TRIAD RELATED CRIMES THEIR PREVENTION AND TYPES OF ACTION - MACAU**
*António Marques Baptista
This work is dedicated for those who strive for a just world and for the generosity and hard working Macau population, who fight, with courage and determination to achieve this aim.A.E.M.B.
Ⅰ INTRODUCTION
This document meant to be delivered at a specialized seminar and submitted, for appreciation, to some of the most notorious world experts in the field of research on issues that directly concern the activities of organized crime in SouthEast Asia, particularly the ones that stand rooted to the Chinese continent, such as their structures, strength, definition of the extent of threats that they pose. Hence,an attempt was made to characterize in general terms, the present situation in Macau and how it affects the region where Macau fits in.
Considering the consistent view that has been held, regarding the important role that this type of meetings may play in the future of enforcement, and we trust this would only be effective if there is an international concerted efforts visà-vis operational matters, by analogy with the transnational aspect of the criminal activities per se, efforts were also made to pass on the knowledge that the author has been able to build up, by virtue of his professional experience.
That experience is based on the complex duty shouldered by the Directorate of a Criminal Investigation Police (Judiciary Police), with the main (but not exclusive) task, in the specific case of Macau, to fight against Triad Societies, locally known as "Seitas".
The definition of the general objectives of the investigation's strategy should come first. To achieve this, law enforcement agencies should be provided with resources, as to enable them distinguishing the phenomena related to the so called conventional crime and those that resulted from an organized structure, without prejudice to the overall performance of a police institution.
These days, there is a consensus amongst law enforcement agencies throughout the world, tasked to handle issues related to organized crime, that instead of channeling efforts into the analysis of the phenomena, through case by case interpretation of the incidents, the analytical efforts should be centered on the activity of every structures of the organized crime,in order to characterize them.
ⅡTHE MOST ACTIVE TRIADS IN MACAU:RECENT PAST
The two years prior to the reversion of Hong Kong's sovereignty was marked by an increase of activities carried out by Macau based triad societies, affecting several areas of Macau's politics, economics and social layers.
That had happened, amid fears that the enforcement that the authorities stepped up against Hong Kong based triad societies, - aiming at keeping the desired peaceful environment during the transitional period, and for the success of Chinese politics during times immediately after the hand-over of sovereignty, might drive the powerful organized crime groups, established there, to try finding a space in Macau Casinos to develop their own activities. These activities have long been under the control of their Macau counterparts, particularly the "14K" and "Soi Fong" triads. Although smaller, there are also other triads, which must not be underestimated. They are the "Big Circle" and "Seng I" which, in the recent past,had made ad hoc agreements with the "14K" and "Soi Fong" and maintained a privileged relationships with them, particularly with 14K.
Effectively, the organized crime groupsthat had their 'territory' more or less defined in Macau Casinos had taken measure towards preventing an eventual attempt of the Hong Kong based organized crime groups to settle in.Otherwise, the end result could have been a decline of profits,earned from parallel activities that they (local triads) had developed, as well as the decline in their influence in Macau's social and economics layers.
The strategy that they followed in 1995,resumed in the establishment of the "Associação Macau Quatro Pacíficos" or "Sei Lun" (comprised by "14K", "Soi Fong", "Big Circle" and "Seng I"). It meant to promote the convergence of interests among the different groups, visà-vis the setting up a super-structure, both in financial and operational areas. This was to enable them facing threats posed by Hong Kong triads and, at the same time,to grant them a supremacy in the parallel structure of Macau's gaming industry,beyond the reversion of Macau's sovereignty.
However, the protagonist behavior of the leaders of those triads and their most direct and active aids was, per se, a revealing sign of disagreements embodied in such initiative, which resulted in Soi Fong's withdrawal from the association.
Soon after the Soi Fong's withdrawal,it became evident that the "14K"- Macau,was trying to play the dominant role. At that point of time, the "14K" had a powerful contact network in Macau's surrounding regions, particularly in Canton Province. This fact, coupled with others, gave it the sense of impunity,which, in turn, caused the wave of violence witnessed in the Territory.
According to the intelligence provided by the "Public Security Bureau of Guangdong Province (PSBGP), it has been long since prominent members of Guangdong's organized crime groups maintained close contacts with Macau triads, especially "14K"and "Soi Fong".
Still according to the same source,during the period that preceded the reversion of Hong Kong sovereignty, the activities of those triads had increased in Guangdong Province. Predominantly,there was a drive to recruit primary and secondary students, in order to set up several groups, with the view to expand triad activities from Macau to Guangdong.
At the same time, notorious personalities of the "14K", intended to expand their influence into the Territory's political institutions. This was manifested through the support they gave to certain electoral lists of candidates running for seats in the Legislative Assembly, in 1996' elections.
That was the last election held under the Portuguese Administration and its term of legislature goes beyond 1999. In this context, it was noticed that personalities with considerable financial means and strong business interest were amongst the candidates.
It was observed, then, that some of the protagonists, who are known to be prominent underground personalities in Macau, some of whom directly or indirectly involved in the parallel exploitation of the gaming industry,attempted to gain access to the political apparatus. The motive was the hand-over of Macau to the People's Republic of China.
Owing to the increasing protagonist role played by triad leaders, chiefly by those of the "14K" and "Soi Fong", during the period immediately before Hong Kong's hand-over, the years of 1996 and 1997 (as mentioned) were markedly prone for a significant increase in triad related crimes.These were loansharking, illegal imprisonment, extortion, homicide, bomb attacks, assaults, etc.
That increase was due to the raising conflicts between the "14K" and "Soi Fong", immediate after the latest had pulled out from "Sei Lun" (this name had since changed to "Sam Lun"). Those disputes were over the control of gambling spaces inside Macau Casinos.
On the other hand, the situation of the Chinese economy dictated a fall in Economic Growth. This had an impact on revenues from gambling and, necessarily,the profits related to triad activities also fell, paving the way for disputes to erupt between triads.
The conflicts between triads got to a stage that even the patronage of the gaming industry was affected, gradually, those conflicts scared away people, who normally travel from abroad to gamble in Macau.
The fact that the "Soi Fong" was no longer part of that deal with the other groups, had allowed the leadership of the"14K" to strengthened their position inside "Associação Macau Três Pacíficos" ("Sam Lun"). Hence, in that scenario of violence that Macau had witnessed, they managed to improve the performance capabilities of the groups, which they control.
During 1996 and 1997, there were increases in cases of trafficking in firearms to Macau, as well as adding and abetting illegal immigrants. The organized crime groups recruited people amongst those illegal immigrants, to take up assignments in the "Associação Três Pacíficos" ("Sam Lun").
Cases of homicide, attacks with genuine firearms, assault and arson also rose considerably. These are the types of crimes known to be associated with disputes between triad gangs.
Chiefly, the sense of impunity often revealed by the most notorious Macau's triad leaders, markedly by those of the "14K", was the reason for the increase of the wave of violence.
In order to consolidate the boundaries of their activities, due to the possible invasion of Hong Kong based triads, and to attempt defining the correlation of forces to be established after 1999, they resorted to a constraining strategy to degrade police performance. This resulted in a general feeling of insecurity amongst Macau residents.
In this regard, local and international media played their part. It seemed that one of the aims of the international media was to spread the news of an alleged incapacity ofthe local authorities to deal with the problem.
Some sectors ofthe Chinese media and the media in Hong Kong, with clear connections with the interest of Hong Kong organized crime groups, sensationally exploited the incidents occurred in Macau in 1996/1997.
Those media reports on Macau's crime situation were subsequently exploited by several institutions abroad, in such a way,that the blame would fall onto their Macau counterparts and the Portuguese Administration.
In this regard, the leadership of some triads, namely leaders of "14K", took a clear advantage ofthe media. One of them carne out to publicize his protagonist role in the world of the organized crime in Macau and, simultaneously, tried to launder his public image. For this purpose, he put his influence into action, as well as his considerable means, in order to manipulate the media.
Afterwards, the way was paved, allowing the "14K" - Macau, to exercise a quasi-absolute control of subsidiary activities related to organized crime. From there, a change in the correlation of forces might have taken place. The other active groups in Macau were never aware of it before.
It was after the "14K" had secured the hegemony, that several attacks in Macau were planned and executed. Their target were personalities closed to the Portuguese Administration: LieutenantColonel Manuel Apolinário, Director of Gaming Supervisory and Coordinating Department, His Worship Lourenço Nogueiro, -Attorney ofthe Republic and the Director of the Judiciary Police of Macau fell victims of attempted murder.
The recourse to this terrorist style of attacks, was the kind of violence that Macau never witnessed before, in the context of actions commonly perpetrated by organized crime groups. With those attacks, they would have meant, not only to uphold a leading position of strength with regard to other active groups in Macau, but also to dissuade local authorities from taking any kind of enforcement against that group.
ⅢTHE NEW ORDER OF THE ORGAN-IZED CRIME IN MACAU
Although the enforcement against organized crime was methodically devised toward achieving palpable results, today's reality in Macau is such that, there are several obstacles barring Police attempts to weaken the response capability and adaptability of criminal structures.
In spite of the fact that Macau triads have a considerable number of followers,they also uphold a high level of inner cohesion, which have much to do with cultural and civilization issues, rather then the emerging criminal phenomena, in its strict sense.
Thus, in spite of the fact that those organized crime groups of Chinese origin had virtually broken away from their roots,be it with regards to principals and objectives or structural settings, the active triads in Macau still keep some of the traditional codes of conduct in place. In most cases, those code set out principals,such us secrecy, honor and revenge, and these are the elements that obstruct police investigation. On the other hand, the organic structure of the groups and the exhaustive hierarchy in the classification of tasks, make them capable of achieving a considerable rate of efficiency towards their criminal goals.
Some experts in highly organized crime do not hesitate in emphasizing that, it's far more difficult to deal with the Chinese triads than the Russian Mafia or any other type of organized crime groups.The reason being, that the Chinese triads exercises an effective control within the group and the involving society. To a grate extent, the constant recourse to extortion and criminal intimidation provides for a life term binding among a person, his/her folk and the organization.
On the other, the fact that part of the Chinese society hold a negative view on Police actions, by associating them with alleged practice of torture and/or alleged suppression of individual rights, makes it difficult for the Judicial and Police authorities to attain co-operation from the Chinese communities. This includes those communities that are settled incountries or territories guided by principles of democratic societies.
As a matter of fact, the detention of a triad leader does not necessarily shakes the drive of any triad towards its ascension and dominion. The alleged leader of the "14K" in Macau was arrested.Nevertheless, this particular society managed to keep up with its high profíle,as far as the rates of success of its activities were concerned. After all, this did not come as a surprise if one takes into account their leadership structure, based on huge financial interests and coupled by cultural and political realities that were previously mention, as substratum.
Nevertheless, that detention forced out the leadership question of the Association in point, as well as the dynamism inherent to its activities. That detention also had an impact on other active organized crime groups in Macau. With confidence, we may say that new signs are emerging,changes in the leadership structure of different groups and their Modus Operandi.
During the second half of 1998, the following changes in the organizations' top hierarchy were depicted:
□ As the need to rearrange the role of its alleged leader, who is now on remand,arose, the "14K" activities became under the command of the (alleged) leader's trustworthy acquaintances, who ensured the continuity of his role.
This was indeed achieved due to two main circumstances.
The first one has to do with a support network,which was set up beforehand, with grips inside the Penitentiary. This maneuvering space that was made available to the "leader",allowed him to keep in touch with the outside, thus ensured the continuity of his commanding role. In this regard, the contacts were secured via telephone and paging system as well as messages slipped out by visitors.
It ought to be said that, a considerable number ofthe "14K's" members are also on remand in the same Penitentiary and they make up the group of"heavies" that coerces and intimidates others, including prison officers. From this scenario, one has to say that the vulnerability of the prison system is evident.
Secondly, the "14K" has an operational group capable of taking over (without prejudice to the internal equilibrium) the task of carrying on with the aims of the organization. In this regard, the role played by one particular person who, for long, had earned the trust ofthe "leader" was vital. The person concerned is known for his extraordinary planning capabilities and he was the person who masterminded what were regarded as being the most important operations carried out by the "14K".
Inadvertently, some of the triad members had been employed as investigators in the Judiciary Police and the Macau Security Forces. This had allowed the triads to gain knowledge about the functioning and Modus Operandi of Police Institutions. Obviously, this situation also facilitated the triads to make significant changes on ways that they function, to include increasing of countersurveillance activities, a better preparation of attacks they have carried out, using, in most of them, sophisticated technology and more powerful explosive devices.
On the other hand, the previous selection of their targets, with the view to degrade judicial and judiciary institutions and to intimidate the authorities directly involved in the fight against organized crime, resulted from those changes made on the triads' strategies. To a certain extent, this would corroborate by the fact that, the suspected masterminds of most ofthe crimes that had been committed are either members of "14K" or connected with it by previously established pacts with other organized crime groups,namely, the "Big Circle" and "Seng I".New changes were introduced to the structure ofthe "14K", when additional members (suspected to be top brasses)of this society were arrested.
The present leadership contour of the "14K" is still not clearly established. In other words, we still have to determine the support network from the outside that grants the suspected leader (who is on remand) to hold the commanding role still. This is because there are indications that the society continues to be directed by either, a core of people who are either on remand or had left Macau to live abroad due to strategic reasons.
We know that some of potential targets of police investigation (some of that with Arrest Warrants pending against them) had for a long time absconded in countries of the region,where they relay on support networks to grant them the necessary protection.
Indeed, we have gathered intelligence indicating that those people were behind some of the attacks oc-curred in Macau.
For such operations, they recruited people from Guangdong Province, where they (especially the "14K") have a considerable maneuvering space.
At present, the Police are putting a great effort to research and follow up the activities of these individuals in Macau.Through operations that have been carried and analyses of the gathered information, it was ascertained that they are still active members of"14K" and the type of security that surrounds them make it extremely difficult for the police to carry out their task.
These security measures include changes in their routines, homes and vehicles as well as using telecommunication facilities under the names of different persons.
It ought to be emphasized that research and information gathering carried out by the law enforcement agencies, prior to the arrest of the main triad leaders in Macau, allowed us to gain a deep knowledge on areas such us:
- The structure of the different groups;
- Places where they were established;
- What their areas of influence are and
- Their support network.
That knowledge was vital for enforcement during the last three years.
At present and bearing in mind, the changes that were introduced in the different groups, especially within the "14K", the law enforcement agencies are being forced to overcome loop holes that,meanwhile, occurred in the chain of intelligence, upon which the fight against organized crime is based.
□ The enforcement in Macau during the last three years also resulted in about 160 people connected with the "Soi Fong" being arrested and forced deep changes (at least to its known pattern) in the top hierarchy of this triad society, as far the leadership was concemed.
The activities of the "Soi Fong's" leaders were closely monitored in 1998.It was then noticed that sets of motives subjacent to changes introduced to the top hierarchy were determined by two factors that emerged from political conditionalisms in Macau.
On one hand, the projection of the policy of fighting against organized crime,which the Portuguese administration was highly committed to, became, concomitantly, prominent in the political agenda of relationship between the Portuguese and Chinese States.
On the other hand, the Chinese State publicly undertook the responsibility to cooperate in the fight against organized crime. For some of the triad groups, the outcome of Big Spenders case was a clear signal ofBeijing's willingness in suppressing the confídence of those who perpetrate triad-related crimes.
In this context, the arrest ofthe "14K's" alleged leader had a decisive impact.
In March 1998, the Criminal Intelligence Unit ofthe Judiciary Police received pieces of information indicating that a radical change might take place in the "Soi Fong's" leadership structure. In other words, a new leader would probably emerge.
Effectively, following the ill faith attempt to establish the "Associação dos Quatro Pacíficos" and the arrest of the "14K's" leader, it was depicted that "Soi Fong's" chief started to play a lower profile. This was seen to be related with his alleged plan to immigrate to Canada,which appears to be one of the most preferred destinations for "Soi Fong" members since, allegedly, this triad has a strong support network there.
However, the inference from the overall analyses of the facts, known to the Police for the past few months, is that the leadership structure remains untouched,although there are signs that "Soi Fong" has new persons in-charge of their operations.
On the other hand, as a matter of strategy, the main supporters of "Soi Fong's" leadership had left Macau, as a result of police operations, something they have been counting with, and so put their efforts to set up support networks abroad.
The sudden departure of those people did not take place in compliance with any internal plan. The determining factor would have been issues related to their criminal activities.
The temporary departure of those people might have also being influenced by the approaching of the reversion of Macau's sovereignty, associated with the emerging of new protagonists in the underground as well as the uncertainty on how the Chinese authorities would deal with triad related arrests.
Indeed, the reversion of Macau's sovereignty had a decisive influence on this situation. However, there is also the problem of the new protagonists meddling in the conduct of conflict of interests surrounding the profits generated by the activities under the control of triads, having in mind, the definition of strategies for beyond 1999.
Also, in the analyses of what we called the "new order" of the organized crime in Macau, it ought to be borne in mind,the deep conflicts of interests that shall arise on the year 2001, when the exclusive franchise of the gaming industry expires and subjecte to renegotiations.
The emerging of new candidates and the rearrangement of political forces over this issue will no doubt, put tremendous pressure on parties involved. These pressures will be exerted by personalities of the underground with the view to uphold their most profitable activities inside casinos and they would also want to keep controlling their "territories".
That pressure will be even worse, if subsidiary groups of Hong Kong triads proceed with their desire in conquering new maneuvering spaces.
Simultaneously, the effects of financial crises (that are going on for too long) and the slow recovery of Macau's economyhave had direct impact on the revenue of such groups.Therefore, it shall be expected that, in a short term,they would diversify the sources of their income.
ⅣACTION
This chapter intends to deal with the guidelines of the security policy set out by Macau's Administration,in response to the increasing cases of violent crimes during 1995/1997, and the attempts of subversion and discredit of the role of institutions responsible for grating peace and security to the population.
Macau became news when the leadership ofthe "14K" embarked or a public campaign of self-promotion. Both the local and international press got carried away and wrote sensational articles, painting a gloomy picture about the security situation, and associated it with the inactivity of Security Forces and the general feeling that the triad leaders enjoyed impunity.
a) Threat to credibility of Institutions/Police Actions
As mentioned before, the stand that the Portuguese Authorities had taken, as far as the rate of efficiency in the fight against organized crime was concerned,experienced setbacks by the end of the 80"s. The situation worsened, with the increase of activities carried out by criminal groups, as the date for the reversion of Hong Kong's sovereignty was getting closer.
It ought to be said that in the public eyes,local law enforcement agencies, especially the Judiciary Police, might not have structures strong enough to enable them embarking in efficient actions against the societies that, historically, are standing rooted to the region. And they are those societies, whose criminal spectrum spans many different areas of local and regional societies. As to the latest, the PCR and Hong Kong are known to be the main ones.
Conscious of this reality and,simultaneously, ignoring all criticisms that it became the target, the Judiciary Police started, by the end 1993, to set up its intelligence structure. The aim was to proceed with a methodic task of gathering, treating and analyzing information, in order to keep itself updated on the phenomena of organized crime and to make a global and interdisciplinary assessment of the multi facetted aspects, which are embodied in the complex process of criminal nature.
The objective of the results of the analysis form that intelligence structure was to subsidize the task of investigation departments and operational sectors, in a direct and concerted way.
On the other hand, by virtue of its nature and aims, the work developed through the said structure was strenuous, due to the versatility of the criminal reality itself.However, the strategy of the analysis,which was based upon the presupposed structural nature of the continuing progress of the same reality, did not get out of track.
With regards to response capability of the Judiciary Police in 1996, a special unit called "Operacional Group" or ("Group for Special Operations") was set up. It is tasked to provide an effective support to the department in-charge of investigative proceedings related to organize crime.Thirty (30) officers man this group, who is being receiving ad hoc training,bearing always in mind the improvement ofits operational capabilities. At this point oftime, the rate of efficiency and professionalism of this group is very high.
Simultaneously, and with regard to the last three years, the Judiciary Police took decisive measures to restructure its investigative personnel. The aim was to prevent eventual misconduct, involving investigators.
Between 1996 and 1998, as a result of those measures, several investigators were dismissed, following the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings of which they were the subjects. Some of those dismissals were related to dangerous connections with high ranked personnel of local triads.
Another step that was taken towards upgrading police performance dealt with an increase of intervention capacity ofthe law enforcement agencies, in technical and operational areas. This had resulted in an increase of preventive actions being taken in geographical areas as well as in public places for entertainment and gambling, which are, by their nature, ideal places for the triads to develop their criminal activities.
The whole dynamic that was mentioned before, with regards to activities carried out by law enforcement agencies, was backed, right from the beginning by thoseconcerned. In other words, the Executive and Legislative Assembly had strained every nerve to enact the Law of Organized Crime - Law No. 6/97/M, of 30th of July. This law revoked the Law No.1/78/M of 4th of February, which was outdated,thus unable to cope with an increasing threat that was not governed by bureaucratic formalities.
Amongst changes that were introduced since the enactment of the Law No. 6/97/M, of 30th of July, we emphasize the following:
- Special Régime - Article 5 prescribes the possibility to mitigate, substitute the punishment to one that does not compel confinement or
- Dismiss the punishment, when the defendants had tried to or did their very best to prevent a criminal association or triad society to pursue with their activities.
That special régime currently in force,foresee the possibility of being able to count with a "contribution" of a "seizure" during the course of investigations. This is a factor that may prove to be relevant in the conclusion of such investigations.
On the order hand, the Office of the Public Prosecutor, set up a special department, commonly known by N.I.C.("Núcleo de Investigação Criminal" or Nucleus of Criminal Investigation in English) which holds the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with all proceedings related to organized crime. Since the establishment of N.I.C., the law enforcement agencies benefited from a privileged interlocutor with that Office.
In 1998, a new Organic Law of the Judiciary Police came into force (DecreeLaw No. 27/98/M, of 29th of June). Article 5-g) of this Law provides that the Judiciary Police has the exclusive jurisdiction to investigate, amongst others, crimes related to organized crime or triad societies. The aim of such provision was to prevent any eventual leakage of information within the context of those crimes.
b) Results
Owing to the gathering and treatment of inexhaustible information, concerning the nature and activities of local criminal groups, the Judiciary Police launched, in April 1997, an operation that was considered to be the greatest one in Macau's memory against the triads. In that action, searches were simultaneously made on homes of the alleged triad leaders and other prominent members.
That operation forced the temporary departure from Macau, big shots from both "14K"and "Soi Fong", who sought refuge in countries in the region, special the ones that are known to be paradises that give shelter to individuals connected with criminal groups that are typically of East Asia region.
With the implementation of the new policy in the fight against organized crime, encouraged and supported by several government and judicial Institutions, it was expected that criminal groups would take several retaliatory actions. This would not come as surprise,since those groups are governed by codes of honor and revenge that are materialized, in most cases, through violent actions, normally against their pre-selected targets.
In this context several attacks were committed against individuals directly linked with the Territory's Administration.
The peak achievement of these actions occurred in 1998, when the present Director of the Judiciary Police fell victim of an attack, which was meant to eliminate him, according to what the investigation could established.
The Director of the Judiciary Police became the preferred target of triad members, since he was the "visible face" of an action carried out by the local security forces against active organized crime groups in Macau as well as their leaders.
On this issue, the Judiciary Police had revealed its response capability, which was being demanded, not only by those with authority in the Administration of Macau,but also several sections of local community, by taken immediate actions. Since then, several high-ranked members of "14K", including its alleged leader were taken to Coloane Prison ("Estabelecimento Prisional de Coloane").
During 1998, several arrest warrants were issued against other members ofthe same triad groups, who had fled Macau and are still absconding elsewhere.Alleged leaders of "Seng I" and "Big Circle" were also detained. Several actions are still being carried out to attain sufficient evidence' to support criminal proceedings currently under way, in order to indict other individuals, who had been identified by the Judiciary Police as being top ranking members of triads.
c) Policy of co-operation
The potential of criminality in Macau goes beyond its frontiers due to the expansion and ramifications that this phenomenon acquires in the international level.
Naturally, the gaming industry in Macau, one of the structural pillars of its economy, strongly attracts the presence of criminal groups, most of that have close links with associations that are established in other countries of the region.
For their turn, a reasonably sophisticated apparatus backs members of criminal organizations, capable of protecting them against actions carried out by those in authority to investigate triad related crimes, through a considerable maneuvering space, when such actions are taken.
Moreover, the relationship between criminal groups and the gaming industry in Macau, involves several forms of complicity, being the tacit knowledge of loansharking activities and procurementof gamblers (through several ways of enticement) the most prominent ones.
This situation is coupled by risks inherent to Macau's geographical peculiarity and the difficulties in controlling its land and sea boundaries,from where a considerable number of illegal immigrants cross in.
As a matter of fact, the phenomena of illegal immigrants is a hindrance to the efficiency of police performance since,very often, the investigation faces with difficulties in identifying the culprits of certain crimes, especially those committed by people recruited from certain Chinese Provinces and smuggled into Macau.
The statistics of the Office of Security Coordinator show a monthly average of 420 illegal immigrants (most of whom from the People's Republic of China)smuggled into Macau in 1997. In most of the cases they traveled in vessels and used the Inner-Harbour and OuterHarbour to land.
These phenomena caused impacts to Macau's security and economy. Thus, in the recent past years, efforts have been made towards strengthening the cooperation between our Security Forces and their counterparts in the region,namely, the authorities of Chinese Provinces and Hong Kong. Those efforts succeeded, effectively, Macau's borders were brought under a tighter control.
Strictly with regards to the co-operation with authorities of the P.R.C., we stress that it was widely developed within the sphere of the Chinese government policies that had consistently made known their eager to strengthen channels of cooperation with authorities in Macau. In terms of security, that co-operation aimed at minimizing the effectiveness of the support network that was built up over the years in Chinese Provinces in the periphery of Macau, which secured links between the triads established in the P.R.C.and those who are active in Macau.
In this context, the campaign launched against corruption (one of the guidelines of the current Chinese politics that won the approval at the 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP))succeeded. It led to a contact network that some organized groups had maintained in several structures being dismantled in the Mainland, specifically in Guangdong Province.
Concretely, the co-operation with Macau authorities resumed, first and foremost, in tightening of surveillance of borders with Guangdong Province.
During 1998, a re-enforcement of Chinese border police was stationed in strategic points at Zhuhai; to fight against the networks of illegal immigration and the infiltration of criminals, paid by Macau's active triads.
Parallel to that, in September 1998, the Police of Guangdong Province carried out an anti-crime campaign that netted 290,000 criminal suspects. Also, about 6,000 criminal gangs were dismantled,including 115 organized crime groups (figures released by the local press).
What also need to be emphasized from this co-operation are the attempts that have been made to speed up the process of exchanging information between the institutions tasked to grant security, in their specific areas.
Apart from strengthening the cooperation with the P.R.C., the Judiciary Police also adopted a similar co-operation policy with Hong Kong and other countries in the region, on matters pertaining to subsidiary activities of the organized crime.
The co-operation with other countries such us Thailand, Taiwan, Cambodia and Vietnam were intensified. This shall prove to be a step of utmost importance for the future. The reason being that, traditionally, these are the preferred destinations for criminals to abscond and to develop certain types of illicit activities with repercussions in Macau, namely, trafficking in firearms and dangerous drugs.
The situation as mention, amongst other factors, had allowed people on Police wanted list, most of who are known to be high-ranked members of the triads, to enjoy ideal conditions to be able to command, from abroad, the operations carried out by the groups that they belong to.
Bearing this scenario in mind, the actions ofthe Security Forces had met with a series of up and downs that, seriously limits the achievement of practical results in the fight against this type of criminality.In spite all of this, the Portuguese Administration in Macau, through its law enforcement agencies, has been revealing courage and determination to face a problem that, although millennial, can still be reduced to a controllable dimension.
ⅤCONCLUSION
These days, the fight against organized crime, particularly those that have their origins in the Orient, represents one of the biggest challenges to law enforcement agencies throughout the world.
They, the triads, have a ready access to sophisticated facilities, finances, and mechanism to recruit new members into the associations, which allows several groups to unlimitedly increase their manpower. They also put into action their influence on different sectors ofthe community. Summon all these up, the triad groups are mainly capable of:
- Diversifying their activities at a fast pace, and,
- Proportionally, create difficulties for the Police to deal with them.
Bearing these facts and the typology of the triads concerned in mind, it ought to be said that, law enforcement agencies must be capable to adjust themselves and keep up with the constant changes ofthe phenomena in point, in order to tackle theproblem. This would require that additional concerted efforts be made by law enforcement agencies (with the involvement of the Executive) in order to establish adequate structures and create conditions to implement (in a medium term)social values that would stop a demographic expansion in the universe of this type of associations.
The capacity to adjust that was mentioned depends on several distinguished factors that, if only combined, would lead to successes in this field of action.
Therefore:
□ Social awareness -Today's society has an image of triad members and their leaders as being powerful and quasi-impunity.This image is directly associated with personal power and means oftriad members which, quite often, are used in subversive and ostensive ways.
It is essential to find ways to change these values, especially amongst the youths.
Within the sphere of police actions,what shall be considered to be contributions towards that end would be the exposure of practical results of the investigation, as to cause the dismantling of particular groups and the arrest of their members and leaders. The media should be used to propagate the "Police phenomena" of such successes.
Knowing beforehand, that such strategy has never been a priority for the Police,I trust that, in future, this might play an important role towards changing attitudes amongst the youngest within Chinese communities.
Parallel to that, I think that the authorities shall, as a matter of priority, make an assessment of triads' rituals within the youngest layer of the society.
□ Joining efforts -At present, Police face demands, particularly from the general public, to produce result in a short period of time, claiming higher levels of security in the society that they live in.
Law enforcement agencies shall be obliged to develop structures, which,parallel to the immediate response, inherent to their responsibilities, would allow them to carry out an objective analysis of the diversity of criminal phenomena that surround them. This would facilitate law enforcement institutions to understand criminal manifestations that are most consistent with the global context of criminal reality.
Obviously, crime phenomena embodied complex structures, which, in physical terms, are difficult to restrict them within limits; they are spread over specific geographical areas, involving different countries and regions. Hence, the analysis of the phenomena turns out to be difficult. As such, if we were to succeed in dealing with them, in a medium term, an effective co-operation amongst all law enforcement agencies must be in place.
This co-operation, which has, as starting-point, the establishment of channels to exchange intelligence, shall have, as its final aim, the execution of joint or simultaneous operations, capable of dismantling operational structures or the financing of organized crime groups.
This aim though difficult to achieve,due to the complexity of means that are involved and its obvious slowness to get on with the execution shall, nevertheless,govern the aims of future police actions.
Finally, we shall all be conscious that the fight against these types of associations must be an ongoing effort,considering that they are around for centuries and stand rooted in the social layers of the Far East. One must not expect that they will somehow vanish,but rather count with new associations of the kind to be established. Therefore,it is the task of the law enforcement agencies to exercise an effective control on the existing associations with the view to minimize, as far as possible, the "power" and impact of such groups on the security of our societies.
1 As far as Macau is concerned,the importation of criminality normally results in a poor rate of efficiency,as far as identification of culprits of certain crimes is concerned. However,in most cases,the masterminds have been identified in informative terms.Thus,the Judiciary Police are continuing with its attempts to gather sufficient evidence that would allow developing investigation proceedings towards success.
* Director of the Judiciary Police of Macau.
** Speech presented at Beijing Law and Politics Sciencs University (Zheng Fa) PRC, with organized crime specialists from Russia, USA,Japan, Hong Kong, PRC, Taiwan and Macau, 12th and 13th June, 1999.
