Overcoming cultural Barriers:Some Reflecitons on Mutual Understanding

Ramakrishna Puligandla

　　There can be no denying that Macau is the fittest place for this international conference on　East-West cultural interflow. The history of Macau in the past four centuries fully justifies our　gathering here, for during this period Macau played a central role in the acquisition and diffusion of ideas between the East, in particular, the Far East, and the West. I wish to congratulate the organizers and supporters of this conference and thank them for inviting me to　participate, along with a distinguished group of scholars seriously committed to the ideal of　promoting mutuai understanding among different cultures and traditions , thereby contributing　to global understanding, to bring about global brotherhood, peace, and harmony.
　　More people today, than ever before, travei, more frequently and with greater ease, to far　and distant places, meet and interact with different peoples from different civilizations, cultures, and traditions; and the marvels of communications-technology unfailingly and　promptly keep us informed, both auditorily and visually, about peop]e and events in vastly separated segments of the world. These facts in themselves open the door for the gradual and　eventually total elimination of bigotry, narrow-mindedness, prejudice, provincialism, ethnocentrism, cultural chauvinism, and other psychic ailments that have plagued since time　immemorial, thereby paving the way towards global brotherhood, peace, and harmony. But　this is only a promising beginning and we are yet to go a Iong way in order to attain creative　mutual understanding and therewith a world at peace and harmony. This ideal will be realized　only when we overcome certain cultural barriers, and I, as a philosopher, shall address myself　here to overcoming the intellectual obstacles, in particular the philosophicat.
　　Books, with the titles “History of Philosophy”and “lntroduction to History of Philosophy,” continue to appear in the West with no signs of abatement. I am not against anyone authoring　a history, whether of people or of ideas; rather, I am certainly against anyone pretending　(worse yet, seriously believing) that philosophy did not and does not exist anywhere else in　the world than in the west and therefore a history of Western philosophy is indeed the history　of philosophy. Am I beating a dead horse? Certain]y not, for ali those who teach and do research in non-Western and comparative philosophies in colleges and universities in the West　know full, well the condescending, and denigrating attitude of the typical Western philosopher　toward non-Western philosophies, with his firm but ignorant and incritical and wholly unexamined belief that the non-Western world does not have philosophies, at best only poetry, myth, and religion. This is a view alive and well in the West and there are few, if any, signs that　anything concerted is happening to controvert the view, correct the aberrations, and thereby　gain knowledge, clarity, and wisdom. Philosophy, according to the Western philosopher, in　its true and therefore only sense originated and continues to exist only in the West. It began with the Greeks, and no other peoples have had anything like it in this sense; that is, no other　peoples have had philosophy. Thus, according to the typical Western philosopher, it is nothing　but a joke to talk about, say, Chinese, Japanese, African, or Indian philosophy. Given this　situation, what are we to do? How are we to go about correcting this sad state of affairs? And　let me emphasize that educational institutions, such as colleges and universities, have a great　role to play in this mission, the mission of bringing about a change in the attitude of people toward philosophical and religious traditions of the non-Western world; for, after ali, changes in　society at large can only come about through changes among its educated and those who are in　charge of its educational institutions. I am not hereby denying the few changes that have taken　place in the past twenty years;thus during this period there have appeared a few - and only a　few introductions to philosophy and religion, whether anthologies or single-author texts, which　include some non-Western materiais, no matter how superficially and disjointedly. This is surely encouraging bur certainly not adequate to the task at hand. And even ir such texts are　available, where are the people willing and competent to cover these materiais in their　teaching? My answer is that there are not many, because the education and training of the　philosopher and philosophy teacher in the West are wholly confined to philosophies and religions of the Western tradition and have nothing whatsoever to do with those of non-Western　traditions. Under these circumstances, is it any wonder that the products of such education are　not only ignorant of the non -Western traditions but pick up from their equally ignorant teachers intellectual chauvinism and contempt I have alluded to earlier toward non-Western intellectual and religious traditions? I must make it perfectly clear that I am not here talking about　Western specialists in some branch or other of a non -Western tradition and comparativists; I　am talking about Western philosophers in general, who typically will not regard a Ph. D. degree, awarded for a dissertation on, say, Lao Tze or Samkara, as a degree in philosophy, but rather a degree in religion, theology, or in some broad and vague category as “Chinese　studies”, “Indian studies”, etc. Whatever the author of the dissertation may have studied and　researched in, one thing is absolutely clear:“It is not philosophy.”This brings me to the following questions' What is philosophy? What does ir mean to philosophize? By what criteria are　we to judge whether or not some work is a philosophical work whether or not someone is a　philosopher? When we examine these questions, it becomes clear that these are very difficult　questions and that we do not even have the vaguest idea as to what is to count as a criterion. Wholly lacking in agreement, the Western philosopher is very pleased to think that this is full　justification for his view that philosophy is found only in the west and nowhere else. It might　be parenthetically mentioned here that such, however, is not the case with the non-Western　philosopher, say Chinese, Japanese, or Indian; the reason for this is that, owing to several　and varied historical circumstances, such as Western colonialism, the non-Western philosopher is usually not only familiar with Western philosophy but sometimes even commands mastery and authority in some branch thereof; and what is most interesting in ali this is that the non-Western philosopher readily recognizes Western philosophy as philosophy. The factor　most responsibleforthis attitude is that the non-Western philosopher’s conception of　philosophy, no matter how vague and unarticulated, unlike his Western counterpart’s, is not　rigid and closed but fluid and open. There is something about the non-Western traditions　themselves, for example, the Chinese and Indian, which provides for the fluidity and openness　of the conception of philosophy. Thus, for example, “philosophy” is understood in Indian tradition in the Western sense of Iove of wisdom, bur rather as vision of reality (dársanas), and　to philosophize is to formulate and advance a vision of reality founded in reason and　experience, intellect and intuition. And ir is fully acknowledged there are more than one　vision, for example, the six systems (darsanas)of Indian philosophy. And the quest for the vision is at once Iove of the vision and of wisdom, for wisdom, we have been taught, unfailingly accompanies the attainment and realization of the vision. In this manner, the Western conception of philosophy is most naturally included in and is fully compatible with and necessary　consequence of the Indian conception of philosophy as vision. And I might mention here that　the Chinese tradition is not lacking in schools of philosophy. And the Chinese philosopher, like　the Indian philosopher, has no difficulty in acknowledging Western philosophy as philosophy, It　is worth noting here that even within the Westem tradition itself there is the question as to　what philosophy is. Does a Western philosopher consider philosopical the works of Plato, Augustine, Plotinus as well as those of Aquinas, Deacartes and Kant? Is there something common to ali these works that qualifies them ali to be considered philosophical works? Think of　the question, and you will see the point. Nor would it for someone to say philosophical works　are those found in shelves labelled “philosophy” in a library; for this leaves ir to the library　catalog-makers to declare what is and is nota philosophical work, and I am not interested in　the librarian’s classification but rather the classification by a philosopher. By the way, it is not　uncommon to find, especially in a public library, Emerson’s works in the philosophy shelves. Is　Emerson a philosopher, according to the Western philosopher? I have heard many a Western　philosopher proclaim that Emerson is nota philosopher bur an essayist and poet; but I have also　known some, yes, very few, Western philosophers who regard Emerson as also a philosopher. What, then, is Emerson really? An essayist anda poet, a philosopher, or ali three? The point　of all these observations is that even within the Western tradition itself there is no clearly articulated and fully agreed upon conception of philosophy. Ir this is the case within tradition　itself, then one can see how much more complicated the matter becomes across traditions. How, then, are we to go about determining what and what is not philosophy?
　　What all the above observations unmistakably point to is that it is a serious error to Iook for　a clear and crisp definition (characterization) of “philosophy,” for ir is simply not possible to　formulate such a definition and laboring under the illusion that there is such a definition, of　course one’s own, as exemplified by the Western tradition, has grave consequences. The　Western conception of philosophy is roo narrow to be useful in classifying even some of the Western works themselves; and, worse yet, of arbitrarily ignores, excludes, and belittles　great works of other traditions by dismissing them as non-philosophical, and the resu[t is a　narrow, distorted, and truncated vision man and the world. According to the Western　conception, philosophy consists of formulating and advancing theses in some area or of　inquiry, such as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, Iogic, etc., and defending them by　arguments, that is, in the format of premises, deduction, and conclusions. Let me emphasize　here that formu]ating, defending, and refuting arguments is at the very heart of this conception　of phi[osophy; and it follows that where there are no arguments, as understood in the Western　sense, there can be no philosophy, either. Armed with absurd and uncritical and rigid and dogmatic conception of philosophy, one cavalierly declares that Chinese do not have philosophy, the Indians do not have philosophy, and gleefu[ly indulges in self-aggrandizing and other-deprecating slogans. But is it true that one does not find arguments in works of their own traditions　regarded by Chinese and Indians as philosophical. It is simply not true, for not only are there　arguments, disputations, and dialectic but whole schools of philosophy whose major inquiries　and contributions are in Iogic and dialectics, for example, the Nyāya and Madhyamaka　schools, respectively, of Indian philosophy. The same is true, to a lesser degree, of the Chinese tradition. Thus the view of the Western philosopher that non-Western thought is devoid　of reason, logic, argument, and dialectic is founded in blissful ignorance, the ānanda of　avidyā. The reason that one finds logic and argument to a lesser degree in the Chinese tradition than in the Indian is the fact that the Indian philosophic thought, rooted as it is in the ancient Vedic Aryan--Indo -European --linguistic and cultural heritage, naturally shares the trait of　logic and argument with the West. The Chinese people, originating from a different linguistic　and cultural matrix, are not as much given to argument and Iogic as the Indians. Remember　what Suzuki once said, referring to some of the most abstruse Indian Buddhist treatises? We　the Japanese and the Chinese are humble people; we are not given to writing this kind of monstrous metaphysical treatises; only the Indians, like ali other Indo-European peoples, have the　gall to think that they can fathom and grasp reality through the instruments of logic and　language. What distinguishes the Chinese tradition is its profound emphasis upon and celebration of the aesthetic and the intuitive. Have your ever wondered why the ancient Chinese　translations of classic Buddhist treatises in Sanskrit are lar superior to and more faithful to the　originais than Western translations? To me, the reason is simple and obvious; faithful, authentic, and elegant translation of these works requires not only a thorough command of a　foreign language (Sanskrit) but also unusual and profound intuition, which has always been at　the very heart of the Chinese civilization. It is this facility for intuitive grasp that is the hallmark of the philosophic and religious traditions of China. Let me emphasize once again that　this does not mean that the Chinese tradition is wholly lacking in Iogic and argument; it only　means that the aesthetic and the intuitive receive greater emphasis. On this point, I cannot　recommend any better reading than Professor Kuang-ming Wu’s essay “Chinese Aesthetics” in Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots, ed. Robert E. Allinson, hereafter　briefly referred to as Chinese Mind. I am in full agreement with professor Allinson’s observation that the message Professor Wu is conveying through this essay is that “…the Chinese way　of understanding is more holistic, less divided, and more true of our nature as a whole”(Chinese Mind, p. 21).
　　We should acknowledge that the philosophy of any tradition, whether Eastern or Western, is the product of its language, its culture, history, environment, etc. That is, the philosophy　of any people has a history; it is a historical phenomenon. To forget this is the gravest of　errors. A large number of factors influence the substance, style, and form of the philosophy of　any people. And it is an equally serious error to try to understand the philosophy of a different　tradition by imposing upon it modes of understanding of one’s own tradition. This is to say that　Westemers should try to understand Chinese works, including works of art, the way the Chinese understand; similarly, the Chinese should endeavor to understand Western works the way　Westerners understand. This is not easy but requires open-mindedness, patience, willingness, and the excitement and enjoyment of learning new ways which will enrich and complement　one’s own way of seeing and experiencing the world. This is not to be mistaken for a recommendation that we Westernize the non-Western mind or non-Westernize the Western; rather, the goal should be to sympathetically cultivate and harmoniously and creatively blend both in　each of us, Westerners and non-Westerners alike. Professor Allinson sums up this point best, when he writes, “Understanding the Chinese mind may take many different forms. We may　see what is uniquely Chinese through Western eyes; we may see what is Chinese by altering　our Western concept of what is the object of our understanding; we may see what is Chinese　by altering our mode of understanding itself; we may adopta way of understanding that is neither Western nor Chinese but is a hybrid way of understanding which is both Western and　Chinese, and is, therefore, something much more”(Chinese Mind, p. 23). Mutatis mutandis, these remarks equally hold for non-Westerners, whether Chinese, Indians, Japanese, etc.
　　As has been mentioned earlier, non -Western thinkers, owing to several historical-political　circumstances, have been more successful in learning to see and understand things through　Westem eyes than Western thinkers through non-Western eyes. There are many distinguished　Chinese, Japanese, and Indian scholars who are perfectly at home with the Western modes of　understanding, as is evident from their masterly treatment of topics in Western philosophy and　religion through the medium of Western languages, such as English, German, French, and so　on. Such, however, is not the case with Western intellectuals, philosophers or otherwise. Is　this so because non-Western ideas were not available to the Western thinker until recently? No, non-Western ideas were making their way into the West for several centuries now. “Long　before the famous journey of Marco Polo (1271-1295), the ideas of the ‘Far East’were familiar to the Moslem philosopher, Averroes ( 1126-1198)and Spanish Rabbi Maimonides ( 11351204). With the appearance of Christian missionaries, Europe’s knowledge of Buddhism began a slow but persisting flow which has greatly accelerated in our time”(Nolan p. Jacobson, Understanding Buddhism, p. 150). Leibniz wrote an essay (14,000 words)on the “Natural Theology ofthe Chinese.”And there is a ring of Jungian synchronocity to my noting here that Father Matteo Ricci’s establishment of the Jesuit mission in 1583 in Macau played the key role in　the transmission of ideas of the Chinese tradition to Europe. As a result of the Jesuit reports, published in Paris in 1600, Pierre Bayle (1647-1706)published his comments on “a set of the　Chinese.”Bayle was totally baffled ar the Buddhist concept of Emptiness (Sùnyatā); he called　it “the incomprehensible notion of nothingness, the real nothingness which has properties of　sensible matter”(Pierre Bayle, Historical and Criticai Dictionary, tr. R. H. Popkin, 290-94). There is no need to mention that Bayle was roo entrenched in the Western modes of thought to　make any sense of this profound Buddhist notion. And we know that the Pope overruled Fr. Ricci’s observation that “basic beliefs of Chinese and the Christians were compatible, and　that differences could ali be accommodated in the China Christian Mission” (Understanding　Buddhism, p. 152). And we also know that the German philosopher Christian Wolff had to　leave Halle, even ir temporarily, for saying in a lecture in 1721 that morality of the Chinese is　not inferior to but on a par with the christian. And it is known among scholary circles that　Hume and Adam Smith were familiar with some Chinese-Buddhist ideas through their friendship　with Francois Quesnay, whose own familiarity with and knowledge of these ideas are due to　direct and personal contacts with the Chinese. The most significant result of these contacts is　the realization on the part of Quesnay and Hume that, contrary to the Western view since　Plato, virtue can be taught and that this idea always reigned supreme in the Chinese　civilization. I do not wish to bore you any more with information like this. I only wish to emphasize that the starting point for developing mutuai understanding and creatively benefitting　therefrom is the recognition and acknowledgement that we are ali human beings and ali belong　to the one world and, more than ever before, our very survival depends on our shedding of　age old and destructive prejudices, dogmas, and complexes that have kept us divided thus lar. As Joseph Needham prophetically said as Iong as four decades ago, “For better or worse, the　die is now cast, the world is one. The world has to live with his fellow-citizens, at the ever　narrowing range of the aerofoil and the radio wave. We are living in the dawn of new　universalism, which, ir mankind survives the dangers attendant on control by irresponsible men　of sources of power hitherto unimaginable, will unite the working peoples of ali races in a　community both catholic and cooperative. No people or group of peoples has had a monopoly　in contributing to the development of science. Their achievements should be mutually recognized and free[y celebrated with the joined hands of universal brotherhood”(Science and Civilization in China, Vol. I. p.9).
　　There can be no better and more fitting manner to conclude this essay than with the wise and　eloquent words of my dear friend, the late professor Nolan Jacobson:“In the ‘space age,’we　need physicists exploring new sources of energy and biologists deciphering the genetic code, but more than anything we need philosophers participating in cross-cultural discussions, elaborating new options which reason can appeal, penetrating the great cloudbank of ancestral　blindness that weighs upon us ali. We need philosophers whose powers of analysis are stronger　than their conceptual commitments, who encourage their fellow-creatures to stop thinking of　conceptual systems as life jackets in a swirling sea, and who live each day with the fear that in　their most careful reflections they may find their intellect bewitched by the encapsulated cultures and linguistic systems of the past ... It is difficult to see how philosophers could continue　in their cultural cubicle to analyze the ancestral language or seek to rethink the thoughts of　Kant or Hume when their daily involvements, recognized or not, have become part of a community unlimited in scope, a community that needs ali the help it can get in learning how to be　self-corrective and more fully aware. Philosophers who are faithful to their own individualized　experience will always disagree too much to tell others what to believe, but they constitute　nonetheless the point in an advancing humanity where new values and alternate life styles must　be assessed. This is their contribution to the survival of our living world” (Understanding　Buddhism, pp. 161-63).
　　Let us therefore be inspired to join together and learn from each other to expand and enlarge　our conception of philosophy through which to attain a larger, richer, and auspicious vision of　the world.

　　①Robert E. Allinson, ed., Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosphical Roots, Oxford University Press,1989.
　　②Nolan P. Jacobson, Understanding Buddhism, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbonda]e, Illinois, 1986.
　　③Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vois . I & II, Cambridge University Press, 1954, 1956.
　　④P. T. Raju, Introduction to Cornparative Philosophy, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1962.