關條款會被排除在合同之外。通知的目的最主要是提起相對方對條款的注意，使他能在清楚知悉合同條款的內容的情況下作出正確的意思表示。究竟要做到哪種程度才能引起相對人對條款的注意呢？其實要視乎具體情況而定。一般情況下，條款制定方不僅應向相對人提供一般合同條款的文本，而且在作出可合理期待的努力後相對人必須能夠理解（而不僅僅是感知）一般合同條款的內容（德國《一般交易條件法》第2條第1款第2項規定）。然而，如果涉及對長期業務關係的調整（當然，這些長期業務關係大多存在於商人之間），則可以事先約定對某種類型的法律行為適用一般合同條款。在這種情形下，只要通過指示和提供，對一般合同條款的使用作了一次約定，並附有“重複使用的協議”即可。然而，如果一般合同條款有變更，則必須對一般合同條款進行重新指示和提供；而倘若相對人欲繼續維持與制定方的業務關係，亦必須對變更的一般合同條款重新表示同意。如果雙方僅僅作出了“一般合同條款應以各自適用的版本成為合同內容”的約定，則還是不夠的。（德國《一般交易條件法》第 2條第 2款）47除通知義務外，根據第17/92/M號法律第6條48規定，一般合同條款制定方有義務向相對方提供列入條款內各項的資訊，並在後者要求時，對他提供解釋，以確保相對方能夠真正理解一般合同條款的內容。如果違反或不完善履行提供資訊的義務，有關條款將被排除於合同之外。（二）相對方表示同意除要採取合理的方式使合同相對人注意條款的內容外，還必須考慮相對人是否願意接受這類條款。針對相對人的同意方面，中國學者王利明認為原則上應當以明示同意為原則，明示同意是以書面或言詞聲明將一般合同條款訂入合同，通常是在合同文本上簽名，如果根據交易的實際情況、交易慣例或雙方當事人的約定，也可以以默示方式作出。值得注意的是，默示同意是一種推定，相對人若有異議，須負反證責任。49剛才提到一般合同條款被排除在合同外的幾個情況，在條款被排除後，合同還會繼續存在嗎？根據第17/92/M號法律第10條規定，是應該維持合同的有效性的；至於被排除的部分則適用現行的補充規則處理，必要時採用法律行為的填補規則。可見，立法者的取向都是盡量希望維持合同的存續性。只是當填補後，仍對不可缺少的主要部分存有未明確因素或存有嚴重影響善意的不平衡給付時，有關合同才被視為無效。這法律制度並不能確保在每一個情況下，相對人都能完完全全理解條款的內容。為解決因此而衍生的問題，在訂立合同後，我們可以援用因瑕疵意思表示而生的錯誤（《民法典》第240條）、無意識之意思表示（《民法典》第239條）等機制。當然，為省卻開支及不必要的工作，還是應當按善意原則的要求，遵守通知及提供資訊的義務。50六、一般合同條款的解釋一般合同條款的解釋是指根據一定的事實、遵循有關的原則，對一般合同條款內容的含義作出說明。一般來說如果合同的各項條款明確、具體、清楚、當事人對條款的理解完全一致，就不會發生合同解釋問題。然而，如果一般合同條款的用語不明確、不確定或當事人對一般合同條款的理解不一致，因而導致爭執的出現，這時便涉及到一般合同條款的解釋問題。對一般合同條款作出準確的解釋對於正確確定當事人之間的權利義務，保護各方當事人的合法權益，並使一般合同條款保持合法性和公平性，都是十分必要的。51一般合同條款在性質上屬於合同，原則上解釋一般合同條款時應適用合同的解釋原則：如解釋合同
51《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4身份訂立合同，則不適用這範圍；此時，應視他們為一般的消費者。而針對消費者方面，除適用針對上述人士的禁止一般合同條款之外，還為消費者特別制訂了其他禁止的情況，以便向消費者提供更大的保障。78其實，這樣區分是較為公平的。如果沒有就不同主體訂定特別規定，而一律適用統一的禁止的一般合同條款，極有可能會發生兩個情況：要麼對相對方提供過多的保護，要麼提供得太少。例如，法律偏向保護一般合同條款的相對方，如相對方是沒有議價能力的消費者，這樣的規定當然不成問題；但如果相對方是企業主，比起消費者他具有較好的議價能力，這樣對作為相對方的企業主提供的保護似乎過多，反而對一般合同條款製作人產生不公平的情況。現時澳門的制度就是如此，其實我們可以參考葡萄牙這個區分的做法，以至更公平地對待合同的各方當事人。最後一層的保護是預先禁止之訴的保護（載於第17/92/M號法律第17–26條），即可以透過提起禁止之訴驅使一般合同條款的製作人停止採用那些被法律禁止的條款。十、結論究竟一般合同條款應否存在？一般合同條款的出現主要歸因於對效率的追求及壟斷的形成，在現今高速發展的社會中，一般合同條款有其存在的積極意義。首先，一般合同條款的優點在於效率。就大量發生的相同的合同，不必重複締約的整個過程，可以節省締約的時間及成本。79由於現代化許多物品生產採取的是大量製造和大宗交易的方式，許多交易活動是不斷重複進行的，許多公用事業服務具有既定的要求，所以通過一般合同條款方式可以使訂約基礎明確、費用節省、時間節約，從而大大降低了交易費用，適應了現代社會商品經濟高度發展的要求。再者，一般合同條款的使用，使企業主不再和單個的消費者進行個別的談判，極大地減少了交易的磋商時間和費用，企業主可以通過固定化的、預先擬訂的合同條款來預先控制及分配風險。80對於經營者而言，由於成本的降低，將有利於商品及服務質量的提高和價格的下降，從而有利於整個社會。就法院而言，一個案件的判例可以為相類似的同類案件的解決提供指導。81然而，一般合同條款亦有其弊端：首先，提供商品及服務的一方在擬定一般合同條款時，往往會利用自己的優勢地位，將一些有利於自己但不利於對方或普通消費者的條款訂入合同當中。提供這樣的合同條款讓自己享有較多的權利，承擔較少的義務和責任；使對方或普通消費者享有較少的權利及承擔較多的義務和責任。此外，正如本文在較早前提到，一般合同條款為合同自由原則帶來了巨大的衝擊，而這亦是其弊端之一。82在現代商品經濟高度發展的社會當中，一般合同條款有其存在的必要性，但其固有的弊端亦是不容忽視的，故必須在兩者之間取得平衡，而一般合同條款法律制度正正能夠達到這個目的。它在承認一般合同條款的重要性的同時，亦為弱小的消費者提供保障。所以，這制度是有其存在的必要性，尤其在澳門，一般合同條款法律制度的存在意義就更大了，理由在於商事交往越來越頻繁，而且很多行業都是專營或獨家經營的。透過這個法律制度，可以對一般合同條款制作人的合同自由設定一些特別的限制，確保合同雙方利益得以平衡，保障消費者在已經存在的不平等的議價能力方面，有一個法律機制讓他們伸張自己的權利，維護自己的利益。83註釋：1 法律行為是由一個或多個旨在實現某些實際效果而又以在法律保護下達到這些效果為意圖從而作出的意思表示所構成的法律行動，而同該一個或多個表意人所表達的意圖相符的法律效果之是否產生，則由法律規章來決定。 C ar lo s A lb e r t o d a M ot a P in to：《民法總論》，澳門：澳門法務局及澳門大學法學院， 2 0 0 1年，第 211 、 215–217 頁。2 陳小君主編：《合同法學》，北京：中國法制出版社， 2002 年，第 60 頁。3 張虹：《試論格式條款的成立及其效力》，載於《河北廣播電視大學學報》，第 5 卷，第 4 期， 2000 年，第 25 頁。4 陳洪平：《格式條款論》，武漢大學碩士學位論文，2004 年，第 5 頁。5 杜軍：《格式條款研究》，載於《西南民族學院學報》（哲學社會科學版），第 5 期， 2000 年，第 105 頁。6 雖然在第 1 7 / 92 / M 號法律中，其名稱為合約的一般條款；但本地學術界以致司法界均對“一般合同條款”此一名稱有普遍的共識。7 在中國，不同的學者對一般合同條款的概念有不完全相同的理解。有的認為“系指契約當事人之一方，為與不特定之多數相對人訂立契約之用，而預先就契約
論澳門一般合同條款制度澳門研究52第51期內容所訂定之交易條款”；有的認為是指“經營者為了與消費者訂立合同而單方擬定的合同條款”；有的認為“是指在商業活動中反覆使用的由一方當事人按照自己的意志決定的，他方只能予以接受的契約條款”；另有學者認為“是指由生產經營者單方面擬定的具有固定格式和內容的合同條款”。同註 5 。8 [德]卡爾‧拉倫茨（Kar l La renz）：《德國民法通論》（下冊），北京：法律出版社， 2003 年，第 769 頁。9 Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro, Claúsulas Contratuais Gerais e oParadigma do Contrato (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra,1990), p. 173.1 0 Jorge A. F. Godinho, Macau Business Law and Legal System(Hong Kong: Lexis Nexis, 2007), pp. 103–104.1 1 龍翼飛主編：《新編合同法》，北京：中國人民大學出版社， 1999 年，第 3 頁。1 2 吳興光、龍著華、周新軍、葉昌富：《合同法比較研究》，廣州：中山大學出版社， 2002 年，第 63 頁。1 3 王利明、崔建遠：《合同法新論‧總則》，北京：中國政法大學出版社， 2000 年，第 100 頁。1 4 王利明、楊立新、王軼、程嘯：《民法學》，北京：法律出版社， 2005 年，第 564–565 頁。1 5 Carlos Alberto da Mota Pinto：《民法總論》，澳門：澳門法務局及澳門大學法學院出版， 2 0 0 1 年，第 4 9頁。1 6 同註 13 ，第 189 頁。1 7 孔祥俊：《淺論格式條款與格式合同》，載於《中國工商管理研究》，第 6 期， 1999 年，第 14–15 頁。1 8 同註 14 。1 9 同上註。2 0 劉文：《論格式條款的效力與解釋》，對外經濟貿易大學在職人員以同等學力申請碩士學位論文， 2 0 0 2年，第 5 頁。2 1 王利明：《對合同法格式條款規定的評析》，載於《政法論叢》（中國政法大學學報），第6期，1999年，第 4 頁。2 2 同註 20 。2 3 同註 13 ，第 190 頁。2 4 王利明：《合同法研究》（第一卷），北京：中國人民大學出版社， 2002 年，第 384 頁。2 5 同註 13 ，第 190–191 頁。2 6 同註 24 ，第 385 頁。2 7 同註 13 ，第 191–192 頁。2 8 同註 24 ，第 147 頁。2 9 同上註，第 140–142 頁。3 0 同上註，第 140–142 頁。3 1 同上註，第 1 48 頁。3 2 同上註，第 385–386 頁。3 3 同上註，第 385–386 頁。3 4 同上註，第 385–386 頁。3 5 同上註，第 385–386 頁。3 6 Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro, Claúsulas Contratuais Gerais e oParadigma do Contrato (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra,1990), p. 144.3 7 Mário Júl io de Almeida Costa, António Menezes Cordeiro,Claúsulas Contratuais Gerais: Anotação ao Decreto-Lei N.º446/85, de 25 de Outubro (Coimbra: Livraria Almedina, 1993),p. 23.3 8 同註 24 ，第 394 頁。3 9 同上註。4 0 [德]迪特爾‧梅迪庫斯（Díeter Medícus）：《德國民法總論》，北京：法律出版社， 2001 年，第 306 頁。4 1 第 17/92/M 號法律第 5 條：“ 合約的一般條款，應完整通知限於贊成或接受的人； 通知應以適當方式於必需的提前時間進行，以便鑒於合約的重要性及條款的範圍與複雜性，令一般使用者完全及實質地理解；按照以上各款規定進行合約的一般條款的通知說明，由主動者負責。”4 2 同註 40 ，第 306–307 頁。4 3 同註 24 ，第 395 頁。4 4 同註 42 。4 5 依據為第 17 /92/M 號法律第 9 條的規定。4 6 同註 24 ，第 394–395 頁。4 7 同註 40 ，第 307–308 頁。4 8 第 17/92/M 號法律第 6 條：“採用合約一般條款的立約人，在其活動範圍內，應將列入條款內的事項知會另一方，同時提供所要求的解釋。”4 9 同註 24 ，第 395 頁。5 0 Mário Júl io de Almeida Costa, António Menezes Cordeiro,Claúsulas Contratuais Gerais: Anotação ao Decreto-Lei N.º446/85, de 25 de Outubro （Coimbra: Livraria Almedina,1993）, p. 24.5 1 同註 20 ，第 34 頁。5 2 同上註，第 34–35 頁。5 3 Mário Júl io de Almeida Costa, António Menezes Cordeiro,Claúsulas Contratuais Gerais: Anotação ao Decreto-Lei N.º446/85, de 25 de Outubro (Coimbra: Livraria Almedina, 1993),p. 31.5 4 第 8 條第 2 款規定：“合約的一般條款的意義應局限於所訂明條文的字句。”5 5 同註 24 ，第 400 頁。5 6 第 7 條規定：“經特別協議的條款比任何合約的一般條款為優先，即使載於雙方簽署的格式內者亦然。”5 7 O art igo 11º do Decreto-Le i N.º 446/85:“1. As claúsu lascontratuais gerais ambíguas têm o sentido que lhes daria ocon t ra t a n t e i n de t e rm i na d o n o rm a l q ue se l im i ta sse asubscrevê-las ou a aceitá- las, quando colocado na posiçãode aderente rea l. 2. Na dúvida, prevalece o sentido maisfavorável ao aderente.”5 8 關於“相對人印象說”這種法律行為解釋方法，請參閱註 15 ，第 254–257 頁。5 9 同註 8 ，第 777–778 頁6 0 同註 20 ，第 38–39 頁。6 1 同註 8 ，第 779–780 頁。6 2 同註 20 ，第 39–40 頁。6 3 同註 3 ，第 26 頁。6 4 載於第 17/92/M 號法律第四章第 11–13 條。6 5 同註 5 ，第 107–108 頁。6 6 第 17 /92 /M 號法律第 14 條第 1 款：“按照本法律的規定，被禁止的合約一般條款是無效的。”6 7 第 17/92 /M 號法律第 15 條：“ 倘若干合約一般條款無效時，贊成或接受該等條款者可選擇保持確實簽署合約； 該等合約的維持引致受影響部分可引用現行的規則，倘有必要時，採用法律行為的補充規則。”6 8 第 17 /92/M 號法律第 16 條：“倘不行使上款所指權力或行使後不平衡的給付而導致嚴重影響善意時，將實施法律行為的減少制度。”6 9 [德]海因‧克茨（Heín Kötz）：《歐洲合同法》（上卷），北京：法律出版社， 2001 年，第 199 頁。
53《澳門研究》第51期2009. 47 0 同上註，第 2 01 頁。7 1 同註 8 ，第 780 頁。7 2 單獨立法指將規範一般合同條款的法條訂立於以控制一般合同條款為目的的法律當中。7 3 混合立法指將規範一般合同條款的法條納入實體法中，與其混合在一起。7 4 王富博：《合同格式條款研究──從消費者權益保護的視角》，中國政法大學碩士學位論文， 2001 年，第23 頁。7 5 第 17/92/M 號法律第 18 條的規定。7 6 第 17/92/M 號法律第 22 、 24 條的規定。7 7 第 17/92/M 號法律第 25 、 26 條的規定。7 8 Mário Júl io de Almeida Costa, António Menezes Cordeiro,Claúsulas Contratuais Gerais: Anotação ao Decreto-Lei N.º446/85, de 25 de Outubro (Coimbra: Livraria Almedina, 1993),pp.37–38, 49.7 9 同註 13 ，第 191–192 頁。8 0 同註 24 ，第 385 頁。8 1 同註 13 ，第 191–192 頁。8 2 在《合同法新論‧總則》一書當中，作者王利明、崔建遠亦引用了中國著名學者王澤鑒先生的描述，王澤鑒先生對一般合同條款曾有一段入木三分的描寫：“一般消費者對此類條款多未予注意，不知其存在；或雖知其存在，但因此種合同條款甚為冗長，字體細小，不易閱讀；或雖加閱讀，因文字艱澀，難以理解其真意；且縱能理解其真意，知悉對己不利條款的存在，亦多無討價還價的餘地，只能在接受與拒絕之間選擇。或由於某類企業具有獨佔性，或由於各企業使用類似的合同條款，消費者無選擇的機會。因此，如何在意思自治的體制下，維護合同正義，使經濟上的強者，不能憑借合同自由之名，壓榨弱者，是現代法律所面臨的艱巨任務。”8 3 Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro, Claúsulas Contratuais Gerais e oParadigma do Contrato (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra,1990), pp. 205–207.
Dependent Development? Macau’s Gaming Industry:Its Problems and Prospects澳門研究64第51期The gaming industry seems to be flourishing in manyparts of the world. In Asia alone, Macau has already becomethe world’s gambling mecca, having logged over MOP83 billion,or USD10.4 billion, in 2007, close to Nevada State’s USD12.8billion in the same year.1 Korea already has casino stylegambling, and Japan and Singapore are building casinos. Taiwan,and even Hong Kong, are thinking about it. Mainland Chinadoes not have casino style gambling, but other kinds of illegalgambling have also persisted, and state lotteries have longbeen introduced. The trend seems unstoppable, whatever theform. It is therefore understandable, for example, that whilstin the 1960s the Brit ish government was talking aboutdiscouraging and strictly controlling gambling, in the 2000s itis talking only about keeping gambling crime-free, ensuringthat it is conducted fairly and openly, and protecting childrenand other vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploitedby gambling.2In the globalization of gambling, Macau has made greatstrides since the liberalization of gambling industry in 2002.In 2001 foreign direct investment was only MOP1.3 billion,but in 2005 it was already MOP10.6 billion, most of whichwas casino capital.3 The increased casino revenue also meansincreased government tax dollars. The six concessionaires eachhave to pay 35% taxes on their gross gaming revenuesin addition to 1.6% of them to Macao Foundation for social,economic, and cultural development, and 2.4% for urbandevelopment and construction.4 This means that in 2007 alone,the Macau government collected MOP32.4 billion in gamblingtaxes. Over 80% of government revenue comes from gambling.In 2006, Macau’s gross national product per capita was alreadyMOP227,508, surpassing that of Hong Kong, and close toJapan.5Does all this data signify that Macau’s economy isdeveloping healthily? Not necessarily. Problems abound. Infact, this paper attempts to understand the problems derivedfrom gaming development and to explore ways to deal withthem. In doing this, classical theories of development, suchas world-systems, dependency, dependent development, andthe developmental state, are relevant and useful. These aretherefore explained first before moving on to an explanationof the problems and their possible solutions in the light ofthese theories. The method used in this paper is mainly historical-comparative, but statistical data is also presented as necessaryto illustrate specific points.1. Dependent Development, the DevelopmentalState, and Macau’s Gaming IndustryGenerally speaking, there are three branches of classicaltheory regarding development: modernization theory, dependencytheory, and world-systems theory. Modernization theories viewdevelopment as progressing from traditional to modern, stageby stage, politically, economically, and socially. Classicaldependency theories think that underdevelopment was causedby the exploitation of the underdeveloped countries by thedeveloped ones. So dependency is necessarily bad. The newdependency theories, namely, dependent developmentDependent Development? Macau’s Gaming Industry:Its Problems and ProspectsHao Zhidong** Associate Professor and Head of Department, Department of Sociology,Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Macau
65《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4theories, however, think that the interests of the exploiter andthe exploited can overlap. Development is possible even whenthere is dependency.6Closely related to the dependency theories is Wallerstein’sworld-systems theory, which suggests that there is a capitalistworld-system. Rich industrialised countries like the U.S., Japan,Bri tain, France and Germany, are at the core. Theunderdeveloped countries are on the periphery, while thosethat trade with both the core and the periphery, like Taiwanand Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, are at the semi-periphery.The former Communist countries belonged to a different system,but many of them are now being integrated into the capitalistworld-system, like China. Dependency development, then, couldmean a process by which underdeveloped countries movefrom the periphery to the semi-periphery, and then from thesemi-periphery to the core.Furthermore, as Gereffi and Evans point out, “The processof dependent development is the result of the interaction ofTNC [transnational corporations] strategies with the political andeconomic strategies of local social classes and host countrystates.”7 This touches on Evans’ concept of triple alliance. Inhis analysis of development in Brazil, Evans discusses theinteraction of the multinationals, local capital and the state indeciding the direction of the socioeconomic development ofa country. 8 To be more specific, it might be useful to separatelocal capital from other classes. McDonough refers to othermembers or classes as a fourth actor, either in alliance withthe above mentioned three, or in conflict with them, including,for example, labour and/or other social organizations.9Also related to the triple alliance is the concept of thedevelopmental state. This concept “focuses on the political will,the ideological coherence, the bureaucratic instruments, and therepressive capacity needed to formulate and implement effectiveeconomic policies to promote high-speed capitalist growth.”10The kind of state in developing countries includes the bureaucratic-authoritarian state like that in Latin America in the 1960s and1970s, or Taiwan and Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. Onecan argue that it is the kind of state in mainland China now.In all of these cases, the state is able to institute rules andregulations that encourage foreign investment in their homecountries and to repress labour movements to create a welcomingenvironment for foreign capital. Many of these regimes havelater on developed into democracies as they enter the semi-periphery and even the core, like Taiwan and Korea. Themainland Chinese state seems to be developing in the samedirection, following what is often called the East Asian Model(of dependent development).Are these theories applicable to the analysis of Macau’seconomy? There are several difficulties. First, dependentdevelopment theories as we explained above are mainly appliedto countries where manufacturing is the chief money-makingindustry, as in mainland China now.11 The nature of thetransnational corporations (TNCs) is thus very different: in Macauit is the service industry, especially the part that is relatedto gaming, which is the money-maker of the economy. AsGereffi and Evans point out when comparing Brazil and Mexico,“students of dependent development will be faced with a newseries of intellectual challenges” when applying the theory ofthe development of the manufacturing industry to the developmentof the service industry.12 Macau’s is not only a service industry,but also a special kind of service industry.Second, although the four actors also exist in Macau,they are of a very different nature than the ones analyzedin the literature. The multinational corporations are all of onekind: they are gambling businesses, providing a special kindof service. And even local capital defies definition. In 2001,after Macau was returned to China, the Macau SAR (specialadministration region) government decided to end the monopolyby STDM (Sociedade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau,or Macau Tourism and Recreation Company), headed by StanleyHo, and to open the industry to foreign competition. In 2002it granted three concessions: Wynn Resorts from the U.S.,the Galaxy Group of Hong Kong, and STDM (now calledSJM, Sociedade de Jogos de Macau). Wynn Resorts thenoffered a sub-concession to Melco PBL, which opened TheCrown Casino in Macau in 2007. Melco is the Melco InternationalDevelopment Limited, a conglomerate in leisure, gaming, andentertainment, located in Hong Kong and with Yau Lung Ho,a son of Stanley Ho’s, as the chairman of the board andchief executive officer. PBL is a broadcasting and entertainmentindustry based in Australia. So Melco PBL is a joint ventureof the two companies. It is hard to say whether Melco PBL
Dependent Development? Macau’s Gaming Industry:Its Problems and Prospects澳門研究66第51期is local or foreign capitalised. The best we can say is thatit is both, if we consider Hong Kong as local, or at leastas Chinese vs. foreign.The Galaxy Group offered a sub-concession to Las VegasSands, which opened The Sands in 2004, and then The VenetianMacau in 2007. To be more accurate. The Sands was oneof the partners of The Galaxy Group, but it withdrew fromthe partnership and became one of the six concessionaires.The entire 120 acre “Cotai Strip” featuring a number of casinohotels is expected to open in 2009.13 SJM offered a concessionto MGM Grand Macau, which opened in late 2007. MGMGrand Macau is a partnership between MGM Mirage of LasVegas and Pansy Ho Chiu-king, one of Stanley Ho’s daughters,the Chairwoman of Macau Tower Convention & EntertainmentCentre, and Executive Director of Air Macau CompanyLimited.14So out of the six major players, The Sands and TheWynn can be viewed as foreign capital, while SJM is entirelyChinese (local) capital. Galaxy Group is not entirely Chinese,since in October 2007, Permira Funds, a British company,bought 20% of the shares of Galaxy Holdings, which meansthat they will be a gambling business partner as well. MelcoPBL and MGM Grand Macau are both joint ventures about50% Chinese and 50% foreign. To use the words of TamPak Yuen, the Secretariat for Economy and Finance of theMacau government, half of the capital is local (meaning Macauand Hong Kong), while the other half is foreign.15 One canargue, however, that none of them is really local, since theyare either from Hong Kong, the U.S., England, or Australia.And they are all TNCs. But because the CEOs of bothMelco PBL and MGM Grand Macau are Chinese and theyown a bit over half of the stocks of these companies, theytake on an air of local capital, and interact with the Americancompanies as if they are different.Thirdly, what then is the interaction like between the foreignand local capital, if we can separate the two? As Gereffiand Evans ask, “To what extent has the level of externalcontrol over the local economy been exacerbated bydisplacement of the national bourgeoisie? To what extent havethese effects been counterbalanced by joint national-foreignownership of TNC subsidiaries and effective state regulationof their behaviour?”16 That we need to find out.Fourth, the developmental state is also different fromthat illustrated in the literature. Like Hong Kong, under the“One Country, Two Systems” formula, Macau enjoys highautonomy in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It hasmore democratic elements in its political system. For example,the Chief Executive is elected by a committee of 300representatives from various social organizations, and 12 ofthe 29 legislators are elected by the populace, 10 are electedby social organizations, and only 7 are appointed by the ChiefExecutive. This in general is more democratic than the mainlandsystem. How effective is the state in its interaction with theother three actors: local capital, foreign capital, and the largercommunity, then? This is what we need to analyze as well.As we can see, although the above mentioned classicaldevelopment theories seem applicable to an analysis of Macau’seconomic development, the situation in Macau poses morechallenges. Nonetheless, they can help us explain developmentin Macau to a great extent. When discussing the developmentof Brazil in the 1970s, Fernando H. Cardoso points out thatdependent development is not without cost, including “aregressive profile of income distribution, emphasizing luxuriousconsumer durables as opposed to basic necessities, generatingincreasing foreign indebtedness, contributing to social marginalityand the underutilization and exploitation of manpower resources,and thereby leading to an increase in relative misery”.17 Macau’ssituation is different, but we want to see how different orsimilar it is. We will now examine the problems in Macau’sgaming industry in light of the dependent theories outlined above.2. Problems in Macau’s Gaming IndustryIn the following pages, we will discuss some seriousproblems in Macau’s economy, including difficulties facing otherparts of the service economy, the political challenges derivedfrom the competition between foreign and local Chinesecompanies, and the casino operators’ responsible gamingpractices in relation to their corporate social responsibility. Wewill also discuss the role of the state in solving these problems.First of all, the expansion of the gaming industry hasgreatly strained other enterprises’ human resources, and thelatter also find that they are losing business to casinos, or
67《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4at least they think they do. And they have to find waysto survive in the market. This is a different kind of “displacementof national bourgeoisie,” as explicated in the dependentdevelopment theory we mentioned above.With the industry hiring more people, other enterprisesfind that their employees leave them for casino jobs. By theend of 2005, the gaming industry had employed 26,000 workers,an increase of 22.8% compared with 2004.18 With the newcasinos opening, the industry was already hiring more than45,000 workers in 2007. (The population in Macau is525,000.) There have been 28 casinos by the end of 2007and it is estimated that there will be altogether 30 casinosat the end of 2009. According to government statistics, thereare 26,000 enterprises in Macau, and 99% of them hire fewerthan 100 people. In fact, 91.5% of the enterprises hire fewerthan 10 people. 19 It is these enterprises that feel the strainin human resources. Casinos tend to pay more money thanthese small companies can, and they provide better workingconditions, including normal weekend and public holiday breaks,so such employers are witnessing large numbers of their workersquitting their jobs to join the casinos. The tourist industry,for example, has lost 40% of their employees to casinos,including their drivers and secretaries. There are over 100travel agencies hiring 3000 workers, but they find they needto apply for non-Macau residents, i.e., foreign or importedlabour. 20What can the state do, then? One of the most acutesocial problems in Macau now is the so-called hei gong,or illegal workers. There have increasingly been moredemonstrations in Macau, for example on May 1 (Labour Day),October 1 (National Day), and December 20 (the day of Macau’sreturn to China). One of their constant complaints is thatcompanies prefer to hire foreign to local workers. So thegovernment is very careful in allowing only a limited numberof non-Macau workers so as not to antagonise the locals.But this further exacerbates the labour shortage problem. Manyhave called for relaxation of the rules for hiring foreign workers,such as allowing foreign, but mostly mainland, college studentsgraduated from Macau to join the labour market, even fora year or two, in Macau, but the developmental state istoo cautious to act on such suggestions. Because of theexecutive-led structure of the government, the legislature doesnot seem to be doing much in this regard, either. So thedevelopmental state is rather weak, as we can see in itsways of dealing with this and other problems. After the AoMan Long corruption case, the government seems even weaker,not taking as much responsibility as it should for fear of makingmore mistakes.21Second, the competition between Stanley Ho’s SJM, thelocal Chinese gambling company, and the American-ownedcasinos has become intense. This arouses nationalistfeelings. This may be the major “displacement of nationalbourgeoisie,” if we view SJM as local and national, althoughSJM, and even Melco PBL and MGM Grand, do like toview themselves as local.As we mentioned earlier, Stanley Ho’s businesses arelocal in the sense of Hong Kong and Macau, which areboth Chinese territories. His businesses are mostly in theselocations. And he is a member of the Standing Committeeof the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, anorganization composed mostly of various small political partiesand groups, whose importance is close to the Chinese NationalPeople’s Congress. On the other hand, he used to own ninecasinos in the Philippines, and he now owns the majorityshare of a casino in Lisbon, Portugal. Overall, he has businessinterests in mainland China, Portugal, North Korea, Vietnam,and the Philippines. The company has in the past decadeor so tried to gain gambling licenses in Australia, Canada,and the Philippines, although unsuccessfully because thesecountries questioned, but never confirmed, his ties with organisedcrime. In the Australian case, one of Stanley Ho’s executivesattributed the failure to obtain a gambling license to Australian“racist policies”.22 Apparently, Stanley Ho is not happy withhis frustrations in these failed efforts that may have to dowith racial and ethnic reasons. So in a word, his companydoes have some characteristics of transnational corporations,although it can be treated mostly as a local Chinese company.In 2005 SJM had a gross income of MOP34.4 billion,75.5% of the share of the market, The Sands Macau madeMOP7.7 billion, 17%, and Galaxy made close to MOP4 billion,or 9%. Although SJM still had the largest share, its sharedecreased by MOP800 million, or 2.3%, while Sands Macau
Dependent Development? Macau’s Gaming Industry:Its Problems and Prospects澳門研究68第51期increased its share by 147.7%, and Galaxy by 29.3%.23By November 2007, the market shares of these companieswere: SJM, 37%; Las Vegas Sands (LVS), 28%; Galaxy,15%; Wynn, 15%, and Melco PBL, 5%.24 By June 2008,the market shares of each operator have been changed asfollows: SJM, 24%; LVS, 23%; Galaxy, 12%; Wynn, 18%;Melco PBL, 14%; MGM (opened in December 2007),9%.25 We can already see a sharply decreased share of themarket on the part of SJM. The loss of market share onthe market by SJM does not, however, necessarily meanthat it will make less money. But it has an effect on thepsychology of local capital.Stanley Ho has already complained that the Americancompanies were practicing unfair competition by enticing hisemployees and not fulfilling their promises for investing in schoolsand gardens. Most recently he has accused American companiesof taking the money they make back to the United States.He even blamed them for students’ dropping out of schoolto work in casinos. But Sheldon G. Adelson, chairman andchief executive officer of Las Vegas Sands Corp, and WilliamWeidner, president and chief operating officer of Las VegasSands Corp, said that if you do not have the ability to compete,then don’t complain. If you cannot compete, you will haveto face elimination. Or if you cannot stand the heat, stayaway from the kitchen. Indeed, Stanley Ho said that onethird of his VIP rooms were facing closure. He wanted thegovernment to exercise control over the growth of the Americancompanies. He was afraid that the Americans would becomea leading player in Macau’s economy. Furthermore they wouldtry to influence Macau’s politics after that. 26Ho’s accusations and worries are finding echoes in peoplewith strong nationalist feelings.27 Some have begun to talk about“re-colonization” or “the new Opium War.” Others have talkedabout Macau, especially the American companies, drawing bloodfrom the Chinese mainland, which is still relatively poor. Inthe Chinese Communist Party’s 17th Congress in October 2007,President Hu Jintao stated that the Chinese government willguard against the interference of outside forces in the businessesof Hong Kong and Macau. Quite a number of opinion leadersand politicians in Macau have appeared on TV programs andwritten in newspapers to blame the American companies forcausing the current social problems in Macau, including inflation,skyrocketing housing prices, congested traffic, etc. And theyare warning that the American businesses have interfered inthe government’s policymaking and hurt local businesses(including the gaming business), and they will eventually causepolitical problems in Macau since they will create their ownrepresentatives in the legislature. In the end, they will controlthe politics and economy in Macau and hurt the centralgovernment’s policy of “One Country, Two Systems.” Alsothat the central government’s other guiding principle of “Macauto be governed by Macau people” will be in jeopardy.28 Sowe are seeing more nationalist complications emerge.It is an interesting case study of the triple alliance amongthe TNCs, local capital (in this case SJM), and the state.How might the Chinese central state and local Macau governmenthandle this issue? We know that one of the reasons whyThe Sands was granted a concession is Sheldon Aldelson’shelp with the Chinese government to win the bid for the2008 Olympics in Beijing.29 That’s an alliance. The Macaugovernment is also happy to see The Sands’s role in diversifyingthe gaming industry. That’s an alliance, too, and an exampleof dependent development. But the nationalist feelings on thepart of local capital and the local community are also issuesthat all parties have to deal with. It will be interesting tosee how things will evolve, and in what way they will affectthe socioeconomic development of Macau. We will come backto this point in the next part.Third, there is the issue of problem gambling and thepromotion of responsible gaming on the part of the casinooperators. For most developing countries, the price paid forindustrialization is often an environmental nightmare. For Macau,the price being paid for more development is problem gambling.The Institute for the Study of Commercial Gaming at theUniversity of Macau researched the gaming activities of Macaucitizens in 2003.30 Out of a representative sample of 1121 Macauresidents, ranging from ages 15 to 65, the researchers foundthat two thirds of the respondents participated in at least onekind of gambling activities in the year before. While it maybe true that most of them might have done it for recreationalpurposes, 1.78% could be identified as “probable addictedgamblers”, and 2.5% were “probable problem gamblers”. If
69《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4the ratio holds, out of 460,000 Macau residents at the time,8188 would fall in the first category, and 11,500 would fallin the second category. With the population increase, the figuremust be higher now. And that is not including the gamblersfrom mainland China, who constitute the majority of the peoplegambling in Macau’s casinos. To prevent people from gettinginto gambling problems and help those who have becomeaddicted to overcome addiction has become a daunting taskfor Macau society, including not only the actors in the triplealliance, but also the Macau community at large.The problems of such gamblers can be seen, indirectly,from the following Hong Kong example. In the year between2003–2004, Caritas A G Counseling Centre, of Hong Konghelped 350 addicted/problem gamblers who came tothem the first time. Each of these persons still had a debtof 200,000 to 300,000 Hong Kong dollars. Half of them wereaddicted gamblers. 50 of them had thought aboutsuicide. 31 Kung Yick, a former Nationalist officer stranded inMacau, lost USD3 million, the money was given to him bythe Nationalists to help people escape from the mainland inlate 1940s, in a gambling career of 40 years. He died in1998 penniless, although he had no regrets for his gamblingsprees.32 One constantly reads and hears stories of people,both in Macau and mainland China, who have lost theirbusinesses and/or families because of gambling.3. Possible Approaches to the Problems andDependent DevelopmentAs Gereffi and Fonda point out, “The essence ofdevelopment is to improve the quality of life. This generallycalls for higher incomes, which are the result of gains inproductivity and technological advances among nations.Economic progress, in turn, depends on a number of otherdevelopment objectives: better education, improved health andnutrition, a cleaner environment, a reduction of poverty, moreequality of opportunity, an enhancement of individual freedoms,and a richer cultural environment”.33 These may be calledeconomic, social, cultural, and political goals of development.So when discussing solutions to problems, we need to keepthese goals in mind, whether we are talking about the survivalof small and medium-sized enterprises, the nationalist conflictsbetween foreign and local capital, or problem gambling.As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the Macaugovernment has an ever increasing reservoir of funds andit has an opportunity to use this money wisely for the city’sdevelopment. Some have argued that the government shouldprovide more welfare to the elderly and build more economichousing for the local Macau people who cannot afford theextraordinarily highly priced housing now. Others have arguedfor building the infrastructure that is sorely lacking in Macau.It appears that the government is thinking about or beginningto do all of these things, but it’s not clear how effectivelythese projects can be carried out. We will focus in this paperon the three problems we raised earlier.First, how can the majority of Macau’s enterprises copewith their human resource strain caused by competition andprosper in this globalised market? They seem to be facingtwo kinds of challenges. On the one hand, they need tomake their businesses more competitive. This means that theywill have to bring their services up to par with internationalstandards so that they can compete with the services providedat the casinos. For example, the food industry has to maketheir environment more welcoming to customers and their foodmore appealing to a wide variety of visitors from all overthe world. On the other hand, they need to provide morebenefits and better working conditions to their employees sothat they can retain them. If they can do the first better andmake more money that way, they will be able to do thesecond better. Only by doing these things can they stayafloat and survive the competition. And by meeting thesechallenges, they will also be contributing to the diversificationof Macau’s economy.Of course, this is much easier said than done. Facedwith the need to transform their services, the more ambitiousare getting small loans from the government to upgrade theirbusinesses and are doing quite well. But others are facingclosure: small shops are increasingly replaced by chain stores.Still others see a drop in their earnings. All of them feelthe squeeze of human resource shortages. This may seemto be a good thing in bringing Macau’s economic developmentto a higher level. But it can also arouse feelings among thelocal capitalists. We occasionally hear small and medium sized
Dependent Development? Macau’s Gaming Industry:Its Problems and Prospects澳門研究70第51期enterprises complain that the government is not doing nearlyenough to help them survive in the market. But other thanthat, they seem to be taking it for granted that they willhave to take care of themselves in the current transformationof Macau’s economy. In the past two years, people tookto the street to protest against the importation of migrant labour,skyrocketing housing prices, traffic laws, corruption in thegovernment, etc.34 But the conflict between this part of the localcapital and transnational capital has not figured as importantly.Second, how might the conflict between the gaming partof local capital versus foreign capital be resolved? WhileStanley Ho is complaining about unfair foreign competition,he is quietly improving his services as other casinos do.Competition and conflict might actually lead to improvements,and conflicts can thus be melted, to some extent.The first of such improvements is in the diversificationof the gaming industry. Rather than focusing on the gamblingitself, the casinos have been trying to add other componentsto their operations. Indeed, when they were granted theconcessions, the casinos were required to invest in otheroperations than gambling, such as convention, shopping,and other recreational areas. SJM, for example, would buildMacau Fishermen’s Wharf, Ponte 16, and East West CulturalVillage.35 The first two projects have basically been completed,but the last one not yet. Meanwhile, The Venetian Macauhas opened its convention centre, which offers 1 million squarefeet of convention and exhibition facilities, 1 million squarefeet of shopping centre with 350 stores, a 15,000 seat stadium,20 leading restaurants, as well as Gondola rides. All newdevelopments such as these will diversify Macau’s gamingindustry like never before. They provide convention centresand entertainment activities other than just gambling. What theother four major players (The Wynn Macau, The Galaxy, TheMGM Grand Macau, and Melco PBL) will do in the sameregard is not yet clear. But the trend seems promising. Andit’s a progressive part of dependent development.Las Vegas has witnessed the following marketing toolsto attract visitors: Grand Prix and Formula One Auto Racing,Boxing matches, golf tournaments, tennis tournaments, musicalconcerts, New Years Eve parties, etc., and it is the world’shoneymoon capital and a vacation destination for manyfamilies.36 One point of introducing foreign capital is thediversification of the gaming industry, and apparently more canbe done. For example, one might argue that the diversificationof the industry provides an opportunity for Macau to protectits World Heritage Site status and to change its image ofbeing “a city of sin” into one of being “a city of culture”.37But this is only an opportunity. How the gaming industrycan associate with World Heritage Site status is not yet clear.Can casinos expand their cultural component by integratingthe local historical contexts into their entertainment sector? Weknow that The Venetian has incorporated the Venetian culture.But not many have thought about incorporating the MacauPortuguese/Chinese culture. For MGM Grand Macau to simplybuild its grand lobby in the style of the Portuguese CentralTrain Station with a Portuguese garden is a good start, butit is probably still too little, too symbolic, and too simple.How will the casinos diversify their own operations? Will thegovernment endeavour to compete with the casinos in attractingpeople’s attention to Macau’s World Heritage Site status, orask the casinos to include this in some way in their entertainmentsector?38 In the triple alliance between the state, the multinationalcorporations and local capital, the government probably needsto take a stronger stand in promoting Macau’s culture. Socan gambling and this other kind of “World Heritage” mesh?If so, in what way? Is foreign capital here only for money,or will it also be able to promote one of the cultural goalsof development as we mentioned above? This we still haveto see.The second improvement derived from the conflict betweenforeign and local capital is the establishment and revision ofrules and regulations regarding the gaming industry. As Eadingtonand Siu point out, the incorporation of foreign companies likeWynn Resorts and The Sands requires reshaping the legaland regulatory framework, only if partially, since the latterare obligated to follow Nevada’s “foreign gaming” statutes andregulations.39 Take the credit system for example. Before 2004,it was illegal to lend money to gamblers, no matter by whom,but such practice was tolerated in reality. If criminal activitiessuch as loan-sharking, intimidation, and violence occurred, andthey did occur, the concessionaire (e.g., STDM) could claimignorance and deny responsibility. When Wynn Resorts came
71《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4to Macau, it insisted that gambling credit be made legal, andit have been since then.40 This made it possible for creditorsto pursue debtors through the courts of law, something theycan do now in Macau but not in mainland China, since gamblingis still illegal there. And it made it possible for the foreigncompanies to establish their own VIP systems and junketoperator networks. The law is still ambiguous enough toallow informal practices to prevail in companies that do nothave to abide by foreign rules, as Eadington and Siu pointout. But it does help alleviate crimes such as loan-sharking,criminal kidnapping, and even murder associated with suchactivities.41Similarly, a law was passed to vet junket representatives.The law does not clearly explain who is a “principal employee”(junket operator) whose personal information has to be disclosed,and who is not. And the penalty for violation is not stated,either.42 But it is a step forward.Establishing rules and regulations for the game is allvery important. But it will not be an easy task, as the abovementioned ambiguities indicate. Furthermore, can and shouldthe gaming industry form its own association, as in the UnitedStates, so that it can better regulate itself? Leong On Kei,a legislator associated with the gaming industry, complainedthat the government promised to organise a gaming advisoryboard in 2007, but nothing had happened. Then at the endof 2007, the government announced its decision to form agaming advisory committee composed of all the players inthe field, including the casino representatives, governmentofficials, and community leaders. So there might indeed bea triple or four part alliance. It was finally established inearly 2008 and has had one meeting so far only about thecommissions to be paid to junket operators. And they didnot reach a consensus. It remains to be seen whether thecommittee will work. Leong has also questioned the open-design of the Venetian Macau, where people can freely visitthe gambling tables and machines without security checks.She wants the government to clarify its rules and regulations.43 As we will discuss below, more areas will need regulating.Of course, rules without enforcement are useless. This is alsoachallenge toMacau’s gaming industry, and the internationalizationof gaming in Macau might help.The third improvement is in human resource management.By definition, human resource management means theorganization of employees as assets in a corporation in sucha way that the employees will be valued as human beingsand can be mobilised to do the most productive work forthe company.44 How does one organise one’s employees, then?How does one show care for one’s employees? Wynn Resortshas been reported as providing its employees with a teammember support program. This would give its employees 24hours of free and confidential hotline support in Cantonese,English and Mandarin as well as training to help them dealwith the various pressures derived from their jobs, includingconflict management.45 In Las Vegas, the dealers at Wynn votedto join the TWU Dealers Local 721 (The Transport WorkersUnion) for the purpose of collective bargaining and lobbyingelected officials.It looks that Wynn Macau is doing better than WynnLas Vegas in terms of its human resource management, althoughmore research still needs to be done to see what the similaritiesand differences are between the two locations. Research shouldalso be done to compare not only the two Wynn propertiesbut also the foreign vs. local Chinese companies and seewhether they are doing similarly or differently regarding humanresource management. We know that under the pressure ofinternational competition, SJM has already improved its servicesand human resource practices. There is apparently more roomfor improvement, and we just need to find out specificallyhow. In a recent court case, a former employee has suedSJM for lost pay in holidays (they did not used to haveholidays, including weekends, annual leaves, Spring Festivalholidays, etc. when they worked there—things seem to havechanged now). How do Macau’s casinos compare in providingemployees with pension plans, free life, health, accident andhospitalization insurance and free meals, in relation to the practicein Las Vegas?46If we judge competition and conflict between local andforeign capital from the point of view of a concrete improvementof quality of life in Macau, then the nationalist feelings wementioned earlier are not really as important, unless there isunfairness and injustice involved. But they are importantnonetheless. The gaming industry simply has to do more to
Dependent Development? Macau’s Gaming Industry:Its Problems and Prospects澳門研究72第51期alleviate Chinese nationalist feelings, not only in the abovementioned areas of diversification, regulation, and human resourcemanagement, but especially in preventing problem gambling.We will come back to the role of the developmental statein the next section, but let us first see what the gamingindustry is or is not doing regarding our third problem area.The third problem we discussed earlier has to do withproblem gambling. Will foreign investment help here? Willdependent development work in this regard? That brings usto the issue of responsible gaming. Responsible gaming meansnot only that players should make rational and sensiblechoices, but that the industry has an obligation to protectthe players by providing rational and sensible products andservices so that the players will make rational and sensiblechoices, and that the industry has an obligation to contributeto the overall welfare of society rather than causing problemsfor sustainable development. This is also part of the casino’scorporate social responsibility.47 Other than the state, localcapital outside the gaming sector, and the communityorganizations, what can the casino operators do to advanceresponsible gaming? Do they have an obligation to helpindividuals, including their own employees and families,prevent, intervene, and treat problem gamblers? What canthey do? Harrah’s is an industry leader in responsible gamingsince the 1980s. In one of its programs named OperationBet Smart , Harrah’s stated that they “provide responsiblegaming signage on the casino floor and back-of-house so thatemployees always know where to refer customers requestingassistance. We also provide responsible gaming informationin brochures, on hold messages, and Harrah’s responsiblespecific media campaign, as well as including helpline phonenumbers on all marketing collateral, player cards, and hoteldirectories. These communication efforts serve to provide ourcustomers an unobtrusive vehicle for obtaining more informationabout responsible gaming and seeking assistance.”48Harrah’s has other programs like Self-Restriction/Self-Exclusion, Looking out for Kids, and Project 21, which “teachescasino employees, minors, parents, and guardians about theconsequences of gambling under the legal age.” Other casinosin the world have taken other measures. And the state mayalso set restr ict ions on where and how casinos canoperate.49But research finds that such measures are not effectivesince the incentives provided by the industry are far morepowerful than their warning signage or other restrictions. Sothese measures have to be accompanied by other controlssuch as limits on the amount of money one can spend pergambling session. Are Macau casinos and the governmentdoing anything similar? Not really. They seem to have takensome initial steps in the way of responsible gaming, but notmuch has really been done.Furthermore, over 70% of casino revenue comes fromthe high rollers, who bet thousands upon thousands of dollars.And they bet in the VIP rooms.50 Comparatively speaking,in Las Vegas the high rollers generate only 40% of therevenue.51 If the money comes from their own pocket and theycan afford it, it is arguably acceptable practice. (Still, weread about too many tragedies here.) But if they gambleembezzled money, this is a pubic issue. Of course, it ishard for casinos to know what money is legal and whatis not. But there are things they can do. They certainly knowwho is spending how much, and they know the identitiesof these people, too. They can certainly put a cap on mainlandcadres or private business owners as to the amount of moneythey can bet in their casinos.Whilst it is true that it may be the middlemen and women(the junket representatives) who control the money transactions,not the cadres themselves, the casinos can have leverageon the middlemen and women. If they want to control whois in their properties, they can exert control over the junketrepresentatives, who can then exercise control over thegamblers. This of course goes against their business instinctsto make as much money as possible. And it may also bein conflict with some privacy laws. But some kind of compromiseneeds to be found to deal with the problem. If casinos areto be responsible businesses, they should make an effort toprevent illegal money from flowing into their pockets.In the triple alliance, the government can also do somethingin this regard since the middlemen and women, numbered3861, are licensed by the government.52 In summer 2007, theGuangdong government also issued an order to limit visasto Macau for their government officials. This is certainly one
73《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4way to deal with the problem, even though corrupt officialsand corrupt casino business operators can find other waysto avoid being caught.53 And the number of corrupt officialscan be large.54 So some concerted efforts by all parties haveto be put on the table. Private gaming salons like the VIProoms in Las Vegas are not the most popular and contributelittle (at least not the most) to the casino revenue there.55If Macau wants to reverse its image of uncontrolled gambling,it may have to decrease the number of exclusive bettingparlours. Yet the trend seems to be the opposite. Here dependentdevelopment faces serious challenges. Dependency does notyet mean development here.4. The importance of the developmental stateand the local communityFrom the discussion in the previous sections on theproblems and solutions in terms of competition faced by thesmall and medium-sized enterprises, the conflict between localand foreign capital, and prevention of problem gambling, weunderstand that up to now neither the government nor thecommunity have played a strong role. Therefore we will takea more detailed look at these two players in relation to Macau’ssocioeconomic development.As Che Sei Tak points out, in the past eight years,the Macau SAR government had largely followed a laissezfaire policy in its relationship with the market.56 This can alreadybe seen from the Chief Executive’s 2000 state of Macaureport. He said that the government would let the market leadthe development of the city, and it would protect the normaloperations of the market mechanisms. Did this mean that thegovernment would not do much at all? Although the governmentdoes not say so, it appears that this is the case. Thegovernment’s role, however, is not necessarily to localise thegaming industry and reject foreign competition, as Che seemsto be implying. However there do seem to be many issueswhere the Government is not taking action when it probablyshould be. Here are a few examples.First, many legislators have been calling on the governmentto clarify its labour policies to help especially the small andmedium-sized local enterprises, but the government has beendragging its feet.57 The legislature, on the other hand, cannotdo much since the political system gives most power to theexecutive branch. Of course, the government cannot take thefull responsibility for the survival of the small and medium-sized companies. As we said earlier, much depends on howthey can enhance their own competitiveness. The governmenthas appeared to catch up on legislation regarding labour laws.It worked with the legislature to pass the new labour relationsact in August 2008, and they were going to work on theimported labour law. But legislation is still lagging far behinddevelopment.Second, regarding the competition between foreign andlocal capital, the government needs to play a more open,fair, and just role. For example, in a conflict in December2007, the government granted a ferry operation license to theLas Vegas Sands’ Cotai Waterjets between Hong Kong andMacau. About one week into operation, the court intervened,and Sands Macau had to stop the operation because bothPansy Ho, the head of Sun Ta Holdings Limited and MGMGrand, and Stanley Ho, her father, protested. Stanley Hoalleged that granting the shipping license to a gamblingconcessionaire was against the law, especially when it wasnot done in a transparent, tendering procedure.58 At a legislativemeeting, Leong On Kei, a wife of Stanley Ho’s, even complainedthat the government was bestowing favours to certaincasino operators at the expense of others. She complainedthat the government granted the rights to certain casinos (shemeant Sands Macau) for land development (she meant theCotai Strip), more imported (foreign) labour, and more convenientways of recruiting mainland workers, etc.59 Apparently, thegovernment has not done nearly enough in regulating the gamingindustry and balancing the business interests of foreign andlocal capital. (Cotai Waterjets resumed operation about a monthlater.)Third, the government has done even less in requiringthe casino operators, local or foreign, to practice responsiblegaming. As we mentioned above, both the casino operatorsand the government are increasing their incomes, but theyhave yet to seriously think about preventing problem gambling.Given the control measures that are increasingly taken in otherparts of the world as, for example, in Great Britain, Australiaand the U.S., they cannot just claim ignorance or pay lip
Dependent Development? Macau’s Gaming Industry:Its Problems and Prospects澳門研究74第51期service to such matters. This is one of the most importantcomponents of dependent development; otherwise, dependentdevelopment may largely fail.As Duarte points out, current problems seem to indicatethat “too many discretionary decisions were taken without properor explicit justification,” and public services seem to be“overwhelmed by their current tasks”, the government being“unable to anticipate consequences of public decisions or toadequately plan even for foreseeable outcomes.” 60 He suggeststhat there might be possible structural or political obstacleshindering the government’s performance. Autonomy andresponsibility need to be better designed and adequatelyrespected, and “competence and dedication must be properlyrecognised and rewarded…” This will probably entail moredemocratic reforms of the government. The Macau SAR’s lackof experience in dealing with modern regulatory practices andmaking licensees adhere to them is one reason for the currentproblems, as Eadington and Siu point out, but more structuralreasons have to be dealt with as well.61In addition to the role of the government, the communityat large needs to be more aware and more active in affectingMacau’s socioeconomic development.62 In fact, the government’sinaction often has to do with the community’s inaction. Macauhas over 4000 social organizations. But most of them arenot active, and those that are active tend to be pro-government,an alliance that is more likely to promote apparent “harmony”than development. For example, the workers’ associations,women’s associations, and neighbourhood associations are threeof the most powerful social organizations. They were normallyin opposition against the Portuguese Macau government. Butafter the return of Macau to China, they shifted their loyaltyto the Macau SAR government, and are seldom in conflictwith it. They are, for example, against more democratic reformsto make the government more responsible. We mentioned severaldemonstrations, but they were organised by severalpro-democracy organizations or new and small independentunions or citizen groups. The mass media in Macau are alsomild even in their criticism. They are afraid of rocking theboat. It is true that there is plenty of discontent in Macau,but much needs to be done to turn it into productive forcesto help enhance dependent development, including moredemocratization of the political system.5. ConclusionIn this paper, we have discussed some theories ofdevelopment, especially dependent development and thedevelopmental state. We have also discussed the problemsof the gaming industry in Macau and their solutions. We haveemphasised the importance of the state and communityorganizations. We do see some problems with theinternationalization of the gaming industry in Macau, and theintroduction of foreign capital in the form of Las Vegas stylecasinos. These include the strain on human resources andpressure put on the local small and medium-sized enterprises,conflict between local and foreign capital, and increased problemgambling. But we also see that the pressure put on smalland medium-sized companies may actually help them to enhancetheir competitiveness. The conflict between foreign and localcapital can lead to improvements in the diversification of theindustry and in human resource management practices. Wealso see the necessity of the establishment of better rulesand regulations that govern the industry. There are, however,still many problems that the state and the industry are notdoing nearly enough to address, such as the diversificationof the gaming industry and prevention of problem gambling.Only when these problems are resolved to a great extentcan the nationalist feelings we mentioned in this paper bealleviated. The government so far has played a rather weakrole in Macau’s economic development, as have the communityorganizations as a whole.As dependent development theories would tell us, it isthe interaction between multinational corporations, local capital,the state and the community organizations that determines thedirection of development. It is the balance and compromiseof their interests and the adjustment of their strategies thatmakes development possible. We need to further study eachplayer’s strategies and see how a balance can be achieved.For only then can it be a winning situation for all the players.In other words, transnational corporations will still stay in themarket, but they are only one of the players, and have tobe equal, fair, healthy, ethical, and productive players as well.In a mature economy, which Macau is not yet, the market
75《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4will no longer be dependent on any one player. And theintegrity and legit imacy of the gaming industry will bepreserved.63 Dependent development will have finished itshistorical task, and the goals of local economic, social, cultural,and political development will have been achieved.Notes:1 One USD equals about 8 Macau patacas.2 See Annual Report of the Gaming Board for Great Britain2004–05 at the British Gambling Commission’s website, http://www.gambl ingcommission.gov.uk/Cl ient/mediadetai l .asp?mediaid=3, accessed January 12, 2008.3 “Xiyi waizi yazhou disan,” Shang Xun, Issue 28 (2007). [《吸引外資亞洲第三》，載於《商訊》，第 28期，2007年。]4 So, Hang Tai, “The Deficiency of Macau’s Over-relianceEconomy on the Gaming Industry,” Journal of Macau Studies,Vol. 32 (2006), pp. 74–83.5 Lou, Shenghua, “Liyi fenhua, jiegou chongshu: aomen jinnianshehui jingji wenhua zhi jubian,” Macao Daily, 21st November,2007, p . F2. [婁勝華：《利益分化結構重塑 澳門近年社會經濟文人化之巨變》，載於《澳門日報》， 2007年 11 月 21 日，第 F2 版。]6 For discussion of development theories in these pages, seeSo, A. Y., Social Change and Development: Modernization,Dependency, and World-System Theories (Newbury Park:Sage Publications, 1990). For more studies using developmenttheories, see Bradshaw, Y. W., “Dependent Development inBlack Africa: a Cross-national Study,” American SociologyReview, Vol. 50, No. 2 (1985), pp.195-207; Goto, M., ThePattern of Development in East Asia and Japan’s Trade andInvestment in the Region: The Cases of Malaysia and SouthKorea, Ph.D Dissertation, University of New South Wales(Australia, 2001) .7 Gereff i , G. and Evans, P., “Transnational Corporat ions,Dependent Development, and State Pol icy in the Semi-periphery: a Comparison of Brazil and Mexico,” Latin AmericanResearch Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1981), pp. 31–64.8 Evans, P. , Dependent Deve lopmen t : The A l l i ance ofMultinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1979).9 McDonough, P. , “A Review o f Pe ter Evans’ book onDependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State,and Local Capital in Brazil,” The American Political ScienceReview, Vol. 74, No. 1 (1980), pp. 234–35. In the review,Peter McDonough refers to the fourth actor as the church,politicians, and the labor leadership in Brazil. In Macau, the roleof the church is very limited. Politicians seem to be part of thestate, even though they may have different views regardingdevelopment. But labor is indeed a force, albeit not a veryforceful one. We will discuss these actors later in the paper.1 0 Gereffi, G. and Fonda, S., “Regional Paths of Development,”Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 18 (1992), pp. 419–448.1 1 Gereff i , G. and Evans, P., “Transnational Corporat ions,Dependent Development, and State Pol icy in the Semi-per iphery: a Compar ison of Brazi l and Mexico, ” Lat inAmerican Research Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1981), pp. 31–64.1 2 Ibid.1 3 According to Sands Macau’s news release on 28 th August,2006: “The Venetian Macau will also serve as the anchor ofthe Cotai Strip (TM), a master planned development of resortand casino properties. The Cotai Strip wil l feature hotelsoperated by some of the most prestigious names in the hotelindustry, including Four Seasons, Sheraton, St. Regis,Shangri-La, Traders, Hilton, Conrad, Fairmont, and Raffles. LasVegas Sands Corp. will own and construct each of the hotelsas well as operate the casinos and entertainment venues ineach hotel.” See http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=185629&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=899653&highlight.1 4 The Harrah’s has just bought a large stretch of golf-course onthe Cotai Strip, and is likely to use it for a casino in the futureif the government agrees. For now we will not yet considerHarrah’s to be an example of foreign capital in the gamingindustry.1 5 Che, Sie Tak, “Bocai ye chenggong you shichang jueding?”Macao Daily, 9 th December, 2007, p. A11. [謝四德：《博彩業成功由市場決定？》，載於《澳門日報》， 2007 年12 月 9 日，第 A11 版。]1 6 Gereff i , G. and Evans, P., “Transnational Corporat ions,Dependent Development, and State Pol icy in the Semi-periphery: a Comparison of Brazil and Mexico,” Latin AmericanResearch Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1981), pp. 31–64.1 7 So, A. Y., Social Change and Development: Modernization,Dependency, and World-System Theories (Newbury Park:Sage Publications, 1990).1 8 See an article on the increase 22.8% in the number of workersin the gaming industry, “Zhan laodong renkou 1/10 bocaicongyeyuan 2.6 wan dazeng 22.8%,” Macao Dai ly, 31 stMarch, 2006, p. A10. [《佔勞動人口 1/10 博彩從業員 2.6萬大增 22.8%》，載於《澳門日報》， 2006年 3月 31日，第 A10 版。]1 9 See an article on the government policies needing to tilt towardmedium and small enterprises, “Zhengce xiang zhongxiao qiqingxie,” Macao Daily, 26 th November, 2006, p. B1. [《政策向中小企傾斜》，載於《澳門日報》， 2006 年 11 月 26日，第 B1 版。]2 0 See an art icle on the tourist industry losing 40% of i tsemployees, “Luyouye renyuan liushi sicheng,” Macao Daily,27 th August, 2006, p. A1. [《旅遊業人員流失四成》，載於《澳門日報》， 2006 年 8 月 27 日，第 A01 版。]2 1 Pina, J., “Transparency Takes Time,” Macao Business, March2008, pp. 24–27.2 2 Lintner, B., “Stanley Ho’s luck turns sour,” Far EasternEconomic Review, May (2007), and in Asia Pacific MediaServices websi te, http: / /www.asiapacif icms.com/art icles/luck_turns_sour/.2 3 See an article comparing STDM and Sands Macau, “Duyesanxiong gongbu qunian yej i aobo shouyi jushou Jinshabeisheng” Macao Daily, 27 th April, 2006, p. A1. [《賭業三雄公佈去年業績澳博收益居首金沙倍升》，載於《澳門日報》， 2006 年 4 月 27 日，第 A01 版。]2 4 “2007 Gaming Results: Market Share per Operator,” MacaoBusiness , December 2007 . MGM Grand was open inDecember, so its share was not counted here.
Dependent Development? Macau’s Gaming Industry:Its Problems and Prospects澳門研究76第51期2 5 “2007– 2008 Gaming Results: Market Share per Operator,”Macao Business, August 2008.2 6 See an article on the exchanges between Stanley Ho andSheldon Adelson accusing each other, “Aidesen: wu jingzhenglitaotai nanmian; Hehongshen: meizi gongsi wu dui chengnuo,” Macao Daily, 29 th August, 2006. [《艾德森：冇競爭力淘汰難免 何鴻燊：美資公司無兌承諾》，載於《澳門日報》， 2006 年 8 月 29 日，第 A01 版。] For his mostrecent accusation, see “Shenge zhengshi Aobo rongzi 50 yiwei xinpujing maiwei,” Macao Daily, 5 th October, 2007, p. A10.[《燊哥證實 澳博融資 50 億為新葡京埋尾》，載於《澳門日報》， 2007 年 10 月 5 日，第 A10 版。]2 7 Ip, Kuai Lam, “Macau Factor in the Sino-American Relationship– a Study Based on International Political Economics,” Journalof Macau Studies, Vol. 41 (2007), pp. 52– 57. [葉桂林：《中美關係中的澳門因素──基於國際政治經濟學的分析》，載於《澳門研究》，第 41 期， 2007 年，第 52–57頁。 ]2 8 Chow, Kam Fai, “Aomen fanrong de beihou,” Macao Daily, 26thOctober, 2007, p. E12. [周錦輝：《澳門繁榮的背後》，載於《澳門日報》， 2007 年 10 月 26 日，第 E12 版。]2 9 “Sealed Information could Put Sands Macau Gambling Licensein Jeopardy” in Macao Daily Times, 9 th October, 2007, p. 4.3 0 Fong, Ka Chio Davis and Bernadete, O., “Aomen Jumin CanyuBocai Huodong Diaocha” Yanjiu Baogao (Chugao) (Macau:Institute for the Study of Commercial Gaming, University ofMacau, 2003). [馮家超、伍美寶：《“澳門居民參與博彩活動調查”研究報告(初稿)》，澳門：澳門大學博彩研究所， 2003 年。]3 1 See “Mingai zhanqing zhongxin diaocha xianshi wenti dutupingjun qianzhai ershi wan,” Macao Daily, 15 th October, 2004,p . C12. [《明愛展晴中心調查顯示 問題賭徒平均欠債廿餘萬》，載於《澳門日報》， 2004 年 10 月 15 日，第C12 版。]3 2 McGivering, J., Macau Remembers (Hong Kong: OxfordUniversity Press, 1999).3 3 Gereffi, G. and Fonda, S., “Regional Paths of Development,”Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 18 (1992), pp. 419–448.3 4 Chou, B. K. P., “The Paradox of Macau’s Development,” Apaper presented at the First Seminar in Law and SocialSciences, co-sponsored by the University of Macau and theUniversidade Estadual Paulista-UNESP of Brazil, on 30 th–31stOctober, 2007 at the University of Macau.3 5 McCar tney, G. , “Casino Gambl ing in Macau: th roughLegislation to Liberalization,” in Hsu, C. H. C. (Ed.), CasinoIndustry in Asia Pacific: Development, Operation, and Impact(Binghamton: The Haworth Press, Inc, 2006), p. 53.3 6 Eade, V., “Las Vegas Gaming Trends Analysis,” in Eade, V.(Ed.), Overview of Gaming (Tokyo: ACE Research Institute,1996), pp. 207-223; Walker, T. C. (Ed.) The 2005 Casino andGaming Market Research Handbook (8 th edition) (Atlanta: TerriC. Walker Consulting, Inc., 2005).3 7 Hao, Zhidong, A City of Sin or a City of Culture: A CriticalEvaluation of Macau History and Society (Macau and Beijing:University of Macau and the Social Science Academic Press,forthcoming 2009).3 8 Chan, Florinda da Rosa Silva, “Ben ao shi yi quefa jingjixiaoyi?” Macao Daily, 26 th August 26, 2007, p. A11. [陳麗敏：《本澳世遺缺乏經濟效益？》，載於《澳門日報》， 2007 年 8 月 26 日，第 A11 版。]3 9 Eadington, W. R. and Siu, R. C. S., “Between Law andCustom-examining the Interaction between Legislative Changeand the Evolution of Macau’s Casio Industry,” InternationalGambling Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2007), pp. 1– 28.4 0 Wang, Wuyi, “A Few Problems Regarding the Development ofGaming Industry in Macau,” Journal of Macau Studies, Vol.26 (2005), pp. 42– 47. [王五一：《澳門博彩業大發展中幾個問題》，載於《澳門研究》，第 26 期， 2005 年，第 42-47 頁。]; Guan, Hongling and Lei, Qiang, “The Socialand Political Effects of the Entry of Foreign Investment intoMacau’s Gaming Industry,” Journal of Macau Studies, Vol. 31(2005), pp. 68– 73. [關紅玲、雷強：《外資進入澳門博彩業帶的社會政治影響》，載於《澳門研究》，第 31期， 2005 年，第 68– 73 頁。]4 1 Eadington, W. R. and Siu, R. C. S., “Between Law andCustom-examining the Interaction between Legislative Changeand the Evolution of Macau’s Casio Industry,” InternationalGambling Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2007), pp. 1– 28.4 2 Ibid.4 3 See “Lianganqi zhixun bocai jingying shoufa,” Macao Daily,26 th October, 2007, pp. B8.[《梁安琪質詢博彩經營》，載於《澳門日報》， 2007 年 10 月 26 日，第 B8 版。]4 4 Eade, V., “Human Resources Management,” in Eade, V. (Ed.),Overview of Gaming (Tokyo: ACE Research Institute, 1996).4 5 For Wynn’s employee support program, see “Yongli Aomen‘tuandui chengyuan zhiyuan jihua’ chuangxin biaozhun Aomenshouge wei guyuan suo sheli zhi jiankang zhiyuan jihua” inJornal Informacao, 17 th August, 2007, p. 2. [《永利澳門“團隊成員支援計劃”創新標準 澳門首個為僱員所設立之健康支援計劃》，載於《訊報》， 2007 年 8 月 17 日，第 2 版。]4 6 Walker, T. C. (Ed.) The 2005 Casino and Gaming MarketResearch Handbook (8 th edit ion) (At lanta: Terri C. WalkerConsulting, Inc., 2005).4 7 Holm, R. and Watts, P., Corporate Social Responsibi l ity:Making Good Business Sense (The U.K.: The World BusinessCouncil for Sustainable Development, 2000). Also see the“Supplementary memorandum from the Royal College ofPsychiatrists,” testimony by professors from the Royal Collegeof Psychiatrists at the British Parliament in 2004, published atthe British Parliament’s website, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtgamb/63/4010807.htm. This is the Victoria Gaming Machine Industry’s Code ofPractice, widely practiced by the gaming industry.4 8 See Harrah’s website , h ttp: / /www.harrahs.com/harrahs-corporate/about-us-responsible-gaming.html.4 9 Hancock, L., “Responsible Gambling? A Critique of AustralianResponsible Gaming Regulations,” a paper presented at aseminar organised by the Department of Sociology, Universityof Macau, Macau, on 19 th September, 2007.5 0 Wang, Wuyi and Zabielskis, P., “Making Friends, MakingMoney: Macau’s Traditional VIP System,” Cultural Perspectiveson Gambling Organizations: Backgrounds, Scenes, Context(forthcoming); Zeng, Zhonglu, “Bocai dazhan ‘guibing ting’ shicheng jiaodian,” Macao Daily, 26 th August, 2007, p. A11. [曾宗祿：《博彩大戰“貴賓廳”勢成焦點》，載於《澳門日報》， 2007 年 8 月 26 日，第 A11 版。]5 1 Walker, T. C. (Ed.) The 2005 Casino and Gaming Market
77《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4Research Handbook (8 th edit ion) (At lanta: Terri C. WalkerConsulting, Inc., 2005).5 2 Li, Yan, “Duting ‘hezuoren’ bushu wailao cang dipan, bufuqizheyangyan bofu guojianglong,” Jornal Informacao, 10 th August,2007, p. 04. [立言︰《賭廳“合作人”不屬外勞搶地盤不服氣者揚言報復過江龍》，載於《訊報》， 2007 年8 月 10 日，第 04 版。]5 3 Li, Yan, “Yuesheng daj i guanyuan j ingwai dubo wei j ianfangsong, huangjin dangqi guibinting lan dake jihua shoucuo,” Jornal Informacao, 21st September, 2007, p. 06. [立言︰《粵省打擊官員境外賭博未見放鬆黃金檔期貴賓廳攬大客計劃受挫》，載於《訊報》， 2007 年 9 月 21 日，第06 版。]5 4 Bill Chu, Harrah’s Asian regional marketing director, says thathe brings 100–500 Chinese players a month gambling in the$30,000-$100,000 category. See Walker, T. C. (Ed.) The 2005Casino and Gaming Market Research Handbook (8 th edition)(Atlanta: Terri C. Walker Consulting, Inc., 2005), p. 467. Thatmay be exaggerat ing, but by the same token, more suchplayers would come to Macau, since it is so close and soconvenient. One can imagine the amount of money involved.One does read frequently stories of mainland officials beingtried and sentenced because of their using public funds togamble and lose big here in Macau. See also Tai, On Nga,“The Social Responsibilities of Gambling Industry in Macau,”Journal of Macau Studies, Vol. 40 (2007), pp. 106–109. [戴安娜：《澳門博彩業社會責任初探》，載於《澳門研究》，第 40 期， 2007 年，第 106-109 頁。]5 5 Walker, T. C. (Ed.) The 2005 Casino and Gaming MarketResearch Handbook (8 th edit ion) (At lanta: Terri C. WalkerConsulting, Inc., 2005). p. 244.5 6 Che, Sie Tak, “Bocai ye chenggong you shichang jueding?”Macao Daily, 9 th December, 2007, p. A11. [謝四德：《博彩業成功由市場決定？》，載於《澳門日報》， 2007 年12 月 9 日，第 A11 版。]5 7 Lee, Leanda, “So Hard to Find Good Help These Days…At theRight Price,” Macao Business, December 2007, p. 70.5 8 Azevedo, P. A., “Battleships,” Macao Business , December2007, pp. 27–29.5 9 Che, Sie Tak, “Bocai ye chenggong you shichang jueding?”Macao Daily, 9 th December, 2007, p. A11. [謝四德：《博彩業成功由市場決定？》，載於《澳門日報》， 2007 年12 月 9 日，第 A11 版。]6 0 Duarte, J. I., “Vicissitudes,” Macao Business, December 2007,p. 33.6 1 Eadington, W. R. and Siu, R. C. S., “Between Law andCustom-examining the Interaction between Legislative Changeand the Evolution of Macau’s Casio Industry,” InternationalGambling Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2007), pp. 1–28.6 2 Ibid.6 3 Ibid.
Basic Principles of Gaming Regulation: Lessons for Macau澳門研究78第51期1. IntroductionPeople have gambled since the beginning of recordedhistory. In North America, during the early part of the 20thcentury, most types of gambling were considered criminal andlegal gambling was highly restricted. In the last decade beforethe millennium, an unprecedented expansion of legalized gamblingoccurred. The interest groups have been engaged in a long-running struggle for control over public policy towards gambling.Opponents would prefer to see gambling banned from theircommunities, whereas those who find pleasure in gamblingprefer legalization of some form. Since a substantial numberof governments depend on gaming revenue to finance theirpublic budget, a moral case for banning gambling in thesejurisdictions is untenable, so there is a role for governmentto play in its public policy to mitigate the ill effects of gamblingon communities and this raises the question of how governmentsshould regulate its gaming industry.2. Need for Gaming RegulationIn the United States and increasingly in the rest of theworld, governments leave the conduct of business for the mostpart to the operations of free markets. In other words, peopleare allowed to employ their time, talents, and energy in whateverform of work they choose. They can sell the fruits of theirlabour in the form of goods and services to anyone willingto buy them at the price they are willing to sell. With themoney earned, they are free to choose the goods and servicesavailable in the market.If the gaming industry were regulated according to thefree market principles, anyone would be able to place a betwith anyone, on anything and at any venue. Anyone couldopen a gaming business in venues like airports, supermarkets,restaurants, universities, or even in doctors’ waiting roomsand hospitals. Faced with this situation, there are some argumentswhich say that gaming business should only take place invenues from which minors are excluded, or that we mustrestrict its availability to reduce the risk of “problem gambling”.On the other hand, some major beneficiaries of sucha free-market system like gamblers may benefit from a greatervariety of goods and services at low prices. However, itshould be noted that a public policy attempted to maximizethe interests of the general public should be sought. Basedupon this, we will not necessarily favour free markets andmay favour regulation of the gaming industry to some extent.3. Objectives of Gaming RegulationRegulation, in this sense, is primarily intended to preventor reduce harm to the public. If we think that regulation ofthe gaming industry implies the imposition of special rulesand regulations on the industry, we might have oversimplifiedthe question “How should gaming industry be regulated?”because we tend to assume that there is only one way inwhich a gaming industry can be well-regulated.According to Borrell, different governments have differentobjectives to achieve with varying prioritization when it comesto gaming regulation, for instance: fairness in the conductBasic Principles of Gaming Regulation:Lessons for MacauSiu Lam Carlos** Associate Professor, School of Business, Macao Polytechnic Institute
79《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4of business; stable revenue base and general economicbenefit; keeping out criminal elements and activities;minimization of social harm and assistance to problemgamblers.1Following this line of thought, whether gaming regulationsare good or not depends on their appropriateness to the objectivesthat the government is trying to achieve. What is good orbad regulation in Biloxi (which wanted to use gaming to establishitself as an attractive destination resort for tourists) will besignificantly different from what is good or bad regulation inDetroit (which is catering mainly for its own local marketand trying to stop them from traveling to Windsor in Canadato gamble).Nevertheless, there are some good gaming regulationscommon to all jurisdictions. For instance, those designed toprevent money laundering or to ensure that customers arenot cheated. However, many of the gaming regulations willbe specific to the perceived problems and opportunities thatconfront their communities and governments. For this reason,it is very important for a government to ask itself what itis trying to achieve and what its priorities to achieve goodgaming regulation are.Some scholars suggest some major factors governmentswould consider in their gaming regulation, including thefollowing2:3.1 Gaming ProductsGovernments that regulate the gaming industry typicallyset rules about what games and activities people may takebets on. They will stipulate the rules according to which tablegames must be played. They will require every game playedon a gaming machine to be individually licensed. They willhave rules setting minimum and maximum for stakes.Generally speaking, there are several reasons for claimingthat gaming products should be subject to special regulation.The first concerns cheating. In the case of gaming machineswhere the player cannot inspect the mechanism that determinesthe ratio of winning to losing outcomes, making clear rulesto casino patrons makes cheating much more difficult. Apartfrom secure and reliable equipment, the setting of standards,followed by inspection and testing both by employees andby the regulatory authority, ensures compliance with therequirements so that casino patrons will not be easily defrauded.Another closely related concern is the diverse ways ofgaming available in the market. With the prospects of newforms of gaming offered by technological change, there is greatneed for the gaming regulators to take account of the variousforms of gaming in the market.The third concerns the protection of revenues to the publicpurse. Governments tend to forbid other organizations to operategaming activities that may offer comparably large prizes andmight detract from the funds that go to the government’s owncoffers.3.2 Gaming SuppliersLessons from Nevada demonstrate that the governmentof Nevada, motivated at least partly by scandals and bythe threat of intervention from federal authorities who hadbecome increasingly persuaded that Nevada’s casinos wereinextricably linked to organized crime, set about creating aproperly regulated legal gaming industry to ensure that thosewho owned and operated casinos were respectable and uprightbusinesspeople.3 As a result, Nevada developed the practiceof requiring the owners and most of the casino employeesto go through a thorough investigation of their background.In this way, the Nevada Gaming Commission could refusea license to people with unsavoury background in the industryand hopefully prevent people with criminal associations fromgetting into the industry in the future. In fact, this licensingpractice has been adopted not only in all other U.S. jurisdictionsbut also in an increasing number of jurisdictions throughoutthe world.Moreover, many gaming jurisdictions add two morerequirements before licensing a gaming business. The first isthat operators need to demonstrate competence to run theoperations in which they propose to trade. The second isthat operators need to prove they have adequate financialresources to sustain their business.The major reason to ensure that gaming businesses donot collapse is related to the peculiar political sensitivity ofthe gaming industry. If a casino goes to bankruptcy becauseits employees make mistakes or because it runs out of fundsto pay its debts, it will seriously damage the reputation ofthe industry as a whole and may well be held against government
Basic Principles of Gaming Regulation: Lessons for Macau澳門研究80第51期by the general public. Since the public support for a legalizedgaming industry is likely to be fragile, government has anexceptional political concern that the gaming industry not onlyshould enjoy good public relations with respect to the harm,but also should be as well thought of as possible amongthe general public.4Furthermore, governments generally have an abnormalfinancial interest in the profitability of the industry since asubstantial number of governments are dependent on gamingrevenues for their public budgets, and this is obviously thecase if the gaming company has been awarded a casinolicense on the promise that it will attract tourists, providenongaming amenities and generate jobs. Based upon this, bothgovernment and industry have a strong interest in a widespreadpublic perception of the industry as socially responsible,competent and financially reliable.3.3 Gaming ConsumersThe objective of protecting the vulnerable generates theprincipal regulatory restrictions that governments may imposeon who may gamble. The vulnerable are people for whomgaming is likely to be abnormally dangerous or harmful. Generallyspeaking, the vulnerable refer to the young, the poor andpotential addicts.Youth is a development stage associated withexperimentation, novelty and sensation-seeking. However, thecurrent youth generation is the first to grow up within a societywhere gaming is widely available and government sanctioned.Surveys in Massachusetts, Minnesota and Novia Scotia andelsewhere point to a high prevalence of problem and pathologicalgambling among youth, estimated to be two to three timeshigher than in the general adult population.5 Young people willlikely damage their lives seriously because they do not fullyunderstand how gaming works or because they cannot controltheir appetite for the pleasure that gaming offers.It is undoubtedly true that gambling appeals powerfullyto the poor. For some rich people, gambling provides thegratifications of engaging in conspicuous consumptions by thesums that they are willing to lose. Most gambling in themodern world, however, is indulged in by low-income peoplefor whom medium-sized wins constitute significant, if transitory,wealth. Recent Statistics Canada reports indicate that althoughgaming participation rates and actual expenditures tend toincrease with household income, lower-income householdsspend proportionately more than higher income households.6For instance, among households in which at least one personwas involved in gaming, those with incomes of less thanCAD20,000 spent an annual average of CAD296 on gamingpursuits. This sum represents 2.2% of total household income,whereas those with an income of CAD80,000 or more spentCAD536, only 0.5% of total income.Although it appears that the gaming activity is harmless,a source of pleasurable entertainment for all but a small, deviantminority, it seems likely that a high proportion of people whogamble regularly have gaming problems, and that the industryis very dependent on those individuals for its income. In fact,in a review of 120 studies of the prevalence of problem gamblingin the United States and Canada, Shaffer et al. concludedthat 1.6% of the adult population can be considered pathologicalgamblers and an additional 3.85% experience a variety ofadverse consequences as a result of their gambling.7 Anothersurvey estimated that the incidence of problem gambling isabout 2.3% of the adult population in Australia.8 Moreover,according to the Australian Productivity Commission, approxi-mately one-third of all gaming expenditure in Australia camefrom problem gamblers.93.4 Gaming VenuesCox et al. indicated that the highest prevalence of gamblingproblems emerged in areas with high concentrations of videolottery terminal slots in the community combined with permanentcasinos. 10 The above explains a major reason for regulatingthe number and size of venues licensed to supply casinogaming services in a jurisdiction.In Reno or Las Vegas, visitors encounter gaming machinesin the concourse of the airport and thereafter at practicallyevery other venue, including shops of all sorts, whereconceivably they might fancy playing a few coins. We recognizethat this may be appropriate in Reno and Las Vegas becausethese are places where people go to gamble, and gamblingis the principal industry of these cities. However, citizensof some other cities may probably think that so much gamblingis just excessive. While some people may feel that to haveas much gaming as the market will bear will lower the quality
81《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4of life in their community, some may have aesthetic objectionsto having gaming houses on every corner. Although thesepeople do not strongly think that all gambling is dangerous,they do not want gaming houses everywhere. What they wantis a limited number of casinos and gaming operations in theircity. In other words, what these people suggest is the viewthat says, “Let us have legal gambling in moderation.”4. Macau’s Objectives of Gaming RegulationWith the passage of gaming laws in 2001, Macau gamingrevenues grew explosively to USD10.36 billion in 2007 fromUSD2.26 billion in 2002. There were only 11 casinos in 2002.At the end of the 3rd quarter of 2008, there were 31 casinosoperating on Macau.11 The liberalization of Macau’s gamingfranchise has resulted in a similarly strong increase in a varietyof areas including taxes on gaming revenue. Although manyeconomic indicators are positive, there has been mountingevidence of gambling-related social problems including problemgambling.With Macau’s poor economy at the end of the last century,the Macau government had strong incentives to derive revenuefrom the liberalization of its gaming industry. Undoubtedly, Macauhas performed well in the achievement of the objective ofeconomic benefits. However, the rapid growth of Macau’s gamingindustry has also presented some new challenges like theemergence of problem gamblers. At this stage, it might beappropriate to see whether the importance attached to economicbenefits by the general public of Macau has changed overtime, and whether there have been requests for the prioritizationof some other objectives other than economic benefits. Moreover,it might also be opportune to consider how Macau’s regulatorystructure might be made to work better to reflect the importanceattached to these particular objectives by the general publicof Macau.Evidently, overregulation can erode the autonomynecessary to keep the industry healthy and growing consistentwith the economic development interests of Macau.12 Obviouslygaming regulation is no easy question to deal with in Macauand it might be beneficial to learn from the experience fromsome other jurisdictions.5. Lessons from Recent Gambling RegulatoryReform in AustraliaThe rapid growth of commercial gaming in the 1980sto 1990s in Australia has presented mounting evidence ofgambling-related social problems. The Federal Treasurerresponded to public protests by making enquiries into Australia’sgaming industries for a better understanding of the economicand social impact of the industries across the country, andthis in fact was the first national review of Australian.13 Toserve our purpose, regulatory reforms in Victoria and NewSouth Wales have been selected, due to their large urbancasinos in the capital city and the highest levels of gamingparticipation and problem gambling prevalence in Australia.New South Wales government’s regulatory reforms havebeen modest and risk-avert. Unwilling to accept a declinein public revenue associated with regulatory reform and havinglittle research to monitor public opinion and examine gamingimpacts since 1999, New South Wales Government has focusedon remedial harm minimization programs and strengtheningdepartmental coordination.14 This strategy gave the appearanceof removing the reform from the industry influence.In contrast to New South Wales, the history of contemporarygaming in Victoria has been characterized by sustained publicdebate, conflict and structural change. Community groups andlocal authorities have been well-organized, informed andstrategic.15 The Victorian government initiated public consultationon draft “responsible gambling” legislation in March 2001. Italso sought community input into tougher regulation of the gamingindustry.16 In fact, Victorian reforms since 1999, which havebeen more inclusive of community values, have helped acrucial regulatory balance to industry perspectives.17The two states of the same country have adopted markedlydifferent approaches to their gaming regulation. Despite this,the structural changes introduced by both governments havestrengthened the connection between government policy andregulatory functions. Based upon this, it appears that thereis no ideal regulatory model and the approaches to gamingregulation, which are shaped by fiscal imperatives, politicalpriorities and local circumstances, can vary much.Given that taxes on Macau gaming revenue finance about75% of Macau’s government budget18, it is evident that Macau’s
Basic Principles of Gaming Regulation: Lessons for Macau澳門研究82第51期gaming regulation is constrained by its fiscal imperatives. Apartfrom this, Macau also needs to be clear about the particularobjectives that it is trying to achieve, whom it is seekingto benefit at the expense of whom in the gaming regulationprocess and why. It is only through the identification of theparticular objectives will Macau be in a better position to considerthe appropriate approach to its gaming regulation so as tokeep its gaming industry healthy and growing consistent withthe economic development interests of Macau.6. ConclusionIt is necessary and desirable that governments shouldseek to furnish their citizens with appropriate gaming opportunitiesthat they or a majority of them want. To effectively achievegaming regulation, governments need to consider such factorsas gaming products, suppliers, customers and venues. Thisis no easy task given the constraints faced by governmentslike fiscal imperatives, political priorities and local situations.Despite all these, governments should be clear about theparticular objectives they are trying to achieve. It is onlythrough the identification of the particular objectives will agovernment be in a better position to consider the appropriateapproach to keep its gaming industry healthy and growingconsistent with the economic development interests of thejurisdiction concerned.Notes:1 Borrell, J., “The ‘Public Accountability Approach’: Suggestionsfor a Framework to Characterize, Compare, Inform andEvaluate Gambling Regulation,” International Journal of MentalHealth Addiction, Vol. 6 (2008), pp. 265–281.2 Ibid.; Collins, P., Gambling and the Public Interest (London:Praeger, 2003).3 Siu, L. C. and Eadington, W. R., Lessons from the NevadaModel on Macao’s Junket Operations (Unpublished, 2008).4 Collins, P., Gambling and the Public Interest (London: Praeger,2003).5 Shaffer, H. J., Labrie, R., Scanlan, K. M. and Cummings, T.N., “Pathological Gambling among Adolescents: Massachu-setts Gambling Screen (MAGS),” Journal of Gambling StudiesVol. 10 (1994), pp. 339–362; Winters, K., Stinchfield, R. andFulkerson, J., “Patterns and Characteristics of AdolescentGambling,” Journal of Gambling Studies, Vol. 9 (1993), pp.371–386.6 Marshall, K., “The Gambling Industry: Raising the Stakes,”Perspectives on Labour and Income, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1998),pp. 7–11; Marshall, K., “Update on Gambling,” Perspectiveson Labour and Income, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2000), pp. 29–35.7 Shaffer, H. J., Matthew, N. H. and Bilt, J. V., Estimating thePrevalence of Disordered Gambling Behaviour in the UnitedStates and Canada: A Meta-Analysis (Boston: Harvard MedicalSchool, 1997).8 Australian Productivity, Gambling Review Report, 1999.9 Austral ian Productivity Commission, Australia’s GamblingIndustries, Report No. 10 (Canberra: Ausinfo, 1999).1 0 Cox, B. J., Yu, N., O Afifi, T. and Ladouceur, R. A., “NationalSurvey of Gambling Problems in Canada,” Canadian Journalof Psychiatry, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2005), pp. 213–217.1 1 Macao Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau, “Numberof Casinos,” in Macao Gaming Inspection and CoordinationBureau website: http://www.dicj.gov.mo/CH/Estat/DadosEstat/2008/estat.htm#n5.1 2 Siu, L. C. and Eadington, W. R., Lessons from the NevadaModel on Macao’s Junket Operations (Unpublished, 2008).1 3 McMillen, J., O’Hara, J. and Woolley, R., Australian Gambling:Comparat ive History and Analysis (Melbourne: VictorianCasino and Gaming Authority, 1999).1 4 McMillen, J and Wright, J. S. F., “Re-regulating the GamblingIndustry: Regulatory Reform in Victoria and New South Wales,1999–2006,” Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43,No. 2 (2008), pp. 277–300.1 5 Ibid.16 Office of the Premier and Treasurer, “Bracks GovernmentIntroduces Australia’s Toughest Gaming Legislation,” MediaRelease from the Office of the Premier and Treasurer website,http://www.dpc.vic.gov.au/domino/Web”>http://www.dpc.vic.g o v . a u / d o m i n o / W e b _ N o t e s / M e d i a R e l A r c 0 2 . n s f /1 7 e d 9 4 1 5 c b 1 7 e 3 d 3 4 a 2 5 6 8 2 5 0 0 2 5 4 7 3 4 /c2172ca21b3c41744a25689400827e53!OpenDocument>, 1stMarch, 2000.1 7 Sparrow, M., The Regulatory Craft : Control l ing Risks,Managing Problems and Managing Compliance (WashingtonDC: The Brookings Institution. 2000).1 8 Siu, L. C. and Eadington, W. R., Lessons from the NevadaModel on Macao’s Junket Operations (Unpublished, 2008).
83《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4按照美國哈佛大學邁克爾‧波特（Michae l E .Por ter）的觀點，產業集群是指在某一特定領域中（通常以一個主導產業為核心），大量產業聯繫密切的企業以及相關支撐機構在空間上集聚，並形成強勁、持續競爭優勢的現象。很明顯，隨 澳門特區政府在2002年開放了博彩專營權，到了2007年底，澳門已有6家博彩公司，28家娛樂場，賭 增至4375張，角子機增至13,267台，分別是2002年底的近13和16倍多。而圍繞賭場，面積小小的澳門有15家五星級、 12家四星級酒店，以及大量的休閒娛樂場所，出現了與美國拉斯維加斯類似的博彩產業集群現象。近年澳門博彩業高速發展，市場競爭的格局已基本形成隨 澳門博彩專營權的開放和獲得專營權/轉批給公司的正式投入運作，以往澳門博彩業的市場份額由“澳博”獨佔的局面發生了根本的變化，博彩業的市場份額之爭將會越來越激烈。在澳門博彩業市場經營模式發生了變化後，澳門博彩產業單一化問題始卻終未能徹底解決。到底澳門博彩產業競爭力應該如何評價？應該從哪些方面對澳門的博彩業進行定量評價？這些問題關係到如何提升澳門博彩業競爭力，令該產業和澳門實現可持續性地發展的重要課題。本文將從產業集群的角度來嘗試探討澳門博彩產業競爭力。一、文獻綜述競爭力作為一個專業術語，肇始於20世紀70年代的美國，最初以國際競爭力的形式進入學術研究領域，定義是國家層次上的競爭力。隨 研究的不斷深入，競爭力的內涵不斷擴大，競爭力研究的對象層次不斷增多，研究的理論和方法也層出不窮。競爭力按其競爭的主體不同，可以分為企業競爭力、產業競爭力、區域競爭力、國際競爭力。國際競爭力是一國競爭力的最高層次，企業競爭力是國家競爭力最重要的基礎，產業競爭力是國際競爭力的核心部分。目前，產業競爭力仍沒有一致的定義，角度不同，定義就不同。波特教授指出產業國際競爭力是在國際間自由貿易條件下（在排除了貿易壁壘因素的假設條件下），一國特定產業以其相對於其他國更高的生產力向國際市場提供符合消費者（包括生產性消費）或購買者需要的更多的產品，並持續獲得盈利的能力。1中國社科院金碚研究員指出，產業競爭力是一國的某一產業能夠比其他國家的同類產業更有效地向市場提供產品或者服務的綜合素質；其實質就是一國特定產業相對於國外競爭對手的比較生產力，從一國特定產業參與國際市場競爭的角度看，特定產業的國際競爭力就是該產業相對與外國競爭對手的比較生產力。2另外，張超認為產業競爭力是指屬於國家的同類產業之間效率、生產能力和創新能力的比較以及在國際間自由貿易條件下各國同類產業最終在產品市場上的競爭能力。3陳紅兒和陳剛認為產業競爭力是指在一國內部各區域之間的競爭中，特定區域的特定產業在國內市場上的表現或地位。這種表現或地位，通常是由該區域產業所具有的提供有效產品或服務的能力具體顯示出來。 4澳門博彩產業集群競爭力初探阮建中、李勝會 ** 前者為暨南大學區域經濟學博士研究生、澳門理工學院高級技術員，後者為經濟學博士、華南理工大學工商管理學院講師
澳門博彩產業集群競爭力初探澳門研究84第51期按照美國哈佛大學邁克爾‧波特（Michae l E .Porter，1998）的觀點，集群是指在某一特定區域下的一個特別領域，存在 一群相互關聯的公司、供應商，關聯產業和專業化的制度和協會。5一般來講，一個真正意義的產業集群至少包括以下三大特徵：一是產業相關性。產業集群內的企業和其他機構往往都與某一產業領域相關，這是產業集群形成的基礎。二是地域集中性。表現為特定領域中相關企業和相應支持機構的“紮堆”現象。這種產業地理集中能夠產生廣泛的集聚經濟效益。三是專業化分工與社會化協作。集群內各個企業立足自身資源，選擇產品生產價值鏈中最能發揮自身優勢的生產環節，大中小企業形成細密的分工協作網絡。產業集群一旦形成，便會帶來很多經濟、政治、社會、文化的作用和影響，主要包括集聚效應、共生效應、協同效應、區位效應、結構效應等。產業集群之所以引起人們的高的關注，是因為它使得產業和企業能夠具有較強的競爭力。這種競爭力主要表現在增長速度、市場佔有率和生產率等方面。據研究表明，在美國，那些具有特色的產業集群發展較好的地區，其經濟增長速度要高於其他地區。在意大利，產業集群內企業的經營狀況，一般要比集群以外的同類企業表現得更為良好。6顯然，產業集群擁有明顯的競爭優勢。這種競爭優勢主要體現在兩個方面：一方面，通過集群內企業的合作與競爭以及集群協同效應，可以獲得諸多經濟效率方面的競爭優勢，如生產成本優勢、基於品質基礎的產品產別化優勢、區域行銷優勢和市場競爭優勢等，另一方面，通過支撐機構和企業間的相互作用，可以形成一個區域創新系統，提升整個集群的創新能力。7對於這種集群優勢的來源，韋伯把它歸之為集聚經濟，馬歇爾強調外部經濟的重要性，克魯格曼認為是報酬遞增、運輸成本和需求交互作用的結果。波特運用“鑽石模型”強調要素稟賦優勢、需求條件、關聯與支援性產業以及企業戰略競爭等的重要性。二、研究方法影響產業競爭力的因素是十分複雜的，幾乎涉及經濟、社會領域的各個主要方面，而且，各種因素相互影響、相互滲透、密切交織，使競爭力成為綜合性極強的問題。所以，要完全準確地把握各種因素之間的因果關係，決不是容易的事情。但是，運用經濟學和統計學的方法，仍可以有效地剖析和分解各種因素，研究各因素之間的相關性和因果關係，並將他們進行量化比較，從而發現決定和影響各類工業品或各個產業競爭力的優勢和劣勢的因素及其相互關係。鑒於對產業競爭力影響因素認識的差異性，目前構建區域產業競爭力評價指標體系尚未形成統一的評價模型。國外研究中較具代表性的有世界經濟論壇（WEF）和瑞士洛桑國際管理發展學院（ IMD）的國家競爭力評價體系、荷蘭格林根大學建立的ICOP（Internat ional Comparisons of Output and Productiv i ty）工業競爭力評價方法和聯合國工業發展組織（UNIDO）建立的工業競爭力指數法。基於對影響區域產業競爭力因素的不同理解，國內學者也分別構造了不同的區域產業競爭力指標體系，一般採用德爾菲法、層次分析法（AHP）、模糊綜合評價法、因數分析法、主成分分析法和均方差法等進行綜合評價研究。（一）本文的指標體系本文在國內外評價競爭力指標體系的基礎上，根據建立指標體系的原則，結合澳門的客觀情況及博彩專營權開放後的博彩也發展狀況，制定了評估澳門博彩產業集群競爭力的指標體系。該指標體系主要從與產業集群競爭力相關的四要素中共選取30項指標進行研究，具體體現為生產要素稟賦子系統的8項指標，需求條件子系統的6項指標，相關產業和支援產業子系統的8項指標，企業戰略結構和政府管理、機遇子系統的8項指標。（表1）（二）評價指標的權數構建評價指標的權數是指在評價指標體系中每個指標的重要程度佔該指標群的比重。在多指標綜合評價中，因各指標在指標群中的重要性的不同。因此，不能等量齊觀，必須客觀的確定各指標的權數。權數值的確定準確與否直接影響綜合評價的結果，所以科學的確定指標權數在多指標綜合評價中具有舉足輕重的地位。最常用的確定評價權數的方法有：德爾菲法（專家打分法）和層次分析法。在本文的綜合評價中，多數指標都是與澳門博彩旅遊產業發展相關的重要指標。在徵求專家意見和
85《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4平日對社會生活切身瞭解的基礎上，經過慎重選擇後，將這些指標分為極端重要、強烈重要、明顯重要、比較重要、重要五大類，並分別記為5、4、3、2、1五個等級。根據產業競爭力系統中生產要素稟賦子系統、需求條件子系統、相關產業和支援產業子系統以及企業戰略結構和政府管理、機遇子系統及其包含的指標的重要程度，分別構建判斷矩陣如下：產業競爭力評價第一層次判斷矩陣為：產業競爭力評價第二層次判斷矩陣分別為：生產要素稟賦子系統：需求條件子系統：相關產業和支援產業子系統：企業戰略和政府、機遇子系統：根據判斷矩陣，計算得出生產要素稟賦子系統中極端重要、強烈重要、明顯重要、比較重要、重要五個等級的權數分別為：0.263 、 0.211 、 0.158 、表1 澳門博彩產業競爭力評價指標體系指標層次及主要指標 單位彩票及其他博彩活動就業人員數千人就業人員數 千人人均道路長度 米生產要 人均綠化區面積 平方米 / 人素稟賦 商業航機抵達班次 次數資本形成總額 百萬元綠化區佔土地面積的比例 %高等教育在校學生數佔總人口的比重%人均 GD P 千元旅客人均消費 元需求條件人均逗留天數 天每月工資收入中位數 千元旅客入境人數 千人消費物價指數（逆指標） –博彩總收益 百萬元酒店客房數 間旅行社數目 間相關產業 旅行社營業額 億元酒店業產值 億元批發零售業產值 億元餐廳及酒樓業產值 億元運輸、倉儲及通訊業產值 億元博彩從業人員高等教育%以上比重酒店業產值佔 G D P 比重 %企業戰略 批發零售業佔 G D P 比重 %結構、政府 餐廳及酒樓業佔 G D P 比重 %及機遇 運輸、倉儲及通訊業佔 G DP 比重%博彩產業的宣傳度 * –博彩專營權的開放情況 * –博彩業產值佔 G D P 比重 %註： 本指標體系參考了 WE F 和 I M D 以及國內部分學者的指標體系，並結合澳門實際情況整理而成。* 指標是根據澳門博彩產業發展情況設計的虛擬指標（用 0 和1 表示），即認為博彩專營權開放後為 1 ，開放前為 0；認為博彩業的宣傳度在 C E P A 生效後為 1 ，生效之前為 0 。產業集群競爭力
澳門博彩產業集群競爭力初探澳門研究86第51期0.105、0.053；經過計算得出 ，一致性檢驗通過，結果合理。需求條件子系統中極端重要、強烈重要、明顯重要、比較重要、重要五個等級的權數分別為：0 . 2 7 8 、 0 . 2 2 2 、 0 . 1 6 7 、0.111、0.056；經過計算得出 ，一致性檢驗通過，結果合理。相關產業和支持產業子系統中極端重要、強烈重要、明顯重要、比較重要、重要五個等級的權數分別為：0.217、0.174、0 . 1 3 0 、 0 . 0 8 7 、 0 . 0 4 3 ；經過計算得出，，一致性檢驗通過，結果合理。企業戰略結構和政府管理、機遇子系統中極端重要、強烈重要、明顯重要、比較重要、重要五個等級的權數分別為：0.227、0.182、0.136、0.091、0.045；經過計算得出， ，一致性檢驗通過，結果合理。（三）研究分析及結論本文主要是對澳門博彩產業的競爭力進行歷史的比較分析。根據澳門博彩業發展的歷史分析，在回歸之初，特區政府即致力於“加強博彩業監管機制，提高經營管理水平”，並制定了一系列的規章制度。2002年2月8日，特區博彩競投委員會將3張賭牌分別批予澳門博彩股份有限公司（簡稱“澳博”）、永利（澳門）度假村股份有限公司（簡稱“永表2 澳門博彩產業競爭力綜合評價原始數據指標名稱 單位 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006彩票及其他博彩活動就業人員數 千人 14.1 15.39 22.91 30.8 42.6就業人員數 千人 204.9 202.59 219.14 237.45 265.1人均道路長度 米 0.772 0.769 0.783 0.76 0.713人均綠化區面積 平方米 / 人 13.1 13.2 12.8 12.2 11.1商業航機抵達班次 次數 17,026 14,479 19,161 21,362 23,866資本形成總額 百萬元 5800.7 8981.9 13,422 24,768 39,330綠化區佔土地面積的比例 % 21.5 21.7 21.6 20.8 19.9高等教育在校學生數佔總人口的比重 % 2.71 3.05 3.02 3.29 3.4人均 GD P 千元 125.1 142.8 181.6 195.2 230.87旅客人均消費 元 1454 1518 1633 1523 1610人均逗留天數 天 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1每月工資收入中位數 千元 4672 4800 5170 5770 6701旅客入境人數 千人 11,531 11,887 16,672 18,711 21,998消費物價指數（逆指標） – 94.94 93.46 98.77 103.11 108.42博彩總收益 百萬元 22,843 30,315 43,511 47,134 57,521酒店客房數 間 8954 9185 9168 10,832 12,978旅行社數目 間 116 122 130 138 145旅行社營業額 億元 14.86 13.56 18.63 20.71 24.07酒店業產值 億元 10.22 9.72 14.13 16.53 17.45批發零售業產值 億元 25.51 29.4 38.6 43.4 54.55餐廳及酒樓業產值 億元 19.47 19.85 27.45 28.55 32.01運輸、倉儲及通訊業產值 億元 29.76 26.82 31.1 34.05 37.94博彩從業人員高等教育以上比重 % 5.5 5.89 7.51 10.36 9.2酒店業產值佔 G D P 比重 % 2.32 1.93 2.08 1.99 1.92批發零售業佔 G D P 比重 % 5.79 5.83 6.22 5.89 6餐廳及酒樓業佔 G D P 比重 % 4.42 3.94 4.43 3.92 3.52運輸、倉儲及通訊業佔 G D P 比重 % 6.76 5.31 5.01 4.69 4.17博彩產業的宣傳度 * – 0 0 1 1 1博彩專營權的開放情況 * – 0 1 1 1 1博彩業產值佔 G D P 比重 % 31.94 36.64 39.13 34.93 33.36註：表中資料均來自澳門統計暨普查局（h t tp : / / ww w . d se c . g ov . m o /c _ i n de x . h tm l），部分資料由作者根據原始資料計算得出。* 資料用虛擬變數賦值法得到
CEPA協議框架下對知識產權地域性突破的探討澳門研究96第51期一、問題的提出隨 CEPA協議的實施，內地與香港澳門之間的經濟交流進入一個高速發展的時期，而內地與港澳之間的知識產權糾紛及法律衝突也凸現出來。筆者曾接觸到其中的一些案例，其中比較典型的有澳門某企業與內地某知名煙草企業之間的商標糾紛案：澳門某捲煙廠有限公司於2005年5月6日，向澳門特別行政區政府之經濟局提出“某煙”商標註冊之申請，並於2005年11月9日獲准註冊，有效期至2012年11月9日。且其註冊的“X煙”商標與江蘇某捲煙廠的“X煙”商標文字圖形組合幾乎完全相同。澳門某捲煙廠有限公司已生產並銷售“X煙”牌捲煙，於香港、澳門市場銷售。江蘇某捲煙廠的“X煙”商標為中國大陸註冊商標，在澳門未註冊。江蘇某捲煙廠發現該情況後立即委託律師在澳門提起撤銷澳門某捲煙廠有限公司在澳門的註冊商標之訴。在受委託的律師進行調查取證的階段，律師發現了一個驚人的事實，該澳門捲煙廠有限公司除了在澳門註冊了涉案商標之外，還在澳門註冊了“紅X山”、“XX貓”等內地香煙品牌。而澳門的一些註冊商標也在內地有被搶註的情況，如到澳門的遊客，特別是女性遊客，一般都會到澳門的“莎莎”買化妝品，該商標的品牌價值不菲，隨 CEPA 協議的實施，澳門“莎莎”曾計劃到上海開店，但經過前期調查，馬上打消了這個念頭，因為“莎莎”已經在上海被註冊了。這種情況，在澳門與內地之間存在，在內地與香港之間也同樣存在；在商標領域大量存在，在版權及專利領域同樣會存在。依據目前的事實，從法律上來看，澳門某捲煙廠有限公司系根據澳門有關法律規定申請並成功註冊了“X煙”商標。而根據澳門《工業產權法律制度》第47、199、229條關於商標註冊之無效的規定，並無充足的法律依據針對澳門某捲煙廠有限公司之“X煙”商標無效之訴。這種對於原告的法律困境，在專利與著作權跨境糾紛中，也或多或少地存在，而這種普遍存在的問題，肯定會在三地的經濟交往中構成自由貿易與投資貿易便利化的絆腳石，與CEPA協定實施的目標不相和諧。而解決這個難題，筆者認為應該從知識產權的基本理論入手，在CEPA協議框架下在一定程度上突破知識產權的地域性。1知識產權的地域性（Ter r i t or ia l i t y of in te l lec tua lproper ty）是最近在知識產權基本理論方面熱議的一個話題。地域性和域外效力從來就是充滿模糊性的術語，如何準確理解其含義對於知識產權國際保護制度的確立和完善至關重要。知識產權地域性不等同於嚴格屬地主義。為了避免混淆，應該將其準確界定為一國授予的知識產權原則上僅在本國地域內有效，知識產權的效力只限於本國境內是知識產權的法律特徵之一。2對有形財產權的保護，原則上沒有地域性的限制。除簽有國際公約或雙邊互惠協定或實踐中實行對等保護原則的以外，知識產權沒有域外效力，其他國家對這種權利沒有保護的義務，任何人均可在自己的國家內自由使用該知識產權，無需取得權利人的同意，也不必向權利人支付報酬。20世紀下半葉，知識產權的嚴格地域性開始有CEPA 協議框架下對知識產權地域性突破的探討易在成 ** 澳門科技大學法學院助理教授
99《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4權的立法保護問題。根據這一原則，條約的規定必須借助各國國內法付諸實施，除了要達到公約所確立的最低保護程度外，並不強求各國立法具體內容的一致性。獨立保護原則承認的是各國具體的政治經濟文化的差異所導致的在知識產權立法上的差異性，並不等同於知識產權地域性，因為公約並沒有規定各國知識產權法產生的法律效力僅及於該法的地域效力範圍之內。另外，知識專利權客體的無形性導致規範其法律關係的困難性。地域性與時間性則在一定程度上可以解決這個問題，其實一定程度上，特別是對知識產權發展水平大致相同的國家，是從法律的經濟分析來解決知識產權無形性的問題。在知識產權突破地域性產生法律衝突時，因為與外國連結的因素過多，可能會牽涉到繁雜的法律體系辨別問題，解決法律衝突的問題，這將導致佔用大量的人力和花費大量的時間。但是，並不是所有的知識產權法律衝突都是繁雜而無法處理的，可能發生的情形並不代表現實中必然會發生，同時，如果基於法律環境的原因將減低立法和司法成本作為一種價值目標加以追求是可以理解的話，當具備一定的條件後，公平正義的價值目標取而代之則是順理成章的事情。再次，在國際交往日趨頻繁的今天，平等主權國家之間的協作備受關注。經濟全球化背景下的世界貿易組織的多邊貿易體系的建立上宣告了共同利益體的形成，而符合世界貿易組織基本原則的區域經濟合作也如火如荼。“具體表現形式是每個國家都推崇多邊制度的優越性，但同時努力和其他國家建立區域性經貿安排，目的就是利用多邊貿易制度的例外規定，在小部分國家間實現更自由、更開放的貿易制度。”10在這些區域性的經濟組織中，無論是關稅同盟，還是共同市場，都對知識產權區域保護的問題進行了規定，如歐洲聯盟先後頒佈了一系列有關知識產權的指令和條例，北美自由貿易區在《北美自由貿易協定》第17章專章規定了對知識產權的協調保護，東南亞聯盟簽定了知識產權合作框架協議等。這些規定都在一定程度上突破了傳統的知識產權的地域性，在區域內不同程度上對知識產權進行區域保護。所以，在知識產權方面的制度設計是一個國家（或地區）理性選擇的結果，也是一國（或地區）行使立法權的表現，與此同時，任何一個國家（或地區）的制度安排在符合本國（或本地區）自身利益的情況下，還必須兼顧其他國家（或地區）的利益。在一個相互交往日益加深的國際社會，國家間（地區間）的合作和互動又成為每一個國家（或地區）生存和發展的必要條件。如果在基本的利益方面背離國際社會，就意味 被國際社會所拋棄。當然，即使是出於國際協作的需要，仍應該在地域性的突破之前加上適時適當幾個字。這意味 對地域性的突破仍然有範圍的限制，時機的選擇仍然由各國（地區）自己把握。三、 C E PA 協議框架下突破知識產權地域性的制度構建CEPA協定自2003年簽署至今已經走過5個年頭了，正如前文所述，CEPA協定中沒有明確規定區域內知識產權保護制度的不足已經在實踐中顯現出許多問題，在CEPA協議的框架下適時適當突破知識產權的地域性具有必要性和可行性。其實在CEPA協議的框架下，內地與港澳之間已經開始了一些區域內知識產權保護的工作。粵港兩地於2003年8月第6次粵港合作聯席會議後成立“粵港保護知識產權合作專責小組”，旨在加強粵港兩地在知識產權不同範疇的交流和合作，包括推廣和教育、培訓、執法以及資訊發佈等方面。粵方成員包括廣東省知識產權局、廣東省公安廳、廣東省對外貿易經濟合作廳、廣東省工商行政管理局、廣東省版權局，以及海關總署廣東分署的官員，廣東省知識產權局局長為小組的粵方組長；港方成員包括香港特區知識產權署、商務及經濟發展局，以及香港海關的官員，香港特區知識產權署署長為小組的港方組長。粵港保護知識產權合作自2003年開展後，多項合作項目已順利完成或持續發展，並成功使粵港兩地相關的知識產權部門建立更緊密的夥伴關係，以及加深企業、公眾人士、知識產權擁有人在粵港兩地知識產權領域的認識。11在珠三角地區投資的企業亦日漸意識到知識產權管理及保護，對這個地區發展成一個國際性經濟體系的重要性。為協助這些企業掌握區內知識產權保護制度的基本情況，廣東省、香港特區及澳門特區多個政府部門，包括廣東省知識產權局、廣東省工商行政管理局、廣東省版權局、香港知識產權署、及澳門經濟局知識產權廳特別製作了
澳門建築產業市場競爭現狀探討澳門研究108第51期一、澳門建築產業市場近況當2008年的金融海嘯的餘波從美國波及經濟增長處高峰期的澳門時，在美國上市的金沙集團博彩業股票從148美元下跌至9美元，澳門的“金光大道”宣佈馬上停工，數以萬計的外地僱員被遣返原居地。當大家關心工人的困境，有誰清楚博彩業上億的工程，澳門建築商及工人佔多少份額呢？從政府、商會的近期資料數據，建造業訪談的資料以及政府公佈資料顯示，建築商（企業）由2001年的324個增長至2006年的540個，增長了約1.6倍（圖1）。據統計，因金融海嘯而叫停工程受影響的外資建築商和工人，因這次海嘯而受影響的建築工人估計有11,000名建築工人，包括2000名本地工人、4000名香港工人及5000名內地工人，受影響的香港工人及國內工人因遣散而需返回原居地，當傳媒公佈這個數字的時候澳門社會才驚訝地發現原來已有這麼多的外地建築公司及工人靜悄悄地進入了澳門的建築市場。這真是一個美麗的誤會，之前大家以為澳門的大型工程中標者一定是澳門本地傳統建築商為主，理論上當澳門的經濟飛躍上升的時候，本地傳統建築商理應佔盡了天時地利人和之便，應當在這個新環境的市場上有很強大的競爭優勢，為甚麼會有目前這個現象呢？由於澳門是一個自由市場，政府在回歸前後都不能用法規來限制外來競爭者進入市場，但回歸前從未有這種現象發生，為何回歸後才有呢？作為高度自治、“澳人治澳”的社會，我們有必要關心澳門社會及經濟的方方面面問題，所以本文認為有必要對此作出探討。導致市場大量新加入者競爭情況的產生和改變的因素很多，我們對這個競爭現象的產生和改變會先從競爭者在何種誘因及情況下才會進入市場開始，作出探討分析。圖1 2001–2006年建築商總數資料來源：澳門土地工務運輸局二、市場新競爭者加入的主要因素澳門特區的建築市場在回歸前的規模很少，但回歸後由於以旅遊博彩為龍頭產業帶動其它產業的政策的成功，使澳門的經濟呈飛躍式加速發展。市場規模大大地擴展。基於澳門的微型經濟體系和回歸這個史無前例的特殊政治背景，新環境是有其獨特的特色，很多問題是沒有從前的經驗可以參考和推論的。故本文將以澳門特區的微型經濟體系的特有環境下引用波特（Michae l E. Por te r）的《競爭戰略》Compet i t ive St rategy Techniques for Analyz ing Indus-tr ies and Compet itors作為分析工具。何謂競爭力？競爭力的定義很多，一般簡單的定義為在自由競爭條件下，一個個體或經濟實體競爭制勝的能力或盈利的能力……等多個不同的定義。可是波特卻認為企澳門建築產業市場競爭現狀探討麥瑞權 ** 華中科技大學管理科學與工程博士研究生
“在地養老”對澳門的啟示澳門研究116第51期最近，政府下調養老金領取年齡和積極推行雙層式社會保障制度1，顯示長者相關福利制度及其退休生活保障日漸受到社會重視。澳門近年已投放不少資源於擴展長者服務及其研究2，這些都對完善澳門長者服務起重要的指導作用。而近期的“城規概念”諮詢文件中亦帶出人口結構與城規概念之間的重要關係，可是，無論“城規概念”或本地研究中，“在地養老”（ag ing in p lace）的概念較少被提及，應知道要有效活化“澳門文化”，並不僅限於保存個別建築物，而更需確保澳門的傳統價值觀及工藝可以代代相傳。在活化歷史文化的過程中，長者無疑扮演十分重要的角色，因此，完善“在地養老”政策與未來的城市發展是密不可分。一、“在地養老”的概念“在地養老”是老人服務的一個重要概念以及政策目標，意思是賦予長者在“家”生活的能力，這個“家”（homel ike sett ings）是指能夠使人們活得舒適、活得自信的居住環境，通常指人們的常居地或者一些熟悉的社區環境，“在地養老”是透過家庭、社會及政府的共同合作，使退休人士或長者不用離開常居地到別的地方生活，甚至接受護理服務。3此概念的提出是由於異地退休（relocat ion）或長居於老人院時會導致他們失去其原有社會網絡，因而必須重新建立社交圈子及適應新的生活環境，在這個過程中，退休人士或長者便會面對各種心理問題（re locat ion stress syndrome），包括壓力、孤獨感、心理功能退化，以及失去原有社交圈子而感到失落等，而且異地退休還可能為低收入人士帶來財政負擔。4因此，減少老人退休後移居異地的情況，盡量支援長者在常居地獨立生活，滿足他們的護理及心理需要（例如選擇權、自尊心和自主性）和避免過早院舍化（pre-mature ins t i tu t ional izat ion）等都是“在地養老”背後的理念。 5推行“在地養老”涉及到不少健康相關的安全考慮（health-related safety），例如，如何減低家居環境的潛在風險（如跌倒），社會與政府機構、以致企業間如何協調，提供針對長者需要的服務以幫助長者獨立生活，以及如何加強非正式照護服務者（如家人、朋友和家傭）在護理服務中的角色等。確保健康相關的安全有助減少不必要的護理服務，和過早院舍化帶來的成本，以及改善長者獨立生活的能力。6二、“在地養老”值得澳門政府探討現在有不少澳門居民及議員都覺得長者政策及服務發展正處於瓶頸情況，根據社工局的資料，現時高度的老人照護服務一般由安老院舍、耆康中心等機構提供7，儘管政府已在這方面撥出不少資源，但一般市民及議員仍覺得長者服務面對不少問題，例如老人入住安老院的輪候時間過長8，床位設施不足9、以及收費昂貴或不合理。10另一方面，對於政府在社區內興建安老院，部分居民卻因為安老院衛生問題而持反對意見。11對此，政府應該增加安老院舍的供應，還是採取其他方法應付日漸上升的需求，是一個值得探討的問題。現時政府在策劃長者政策時，較多提及是興建安“在地養老”對澳門的 示區耀榮、陳建新 ** 前者為澳門大學社會科學及人文學院公共行政碩士研究生，後者為澳門大學社會科學及人文學院政府與行政學系助理教授
117《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4老院舍及跨區養老，不過需要留意的是居住在老人院舍長者較居住在社區的長者更容易患上抑鬱症，原因是家人與其相處的時間較少12，而專業的長期照護服務亦容易使長者覺得自己在生活上過分依賴別人，以致產生一種挫敗的感覺。13 故近年不少研究都建議在提供照護服務時，應尊重病人本身的選擇權、維護長者的自尊心、以及確保長者在生活上的自主性，因此如何把這些重要的醫護原則融入社區長者服務政策，值得予以重視。而跨區養老方法亦帶出不少問題，例如增加鄰近地區的社會負擔及導致相關資源緊張情況等14，甚至澳門與鄰近地區沒有跨境醫服務互換安排，不難想像，當異地養老的長者需要長期護理服務，這些長者很有可能回流澳門，所以異地養老便不應視為長遠解決澳門老化問題（特別是長期照護服務）的方法。鑒於上述問題，“在地養老”可說極之值得政府研究。本文將會介紹外地在這方面的發展情況，特別是傳統“安老院式”服務以外的其他優化“在地養老”政策的方法，冀能為澳門為有關方面的發展提供一點參考，和帶出社會對議題的注意及討論。以下部分將會先行介紹三種有助推行“在地養老”政策的社區護理模式及概念──支援性居處、風險與照護管理和獨立性居處。三、支援性居處模式近年，美國的支援性居處的行業發展迅速，其中主要的原因是人口老化以及長者對自主地生活的渴求上升，支援性居處機構正是針對這些變化而出現的15，是特意為那些在日常生活中需要協助但不需要全天候式專業護理服務的長者服務而設。在美國，這些機構已發展成不同的服務模式以應付住客的各種需要16，從日常起居活動到物理治療等方面都包括。17支援性居處機構沒有單一的標準，根據美國支援性居處協會，它可以被概括為一套住宅與個人化服務的特別組合，設計給需要日常生活幫助的人士，住客的家人、朋友以致鄰居亦會提供一定的服務。18支援性居處背後的理念與“在地養老”相近，它主張“消費者導向”，重視住客的選擇權，使住客對居住環境有較大的控制能力，協助住客在“家”的環境內接受服務，從而維護他們的自尊心和自主性。 19 其實“消費者導向”於長者服務佔有重要地位，例如香港政府現在積極研究“現金券制度”於長者服務的可行性，美國方面更前瞻性地推擴“現金卷與諮詢服務”，而這些制度都是利用“消費者導向”去優化長者服務。由於支援性居處的服務主要針對一些非專業護理服務或半專業護理服務的人士，故這些機構的入住、逗留及離開的要求一般比較彈性，但同時亦有法規禁止支援性居處機構接收一些只能接受護老院護理的長者，例如那些由於心理或生理上有嚴重缺陷，而需要接受24小時專業護理的長者。20有研究指出這種彈性化的入住規定有助推行“在地養老”的政策。21另一個推行支援性居處的重要措施是把護理工作下放給受過適當培訓的非專業照護者執行，以減低機構成本和提升效益，從而降低服務成本。22而且非正式護理員可提供正式護理員不能提供的情感上的支援23，他們更可作為醫生與長者之間的傳譯員，幫助長者表達意願，幫助一些專業醫護人士去監察被照顧者生理及心理狀況。24其實香港亦有類似的職位，由經護士培訓的照顧員擔任，提供各類長者照護服務。支援性居處是盡量協助人們獨立地生活，即使生理需求改變亦不用過早院舍化，其模式較為彈性，因此發展時應採取多元化的模式，而非一體適用（one s ize f i ts a l l）的模式25，應按服務類型發出不同的牌照以供住客參考，以應付不同長者或住客在不同年齡階段的需要。例如在美國舊金山，支援性居處機構有不同類型，有容納十數人的住宅，亦有可容納幾百人的大型場所，可提供從獨立起居到專業服務的不同選擇。26四、風險與照護管理由於支援性居處機構是以彈性規章和非正式照護者為基礎運作，相對於安老院舍，它所提供的專業服務較少，而另一方面支援性居處的前提條件是允許住客參與服務的制定，因此，如何平衡住客的選擇與服務的質量、做好風險管理工作是支援性居處機構的重要挑戰。27對此，協商風險協議（negot iated risk agreement）是其中一個平衡風險與住客選擇的方法。28其內容包括對住客潛在風險的理解，住客的決定及其負面影
“在地養老”對澳門的啟示澳門研究118第51期響，以及機構對住客選擇的回應和擬定可行方案。29作為照護人員與住客之間的溝通工具，其目的是討論如何妥善管理風險，合理地允許病人決定接受某程度的風險。30當一個住客想拒絕接受某種服務時，協商風險就要進行，機構管理層和住客家人就居住的選擇可能產生的風險作充份討論是必要的，從另一方面看，了解住客的情況、及時回應他們的需要對減低風險也是不可或缺。31因此，在不影響其他住客的情況下，對於住客的意願，提供照護服務的機構應予以重視。不過，制定協商風險協議的先決條件是對住客的能力作出正確評估32，例如住客在心理（如精神狀態）或生理上（語言能力）能否作醫療決定和為自己的決定負責？故應定期對住客的能力進行評估，以確保資料的正確性。33另一種風險管理的方法是護理管理（ c a r emanagement），包括護理計劃和護理風險評估，支持照護管理的人認為其比協商風險協議更好地平衡住客的選擇權和風險，有助防止機構利用協商風險協議來逃避護理服務上的過失和責任。34照護管理同樣考慮到住客的意願因素，按住客的評估結果制定護理目標和服務類型再與他們協調如何達成這些目標35，對加強相互溝通和護理服務的評核起重要作用。36五、獨立性居處模式獨立性居處的提出是針對一些殘障或行動不便的人士，他們對護理服務需求較少，只需有適當的輔助設備就能夠獨立地生活。獨立性居處並不是指這類人士不需任何人的幫助或孤獨生活，而是指能夠按自己的方式生活，正如健全人士有權選擇自己的生活方式一樣。37此模式背後的理念認為殘障人士較清楚自己的需要，所以能規劃較好的獨立生活方式。38與支援性居處相似，其目的是使殘障人士能夠表達自己的意見，對自己的生活有選擇和控制能力，避免因為其他人替他們做生活上的決定而產生社會排擠的情況（如對社會感到疏離）。 39安老院、支援性居處和獨立性居處模式可按照其護理服務及住客的選擇程度區分，支援性居處可被視為安老院與獨立性居處之間的橋樑40，如下圖：圖1 居處方式與選擇及護理之程度安老院 支援性居處 獨立性居處最少的選擇 中等 最多的選擇最多的護理 最少的護理外地亦推行不少有助獨立性居處的政策，例如在英國，政府將建立獨立性居處的目的定為能讓殘障人士對居住、交通、健康、就業、教育以致家庭和社區生活有較大的參與權利；在交通方面，鼓勵交通供應者對那些無法使用一般運輸工具的人士提供另類選擇或設備，加強他們在社區內的活動能力；在健康方面，增加他們接受醫療護理服務的機會、資訊及選擇；在居住及教育方面，政府亦相應增加殘障人士的權利、選擇及資助。41在美國，亦有法律如《美國人殘障法案》保障殘障人居住與接受交通運輸的權利。六、外地相關經驗支援性居處模式比較重視非正式護員的角色，如何善用這些社區的人力資源可參考台灣的經驗。在台灣一些社會機構會利用非正式護理者為長者提供社區照護服務，在長者家裏安裝通訊設備並提供24小時連線服務，服務類型包括心靈關懷的服務，與長者聊天解悶，提供資訊問安，以致各種家居照護服務如送餐、家居清潔。有條件的長者更可加入服務行列，幫助其他長者，這種社區互助機制比專業醫護人員單方面提供服務更能促進社會互動和及時回應長者生活的各種身心需要，台灣的經驗充分突顯出非正式護理者在社區照護服務重要性。42和諧睦鄰關係是華人社會的重要社會資本，對發展以非正式照顧員和志願者為主導的社區照護模式有重要的推動作用。而獨立性居處模式就 重環境配套方面，希望能夠為長者構建合適的環境，以維持他們的獨立生活能力。這種模式特別強調在居住環境作出改變，其中一個方法是興建新式的住宅，例如在新加坡，支援性居處住宅是專為長者而建造，環境特徵以方便長者為主，住宅內亦有不少長者互相交流的公共空間43，此類建築強調以群體生活為主的環境設置。不過，限於資金或技術問題，有些地區則採取了家居
119《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4改造（home modi f ica t ion）的方法，其較興建新式的住宅更為可行和實際。44家居改造的目的是構建一個方便長者（elderly-f r iendly）的環境，例如在家內設置扶手、浴室內安置欄杆防止跌倒、移走浴缸，安裝防滑地板等，亦可配合一些科技如聲控電燈，電動開門設備。45在香港，具方便長者特徵的住宅近年相繼推出，單位設有特別配套、裝置和護理設施，其他配套設施則包括餐廳、診所、圖書館46，可是這些單位的對象主要是生活較富裕的長者。而對已建的房屋，政府亦為長者住戶進行家居改造，例如，將大門的門檻改為斜道、改良浴室間隔、花灑、淋浴設施、改良座廁、以及改良電掣開關按鈕位置等47，甚至容許長者調遷於有升降機到達的樓層。這些方便長者的居住環境對推動“在地養老”政策有重要作用。七、澳門在地養老的問題在澳門現時除了安老院舍提供長者提供服務外，還有一些老人中心提供類似支援性居處的服務如日常起居協助、個人照顧、以及心理輔導等。48根據房屋局資料，政府建造了二座長者單位住宅，大廈內設有老人中心，單位內亦設置平安鐘以方便長者求助。49相對鄰近地區來說，澳門的“在地養老”政策仍在初步階段，有很多的方面未能配合“在地養老”的發展，譬如：社會對長者社區照護的認知不一，部分居民因對安老院的誤解（特別是衛生問題），而反對政府在社區建安老院；那些老人中心通常有服務時間限制，令有需要的長者在服務時間外較難尋求協助；院舍單位數目不多，同時院舍服務很難擴展到舊城區，但家居改造的方法並未能有效推廣50；而在交通方面，保障殘障人士權利的《復康綱要法》亦未能有效落實。51第二，正如上文指出現時澳門安老院供不應求，本澳目前約有2800位長者表示需要各式長期照顧，但私營及政府資助的安老院舍只可提供1000多個宿位52，按未來老年人口比例增長，令不少澳門居民覺得澳門政府極需大量興建院舍應付需求。但是現時護理機構缺乏對輪候的長者作出生理及身理上的評估53，同時一般澳門居民對長期照顧服務認識只有院舍服務。應該留意的是長者服務並不是二元化的（家居與院舍），而院舍服務於外地長者照顧服務更非主流服務，除了香港外，大多數先進地區住院舍的長者只佔整體長者人數約5%，所以如何促進“在地養老”發展非常值得政府考慮。第三，澳門仍未有詳細的長者服務及政策規劃，例如一些學者指出澳門老人心理和精神服務發展不足；老人護理機構的服務缺乏計劃和協調，管理並不完善；缺乏對護理人員的培訓，影響服務質量等。54近年澳門政府積極進行多方面規劃，頗為全面，過程中亦樂於全面諮詢社會各界，因此筆者們期望政府在規劃過程中考慮上述因素。其實近年政府亦積極投放資源強化長者服務（特別復康及護理方面），加上澳門一向重視街坊鄰里關係，如果在城市規劃中作出恰當配合，不難令澳門成為“在地養老”的典範。八、建議為了完善“在地養老”政策，筆者提出以下建議：第一，引入合適的評估工具如MDS/RAI，評估長者的體能缺損、健康狀況、服務使用等，作分配資源之依據。由於輪候安老院的人數並不能真實反映長者的實際需求，所以，先對輪候長者進行評估，再對興建甚麼類型的照護機構或及其提供的服務作決定，有助合理分配醫療資源。近年香港亦引入此工具，但沒有充分利用，例如分類準則沒有標準化，只用於服務分流，而沒有利用作服務群組分類、照護計劃、和服務品質指標等。第二，鼓勵社會團體發展支援性居處機構，再參考鄰近地區經驗，發展適合澳門本身“在地養老”模式，同時促進類似台灣利用社區人力資源提供24小時服務的社會企業的發展，以應付不同長者的個人化需要。發展這類照護機構同時可以避免安老院所產生的“標籤”效應，即安老院的長者就視為社區健康的障礙，另一方面也可推廣積極老化（a c t i v eaging）的概念。第三，鼓勵老人服務機構尊重長者的選擇權、自尊心和自主性，並把這些重要的醫護原則通過協商風險協議或護理計劃融入他們的服務中。同時亦應增強相關配套，例如增加對非正規護理者及非專業護理者的培訓，包括基本醫護知識、溝通技巧以及觀察長者的需要等55，從而加強對長者、非正式照護
“在地養老”對澳門的啟示澳門研究120第51期者情感上的支援，互補專業護理的不足之處。值得注意的是，非專業照護者多是中年人士，因他們需要照顧其體弱親人，令他們亦能掌握不少照顧長者的經驗。發展社區照護模式不但可以增加中年人士的就業機會，而且可促進社區服務的互動。第四，澳門正在規劃未來城市發展方向，在規劃中涉及發展新城區，同時亦會對舊城區進行更新、改造的工作。鑒於支援性居處對推行“在地養老”政策的重要性，筆者建議在新區的規劃中預留一定空間作興建支援性住宅及提供相關服務的社會機構之用，大廈亦不應只建造家庭單位或高尚住宅，應該按比例建造適合群體生活的單位，以配合支援性居處的發展、平衡各區的人口結構及加強不同年齡層的文化交流；在規劃中，政府亦應諮詢社會團體及市民及推廣社區照護模式的概念，為對未來這類住宅的需求作出評估，以防止房地產業的發展過單一化，導致未來房屋供應不能符合居民的住屋需要。美國的房地產業的下滑其中一個原因是現時的房屋不能配合老齡人口的生活需要，以致他們傾向出售現有房屋換取入住一些配有照護服務的住宅，結果房價大幅下跌56，美國的經驗澳門應引以為鑒。另外，在舊城區的改造中，政府亦應該引入家居改造的概念，在社區內構建方便長者的環境，協助有經濟困難而不能移居的長者過獨立性生活，加強他們在舊城區“在地養老”的能力。而在交通運輸上，亦應鼓勵供應者完善方便長者的設備，以加強他們在社區內的活動。第五，在城規諮詢中，學者們提出保護歷史文化，加強對歷史城區建築的保護工作，但卻忽略長者在歷史文化中扮演的角色。其實，長者是見證 澳門歷史的演變過程，每個長者背後的故事都是歷史文化的一個重要組成部分。長者的記憶是文化的寶庫，透過口述歷史的形式傳遞更能夠使年青人認識自己生活地方的文化，同時不少長者都能掌握極具價值傳統工藝，因此在活化歷史文化方面，長者扮演 不可或缺的角色。57政府把“在地養老”政策融入各項文化保育政策中，不但是為了保障長者的生活，而且是為了增加年青人與長者的交流，使人文文化得以薪火相傳。九、總結老人相關的照護服務是社會保障制度的重要領域。現時澳門老年人口比例為7%58，到2031年比例會上升至19%59，但相對鄰近地區如香港，澳門面對的人口老化壓力較少，因此政府應利用現時“人口機會窗口”60 的時期完善“在地養老”政策，為未來人口結構變化作好準備。本文介紹的兩類社區照護模式都是以長者、退休人士或有需要的人的權益為基礎，在社區照護服務和城市設施上應作出相應的配合，完善“在地養老”的政策。澳門正處於城市發展的十字路口，但現時城規諮詢對老年人口的需要及居住環境方面 墨不多，實應考慮文內有關完善“在地養老”政策的建議，藉此為長者構建合適的居住環境，維持長者在“家”生活的能力，這不僅有助政府落實“老有所養、老有所屬”的政策方針，也是促進社區互動、維護澳門文化的有效方法。（本文作者鳴謝齊銥教授在論文寫作過程中給予之指正及陳慧丹小姐在資料搜集時提供的幫助。）註釋：1 《議員贊同下調領養老金齡》，載於《澳門日報》，2008 年 7 月 12 日，第 A2 版；澳門政府新聞公佈，社會保障和養老保障體系重整諮詢方案， 2 0 0 7 年，載於 http://mfa.3forum.hk/viewthread.php?tid=516&extra=page%3D1 。2 澳門社會工作局網站， http://www.ias.gov.mo/web2/big5/index.htm 。3 Mitty, E. and Flores, S. “Aging in Place and Negotiated RiskAgreements,” Geriatric Nursing, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2008), pp. 94–101.4 Chapin , R. and Dobbs-Kepper, D., “Ag ing in Place in As-sisted Living: Philosophy Versus Policy,” The Gerontologist,Vol. 41, No. 1 (2001), pp. 43–50.5 Ibid.6 Lau, D. T., Scandrett , K. G., Jarzebowski, M., Ho lman, K.and Emanuel, L., “Health-Related Safety: A Framework toAddress Barriers to Aging in Place,” The Gerontologist, Vol.47, No. 6 (2007), pp. 830–837.7 同註 2 。8 《梁玉華︰善用社區的力量完善長者專業護理服務》，載於梁玉華立法會議員辦事處網站， h t t p : / / w w w .updmo.org/?mod=page&pid=1204096638 ， 2008 年。9 《議員質詢安老服務》，載於《澳門日報》， 2008 年5 月 25 日，第 B07 版。1 0《梁玉華︰議程前發言》，載於梁玉華立法會議員辦事處網站， h t t p : / / w w w . u p d m o . o r g / ? m o d = p a g e & p i d =1143701049 ， 2006 年。
121《澳門研究》第51期2009. 41 1《梁玉華︰冀政府協調解疑慮》，載於梁玉華立法會議員辦事處網站， h t t p : / / w w w . u p d m o . o r g / ? m o d =page&pid=1194834420 ， 2007 年。1 2 Gaugler, J. E., Leitsch, S. A, Zarit , S. H. and Pearlin, L. I. ,“Caregiver Involvement Following Institutionalization: Effectsof Preplacement Stress,” Research on Aging, Vol. 22 (2000),pp. 337–359.1 3 Pot, A. M., Deeg, D. J. H., Twisk, J. W. R., Beekman, A. T.F. and Zarit , S. H., “The Longitudinal Relat ionship Betweenthe Use of Long-Term Care and Depressive symptoms inOlder Adults,” The Gerontologist, Vol. 45, No.3 (2005), pp. 359–369; Devanand, D. P., Kim, M. K., Paykina, N. and SackeimH. A., “Adverse Life Events in Elderly Pat ients with MajorDepression or Dysthymic Disorder and in Healthy-ControlSubjects,” American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, Vol. 10(2002), pp. 265–274.1 4《澳門人欲北上養老珠海人卻不願變老》，載於《羊城晚報》網站， h t tp : / / news. i do i can .com.cn /ycwb /h tml /2007-08/30/content_665498.htm ， 2007 年 8 月 30 日。1 5 Magyera, A. R., “Aging in Place: Examining the Pract ice inWisconsin,” in Wisconsin Assisted Living Association website,ht tp: / /www.ewala .org/ industryinsider/aging_in_place.PDF,2002.1 6 Chapin , R. and Dobbs-Kepper, D., “Ag ing in Place in As-sisted Living: Philosophy Versus Policy,” The Gerontologist,Vol. 41, No. 1 (2001), pp. 43–50.1 7 C i cca r e l l o , M . J . a n d W e t z l e r , J . , “ A ss i s t e d L i v i n g i nUtah: A Brief Overview for Consumers, ” Utah Bar Journa l ,Vo l . 19, No . 1 (2006) , pp . 24–33.1 8 Just , G. , Deyoung, S. and van Dyk, R. , “Assisted Liv ing:Challenges for Nursing Practice,” Geriatric Nursing, Vol. 16,No. 4 (1995), pp. 165–168.1 9 Chapin , R. and Dobbs-Kepper, D., “Ag ing in Place in As-sisted Living: Philosophy Versus Policy,” The Gerontologist,Vol. 41, No. 1 (2001), pp. 43–50..2 0 “Pol icy Principles For Assisted Living,” in Center for Medi-care Advocacy website, http:/ /www.medicareadvocacy.org/SNF_AsstLivingPol icyPaper.htm, 2003.2 1 Chapin , R. and Dobbs-Kepper, D., “Ag ing in Place in As-sisted Living: Philosophy Versus Policy,” The Gerontologist,Vol. 41, No. 1 (2001), pp. 43–50.2 2 Just , G. , Deyoung, S. and van Dyk, R. , “Assisted Liv ing:Challenges for Nursing Practice,” Geriatric Nursing, Vol. 16,No. 4 (1995), pp. 165–168.2 3 Steverink, N., “When and Why Frail Elderly People Give upIndependent Living: The Netherlands as An Example,” Age-ing and Society, Vol. 21 (2001), pp. 45–69.2 4 陳章明、馬學嘉：《護老者在診症中的角色》，載於關兌 、陳章明、梁萬福：《護老者綜合服務論》，香港：天地圖書， 200 4 年。2 5 Jenkens, R. , O’Keef fe , J. , Carder , P. and Wi lson, K. B. ,“Study of Negotia ted Risk Agreements in Assisted Living:Final Report,” in Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planningand Evaluation website, http:/ /aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2006/negrisk.htm, 2006.2 6 “ A ss i s t e d L i v i n g a n d S u p p o r t i ve H o u s i n g , ” i n F a m i l yCaregiver All iance and Caregiver Resource Center website,h t t p : / / w w w . c a r e g i v e r . o r g / c a r e g i v e r / j s p / c o n t e n t / p d f s /fs_ct_assisted_living.pdf, 2001.2 7 Mitty, E. and Flores, S. “Aging in Place and Negotiated RiskAgreements,” Geriatric Nursing, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2008), pp. 94–101.2 8 I b i d .2 9 I b i d .3 0 Jenkens, R. , O’Keef fe , J. , Carder , P. and Wi lson, K. B. ,“Study of Negotia ted Risk Agreements in Assisted Living:Final Report,” in Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planningand Evaluation website, http:/ /aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2006/negrisk.htm, 2006.3 1 Petersen, S. , “Develop ing Risk-Management Protoco ls inAssisted Living: Assisted Living has its Own Litigation Trapsfor the Unwary,” in Goliath website, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-5070094/Developing-risk-management-proto-cols- in.html, 2005.3 2 Mitty, E. and Flores, S., “Aging in Place and Negotiated RiskAgreements,” Geriatric Nursing, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2008), pp. 94–101.3 3 Just , G. , Deyoung, S. and van Dyk, R. , “Assisted Liv ing:Challenges for Nursing Practice,” Geriatric Nursing, Vol. 16,No. 4 (1995), pp. 165–168.3 4 Car lson, E. M., “Protect ing Rights or Waiving Them? Why‘Negotiated Risk’Should Be Removed from Assisted Liv-ing Law,” Journal of Health Care Law & Policy, Vol. 10 (2007),pp. 287–337.3 5 Delaney, S., Garavan, H., McGee, H. and Tynan, A., “Careand Case Management for Older People in Ireland: An Outlineof Current Sta tus and a best Pract ice Model for ServiceDevelopment,” Ireland: National Council on Ageing and OlderPeople Report, No. 66 (2001).3 6 Worden, A. and Challis, D., “Care Planning Systems in CareHomes for Older People, ” Qual i ty in Ageing , Vol. 9, No. 2(2008), pp. 28–38.3 7 “A Cross-government Strategy about Independent Living forDisabled People,” Office for Disabi l i ty Issues , in the Officefor Disabi l i ty website, http:/ /www.off icefordisabi l i ty.gov.uk/working/independentl ivingstrategy.asp, 2006.3 8 “Independent Living,” in Wikipedia website, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_living.3 9 “A Cross-government Strategy about Independent Living forDisabled People,” Office for Disabi l i ty Issues , in the Officefor Disabi l i ty website, http:/ /www.off icefordisabi l i ty.gov.uk/working/independentl ivingstrategy.asp, 2006.4 0 “Assisted Living,” in Wikipedia website, http:/ /en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assisted_l iving.4 1 “A Cross-government Strategy about Independent Living forDisabled People,” Office for Disabi l i ty Issues , in the Officefor Disabi l i ty website, http:/ /www.off icefordisabi l i ty.gov.uk/working/independentl ivingstrategy.asp, 2006.4 2 台灣其中一個為長者服務的社會機構──長青連線，http :/ /www.evercare.com.tw/ tw/showroom.html 。4 3 Addae-Dapaah, K. and Wong, J. K. M. , “Housing and theElderly in Singapore-Financial and Quality of Life Implicationso f Age i ng i n P l ace , ” Jo u rna l o f Hou s ing and the Bu i l tEnvironment, Vol. 16 (2001), pp. 153–178.4 4 Ibid.4 5 Kofsky, B., “Aging in Place through Home Modifications,” inHousing and Assistive Technology website, http://www.hatfl.com/Aging_In_Place_home_modifications.pdf, 2005.
“在地養老”對澳門的啟示澳門研究122第51期4 6《香港今年將完成所有公屋的出入無障礙改造》，載於新華網網站， http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/house/2007-02/19/content_5754708.htm ，2007 年 02 月 19 日。4 7《長者房屋》，載於香港安老事務委員會網站， http :/ /www.elderlycommission.gov.hk/cn_txt/related_sites/index1.html#cso ， 2007 年。4 8 同註 2 。4 9 澳門房屋局網站， h t t p : / / w w w . i h m . g o v . m o / ch i / m e d i a /unit_elderly_other.php 。5 0《澳門特別行政區長者長期照顧服務需求評估研究報告》，載於澳門鏡湖護理學院網站， h t t p : / / w w w . i a s .gov.mo/web2/big5/rept/elderly2006/index.htm ， 2006 年。5 1《澳門特別行政區政府復康服務的供給體系與長遠策略研究報告》，載於社會工作局網站， ht tp:/ /www.ias.gov.mo/web2/big5/rept/rehab_research_2005/index.htm ，2005 年。5 2 同註 9 。5 3 同註 50 。5 4 Lin W., “Reviewing Current Stud ies of Long- term Care inChinese Communities and the Impl ications for Macau AgingSociety,” Journal of Macau Studies, Vol. 37 (2006), pp. 104–110.5 5 同註 24 。5 6 Myers, D., Ryu, S., “Aging Baby Boomers and the Genera-tional Housing Bubble: Foresight and the Mitigation of an EpicTransition,” Journal of the American Planning Associat ion ,Vol. 7, No. 1 (2008), pp. 17–33.5 7 Olmedo, I. M., “Redefining Culture Through the Memories ofElderly Latinas,” Qual itative Inquiry, Vol. 5 (1999), pp. 353–376.5 8《澳門居住人口預測》，載於澳門統計暨普查局網站， http:/ /www.dsec.gov.mo/index.asp?src=/chinese/html/c_demgraphic.html 。5 9 同上註。6 0 人口負擔系數（兒童及老年人口的比例）小於或等於50% 稱為人口機會窗口期，這時期對經濟的發展較為有利。定義來自維基百科全書網站， h t t p : / / z h .wikipedia.org/ 。
123《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4家庭是社會組成的基本單元，大部分的人都是經過家庭的教養、成長，因此，家庭和我們的日常生活是息息相關的。傳統的華人社會對家庭的功能更為重視，社會學者劉兆佳，曾以功利家庭主義來分析華人家庭的取向，其指出華人社會一向以家庭利益作為行事、決策的重要考量，足見家庭在華人社會中，是扮演極為重要的角色。1澳門是一個是華人為主的社會，本地社會對家庭的功能也特別重視，從過去的殖民地政府到現在的特區政府，都設有特定的部門來處理家庭問題，而澳門的家庭服務也是歷史較長的社會服務。2澳門家庭服務發展的重要里程碑應是在1994年7月頒佈的《家庭政策綱要法》（第6/94 /M號法津）。上述的法規除了釐定家庭政策的目標，還明確指出行政當局有鼓勵成立家庭輔助中心、協助家庭解決困難、和透過與家庭及志願團體合作推展個人及家庭的福祉等責任。《家庭政策綱要法》也確定了社會工作制度在回應家庭問題上的補救性和預防性功能。 3雖然，澳門的家庭服務已有愈30年的歷史，但有關的服務能否真正有效回應社會的需要？特別是在服務手法上，有否配合服務使用者的需要及社會的變遷？本文將會運用家庭服務的兩個視覺，來檢視澳門現時的家庭服務，其分別是成人中心主義（adu l tcen t r i sm）及家庭中心（ f am i ly cen t re）兩個視覺，分析如何應用到澳門的家庭服務。一、成人中心主義對服務的影響成人中心主義是近年來備受社工界關注的一種觀點，其指出很多社工人員在推行實務工作時，時常不能拋棄自己作為成人的身份，用一種成人世界的視野來評估兒童的需要甚至造成對兒童的偏見4。成人中心主義是一種對兒童有偏見的傾向，此偏見的形成是由於對不同年齡人士有不同的印象而產生的，例如：老是認為兒童是少不更事、年少無知等等，成人世界對兒童期的人有很多不同的刻板印象，總是認為兒童是不可自決，極需要成人輔助的。造成此現象，還包括兒童和成人不論在語言、溝通模式及世界觀等等，均有極大的差異，也令成人認為兒童只是需要照顧；成人中心主義會視兒童為一未發展完成的階段，Petr指出成年人通常對兒童會有不同的成見，而主要的成見，及與成人的差異，可見於下表：表1 成人中心主義對兒童的偏見兒童 成人依賴 獨立不認識道德 道德自我 社會性沒有修養 有修養非理性 理性情緒不穩定 情緒穩定沒有生產力 生產力即時取向 未來取向Petr認為要抗擊成人中心主義在兒童社會服務中產生的影響，作為社會工作者當然要本身注意自己從“家庭中心為本”及“成人中心主義”反思──分析澳門兒童及家庭服務梁 賢、龐麗華 ** 前者為澳門理工學院社會工作課程講師，後者為澳門街坊會聯合總會非駐校輔導員
從“家庭中心為本”及“成人中心主義”反思澳門研究124第51期的實務工作，避免以成人中心主義來推動工作。在澳門的家庭服務中，社工人員固然是成年人，他們也可能難以擺脫成人中心主義的影響；筆者曾在一間家庭服務中心從事兼職工作，發覺中心的社工也有很強的成人中心主義；例如：那裡的社工人員，慣常理解中心的兒童都是貪玩的人，特別是處理家長投訴子女學業成績時，社工人員很多時都會馬上跳下一個“懶人”的結論，認定他們是“懶”，在此評估下，社工會要求兒童要準時出席補習班，定期接受社工的評估，盡量使兒童可達到社工的期望“目標”。但事實上，兒童的成績出現問題，可能背後是有很多原因的，例如：生理問題、個人成熟程度問題等等，但作為成人的社工，很快便把中心兒童的成績問題歸因於他們“懶”、“貪玩”等問題，這樣的處理方式，完全是成人中心主義影響下的表現。Petr指出，要抗衡成人中心主義，真正放下成人對兒童的偏見，社會工作者應如何與兒童接觸，建議要注意以下各方面的工作：首要製造良好的氣候，因為有良好的氣氛才可讓兒童感到被接受的氣氛。其次是：接觸及澄清，要盡量理解兒童的行為及其意思。另一方面，小心聆聽兒童的說話內容，因為在兒童的說話中，可能蘊藏了很多的隱喻，例如：小朋友可能形容自己是某卡通人物，可能是有其他的含意。最後，近年來，社工界十分流行與兒童工作時，利用畫人物，來理解兒童的心態。由於一般兒童礙於本身的詞匯有限，未必可以用準確的語言，來描述自己的處境，因此，社工人員未必可透過與兒童交談中，完全掌握他們的問題，而要求兒童繪畫，正是希望從他們的繪畫內容中，來評估的他們面對 甚麼問題。而針對兒童繪畫的評估，列出以下的指引： 看了圖畫後，不要太快跳到結論； 先作聆聽及觀察，並分析在溝通過程中的隱喻； 與兒童討論圖畫時，應以開放式的問題進行討論，而逐步邁向詳細及具體； 在作出結論前，應先理解他們的畫與他們生活的關係。Petr為抗衡成人中心主義作結時，明確指出，社工人員應以不同的策略（strategies）來抗衡成人中心主義的影響，這些策略包括進入兒童的世界、吸收更多關於兒童的知識、擴大兒童可自決的範圍，及運用兒童可明白的語言和兒童溝通。此外，利用兒童繪畫也是可行的評估方法。反觀在澳門的家庭服務，工作人員從不注意自己成人中心主義的傾向，常以自己作為成人的觀點來指責兒童，同時，在分析兒童問題時，很容易跳進已有結論中，沒有視他們也是個別的個體，有其特別的需要，因此，澳門從事家庭服務的社工有必要學習如何抗衡成人中心主義，同時，也要注意成人中心主義對他們的影響。二、以家庭中心的實務以家庭中心的實務工作，是Petr另一個務實的觀點，這也是近年來，兒童及家庭工作的新趨勢。Petr指出，以家庭為中心的定義是：家庭中心的服務提供，應是橫貫不同的專業、設置，認同家庭是每一個人生活必須的。家庭應可以得到足夠的資料提供，以提升家庭抵抗力及能力。此定義強調家庭中心實務的核心是：家庭應被視作為一個單位，應享有足夠資訊以作決定，及增加其抵抗力的觀點。在2008年5月13至15日在澳門舉行的聯合國亞洲及太平洋經濟社會委員會主辦及澳門特區政府社會工作局協辦的“推動社會服務政策：促進亞太區家庭福祉地區性研討會”（R e g i o n a l S e m i n a r o nEnhancing Social Services Pol ic ies to Strengthen FamilyWel l-being in Sia and the Pac if ic）中，在四項主要討論內容中，有兩項都是討論以家庭為中心的服務，其分別是： 推動以家庭為中心之社會服務的國家機制； 以家庭為中心之社會服務的區域及國際合作。足見世界各地政府，均十分重視發展以家庭為中心的服務。但是，我們該如何實踐以家庭為中心的服務？Petr指出，以家庭為中心的實務工作，其核心元素是：足夠的家庭選擇，關於選擇，包括： 誰在家中做決定：工作員必須清楚家庭的權力關係； 關心、尊重：家庭為中心的工作員，必須要尊重家庭有權選擇； 家庭與專業助人者的關係：專業助人者，應是代理人，協助家庭作出選擇，但不是代替他們選擇； 分享資訊：家庭為中心的工作員，應為家庭提供足夠的資訊，同時避免專業術語； 分辨需要、目標：以家庭為中心的實務中，工作員必須關注
從“家庭中心為本”及“成人中心主義”反思澳門研究126第51期上時代的發展，也急需改革。Petr提出的成人中心主義與以家庭為中心實務的觀點，也可是澳門家庭服務工作者反思的方向。家庭服務的社工應思考如何在工作中放下自己作為成人的觀點，投入一個兒童的世界，認識他們的處境、需要。至於“以家庭為中心實務”的方向，也是家庭服務的社工要注意的，現時的家庭服務只是處理個案，沒有注意如何強化家庭的抵抗力，專業的工作員需要協助家庭達成他們的需要。四、總結澳門的家庭服務，雖然是本地較早期發展的社會服務，但在過去的10多年，一直只是停滯在經濟援助、個案輔導、康樂活動等等，在服務層面上，家庭服務與青少年服務關係密切，但兩者卻甚少聯繫，使兩者未能好好配合，預防各式各樣的社會問題。Petr提出的成人中心主義與以家庭為中心實務的觀點，正好讓澳門從事家庭服務以至青少年服務的同工，一個好好反思方向。特別是成人中心主義是現時很多社工犯上的毛病。兩年前，筆者曾經參加過一個兒童故事工作坊，導師在未開始教授時，先要所有學員，先蹲下來，再看看周圍，讓學員嘗試一下以兒童的高度看世界，他要求學員與兒童工作時，先要放下成人世界對兒童的偏見，才可開始為兒童提供服務；當時，已覺得那位導師甚有道理；今天看了Petr的分析，對成人中心主義有進一步的認識。至於以家庭為中心的實務工作，更是世界的趨勢，澳門政府以致非政府機構應鼓勵及加強訓練，讓家庭服務中心的社工採取更積極的服務手法，來協助有需要的家庭。家庭是社會組成最基本的單元，肩負教育、養育、情感支援等功能，可是面對急速的社會變遷，家庭是最備受衝擊的一群，家庭功能也受到影響，家庭成員關係日漸疏離，甚至形成社會問題；家庭服務也應隨時代改變，更新服務手法。Petr建議抗衡成人中心主義與家庭中心實務的觀點，值得本地社會工作者反思。註釋：1 Lau, S. K . , From Trad i t iona l Fami l ism to Ut i l i t a r ian i st icFamil ism: the Metamorphosis of Famil ia l Ethos among theHong Kong Chinese (Hong Kong: Chinese Universi ty press,1978).2 香港理工大學應用社會科學系︰《澳門特別行政區家庭狀況及家庭服務發展研究報告》，澳門︰澳門特區政府社會工作局， 200 4 年。3 同上註。4 Petr , Chr istopher G., Social Work wi th Chi ldren and the irFamilies: Pragmatic Foundations (New York: Oxford Univer-si ty Press, 1998). 下引 Petr 之內容均取自此書。5 盧鐵榮︰《澳門特別行政區──青年問題與服務發展藍圖研究報告書》，澳門︰澳門特區政府社會工作局， 2005 年。6 同註 2 。
127《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4一、引言城市化是未來經濟和社會發展的總趨勢，人口指標是衡量城市化水平的最重要的指標之一。人口是城市發展的基本要素和基礎環境，其數量、結構、空間分佈及變動是城市人口、資源、環境和社會經濟協調發展的基礎，是制定城市管理政策的前提。11971年美國麻省理工學院Meadow教授率先對世界人口和資源進行系統仿真。研究結果表明地球上的資源有限，不能單靠科技的進步來養活越來越多的人口。Meadow教授把研究結果《增長的極限》在Nature雜誌發表，啟發以後30多年人們對可持續發展觀念的重視及進行深入探討和研究。1984年蘇格蘭的資源利用研究所首次將其應用到環境人口容量的研究中。隨 人口學的恢復和發展，對人口適度規模研究逐步深化，在相關理論和計量方法上都取得了很大突破。王浣塵借鑒系統動力學的多目標決策方法，利用可能滿意度工具（PS）測算適度人口規模，得到廣泛地借鑒和應用。2林清和徐中民在廣西某村的人類活動與石漠化過程進行了探索。32006年，李金平等對澳門的人口進行了研究。4本次研究是在參考了美國人口增長模型的基礎上5，結合澳門人口年齡結構和死亡率的分佈，對澳門的人口結構進行了系統的仿真。二、模型的仿真原理出生率、死亡率等參數的變化，受穩定的外界條件的影響，其變化是有規律，這些規律可以通過統計學方法揭示。統計學規律建基於大量的資料之上。為此，本項研究中，從政府統計暨普查局網頁6上查找了近7年澳門人口就各年齡層變化的各項指標值，作為統計回歸分析的基礎。同時，為了檢驗回歸的結果，對R2值進行了分析和檢驗。7對多種假設下的回歸分析結果進行了對比，從中篩選出相關性最高的假設，作為系統仿真的基礎。系統動力學模型主要通過仿真實驗，進行分析計算而得到的未來一定時期內各種變數隨時間而變化的曲線。能處理高階次、非線性、多重回歸的複雜系統的有關問題。Populat ion ( t )=Populat ion( t–dt )+(Bi r th+Immigrant– Death)*dt三、模型參數選擇澳門過去8年澳門實際的人口變化及各項人口統計指標如下，有關資料來自於澳門統計暨普查局網頁（表1）。在人口庫中，設置了五個子庫，即少年組庫，成人組庫，中年組庫，老年組庫和耆老組庫，每個子庫有不同的死亡率。（一）年齡組之死亡率根據人口的整體表示，不同的年齡組的死亡率不盡相同。因此，計算分析各年齡組的死亡率是必須的。死亡率的總變化特性隨 年齡增大而增加。而這種變化分佈的原因是非常明顯的，老的人口沒有很多但其死亡數是相當大的，嬰兒階段也有相同類似的情況。人口的年齡結構對死亡率有直接的影響，本研究中根據資料的可得性，而將人口分為了五組，各組相關之死亡率為：未來澳門人口年齡結構的預測李金平、林子健 ** 前者為環境科學和工程博士，後者為南開大學數學科學學院本科生
中美世界自然遺產資源管理比較澳門研究134第51期源的保護與管理，並建立了相應的管理機構和相關法律制度，但由於種種原因，兩國無論在演進過程、管理體制，還是在管理方式上均存在 一定的差異。（一）演進過程的差異縱觀世界自然遺產資源管理的演進過程，中美兩國呈現出截然不同的特點與差異。1. 管理體制演進過程中沿襲的對象不同中國的世界自然遺產資源主要由國家級風景名勝區演變而來，加上中國批准和加入《世界遺產名錄》比較晚，直到 1985 年全國人大常委會才批准承認《保護世界文化和自然遺產公約》，1987年泰山等自然遺產地才加入《世界遺產名錄》，因而受此影響，中國世界自然遺產資源管理體制的形成不僅相對較晚，而且還呈現出基本沿襲中國風景名勝區管理體制之特點。美國則不然，早在1916年，美國就設立了專門的國家公園管理局直接管理自然遺產，受此影響，美國的世界自然遺產資源管理體制完全沿襲了國家公園管理體制。2. 管理體制演進過程中吸收外來管理元素情況不同在世界自然遺產資源管理體制發展過程中，為了優化管理體制，自20世紀90年代以來，中國各個世界自然遺產資源景區都進行過不同程度改革，試圖通過經營管理改革，以吸收外來、尤其是美國、加拿大的先進管理體制元素，如20世紀90年代通過“管理權與經營權分離”改革產生的新的經營模式 ──“整體租賃經營模式”、“整合開發經營模式”、“股份制企業經營模式”和“市公司經營模式”，無一例外地證實了這一點。美國的情況則不同，其世界自然遺產資源管理體制自始至終走的都是獨立發展的道路，絲毫也找不出外來影響的成份。3. 管理體制演進過程的曲折情況不同在世界自然遺產資源管理體制演進過程中，中美兩國雖然都有過艱難曲折發展的經歷，但具體情況卻不盡相同。在中國，由於自然遺產管理體制形成時間較晚，所走過的路程遠不如美國長，加之善於吸取借鑒國外成功的經驗與教訓，因此，中國有關自然遺產的管理理念和實踐在發展過程中，雖然有風有浪，出現過波折與爭論，如20世紀末以來，圍繞 “管理權與經營權分離”這一主題，國內逐漸形成了不同的觀點派別，彼處進行了激烈的論爭25，但從總體看，中國有關自然遺產管理理念和實踐發展還比較順利。美國則不然，不僅“對於如何處置國家公園乃至更廣泛意義上的公共物品（資源）一直存在 激烈的爭論”26，而且美國的自然遺產管理理念與實踐也經歷了一條頗為曲折的道路。在美國早期的資源管理理論中，國家公園內的資源管理都是為了滿足遊客的需要。在《黃石公園法案》中，明確聲稱公園將成為“巨大的國家度假地（Place of g rea tnat ional recreation）”，“必須服務於公共用途、度假和遊憩（Publ i c use, resor t and rec rea t ion）”，在“發展遊憩理念”的支配下，公園內生態的完整性受到了極大的損害，如在野生動物管理方面，各國家公園基本上從不間斷地為了保護觀賞性較高的野生動物而對捕食者進行大量捕殺，黃石公園為保護灰熊而大肆捕殺土狼，以至土狼在黃石公園一度絕跡；此外，為增加觀賞性魚類、森林大量引進外來種；不顧生態原野干擾原則效仿其他地區任意撲滅野火等，這一系列違背生態和科學管理原則的做法從發生到被禁止──被禁止又發生，一直延續數十年，直到20世紀80年代末才開始真正得到實現，最典型的例證是1988年黃石公園遭受大火，公園管理處秉持科學的生態觀，任其自生自滅，事後也順其自然，10 年之後，被燒焦了的 36% 的公園面積披上了綠裝，一片生機盎然。（二）管理體制的差異在世界自然遺產資源管理體制方面，中美兩國管理體制既在管理模式方面存在 較大的差異，也在管理組織體系、管理機構方面不盡相同。1. 不同的管理模式目前，中國對世界自然遺產資源管理實行的是屬地管理模式，即將管理權力下放，由行政級別較低的地、縣級政府管理。屬地管理的內涵主要體現在管理負責人的人事任命、資源管理權和財務管理權。例如，黃山由黃山市、泰山由泰安市、峨嵋山由峨嵋山市管理。美國對世界自然遺產資源進行管理，採取的模式與中國截然不同，即為中央政府直接管理的模式。目前，美國已有10個國家公園被列入世界自然遺產地，此外，還與加拿大共用2個世界自然遺產地。對於這些自然遺產，統一由美國中央聯邦政府內政部下屬的國家公園管理局直接管理。
141《澳門研究》第51期2009. 42 4 楊銳：《中國自然文化遺產管理現狀分析》，載於《中國園林》，第 9 期， 2003 年。2 5 苟自鈞：《中國自然文化遺產要走專業化經營管理之路》，載於《經濟經緯》，第 1 期， 2002年；楊振之、馬治鸞、陳謹：《我國風景資源產權及其管理的法律問題》，載於《旅遊學刊》，第 4 期， 200 2 年。2 6 Sel lars, R. W., Preserving Nature in the National Parks: AHistory (New Haven: Yale Universi ty Press, 1997).
145《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4差別，直接地反映到學生生活中，就是大陸學生和澳門學生的興趣和所參加的活動的差別。其次是權利差距與個人主義和集體主義，這兩項維度描述的都是個人與他人、與集體的關係。可以看出，兩類學生在這些方面還是存在一定的差異的。此項差異直接決定了組織構建的方式，比如是類似於金字塔型的組織形式，還是更扁平的組織方式。只有根據文化根基選擇最適合的組織形式，才能取得最有效的組織管理績效。而差異最小的是兩類學生在不確定性規避方面的差異，澳門學生在對風險的態度上表現得較為保守。本項研究將持續關注澳門學生與大陸學生管理及多文化生源的學生管理問題。參考書目：1. 尼格爾‧霍爾頓：《跨文化管理：一個知識管理的視角》，北京：中國人民大學出版社， 2006 年。2. 簡 - 路易士‧巴爾索克斯、蘇珊‧ C ‧施奈德：《跨文化管理》，北京：經濟管理出版社， 2002 年。3. 馬爾科姆‧沃納、派特‧喬恩特：《跨文化管理》，北京：機械工業出版社， 2004 年。4. 菲力浦‧ R ‧哈內斯、羅伯特‧ T ‧莫蘭：《跨文化管理教程》，北京：新華出版社， 2004 年。
The Impact of Intergroup Attitude on Language澳門研究146第51期1. IntroductionMacau is a southern city in China, lying on the westernside of the Pearl River Delta, bordering Gongbei SpecialEconomic Zone in the Guangdong Province. Since 1533 whilethe Portuguese settled in the city, it had become a placeruled by Portugal. It was until 20th December, 1999, Macauwas restored by China, and became one of the two specialadministrative regions of its mother nation. During the 400-year period under the Portuguese ruling, Macau was an importantport of communication for the Sino-Western cultures. It hasbecome a city of people of different origins. Various ethnicgroups brought in their own languages. These languages mixedand integrated in Macau, and turned Macau into “languagemuseum” worthwhile for social linguistic researches.After the establishment of the Macau Special AdministrativeRegion (MSAR), there has been a popular saying of “Tri-literacy and Quadri-lingualism”. “Tri-literacy” refers to the writinglanguages of Chinese, Portuguese and English; while “Quadri-lingualism” refers to the oral languages of Cantonese, Putonghua,Portuguese and English. Since then, the languages includedin “Tri-literacy and Quadri-lingualism” possess comparativelysuperior roles in the society of Macau to other languages.The dominant ethnic group in Macau is the Chinese.According to the By-Census 2006 by the Statistics and CensusService of the MSAR, 94.3% of the resident population wasof Chinese ethnicity. Chinese was the mostly spoken languagein the region. Among the resident population aged 3 and above,85.7% spoke mostly Cantonese at home, 3.2% spokePutonghua and 6.7% spoke other Chinese dialects.1 Althoughthe majority of the population in Macau are of Chinese originand speak Chinese dialects, they may not have the sameopinions on their social identity.A previous research suggested that after the restoration,a new ethnic group – the Macanese group – would be formed.This would be a group of certain diversification, including varioustypes of people in Macau. The main reason for its appearancewould be the “localization” trend and “Macau People RulingMacau” policy of the MSAR. Members in this group wouldpossess a strong “sense of Macau”, and would tend toemphasize the distinctiveness of their social identity of Macauresidents.2 However, the restoration to China might also bringanother result. It is expected that there would be an increasein the amount and intensity of patriotism education. The “senseof nation” of the Macau resident might be intensified. As aresult, when being asked to indicate their social identity, someMacau Chinese may identify themselves as primarily Macanese,an exclusive identity of a distinctive group including onlypermanent residents of Macau, while some may identifythemselves as primarily Chinese, a more inclusive identityincludes both Macau Chinese, Mainland Chinese, and overseasChinese as well.This study is aimed at investigating the relationship betweensocial identity, intergroup attitude and language. It is set assurvey study of Chinese high school students in Macau. Throughthe investigation of their self identity, it is hoped to exploretheir intergroup attitude towards the Chinese culture and theirThe Impact of Intergroup Attitude on Language:A Survey Study of Macau High School StudentsLeong Sok Man** Master of Foreign Linguistics and Applied Linguistics, Beijing Normal University
147《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4ideas and comments on “Quadri-lingualism”.As a matter of fact, Chinese people consider Cantoneseand Putonghua as two Chinese dialects instead of two differentlanguages. However, for the sake of convenience in expression,this study uses a loose definition of “language” and takesCantonese, Putonghua, Portuguese and English in “Quadri-lingualism” as for languages.2. Literature Review2.1 Ethnic Group and Intergroup AttitudeAn ethnic group refers to “a social group or categoryof the population that, in a larger society, is set apart andbound together by common ties of race, language, nationality,or culture.”3 According to Giles and Johnson, “most ethnicgroups… have a distinct language or dialect and these ethniccharacteristics can be a necessary attribute for membershipof the group.”4 As it is mentioned above, the most spokenusual language of the Macau Chinese is Cantonese whilethat of the other Chinese, especially Mainland Chinese isPutonghua. This difference, together with the different socialcultural backgrounds and life styles, attributes to the appearanceof two ethnic groups in Macau: the Macanese group, whospeak Cantonese and emphasize the distinctiveness of beingMacau residents; and the Chinese group, who speakPutonghua (and sometimes other Chinese dialects like Hokkien,Hakka, etc.) and claim a social identity of being a memberof the nation, China.Intergroup attitude means the attitude a group memberhold during the communication with people of other ethnic groups.Berry, Kim, Power, Young and Bujaki claimed that frequencyintergroup communication might lead to acculturation.5 Theyalso identified four coping strategies that individuals use inthe acculturation process: assimilation – interacting withindividuals from the outgroup culture and devaluating theingroup culture; integration – maintaining the ingroup cultureas well as interacting with individuals from the outgroup culture;marginalization – rejecting the ingroup culture of origin aswell as avoiding individuals from the outgroup culture; andseparation – maintaining the ingroup culture and minimizinginteraction with the outgroup.6The relationship between Macau and the Mainland hasalways been close while the connection between the peoplein these two places has been tight. Numerous labors cometo work in Macau from the Mainland, and Macau citizensalso seek development opportunities in the Mainland. After theestablishment of the MSAR, this kind of intergroup communicationhas become more frequent, resulting to the appearance of theacculturation. From general observation, it can be seen thatin the acculturation process, Macau citizens basically usestwo coping strategies of the four suggested by Berry andhis associates: integration or separation.There have been a number of studies about the ethnicgroups and intergroup attitudes of the people in Macau. Zhoudiscussed the formation, boundary, characteristics and developingtrend of the ethnic groups in Macau in 1997 and suggestedthat after the restoration of Macau in 1999, there would bea new ethnic group: the Macanese group.7 Sun also talkedabout the various ethnic groups in Macau and their culturesand customs.8 Researches about the Portuguese ethnic groupin Macau have even been numerous. However, studies relatedto the Chinese ethnic group in Macau and their attitudes towardstraditional Chinese culture are limited. There has been a relevantarticle written by Liao9, yet it is mainly a theoretical reviewingreport. No empirical research can be found in this area. Sincethere is no existing evidence of the intergroup attitude of MacauChinese found in the present literature, this study tries toinvestigate that through the participants’ self-indicated socialidentity and their attitude towards the Chinese culture. Withtheir social identity and their attitudes towards the Chineseculture, it is possible to demonstrate their intergroup attitudesduring their intergroup communication.2.2 Intergroup Attitude and LanguageIntergroup attitude has significant relation to people’s choiceand attitude towards languages. Giles, Coupland and Couplandproposed “Communication Accommodation Theory” in 1991. Theybelieved that when groups of different cultures communicates,people may choose to adjust their style of speech, includingtheir accent, tone, wordings or even the language, so asto ensure the efficiency during the intergroup communication.On the opposite, some people may want to derive their senseof identity in a particular group, thus they may deliberatelyemphasize their original style of speech and increase the
The Impact of Intergroup Attitude on Language澳門研究148第51期specialty of their group. The former situation appears becausethe speaker holds a positive attitude towards the outgroup,while the latter situation appears because the speaker holdsa negative attitude towards the outgroup.10 Therefore, it can beseen that during intergroup communication, different choice oflanguage may be resulted from different intergroup attitudes ofthe speaker. As a result, it can be assumed that intergroupattitudes can influence people’s choice of language duringintergroupcommunication.Furthermore, Giles and John proposed “EthnolinguisticIdentity Model”, believing that people with a strong senseof their group treat their language as an important indicatorof group membership.11 Van Den Berg’s study also showedthat people with a strong sense of ethnic group and ethnolinguisticidentity tend to use their own language during daily intergroupcommunication.12 Moreover, Kelly, Sachdev, Kottsieper andIngram pointed out the motivation to learn a foreign/secondlanguage is strongly associated with acceptance of the relevantlanguage group.13Based on the present foundation of the existing literatures,this study takes Chinese high school students as participants,aiming at exploring if their intergroup attitudes, under the socialcontext of the MSAR, have influenced their comments andattitudes towards “Quadri-lingualism”: Cantonese, Putonghua,Portuguese and English.Table 1 Questionnaire Items Used in the StudyItem Content ChoicesPart I Personal Information1 GenderMale;Female2 Age (Blank for free answering)Macanese;Chinese;3 You identify yourself as Primarily Macanese, only secondarily Chinese;Primarily Chinese, only secondarily Macanese;OthersPlease indicate your how likely you will:make connection with4accept On a 6-point scaleavoid (from “very unlikely” to “very likely”)rejectthe Mainland people and culture.Part II About “Tri-literacy and Quadri-lingualism”Please indicate respectively how important you think the four language in“Quadri-lingualism” is in the social context of Macau.6Cantonese On a 6-point scalePutonghua (from “extremely unimportant” to “extremely important”)PortugueseEnglishCantonese;7Which language do you think the Chief Execute of the SAR should use while making Putonghua;the policy address orally to the public? Portuguese;EnglishAccording to the Basic Law, both Chinese and Portuguese are the official languagesCantonese;9of Macau. How would you define “Chinese” in oral usage?Putonghua;not sureAt what age would you recommend Macau children to start learning10Putonghua?(Blank for free answering)Portuguese?English?
149《澳門研究》第51期2009. 43. Empirical Research3.1 Research Method and MaterialsThis is an attitudinal study, thus is carried out throughconducting a survey. All the data collected were input intothe SPSS 8.0 software for calculation and analysis.The questionnaire used in this study was one about thegeneral attitude towards “Tri-literacy and Quadri-lingualism”. Itwas divided into two parts: Part I included items about thepersonal information of the participants. Part II included itemsabout their attitude towards “Tri-literacy and Quadri-lingualism”.There were altogether 10 items in the questionnaire. The presentarticle is the presentation about the study concerning “Quadri-lingualism”, thus the items about “Tri-literacy” are not usedin this study. Table 1 presents the questionnaire items thatare used as data in this study.Item 3 was designed to measure participants’ social identity.Item 4 was designed to assess participants’ intergroup attitudes.Responses to “making connection with” and “accepting” theMainland people and culture are averaged to form an integrationscore, and responses to “avoiding” and “rejecting” the Mainlandpeople and culture are averaged to form a separation score.Item 6 was designed to assess participants’ attitude on theimportance of the four languages. Item 7 and 9 was designedto assess the participants’ attitude towards the definition of“Chinese” (the language). While Item 9 was set to ask directlyparticipants’ comments on the definition of “Chinese”, Item 7was designed to ask about it in an indirect way. Item 7asked participants to indicate the language which they thinkthe Chief Executive should use while making policy addressorally to the public. It was expected that participants’ answerwould very likely be one of the “Chinese languages” asboth the Chief Executive and the majority of Macau residentsare Chinese. Thus it is very likely to be a choice amongCantonese and Putonghua. Item 10 was designed to assessparticipants’ attitudes towards learning Putonghua, Portugueseand English.3.2 ParticipantsThe participants of the study were 183 high school studentsof Grade 3 from four schools in Macau, 89 males and 94females. The average age is 15 years old, with the standarddeviation as 1.03.The four schools were chosen as the place for samplecollection with particular reasons. The secondary educationsystem and school format in Macau are of high diversificationdue to the history. Some schools that are founded by Christianorganization and churches are Catholic oriented and teachreligious issue to their students. Some schools, which aregeneral known as “red” schools, are highly Mainland-related,use Mainland teaching materials and have the “Five-starredRed Flat” hoisted on the campus. There are also schoolsenrolled either boys or girls only in Macau. It was suspectedthat different education systems and school formats may alsolead to different results of the participants’ choices. Therefore,the study selected four high schools with different educationsystems or school formats: including schools of Catholic, “red”,boys only and girls only.3.3 Research QuestionsThe aim of the study is to investigation if the socialidentity and intergroup attitude possess any influence on theirattitude towards “Quadri-lingualism”. Research questions are asthe following:Will different intergroupattitudes influence theparticipants’comments on the importance of the four languages?Will different intergroup attitudes influence their sugges-tions on the starting ages of learning Putonghua, Portugueseand English?Will different intergroup attitudes influence their opinionson the definition of “Chinese”?4. Data Presentation4.1 Various Intergroup AttitudesThe intergroup attitude is shown though their integrationand separation scores toward the Chinese culture.The data showed that, among the 183 participants, 63(34.4%) identified themselves as “Macanese”, 26 (14.2%)identified themselves as “Chinese”, 49 (26.8%) identifiedthemselves as “primarily Macanese, only secondarily Chinese”,and 45 (24.6%) identified themselves as “primarily Chinese,only secondary Macanese”. None of the participants chose“others”. Since relatively few participants chose the “Chinese”identity (only 26 participants, less then the minimum requirementof 30 in social science researches), the present study adopted
The Impact of Intergroup Attitude on Language澳門研究150第51期the usual way for categorization as other similar studies14.The participants were categorized into two groups: those whochose the identity of “Macanese” or “primarily Macanese, onlysecondarily Chinese” were categorized into the “primarilyMacanese group” while those who chosen the identity of“Chinese” or “primarily Chinese, only secondarily Macanese”were categorized into the “primarily Chinese group”. The“primarily Macanese group” vs “primarily Chinese group” wasnot related to gender (X2 = 0.119, p = 0.656, not significant)or the four schools they came from (X2 = 0.691, p = 0.875,not significant). (Table 2)Table 2 Participants’ Social Identity beforeAdjustment CategorizationSocial Identity Frequency PercentageMacanese 63 34.4Chinese 26 14.2Primarily Macanese, only secondarily Chinese 49 26.8Primarily Chinese, only secondarily Macanese 45 24.6Others 0 0Total 183 100.0Table 3 Participants’ Social Identity after AdjustmentCategorizationSocial Identity Frequency PercentagePrimarily Macanese group 112 61.2Primarily Chinese group 71 38.8Total 183 100.0The intergroup attitude was measured by the integrationscore and the separation score. The integration score wasobtained through averaging participants’ likeliness of makingconnection with and that of accepting the Mainland people andculture on the 6-point scale. During data processing with SPSS8.0, the identity of “primarily Macanese group” was input as1 while the identity of “primarily Chinese group” was inputas 2. After analyzing, it was proved that the correlation betweensocial identity and the scores of integration and separationis highly significant. The social identity is of a positive correlationwith the integration score, indicating participants who identifiedthemselves as “primarily Macanese” showed a relatively lowintegrating attitude towards the Chinese people and culture,and participants who identified themselves as “primarily Chinese”showed a relatively high integrating attitude towards the Chinesepeople and culture. On the other hand, the social identityis of a negative correlation with the separation score, indicatingparticipants who identified themselves as “primarily Macanese”showed a relatively high separating attitude towards the Chinesepeople and culture, and participants who identified themselvesas “primarily Chinese” showed a relatively low separatingattitude towards the Chinese people and culture. (Table 4)Table 4 Correlation between Social Identity andScores of Integration and SeparationScore Social Identity M SD r pIntegrationPrimarily Macanese group 3.487 1.1320.465 0.000*Primarily Chinese group 4.887 1.011SeparationPrimarily Macanese group 2.674 1.138-0.257 0.000*Primarily Chinese group 2.028 0.878* p < 0.01The result shows that participants’ social identity indicatedtheir intergroup attitudes. Participants with a stronger senseof group emphasized the distinctiveness of the Macanese identityand wanted to be separated from the Mainland people. Theirintegration level was relatively low and their separation levelwas relatively high. On the opposite, participants who showeda higher acceptance to the Chinese culture identified themselvesas Chinese. They were more willing to integrate with theMainland people and culture and had a relatively low separationscore. As a result, in the following analysis, participants claimingthe social identity of “primarily Macanese group” were takenas those who possessed a negative intergroup attitude towardsthe Chinese culture while participants claiming the social identityof “primarily Chinese group” were taken as those who possesseda positive intergroup attitude towards the Chinese culture.4.2 Intergroup Attitude vs. the Importance of “Quadri-lingualism”Generally speaking, participants believed that, in the socialcontext of Macau, the language with highest importance among“Quadri-lingualism” was Cantonese (M = 5.36, SD = 0.74),English was considered as secondly important (M = 5.05,SD = 0.99), Putonghua placed the third (M = 4.69, SD =1.09), and Portuguese was believed to be the least important(M = 2.87, SD = 1.16).
151《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4The result of the ANOVA test showed that participants’intergroup attitudes did not attribute to their comments on theimportance of Cantonese, Portuguese and English. However,it is not the same with Putonghua. The ANOVA test resultshowed that the influence of participants’ intergroup attitudesto their comments on the importance of Putonghua was highlysignificant. (Table 5)Table 5 Influence of Intergroup Attitudes toComments on the Importance of “Quadri-lingualism”Language Intergroup Attitude M SD F pCantoneseNegative 5.68 0.761.045 0.308Positive 5.56 0.71PutonghuaNegative 4.30 1.1146.073 0.000*Positive 5.31 0.71PortugueseNegative 2.97 1.042.354 0.127Positive 2.70 1.32EnglishNegative 5.16 0.973.336 0.069Positive 4.89 1.01* p < 0.0054.3 Intergroup Attitude vs. Recommended Starting Agefor Language LearningAfter the data processing, it was found that the meanrecommended starting age for learning Putonghua was 7.96,that for learning Portuguese was 13.46 and that for learningEnglish was 4.21. The analysis reviewed that the impact ofparticipants’ intergroup attitude was highly significant only totheir opinions on the recommended starting age of Putonghua.The overall findings are listed in Table 6.Table 6 Influence of Intergroup Attitudes toRecommended Starting Age for Language LearningLanguage Intergroup Attitude M SD F pPutonghuaNegative 9.14 5.1419.092 0.000*Positive 6.08 3.62PortugueseNegative 12.79 6.413.410 0.066Positive 14.51 5.60EnglishNegative 4.10 2.011.041 0.309Positive 4.39 1.74* p < 0.0054.4 Intergroup Attitude vs. Definition of the Official Language“Chinese”Item 9 in the questionnaire directly asked the participantsto indicate their idea of the definition of “Chinese” as oneof the official language in the MSAR when being used orally.100 (54.6%) participants indicated that it should be Cantonese,51 (27.9%) participants indicated that it should be Putonghua,and 32 (17.5%) said they were not sure. Excluding participantswho chosen “not sure” as their answer, there were 151participants making a choice between Cantonese and Putonghua.Through the correlation test of these 151 entries, it was foundthat there was a highly significant correlation between intergroupattitude and participants’ opinions on the definition of “Chinese”in oral usage (X2 = 53.373, p = 0.000, highly significant).Participants with a negative intergroup attitude tended to considerCantonese as the official Chinese language in oral usage whileparticipants with a positive intergroup attitude tended to considerPutonghua as the official Chinese language in oral usage. (Table7)Table 7 Intergroup Attitude vs. Definition of“Chinese” in Oral UsageDefinition ofIntergroup Attitude Frequency X 2 P“Chinese”CantoneseNegative 83 100Positive 17 (54.6%)53.373 0.000*PutonghuaNegative 10 51Positive 41 (27.9%)Not sureNegative 19 32Positive 13 (17.5%)* p < 0.005As it is mentioned above, Item 7 set a certain contextfor the language use – the Chief Executive is making hispolicy address orally, thus tried to assess participants, opinionson the definition of “Chinese” in an indirect way. Althoughthe choices included Portuguese and English, it was expectedthat participants’ answer would very likely be one of the “Chineselanguages” – either Cantonese or Putonghua, as the ChiefExecutive and the majority of Macau residents are Chinese.Since making policy address is an official action carried outby the Chief Executive of the MSAR, the answer of thisitem could help to infer participants’ idea on the official statusof Cantonese and Putonghua. The collected data showed thatparticipants’ intergroup attitude did not influence their choiceon this item. 149 (81.4%) participants believe the Chief Executive
The Impact of Intergroup Attitude on Language澳門研究152第51期should make the policy address in Cantonese. (Table 8)Table 8 Intergroup Attitude vs. Recommended OralLanguage for Policy AddressIntergroup Attitude Cantonese Putonghua Portuguese EnglishNegative 97 4 1 10Positive 52 16 – 3Total 149 (81.4%) 20 (10.9%) 1 (0.5%) 13 (7.1%)5. DiscussionFrom results of the data analysis presented above, itcan be see that the different intergroup attitudes of Chinesehigh school students to Chinese people and culture, to someextent, were influencing their attitudes towards “Quadri-lingualism”. Intergroup attitude possesses significant influenceto Putonghua, a less significant influence to Cantonese. Nodirect influence can be seen to Portuguese and English.5.1 Cantonese, as the Ingroup Language of Macau Chinese,Possesses Superior StatusCantonese is the ingroup language of the Chinesecommunity in Macau. People’s recognition of its important statusin the social context of Macau is of no doubt. The meanscores of the importance of the language given by bothparticipants of negative and positive intergroup attitudes wereover 5.5. This showed that the social status of the ingrouplanguage is not influenced by the intergroup attitude of thegroup members.Nevertheless, if there is any comparison between theingroup language and some outgroup languages, the influencingpower of people’s intergroup attitude would be seen. After thesigning of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration on the Questionof Macau on 13 th April, 1987, one of the imperative taskduring the transitional period was to change the status ofPortuguese as the only official language in Macau becauseboth the Joint Declaration and the MSAR Basic Law statedthat Chinese would be the main official language in the MSAR.Therefore, on 23rd December, 1991, the Portuguese governmentin Lisbon approved legislation granting the Chinese languageofficial status in Macau on a par with Portuguese. From thenon, the definition of “Chinese” has always been ambiguous.No document has ever mentioned whether it is, in oral context,Cantonese or Putonghua or even any other Chinese dialects.Thus, the fact that a number of participants (17.5%) in thissurvey were actually confused in this issue is understandable.However, it is obvious that participants with a negative intergroupattitude tended to believe that “Chinese” refers to Cantonese.It demonstrates that participants with a strong sense of ingroupwere more likely to insist on the official position of their ingrouplanguage, and through that they could keep their language ina superior position during the comparison with an outgrouplanguage (Putonghua).Although intergroup attitude was significantly related to thechoice between Cantonese and Putonghua as the official“Chinese” language, participants generally believed that the ChiefExecutive of the MSAR should make his policy address inCantonese. It is actually reasonable and considerate underthe social context of Macau. Cantonese is the mother tongueof 85.7% Macau residents. The Chief Executive’s using ofCantonese during his oral presentation of the policy addresssuits the usual practice of the region, and at the same time,helps to make him a part of the Macau residents. The “SpeechAccommodation Theory” suggested by Giles can explain thisphenomenon.155.2 Putonghua, as the Outgroup Language in the IntergroupCommunication, its Value depends on People’s IntergroupAttitudePutonghua is seen as the ingroup language of the MainlandChinese. Thus, when the Macau residents have intergroupcommunications with the Mainland people, their attitude towardsthe language is actually highly dependent on their intergroupattitude towards the Mainland people and culture. This researchproves it.Participants’ evaluation on the importance of Putonghuain the social context of Macau was highly influenced by theirintergroup attitude. The average scores of the importance ofPutonghua rated by participants with a negative intergroup attitudewas 4.3, while that rated by participants with a positive intergroupattitude was 5.31.Moreover, the result of the present research also accordswith the suggestion of Kelly et al. on the strong associationbetween motivation to learn a foreign/second language and theacceptance of the relevant language group. The meanrecommended starting age for Putonghua learning by participants
153《澳門研究》第51期2009. 4with a negative intergroup attitude was 9.14 years old, whilethat of those with a positive attitude was 6.08. The impactof intergroup attitude was significant in this issue.5.3 Portuguese Possesses a Low Importance in MacauThe research result shows that, regardless of the intergroupattitude, Portuguese received a relatively low importance ratedby participants, and the mean recommended starting age forPortuguese learning was older than that for Putonghua andEnglish learning. There might be two reasons that could beaccounted for the insignificant influence of the intergroup attitudetowards the evaluation of Portuguese. Firstly, the presentresearch mainly focuses on investigating Macau Chinese’sintergroup attitude towards the Mainland Chinese people andculture, thus, is not directly related to Portuguese. Therefore,the influence of the independent variable “intergroup attitude”to the dependent variable “Portuguese” is not significant.Secondly, the research result is related to the practical situationin Macau. Although Portuguese is one of the official languagesin the MSAR, and before 1991, it was even the sole officiallanguage in the region, the Portuguese-Macau government, whoruled Macau before 1999, had not widely promoted thePortuguese language education and the Portuguese culture. Asa result, most Macau Chinese are not familiar with this outgrouplanguage.5.4 English, as One of the International CommunicativeLanguages, Enjoys a Special Status in MacauEnglish, in the same case as Portuguese, is not directlyrelated to the intergroup attitude investigation of the presentresearch. The result shows that participants’ intergroup attitudehad an insignificant influence to their evaluation of the Englishlanguage. However, participants gave a high evaluation of itsimportance in the social context of Macau. The meanrecommended starting age for English learning was very young,even younger than that for Putonghua learning.As a matter of fact, it is claimed to be really surprisingto find English enjoys such a superior position in a regionthat was ruled by the Portuguese.16 English is the main foreignlanguage taught in the primary and secondary education, andmany Macau students even start their learning of the languagein kindergarten. Moreover, English, as one of the most importantmedia during international communication, is inevitably seenas one of the languages with high significance in the rapiddeveloping economy of the Macau society. Besides, anotherexplanatory reason for such language phenomenon might bethat Macau society holds an accepting attitude to the Englishculture due to their close attachment to the Hong Kong societythat received a lot of influence from the British in the pastcolonial period. The attaching importance to the English languageand the acceptance of the English cultures lead to the ideaof an early starting age of English learning.6. ConclusionThe paper reports a survey study of the intergroup attitudeof Macau Chinese high school students towards MainlandChinese culture during intergroup communication, and theinfluence of that towards their evaluation on “Quadri-lingualism”.The research result shows that the impact of intergroup attitudewas highly significant to the evaluation on Cantonese andPutonghua. While the impact of intergroup attitude was notsignificant to the evaluation on Portuguese and English, theresearch result does help to shed some light on Macau highschool students’ general idea and comments on the twolanguages.There are a number of limitations in the present research.Firstly, the number of participants of the survey was relativelysmall and they were all high school students. Thus, the resultis just referential and cannot stand as representation of allMacau Chinese residents. Secondly, the research data wereobtained through self-reported survey, the reliability was, thus,relatively low. Experimental research is necessary if a morereliable and effective result on people’s attitude towards languagesis to be obtained. Nevertheless, the present research doeshelp to prove there is certain relationship between social identity,intergroup attitude and language, and at the same time,demonstrates Macau Chinese high school students’ general ideason “Quadri-lingualism”.Notes:1 Macau Statistics and Census Service, Global Results ofBy-Census 2006 (Macau: DSEC, 2007), pp. 163, 166.2 Zhou, Daming, “Ethnic Groups in Macau,” Social Sciencein China, Vol. 5 (1997), pp. 142–155. [周大鳴：《澳門
The Impact of Intergroup Attitude on Language澳門研究154第51期的族群》，載於《中國社會科學》，第 5 期， 1997 年，第 142–155 頁。]3 “Ethnic group,” Encyclopedia Britannica Online, http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9033136.4 Giles, H. and Johnson, P., “The Role of Language in EthnicGroup Relat ions,” in Turner, J. C. and Giles, H. (Eds.),Intergroup Behaviour (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1981),pp. 199–243.5 Berry, J. W., Kim, U., Power, S., Young, M. and Bujaki ,M., “Acculturat ion Attitudes in Plural Societies,” Appl iedPsychology, Vol. 38 (1989), pp. 185–206.6 Ibid.7 Zhou, Daming, “Ethnic Groups in Macau,” Social Sciencein China , Vol. 5 (1997), pp. 142-155. [周大鳴：《澳門的族群》，載於《中國社會科學》，第 5 期， 1997 年，第 142–155 頁。]8 Sun, Jiuhai, “Ethnic Groups in Macau and their Cultures,” Open Times, Vol. 7 (2000), pp. 73–78. [孫九霞：《澳門的族群與族群文化》，載於《開放時代》，第 7 期，2000 年，第 73–78 頁。]9 Liao, Yang, “Chinese People in Macau and the Chinese Culture,” Study of Ethnics in Guangxi, Vol. 3 (2002), pp. 111–114. [廖楊：《澳門華人與中華文化》，載於《廣西民族研究》，第 3 期， 2002 年，第 111–114 頁。]1 0 Giles, H., Coupland, N. and Coupland, J., “AccommodationTheory: Communication, Context and Consequences,” inGiles, H., Coupland, N. and Coupland, J. (Eds.), Contextof Accommodation: Developments in Applied Sociolinguistics(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 1–68.11 Giles, H. and Johnson, P., “Ethnolinguistic Identity Theory: ASocial Psychological Approach to Language Maintenance,”International Journal of the Sociology of Language, Vol. 68(1987), pp. 69–100.1 2 Van Den Berg, M. E., “Long Term Accommodation of (Ethno-)Linguist ic Groups Toward a Societal Language Norm,”Language and Communication, Vol. 8 (1988), pp. 251–261.1 3 Kelly, C., Sachdev, I., Kottsieper, P. and Ingram, M., “TheRole of Social Identity in Second-Language Proficiency andUse: Testing the Intergroup Model,” Journal of Languageand Social Psychology, Vol. 12 (1993), pp. 288–301.1 4 Hong, Y., Lee, S. and Chiu, C., “Language Use as Carrierof Social Identity,” Journal of Language and Social Psychology,Vol. 12 (1999), pp. 281–296.1 5 Bourh is, R . Y . , “Organ iza t i ona l Communica t ion andAccommodation: Toward some Conceptual and EmpiricalLinks,” in Giles, H., Coupland, J. and Coupland, N. (Eds.),Context o f Accommodation: Deve lopments in Appl iedSociolinguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1991), pp. 270–303.1 6 Cheng, Xianghui, “The Prospect of Chinese Teaching inMacau,” Journal of Guangdong Education Institute, Vol. 3(2001), pp. 77–79, 85. [程祥徽：《澳門語文的前景展望》，載於《廣東教育學院學報》，第 3 期， 2001 年，第 77–79 、 85 頁。]
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